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Abstract 
 
This dissertation combines an interest in political economy, political theory 
and cinema to offer an answer about the pace of the Hollywood film business and its 
general modes of behaviour. More specifically, this dissertation seeks to find out 
how the largest Hollywood firms attempt to control social creativity such that the 
art of filmmaking and its related social relations under capitalism do not become 
financial risks in the pursuit of profit. Controlling the ways people make or watch 
films, the thesis argues, is an institutional facet of capitalist power.  Capitalist 
power—the ability to control, modify and, sometimes, limit social creation through 
the rights of ownership—is the foundation of capital accumulation. For the 
Hollywood film business, capitalist power is about the ability of business concerns 
to set the terms that mould the future of cinema.  
The overall objective of Part I is to outline and rectify some of the 
methodological problems that obscure our understanding of how capital is 
accumulated from culture. Marxism stands as the theoretical foil for this argument. 
Because Marxism defines capital such that only economic activity can create value, it 
needs to clearly distinguish between economics and politics—yet this is a 
distinction it is ultimately unable to make. With this backdrop in mind, Part I 
introduces the capital-as-power approach and uses it as a foundation to an 
alternative political economic theory of capitalism. The capital-as-power approach 
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views capital not as an economic category, but as a category of power. Consequently, 
this approach reframes the accumulation of capital as a power process.  
Part II focuses on the Hollywood film business. It investigates how and to 
what extent major filmed entertainment attempts to accumulate capital by lowering 
its risk. The process of lowering risk—and the central role of capitalist power in this 
process—has characterized Hollywood’s orientation toward the social-historical 
character of cinema and mass culture. This push to lower risk has been most 
apparent since the 1980s. In recent decades, major filmed entertainment has used 
its oligopolistic control of distribution to institute an order of cinema based on 
several key strategies: saturation booking, blockbuster cinema and high-concept 
filmmaking. 
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Introduction 
 
 In Budd Schulberg’s novel What Makes Sammy Run? the protagonist, Al 
Manheim, becomes obsessed with trying to understand the behaviour of Sammy 
Glick, his work colleague and pseudo-friend. Manheim first becomes puzzled when 
he notices that Sammy never really walks anywhere—he literally runs from spot to 
spot. Sammy’s general mode of behaviour is also much like that of a driver who is 
willing to run over anything in his way. And when Sammy runs over other people in 
his pursuit of success, he does not slow down to look behind him.  
 A flabbergasted Manheim witnesses Sammy Glick successfully lie, sweet-talk, 
bullshit, backstab and plagiarize his way up the ranks, first as a journalist in New 
York and then as a screenwriter in Hollywood. While also working in Hollywood, 
Manheim comes to realize that the film business might be better suited for the 
Sammy Glicks of the world—even if Sammy, the individual, is rather exceptional. 
Although Manheim is older and wiser than Sammy, and although he actually writes 
his own screenplay assignments, he can’t seem to synchronize himself with the pace 
of the Hollywood “Dream Factory.”  
 And why not? If Manheim cannot keep pace with a capitalist institution like 
the Hollywood film business, what makes Hollywood run? What does Hollywood 
want and what are its strategies to achieve its goals? 
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General Overview 
 
 This dissertation combines an interest in political economy, political theory 
and cinema to offer an answer about the pace of the Hollywood film business and its 
general modes of behaviour. More specifically, this dissertation seeks to find out 
how the largest Hollywood firms attempt to control social creativity such that the 
art of filmmaking and its related social relations under capitalism do not become 
financial risks in the pursuit of profit. 
 Controlling the ways people make or watch films, the thesis argues, is an 
institutional facet of capitalist power.  Capitalist power—the ability to control, 
modify and, sometimes, limit social creation through the rights of ownership—is the 
foundation of capital accumulation. For the Hollywood film business, capitalist 
power is about the ability of business concerns to set the terms that mould the 
future of cinema. For the major film distributors, these terms include the types of 
films that will be distributed, the number of films that will be distributed, and the 
cinematic alternatives that will be made available to the individual moviegoer. 
 Parts of the dissertation substantiate this thesis with empirical research on 
the financial performance of major filmed entertainment, which is our term for what 
have been, historically, the six largest business interests in Hollywood—Columbia, 
Disney, Paramount, Twentieth Century Fox, Universal and Warner Bros. Other parts 
of the dissertation, including all of Part I, develop the theoretical framework that 
will frame the empirical research and the conceptual arguments of this project.  
A detailed presentation of our theoretical framework is crucial. Most 
analyses of mass culture and Hollywood cinema are undermined by one of the 
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cardinal assumptions of mainstream political economy—that politics and economics 
are, ultimately, analytically separate. Economics and politics are usually separated 
analytically because of a desire to delimit and isolate a specific dimension for study, 
but this separation begets mismatches and confusions about the very essence of 
capitalist society. It generates a dualist methodology that has trouble explaining 
how a set of concepts for capitalist production (economics) does or does not relate 
to another set for ideology, power and authority (politics). 
 In order to offer insights into how various social elements of cinema come 
under the same heel of control and capital accumulation, this dissertation makes use 
of the capital-as-power approach, which was first developed by Jonathan Nitzan and 
Shimshon Bichler. In support of this political economic approach, the reader will 
also find references to the works of Friedrich Pollock, Franz Neumann, Herbert 
Marcuse, Theodor Adorno, Cornelius Castoriadis and Thorstein Veblen. This unique 
theoretical constellation of political economy and contemporary political theory 
produces an alternative method through which one can analyze the capitalist 
character of Hollywood cinema. It shows that the so-called “non-economic” 
elements of mass culture have a direct bearing on the accumulation of capital 
because the latter is not an economic magnitude to start with. Capital does not 
measure utility or socially necessary abstract labour time. Rather, capital is a 
quantitative, symbolic expression of organized power over society; it is a measure of 
the ability of capitalists in general and dominant capitalists in particular to 
strategically sabotage social relations for the purposes of pecuniary gain. 
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 Much of this project’s historical and empirical research seeks to demonstrate 
that Hollywood’s dominant firms have a very specific orientation to the aesthetic 
potential of cinema. Like other firms, major filmed entertainment obeys the 
forward-looking logic of capitalization, the discounting of expected future earnings 
to present prices. Consequently, these firms value films as income-generating assets. 
However, the price of a film depends on what is happening in the world of cinema, 
mass culture and, indeed, society at large. Thus, major filmed entertainment 
capitalizes its films according to how social dimensions of culture might affect 
earning potential.  
 The overall logic of capitalization can be broken down further into primary 
components. One of these components is risk. In the capital-as-power approach, risk 
concerns the degree of confidence capitalists have in their own expectations. In our 
study of Hollywood, we find that risk relates to Hollywood’s reluctance to let the 
world of cinema grow and evolve without limits instituted “from above.” Thus, the 
control of creativity is motivated by a business concern to mitigate the risk of 
aesthetic overproduction. Aesthetic overproduction is not about the cultural or 
political value of cinema, but about the risk such overproduction poses to cinema’s 
earning potential. In fact, the degree of confidence in the expected future earnings of 
Hollywood cinema tends to increase when the industrial art of filmmaking and the 
social world of mass culture are ordered by capitalist power. In this cultural 
environment—which we will describe as an order of cinema—limitations are 
imposed on what cinema can or cannot do, an imposition which in turn allows for 
the financial trajectory of film projects to become more predictable for those who 
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have a vested interest in future streams of earnings. Indeed, risk perceptions and, 
more generally, the logic of capitalization demand that assessments of a film’s social 
significance be translated, with a degree of confidence, into quantitative 
expectations about the film’s future income. 
 
Outline of Part I 
 
 The overall objective of Part I is to outline and rectify some of the 
methodological problems that obscure our understanding of how capital is 
accumulated from culture. In a world in which businesses, both large and small, and 
even individuals, explicitly attempt to produce culture for profit, the capitalist ethos 
of modern culture is obvious. However, political economic theories of value are 
designed to go “further” than the obvious and explain what, beyond the appearances 
of prices, is getting accumulated. Is it utility? Is it the exploited labour time of 
workers? Is it something else? Notwithstanding particular differences between 
schools of thought, it is common practice to build a concept of capital on the 
assumption that economic and political activity are distinguishable because 
economic value is, essentially, a measure of productivity. 
 Part I identifies key assumptions about economic value that create 
theoretical problems for the analysis of the political economy of mass culture. 
Marxism stands as the theoretical foil for this argument. Because Marxism defines 
capital such that only economic activity can create value, it needs to clearly 
distinguish between economics and politics—yet this is a distinction it is ultimately 
unable to make. Unfortunately, it runs into the same methodological problem from 
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two different angles. First, it incorporates politics and institutional power into its 
theory of capital accumulation yet simultaneously assumes that the quantities of 
accumulated capital never measure organized power. Second, it separates politics 
and economics by articulating a concept of capital that is about the productivity of 
labour.  
 With this backdrop in mind, Part I introduces the capital-as-power approach 
and uses it as a foundation to an alternative political economic theory of capitalism. 
The capital-as-power approach views capital not as an economic category, but as a 
category of power. Consequently, this approach reframes the accumulation of 
capital as a power process. Our particular path to the capital-as-power approach is 
influenced by the Frankfurt School, whose members began to rethink the role of 
political power and the economics-politics separation in the age of monopolies, 
concentrated ownership and automated technology. The capital-as-power approach 
goes further with respect to the definition of capital: it argues that the quantities of 
capital are symbolic expressions of organized power over society. 
 Chapter 1 demonstrates that the economics-politics separation needs to be 
reconsidered and that capital accumulation needs to be reframed. After explaining 
how the economics-politics separation creates problems for the definition of capital, 
this chapter examines the works of three thinkers of the Frankfurt School: Pollock, 
Neumann and Marcuse. Each of these thinkers helps illustrate that the solution to 
the politics-economics problem lies in a reconceptualization of capitalist power. 
Moreover, their writings demonstrate why Marxism cannot retain its economic 
assumptions about capital and overcome the economics-politics problem. On the 
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one hand, the Frankfurt School’s arguments for the dialectical study of a capitalist 
totality inspire us to understand processes of accumulation, ideology and power 
holistically. However, holistic Marxist approaches still require an unhelpful split 
between capital and power, regardless of any intention to reject the base-
superstructure model of classical Marxism. Marxism must keep making this split 
between capital and power because it is the only way for its definition of capital to 
privilege the productivity of labour in the capitalist pursuit of profit. 
 Chapter 2 looks at Marxist economics more closely. This chapter 
demonstrates why the Marxist assumption about the nature of economic value has, 
when applied to mass culture, little explanatory power. In general, we cannot 
objectively measure the magnitudes of the Marxist concept of capital. And since this 
shortcoming is general, Marxist theories of culture have no solid basis from which to 
assume that socially necessary abstract labour time is the unit of value that 
underpins the heterogeneous appearances of cultural commodities, prices and 
profit. Moreover, since the labour theory of value lies at the root of the Marxist 
method, it is difficult to see how this methodological problem could be solved when 
some cultural theorists include the desires and attitudes of consumers in a broader 
concept of productive valorization.  
 Chapter 3 develops a more comprehensive concept of capitalist power by 
putting power at the heart of capital accumulation. First, the writings of Garnham, 
Babe, Adorno and Marcuse act as precedents for thinking about the political 
economy of mass culture from the viewpoint of institutional power. Second, Veblen 
and the capital-as-power approach both argue that organized, institutionalized 
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power is the essence of business enterprise and the financial logic of capitalization. 
The capital-as-power approach is particularly useful because it breaks the 
separation of politics and economics before it builds a theory of institutionalized 
power in capitalism. Thus, we can use this approach to study the power processes 
that other studies of mass culture have noticed as well, but in a manner that avoids 
treating value as a so-called “real” magnitude of economic production.  
For example, by greatly relying on subjectivity, desire and matters of taste 
and pleasure, the business of mass culture is filled with many qualitative, social 
aspects. The capital-as-power approach does not pretend otherwise. Rather, it 
claims that the control of culture is capitalized, which only means that capitalists 
incorporate the qualitative aspects of culture into their future expectations 
regarding streams of earnings. In other words, culture is produced and consumed, 
but this production and consumption bears on accumulation in relation to a negative 
component of private ownership. As a symbolic expression of organizational power, 
capital value is only attached to the protected claims of ownership that allow 
capitalists to withhold industrial processes—in this case, the unfettered production 
and consumption of culture—from society at large. Veblen called this socio-legal 
process of exclusion and control “strategic sabotage.” 
 
Outline of Part II 
 
 Part II focuses on the Hollywood film business. It investigates how and to 
what extent major filmed entertainment attempts to accumulate capital by lowering 
its risk. The process of lowering risk—and the central role of capitalist power in this 
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process—has characterized Hollywood’s orientation toward the social-historical 
character of cinema and mass culture. This push to lower risk has been most 
apparent since the 1980s. In recent decades, major filmed entertainment has used 
its oligopolistic control of distribution to institute an order of cinema based on 
several key strategies: saturation booking, blockbuster cinema and high-concept 
filmmaking. Of course, there is much more to cinema, and even Hollywood cinema, 
than these three key strategies. Yet the purpose of major filmed entertainment is to 
create an order of cinema that benefits its business interests. And when major 
filmed entertainment has the institutional means to shape the movements of the 
cinematic universe—social relations and all—it possesses a greater ability to affirm, 
modify or deny film projects and ideas according to their perceived function in 
capital accumulation. 
 Chapter 4 examines the capital-as-power approach in greater detail. First to 
be examined is the concept of differential accumulation. In this dissertation, 
differential accumulation denotes the process of accumulating capital faster than 
dominant capital, proxied by the 500 largest firms in the COMPUSTAT database. The 
second issue to be examined is the role of risk in the logic of capitalization. Since 
lower risk increases capitalization, differential reductions of risk lead to differential 
accumulation. As with our definition of differential accumulation, our analysis of 
differential risk concerns the ability of major filmed entertainment to lower its risk 
faster (or have it rise slower) than dominant capital as a whole. 
 Chapter 5 explains why the Hollywood film business seeks to create and 
reinforce deterministic social relations in the world of cinema. An order of cinema is 
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a defence against the threat of aesthetic overproduction. This threat, which is 
financial, can appear when the future social significance and aesthetics of cinema 
seem uncertain. This uncertainty derives from social-historical shifts in meaning, 
desire and, more generally, cultural norms and values. Again, shifts in the social 
meaning of cinema do not undermine filmmaking and film watching as cultural and 
political activities; in fact, these shifts in meaning might foretell a cinematic 
renaissance or democratic potential. But they can undermine the goals of business 
interests, which value film production, distribution and exhibition as, primarily, 
capitalist techniques. Therefore, the capitalist control of cinema requires that vested 
interests shape the relationship between new creativity and already established 
meaning. 
 Chapter 5 also examines a historical example of Hollywood’s institutional 
power to control the relationship between creativity and meaning. In the early 
period of the Hollywood studio system, the Motion Picture Producers and 
Distributors of America (MPPDA) and the Production Code Administration (PCA) 
actively shaped the form and content of Hollywood cinema. Lack of relevant data on 
the profits of major filmed entertainment from 1920 to 1950 makes it is difficult to 
accurately determine how this period of self-censorship affected the risk 
perceptions of the vested interests. Nevertheless, the analysis of this period suggests 
that Hollywood has always had a political economic incentive to narrow the horizon 
of cinema—in this case, through the formal institution of filmmaking taboos.  
 Chapter 6 examines, analytically and quantitatively, how and to what extent 
major filmed entertainment has been able to reduce risk in the contemporary period 
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of the Hollywood film business, from 1960 to 2013. The chapter outlines some of the 
business strategies that have been instrumental ever since the U.S. Supreme Court 
demolished aspects of the classical studio system in 1948. Key post-1948 strategies 
have been saturation booking and blockbuster cinema, and both were successful in 
reducing the risk of major filmed entertainment, both absolutely and relative to 
dominant capital.  
These empirical conclusions are antithetical to mainstream theories. By 
relying on the neoclassical concept of consumer sovereignty, many theories claim 
that the systemic risk of Hollywood is always somewhere between high and 
extremely high, whereas in reality this risk has been dropping. In fact, the chapter 
demonstrates that major filmed entertainment is now able to confidently determine 
which films will be very successful in the saturation-booking system of theatrical 
exhibition. 
 Some of the data analysis in Chapter 6 show that the highest level of risk 
occurred in the late 1960s and 1970s. Risk dropped significantly in the early 1980s 
and then continued to drop steadily through to 2013.  Chapter 7 analyzes how this 
historical trajectory of major filmed entertainment’s risk parallels the sector-wide 
transition from American New Wave cinema (~1968-1975) to the narrowed 
aesthetic horizon of Hollywood cinema after 1980. This latter period was marked by 
a growing emphasis on high-concept cinema. High-concept filmmaking demands 
that large-budget films have simple and straightforward stories, character types and 
imagery. High-concept cinema is not just an aesthetic standard; it was a key idea 
after American New Wave cinema became a financial burden for major filmed 
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entertainment. The general institution of high concept enabled major filmed 
entertainment to refrain from distributing film projects that were deemed too 
complex, too ambiguous or, in light of what American New Wave was seeking to 
achieve, too political for its twin-engine strategy of saturation booking and 
blockbuster cinema. And this ability helped it achieve significant reduction in 
differential risk and a concomitant increase in differential earnings. 
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Part I  
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Chapter 1 
The Economics-Politics Separation and the Marxist Concept of Totality 
 
Introduction 
 
 In both academic theory and public opinion, there is an inclination to think 
that material production has its own distinct place in capitalism, in the sphere of 
economics. Our subjective experiences often fuel this inclination; economics 
immediately appears to consciousness as a definite circuit of activity. Factories and 
offices are distinguishable from residences, schools, churches, army bases and 
government ministries. Goods are bought and sold on the market, which is a place 
that is neither familial nor governmental. Hegel, for instance, described “civil 
society” as a place where individuals negotiated their needs in relation to the “work 
and satisfaction of the needs of all the others” (Hegel 2005a, p.§188). Hegel’s 
description of civil society was influenced by Adam Smith’s concept of the market. 
The extent of the market could, for Smith, be so large that individuals, each with 
only finite knowledge and specific abilities in the greater social division of labour, 
could find the goods they needed. Even if each object brought to market had specific, 
limited utility—like a pair of shoes, or a hunting bow—the market would mediate 
the needs of its participants (Smith 1991, pp.15–19). 
 Beneath such descriptions of the market and the places of material 
production is a deeper assumption about the composition of capitalist society. 
Different theories of capitalism, each with its own intentions, assume economics is 
separate from politics. Caporaso and Levine explain how one can even 
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unintentionally affirm this separation: “When we speak of the economy, we already 
assume the existence of a separate entity: ... a distinct set of relations between 
persons not in essence political or familial” (Caporaso & Levine 1992, p.28). But can 
we really speak of the economy? Should theory try to isolate economic relations 
from other social relations? 
 Neoclassical and Marxist approaches would disagree on many other aspects 
of capitalist society, but their respective concepts of capital both produce an 
analytical distinction between political power and economic production. Political 
power creates and institutes laws, norms and social values on the basis of 
institutional authority. This authority can take different forms—the authority of a 
king or queen can be “sanctioned” by divine right, but it is also theoretically possible 
for laws and norms to be instituted on the authority of the demos. Regardless, as 
Hobbes noted, if there is authority, there is an author. Political power, whether it 
represents the interests of the commonwealth or not, is “done by Authority, done by 
Commission, or Licence from him whose right it is” (Hobbes 1985, p.218).  
Economics appears to be analytically different in this regard because 
“nobody” is the author of market activity. Governments still impose rules and 
regulations through command, but somehow, when market activity is itself the 
object of study, it seems that capitalist economics is in the “grip of subterranean 
forces that have a life of their own” (Heilbroner 1992, p.18). Power and authority 
are denoted as non-economic entities that affect competitive market activity from 
the outside; and in the competitive market proper, commodities are said to be 
produced and sold at prices that neither buyers nor sellers author. The motions of a 
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capitalist economy are, unlike the motions of politics, said to be governed by 
structural laws, material conditions and the measures of input, output and 
productivity.  
 Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler argue that the economics-politics 
separation, as it is commonly understood, needs to be thoroughly reconsidered. It is 
commonly assumed that capital is an economic magnitude that is rooted in material 
production. Consequently, value is defined as a measure of material productivity, 
and political power can only ever distort economic activity (neoclassical) or assist, 
support or condition the mode of production (Marxism). According to Nitzan and 
Bichler, this is where the problem lies. If a given concept of capital privileges 
material productivity—measured as utility or socially necessary abstract labour 
time—a political economic framework is ill equipped to explain a capitalist 
historical reality in which the so-called economic sphere is itself a composite of 
power processes. In other words, the politics-economics separation creates 
methodological problems if, in fact, the existence of power undermines the very 
theoretical conditions that would make economics a separate sphere of activity to 
start with. Furthermore, the very concept of capital is wrought with logical fallacies 
and empirical obstacles because economic categories are developed on the 
assumption that the analytical separation of economics and politics is 
unproblematic.  
 Aside from a few comparative references to neoclassical economics, this 
chapter focuses on Marxist political economy. Focusing almost all of our attention 
on Marxism is justifiable. As Nitzan and Bichler note, Marx was “concerned with 
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social power writ large. For Marx the question is how production and exploitation, 
organized through the process of accumulation, dictate the totality of human 
relations in capitalism…” (Bichler et al. 2012, p.8). Unlike neoclassical approaches 
that try to ignore the effects of power on society, Marxism argues that social power 
is a necessary condition for the class structure of capitalism to function in spite of its 
contradictions. Whether expressed through the political power of the state, the 
ideology of the media or the subject formation of the modern individual, power is a 
key factor in the social reproduction of capitalist society. Power is also expressed in 
the struggle over the terms of the labour-capital relationship, which includes the 
wage rate and the length of the working day. 
 Yet methodological problems appear because Marxism must also say 
something specific about the prices of capitalist society—why, for example, a pair of 
shoes is worth a certain amount of money, or why IBM’s net income in 2010 was 
almost $15 billion. Marxism can answer these questions only if it commits to 
theoretically splitting economics and politics. If capitalism is, in essence, a mode of 
production, and if the circuit of capital is, beyond the appearances of price, rooted in 
labour values, a delineated economic sphere must exist. Otherwise, there is no 
logical reason why prices and profit should reflect material productivity. Ignoring 
for the moment the empirical dilemmas of measuring socially necessary abstract 
labour time, the existence of institutional power in society undermines the 
exclusivity of the labour theory of value. Only under perfect competition, in a 
“power-free” market, would it even begin to be conceivable that the difference 
between production prices and profit is, essentially, the difference between “the 
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value paid by the capitalist for the labour-power” (Marx 1990, p.302) and the 
exchange value of the commodity.  
 This chapter uses Nitzan and Bichler’s arguments about theories of capital as 
a platform from which to analyze the writings of Neumann, Pollock and Marcuse. 
These three members of the Frankfurt School are important for our purpose 
because their political economic ideas, which are sometimes fragmentary, reside in 
the grey areas of Marxism. While the Frankfurt School never intended to overcome 
Marxism entirely, its members shook and rattled the assumptions of Marxist 
political economy from within. The pushes and pulls of the Frankfurt School sought 
to reconsider the essence of capital accumulation in advanced capitalism, and this 
type of intellectual curiosity allows us, many decades later, to highlight the 
problematic nature of the politics-economics separation.  
 By virtue of its interest in the changing composition of domination in 
capitalist society, the Frankfurt School started to outline, however abstractly, a 
political economic process of power. Its different outlines of capitalist power reveal 
two problems with the politics-economics separation in Marxism.  
 First, there are numerous reasons to redefine capital in light of historical 
developments. Social power is everywhere in what Marcuse calls advanced 
capitalism: mass culture influences psychology, desire and social behaviour; 
technological infrastructure and the scientific worldview require their own forms of 
instrumental rationality; and, perhaps most importantly for our concept of capital, 
giant firms have power over small firms and society at large. Thus, the Frankfurt 
School erases, ignores or modifies the politics-economics relationship when it 
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obscures the role of power in capital accumulation. Gone is the idea that cultural and 
political processes only ever support or assist what is, in the last instance, an 
economic system. Rather, monopolization and the structure of the modern 
corporation, for example, suggested that institutional power was no longer on the 
margins of market activity.  
 Second, the political economic contributions of the Frankfurt School expose a 
fundamental problem in the Marxist concept of totality. Marxism is right to argue 
that a dialectical theory of society is indispensable if in fact the movements of 
capitalism reveal themselves through a diversity of social relations. Additionally, the 
concept of totality supersedes the base-superstructure model of less holistic Marxist 
approaches. However, it is the Marxist concept of capital that forces a split between 
political and economic categories. Historical materialism can reject the base-
superstructure model, but its more holistic versions must still retain well-defined 
ideas of what is and is not economic exploitation. In other words, the conceptual 
tool that describes the mode of production and the accumulation of surplus value is 
dialectical only up to a point. Dialectical mediation, which remains an important 
methodological principle for both the Frankfurt School and Marxism, is arrested by 
the necessity to keep any critical insights about the role of power in advanced 
capitalism from transforming the Marxist concept of capital into something else. 
 
Economics-Politics and the Definition of Capital 
 
 The conceptual boundaries of any academic discipline influence the scope 
and methods of its research. In the case of political economy, the range of analysis is 
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categorized, weighed and interpreted according to the method through which it 
understands the connection between politics and economics.  
 Based on the assumption that politics and economics are separate, most 
theorists tend to explain capitalism with dualist methodologies that have two sets of 
categories: one set for capital (economics) and another for ideology, power and 
authority (politics) (Nitzan & Bichler 2000; Nitzan & Bichler 2009). A simple but 
relevant example is found in the measurement of GDP. Notwithstanding the more 
technical debate about whether GDP is even a relevant measure of a country’s 
prosperity (Stiglitz et al. 2009), GDP only counts some social activity on the 
fundamental assumption that activity in the economy produces wealth, while 
political activity cannot. For instance, government transfer payments—welfare, 
social security and subsidies—have great effects on society because they 
redistribute income (by authority of the state), but they are not counted in 
measurements of GDP. If economics is about the production of wealth, political 
exercises like transfer payments can only shape, support, influence, bend or distort 
the economy from the outside. 
 For many thinkers, the autonomy of economic activity explains the difference 
between capitalism and pre-capitalist societies. There is common agreement that, to 
understand material production in pre-capitalist societies, one cannot winnow out 
politics. Before capitalism, the economy was political; the meaning of material 
production was defined in relation to the institution of a political order. We can 
certainly look at a past society and distinguish work and its details from other 
activities, such as leisurely dialogue or religious prayer. Past social hierarchies also 
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reveal how unproductive rulers separated themselves from the mass of labourers 
who toiled and got their hands dirty. Nevertheless, many theorists find no point in 
drawing a circle around economic activity in pre-capitalist societies because the 
relations of production, exchange, distribution and consumption were not 
autonomous.  Social institutions determined the form, means and ends of economic 
activity: material production could help actualize the good life or it could fuel war, 
territorial expansion and crusades against foreign peoples; and who worked, how 
they worked and what they were working for was affected by myth, tradition and 
custom, as well as by a ruling authority, be it democratic or autocratic.   
 The Sumerian debt system, for instance, was largely the prerogative of state 
rulers. Their decrees about the terms of debt and the interest rate had more to do 
with religious sanction and mathematical simplicity than profit and productivity 
rates (Hudson 2000). Through systems of absolute power, the rulers of Ancient 
Egypt controlled the social division labour in order to build grand public works and 
monuments like the pyramids, which celebrated “the cult of Divine Kingship” 
(Mumford 1970, p.29). Could we understand the building of pyramids without an 
idea of how this excessive and wasteful expenditure of human energy was politically 
sanctioned? It would be silly to shear politics and explain the existence of ancient 
pyramids from a “purely” economic standpoint. In fact, Bataille shows us how the 
reduction of symbolic power to economic laws unveils the absurdity of Keynes’ 
suggestion for economic recovery: “the pyramid is a monumental mistake; one 
might just as well dig an enormous hole, then refill it and pack the ground” (Bataille 
1991, p.119). 
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 Some theorists also demonstrate how the political terms of pre-capitalist 
production can be seen at the level of the individual. From a comparison of different 
societies, Polanyi drew the following conclusion about pre-capitalist economic 
behaviour: “Custom and law, magic and religion cooperated in inducing the 
individual to comply with rules of behavior which, eventually, ensured his 
functioning in the economic system” (Polanyi 2001, p.57). A similar argument is 
found in Weber. If, as Weber argues, capitalism is indeed “identical with the pursuit 
of profit, and forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic 
enterprise,” then pre-capitalist economic behaviour never approximated this 
description (Weber 2002, p.xxxi). Pre-capitalist behaviour was entangled with and 
limited by cultural, religious and political traditions. 
 What then is different or “special” about capitalist societies? Often, in the 
interest of affirming what is novel about the economics-politics relation in the 
capitalist universe, theorists tend to treat commodity production and exchange as a 
distinct domain. Economics is now seen as its own system, which, to some degree, 
has its own internal logic or laws of behaviour. Consequently, economic categories 
comprise a specific set of tools, distinct in function from other theoretical toolsets. 
Concepts of tradition, myth, command and power can explain some aspects of 
capitalist society, but they fumble with the details of material production and 
market exchange. This fumbling is to be expected if the capitalist economy has its 
own eidos, archē and telos. The discipline of economics and economic categories 
thus exist to fill in the technical details about capitalist investment, wage labour and 
the value of production.  
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 For instance, the economy is sometimes understood to be its own “thing” 
because people now behave and act according to a behavioural principle that 
originates in the market itself. According to Polanyi, the capitalist pursuit of gain for 
the sake of gain is characterized, first and foremost, as an economic motive that 
requires no “extra” reference to “social standing... social claims... or social assets” 
(Polanyi 2001, p.48). Or economic categories are deemed exceptional social 
categories because it is assumed that capitalist economics has determinable laws of 
motion, much like natural phenomena. Marx, for example, argued that the economic 
system is not only the key to explaining the class structure of capitalism, but also 
that it can, unlike our “legal, political, religious, or philosophic” systems, “be 
determined with the precision of natural science…” (Marx 1999, p.21). 
 The marked shift in perspective regarding capitalist societies produces a new 
form of dualism, one that assumes that the immanent laws of politics and economics 
are each understandable in isolation. Nowhere is this dualism more celebrated than 
in neoclassical economics. As Nitzan and Bichler explain, the existence of power 
politics can disturb capitalism’s economic system, but, for the neoclassical 
economist, the presence of power in the world never alters the basic meaning of 
capital:  
According to the neoclassicists, capital is the utilitarian manifestation of 
multiple individual wills, expressed freely through the market and incarnated in 
an objective productive quantum. As a voluntary, material substance, capital 
itself is orthogonal—and therefore impermeable—to power politics, by 
definition. (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.27) 
 
Mancur Olson, for instance, goes to great lengths to list contemporary forms of what 
he calls “distributional coalitions,” rigid organizations that use power to protect 
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their specific interests against the collective good (Olson 1982). Olson finds that, as 
in the Indian caste system or the British class structure, modern institutions like the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, labour unions, lobbying 
organizations and professional associations use their size and complexity to control 
the distribution of material and intellectual resources. However, Olson also assumes 
that the institutional power of distributional coalitions, no matter how large, 
complex or ubiquitous, can never change the categories we should use to 
understand economic activity. Distributional coalitions can accumulate “power and 
income,” but they can only depress the economy, which, for Olson, is still analytically 
separable. According to the neoclassical definition, economic activity is only about 
growth and productivity.  
What about Marxism? By having different social and political interests than 
neoclassical economics, Marxist political economy takes a different approach to the 
politics-economics relationship. Marxism’s curiosities about the capitalist mode of 
production and the accumulation of capital are intimately connected to a political 
theory of liberation, whereby those outside the capitalist class have a real interest in 
overcoming the contradictions of capitalism. Marxism’s theoretical foundations also 
precede the neoclassical movement, which first began in 1870s. Along with Adam 
Smith and David Ricardo, Marx was a major figure in the classical tradition in 
political economy.  These intellectual roots prevent Marxist studies from keeping 
economics “pure.”1  
                                                        
1 This fact is celebrated in the introduction to the edited volume Cultural Political Economy. 
Jacqueline Best and Mathew Paterson argue that Marxism is a good example of how political 
economy can have a rich life when it avoids the neoclassical path. Marxism is not “deadened by the 
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 It is noticeable that Marxism mixes economics and politics with enthusiasm. 
For instance, the economics-politics relationship is key to understanding how the 
historical development of the capitalist mode of production has been 
contemporaneous with liberalism, fascism, imperialism, colonialism, post-
colonialism and neo-liberalism. Furthermore, Marx had great insight on social 
power because he understood that political force, e.g., state intervention, balanced 
the otherwise unstable contradictions of production and accumulation. As 
Habermas notes, Marx countered liberal claims of a power-free marketplace: 
hierarchical power must be present lest a class society quickly collapse from its 
inequalities, injustices and other irrationalities (Habermas 1991, p.122).  
  But regardless of how complex its analysis becomes, Marxism needs to keep 
its two main ingredients, economics and politics, separate. Because of the way in 
which capital is defined in Marxism, political processes must recede to the 
background when it is time to explain, in technical detail, what is directly 
responsible for the production of value (Nitzan & Bichler 2000). Power, law, 
violence, education, repression, ideology and other such mechanisms are still 
important to Marxism’s general theory of capitalism, but they only ever assist or 
support the set of social relations that exploit human labour’s singular capacity to 
create value. Thus, the Marxist concept of capital always has, at root, an exclusive 
function. In the final analysis, it is the only thing that can explain the technological 
                                                                                                                                                                     
insistence that ‘the economy’ can be analyzed without reference to the specific sorts of people which 
inhabit and produce it (its cultures), the forms of power embedded in it (its politics) and the 
normative questions which animate both it ‘in itself’ and reactions to it” (Best & Paterson 2009, p.24). 
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composition of material production, the productivity of labour and the effect of 
socially necessary abstract labour time on the exchange values of commodities.  
 To be sure, there is no analytical definition of capital in Marx (Nitzan & 
Bichler 2000, p.74). Capital, for Marx, is a complex, historical social relationship, and 
the complexity and historicity of that relationship make it impossible to reduce 
capital to a simple thing. For example, the Marxist concept of capital references, in 
its own definition, other concepts like primitive accumulation, expanded 
accumulation, capitalists, workers, labour, technology, commodity, value, money, 
price and surplus (Ollman 2003, p.14). Yet this dialectical mediation of concepts 
cannot go so far as to cause the labour theory of value to lose its relevance. In other 
words, the theory that describes the accumulation of surplus value is dialectical only 
up to a point. Political concepts such as power and ideology cannot qualitatively 
transform the Marxist theory of value, lest it be suggested that the exploitation of 
labour is secondary or inessential to accumulation. Additionally, only a certain set of 
categories is designed to explain how value is produced and exchanged according to 
socially necessary abstract labour time, the substance that “gives commodities their 
value and makes them commensurate” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.88).  
 
The Frankfurt School and the Historical Development of Capitalism 
 
 At the end of the first volume of Capital, Marx reminds the reader of where 
the class struggle is heading, should “the immanent laws of capitalist production” 
keep their grip on both the capitalists who own the means of production and the 
wage labourers who have nothing to sell but their labour power:  
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Along with the constant decrease in the number of capitalist magnates, who 
usurp and monopolize all the advantages of this process of transformation, the 
mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation and exploitation grows; but 
with this there also grows the revolt of the working class, a class constantly 
increasing in numbers, and trained, united and organized by the very 
mechanism of the capitalist process of production. (Marx 1990, p.929) 
 
On the same page, Marx also emphasizes how “capitalist production begets, with the 
inexorability of a natural process, its own negation.” These words suggest why, since 
the early twentieth century, Marxist theory has been filled with internal debates 
about methodology.  
 In spite of significant crises such as the First World War, inflation in the 
1920s and the Great Depression in the 1930s, the general actions of the European 
proletariat in the early twentieth century did not confirm Marx’s theory of capitalist 
crisis. To the surprise of Marxist intellectuals living through the first decades of the 
twentieth century, workers all over Europe were, in fact, going in the “wrong” 
direction. Rather than being a great moment of historical self-consciousness in 
which the proletariat recognized how “the centralization of the means of production 
and the socialization of labour [had reached] a point at which they become 
incompatible with their capitalist integument” (Marx 1990, p.929), Europe in the 
1920s and 1930s was characterized by worker apathy, social democracy and, most 
disturbingly, fascism.   
 As a consequence of these historical developments, a new intellectual 
movement percolated within Marxism. Various European thinkers, while still 
sympathetic to Marxism’s political goals, openly reinterpreted the Marxist method 
of social theory. Georg Lukacs’s History and Class Consciousness, for example, was 
one of the first texts to explicitly present a Marxism-for-the-twentieth-century.  
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According to Lukacs, ideology and the related issues of subjectivity and class-
consciousness were now too important to only have a marginal place in Marxist 
theory. He also felt that some of his contemporaries, like Otto Bauer, were missing 
the point when they argued that Marxist economics simply needed to be “brought 
up to date.” Classical Marxist economics was not only blind to the “ultimate fate of 
capitalism as a whole” (Lukacs 1968, p.31), its methods also betrayed its “inability 
to understand either the connections of the so-called ‘ideological’ forms of society 
and their economic base or the economy itself as a totality and as social reality” 
(Lukacs 1968, p.34).  
 The Marxism of Lukacs gave credence to the methods of the Frankfurt 
School. Reductionist versions of Marxism, thanks to Lukacs’s interrogations, did not 
need to be defended when one rethought the relations between theory and practice. 
Indeed, the obstacles to revolutionary leftism in early twentieth-century Europe 
suggested that Marxism take a new approach: abandon classical Marxism and 
reconsider the essence of historical materialism. Events of the twentieth century 
gave, according to Marcuse, “a new import to many demands and indices of 
[historical materialism], whose changed function accords in a more intensive sense 
the character of ‘critical theory’” (Marcuse 1968c, p.142).  
 The Frankfurt School’s development of critical theory sought to explore new 
ways to understand the totalizing nature of contemporary social domination 
(Marcuse 1968c, p.158). In this theoretical development, we find, among other 
things, the Frankfurt School’s contributions to political economy.  
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The Political Economic Ideas of the Frankfurt School 
 
 Given space limitations, only the contributions of Pollock, Neumann and 
Marcuse will be presented in this section. These three thinkers developed political 
economic concepts, such as “state capitalism” and “Totalitarian Monopoly 
Capitalism,” and they attempted to account for the modern corporation and the rise 
of automation in industrial production. Their analyses were premised on the 
principle that a historically grounded dialectic was the only way for critical theory 
to be both negative and emancipatory.  
 In my view, the writings of the Pollock, Neumann and Marcuse illustrate why 
the economics-politics separation needs to be thoroughly reconsidered and the 
concept of capital reconceptualized. Marxism’s key economic assumption that value 
is rooted in the labour time of material production muddles the political economic 
insights of the Frankfurt School. On the one hand, Pollock, Neumann and Marcuse all 
began to respectively reframe capital accumulation according to how they 
understood the role of command, authority and domination in advanced capitalism. 
On the other hand, their suggestion that we have witnessed qualitative changes in 
the historical structure of capitalism did not push hard enough against the 
“economic” assumptions of Marxism. This weak push creates an incompatible 
relationship between the fundamental Marxist assumption that capital is a 
productive entity and the following hypotheses of the Frankfurt School: (1) that a 
holistic theory of capitalism is necessary because economics cannot be isolated from 
politics; (2) that it is doubtful that there is a link between material production and 
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prices; and (3) that a concept of capital that splits production and power is 
unhelpful. 
 From the functional perspective of intellectual history, the last facet of the 
argument—the incompatible relationship—seems to be an unfair critique, as it 
holds these members of the Frankfurt School to a goal they never personally held. 
As Kellner notes in his intellectual history of the Frankfurt School, the school’s 
rejection of classical Marxism and its rethinking of the politics-economics 
separation were meant to strengthen rather than weaken historical materialism 
(Kellner 1989, p.70). Nevertheless, the historical materialism of the Frankfurt 
School’s first generation is now in the hands of its interpreters, and the way in 
which this latter group has handled its engagement with the economics-politics 
problem is telling: to the best of my knowledge, no one in this group has considered 
the possibility of using abstract ideas of capitalist power as a platform for a non-
Marxist, yet critical, political economy.  
 Instead, the writings of the Frankfurt School are used in arguments that 
defend Marxism’s understanding of the politics-economics relationship. Moishe 
Postone, for example, uses the political economy of Pollock and Horkheimer as foils 
for his own reading of Marx’s theory of capital. According to Postone, Marx’s mature 
writings do not split politics and economics because Marx did not seek to produce a 
dichotomy between the value of labour and the modes of distributing value across 
society. Rather, Marx used a concept of the capitalist totality to explain how the 
value of labour is always mediated by capitalism’s overarching structure of social 
domination (Postone 1996). According to Postone, the Frankfurt School retained the 
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politics-economics dualism of classical Marxism and overstated the novelties of 
institutional power in advanced capitalism (Postone 1996, p.90).  
 Other theorists, such as Martin Jay and Douglas Kellner, interpret the 
Frankfurt School more favourably. They credit the Frankfurt School for developing a 
holistic Marxist theory of capitalist society. Indeed, the writings of the Frankfurt 
School produce a concept of totality, theorize dialectical theory and conceptual 
mediation and criticize the base-superstructure model for its analytical simplicity 
(Jay 1984; Kellner 1989). 
 As we will see in our analysis of Pollock, Neumann and Marcuse, these two 
interpretations of the Frankfurt School fail to adequately consider the limitations of 
the Marxist framework—limitations that the school’s analysis inadvertently 
revealed. First, as our analysis will show, the very historical development of 
capitalism challenges the theoretical primacy of labour time in the valorization and 
accumulation of surplus value. In fact, the Marxist labour theory of value obscures 
our understanding of capital in a world in which modern firms (a) erase the 
distinction between economic and political activity, and (b) acquire the power to 
accumulate capital in ways that are not primarily about material productivity: law, 
ideology, price control, etc.  
 Second, we will posit that a holistic theory of capitalism does not necessarily 
overcome the rigid separation of economics and politics. Mixing pre-existing 
economic and political categories differs from fundamentally redefining a theory of 
capital in light of the capitalist ability to accumulate through power. This failure is 
not one of dialectics per se, but of the Marxist distinction between economic 
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valorization and political power. Holistic Marxism certainly mixes the two with 
enthusiasm—it has to do so in order to explain the social reproduction of the 
capitalist system. Yet economics must still be isolatable in this theoretical mixture, 
lest a multi-dimensional picture of capitalist society undermine the key assumption 
that one specific social activity, labour, is the source of value.  
  
Pollock on Political Power and State Capitalism 
 
 Writing just after another member of the Institut, Henryk Grossman, had 
argued that classical Marxist economics was just fine—a claim that seemed to have 
been vindicated by the Wall Street Crash of 1929—Pollock’s perspective in 1941 
was unusual by comparison (Kellner 1989, p.57). Since the early 1930s, argued 
Pollock, capitalism had found ways to solve its own crises. The concentration of 
ownership and the size of large-scale production transformed capitalist societies 
into “planned economies.” Consequently, in order to theorize how a “new set of 
rules” had replaced “the methods of the market,” the critical theorist had to make a 
conceptual shift (Pollock 2005, p.75). Pollock suggested that we use the concept of 
“state capitalism.” Market activity still existed, just as production and distribution 
were still theoretically relevant, but old assumptions about their specifically 
economic essence had to be jettisoned: 
During the non-monopolistic phase of private capitalism, the capitalist 
(whether an individual or a group of shareholders represented by its 
manager) had power over his property within the limits of the market laws. 
Under state capitalism, this power has been transferred to the government 
which is still limited by certain “natural” restrictions but free from the tyranny 
of an uncontrolled market. The replacement of the economic means by 
political means as the last guarantee for the reproduction of economic life, 
  
 
33 
changes the character of the whole historic period. It signifies the transition 
from a predominantly economic to an essentially political era. (Pollock 2005, 
p.77) 
 
Economic problems were now “problems of administration,” and political concepts, 
like power, could be used to explain the control of production and distribution.  
 Members of the Frankfurt School reacted in different ways to Pollock’s 
political economic theory of state capitalism (Horkheimer 2005b; Neumann 1942, 
pp.181–187). Neumann, for example, disagreed with Pollock’s distinction between 
economics and politics. A social formation in which “the new economy is… one 
without economics,” “the profit motive is supplanted by the power motive,” and 
“force, not economic law, is the prime mover of this society” is “no longer 
capitalistic” (Neumann 1942, pp.182–183). If politics has supplanted economics, a 
state could be called “a slave state or a managerial dictatorship or a system of 
bureaucratic collectivism—that is, it must be described in political and not in 
economic categories” (Neumann 1942, p.183).  
 The disagreement between Pollock and Neumann was rooted in the 
assumption that economics and politics begin as separate domains. If economics and 
politics are separate and the latter sphere has conquered the former, a new political 
ruling class must also have superseded the class of private capitalists, whose habitat 
was the economy. Thus, in Neumann’s eyes, Pollock’s shift to the political suggested 
that we now needed to focus on a new group of elites: “industrial managers, party 
bureaucrats, high-ranking civil servants, and army officers” (Neumann 1942, p.182). 
This new focus, however, appeared to keep capitalism’s primary instinct, the drive 
to accumulate, out of sight. 
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 But it seems that Neumann misread Pollock’s intentions. For Pollock, the 
object of study remained capitalism. The term “state capitalism” simply tells us 
where Pollock thought power lay in the capitalist societies of the 1920s and 1930s. 
Moreover, power was still capitalist in form: “… profit interests still play an 
important role” and the political economic system being described is “not socialism” 
(Pollock 2005, p.72). In fact, Pollock’s seemingly unorthodox conflation of profit and 
power produced two important insights about the character of capitalist societies 
since the early twentieth century.  
 First, similarly to Veblen, Pollock wanted us to think about the control of 
production and distribution. Concentration of ownership and the role of the state 
have changed the political economic environment: output is planned and prices are 
administered through political power (Pollock 2005, p.76). Second, and most 
importantly, the exercise of control over production and distribution is still 
understood and applied in the language of business enterprise. In capitalism, the 
power to “define the needs of society,” allocate resources, “coordinate and control … 
all productive resources,” and “distribute the social profit” is now very much a 
matter of how monopolies secure “monopoly profits at the expense of the non-
monopolistic market prices” (Pollock 2005, pp.74–76). Thus, in the furnace of 
“modern giant enterprises” the once separate logics of the entrepreneur, the 
financier and the government bureaucrat have become a single alloy whose purpose 
is to seek profit on the wings of administered prices:  
Specific means of control include modern statistical and accounting methods, 
regular reporting of all changes in plant and supply, systematic training of 
workers for future requirements, rationalization of all technical and 
administrative processes and all the other devices developed in the huge 
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modern enterprises and cartels. In addition to these traditional methods 
which have superseded the occult entrepreneurial art of guessing correctly 
what the future market demand will be, the state acquires the additional 
controlling power implied in complete command over money and credit. 
(Pollock 2005, p.79) 
  
Neumann on Totalitarian Monopoly Capitalism 
 
 Interestingly, both Pollock and Neumann tried to overcome the same 
analytical problem. When no longer grappling with “politics” and “economics” in the 
abstract, Neumann was much closer to Pollock’s position than he would have been 
willing to admit. Neumann did not like what “state capitalism” implied, and he also 
thought that Pollock simply supplanted the profit motive with the power motive. 
But the progressive concentration of ownership compelled Neumann, like Pollock, 
to reinterpret the relationship between capital accumulation and power.  
 Neumann’s political economic study of Nazi Germany, Behemoth, has its own 
term to describe capitalist power: “Totalitarian Monopoly Capitalism.” This term 
explains the heart of Nazi Germany’s business structure. It also denotes changes in 
the politics-economics relationship. Nazi Germany was an example of how a modern 
capitalist society could be both “a monopolistic economy” and “a command 
economy” (Neumann 1942, p.214).  
 For Neumann, the study of capitalist power prevents our conceptual 
language from obscuring the real differences between different types of property 
ownership. “In our language,” writes Neumann, “domination over means of 
consumption and over means production is called by the same name: ‘property’” 
(Neumann 1942, p.210). However, describing the power of individuals and the 
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power of business enterprises with the same term is a “legal mask.” The size of 
massive industrial infrastructure and joint-stock companies has created qualitative 
differences between capitalist power and consumer power. Power over industrial 
capacity has shattered the classical economic assumption that “a large number of 
entrepreneurs of about equal strength” can do nothing but “compete with each 
other on the basis of freedom of contract and freedom of trade.” Rather, the size and 
scope of contemporary industry gives its elite group of owners power over others: 
“power over workers, power over consumers, power over the state” (Neumann 
1942, p.210).  
 In contradistinction to Pollock, Neumann still wanted to hold on to 
“economics” as an independent idea. However, the rich historical details in 
Behemoth demonstrate that he was rethinking the meaning of “economics” in light 
of historical developments in ownership and the size of modern institutions. There 
are too many details to cover here, but we can provide three examples that show 
that Neumann understood capital accumulation to be a power process.  
 First, prices no longer find market equilibrium because they no longer float 
in a “power-free” environment.2 Only in “a purely competitive economy,” where 
firms are of roughly equal size and the concentration of ownership is low, will 
“prices crystallize as a result of supply and demand” (Neumann 1942, p.255). When 
                                                        
2 This is a point of Neumann’s that Pollock would agree with. Pollock writes: “Nothing may seem on 
the surface to have changed, prices are quoted and goods and services paid for in money; the rise and 
fall in prices may be quite common. But the relations between prices and cost of production on the 
one side and demand and supply on the other… become disconnected in those cases where they tend 
to interfere with the general plan [of administered prices]…. In the last decades administered prices 
have contributed much toward destroying the market automatism without creating new devices for 
taking over its ‘necessary’ functions” (Pollock 2005, p.75). 
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this competitive environment does not exist, one must, according to Neumann, 
develop a theory of price control. 
 Here, on the topic of price control, Neumann’s misinterpretation of Pollock’s 
framework has a beneficial result. Pollock’s concept of state capitalism, in 
Neumann’s eyes, suggested that prices are now administered by the state. Thinking 
that Pollock was unaware of other types of price control, Neumann studied the 
opportunities for large firms to set prices on the basis of their “strength.” 
Neumann’s interest in pricing through strength bears similarities to the theory of 
Kalecki, who argued that giant corporations fix prices at levels higher than marginal 
cost. These higher levels are, according to Kalecki, indicative of a firm’s “degree of 
monopoly” (Kalecki 1971).  
 For Neumann, pricing through monopoly power unravels the theoretical 
relationship between price and production: 
The slightest check on competition—either as a result of a natural shortage in 
the supply of elements of production or of an artificial regulation of supply or 
demand in any particular sphere—must disrupt the system of functional 
equations that constitutes the “price level,” and must prevent the proportions of 
production from directly following the price equations as well as preventing the 
price equations from exactly reflecting the proportions of production. This is 
the case both when monopolies bar competition in particular fields and when 
centralized controls are established to “stabilize” any set of given correlations of 
several elements of production or even of all of them. (Neumann 1942, p.255) 
 
The distinction between “natural” supply and “artificial” shortages suggests that, 
beneath it all, Neumann still assumed that power “distorts” true economic value. 
However, Neumann tried to incorporate historical development into his theory of 
capitalism, such as the systematic application of price control and the existence of 
an uncompetitive market. In this state of affairs, the distillation of “pure” economic 
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value from nominal prices was less of a theoretical concern than what giant 
corporations had been able to do with their degree of monopoly.  
 This takes us to our second example: the increase in size of a corporation is 
not exactly about making gains in efficiency, or what is sometimes called 
“economies of scale.” Firms with large amounts of retained earnings—net profits 
that are not distributed as dividends—have the ability to expand or acquire 
industrial infrastructure. But, as Neumann notes, a reserve of undistributed profits 
is “not merely used for plant expansion and for an increase in stock….” It can also be 
“utilized for the extension of power of the monopolies over other enterprises” 
(Neumann 1942, p.264).  
 For Neumann, this particular phenomenon of giant firms acquiring smaller 
firms to extend their monopoly power rather than to become more efficient 
revealed the fallacy of Nazi ideology. The anti-capitalist views of the Nazi party 
“always exempted productive capital” according to a distinction between 
productivity (industrial firms) and predation (banks). This distinction proved to be 
fallacious when so-called industrial firms acted like banks—they could be just as 
predatory with their undistributed profits (Neumann 1942, p.263).  
 Neumann’s descriptions of predation are interesting to us because they are 
attached to his theory of price control. If a giant corporation can set prices on the 
basis of its strength, the acquisition of other firms can extend or even increase the 
ability to price through fiat. Indeed, the institutional power behind the setting of 
prices forces us to fundamentally reconsider why a firm is of a certain size in 
advanced capitalism (Nitzan & Bichler 2009; Nitzan 2001). 
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 Third, Neumann found that the big firms of modern business do not perceive 
legislative and judicial acts to be extra-economic factors in the pursuit of profit. 
Rather, legal and political measures are essential to monopoly profits because they 
keep market competition depressed. Competition is never fully extinguished, and it 
is rare for monopolization in a sector to be perfect. Yet Neumann understood that 
capitalism’s biggest players are not simply seeking material and technological 
advantages through utility or efficiency. Rather, these players use political and legal 
measures to refrain from competitive games. Market competition and a supply-and-
demand environment undermine the ownership of modern technological 
apparatuses, which are so large that they require “enormous investments.” Thus, 
“rich and powerful corporations” seek protection from “outsiders, new competitors, 
labour unions”—entities that could undermine the ability to price and purchase 
through monopoly power (Neumann 1942, p.213).  
Business enterprise in Nazi Germany provided Neumann with a brutal 
example of how the law was much more than simply a mechanism to regulate 
economic behaviour and competition. Anti-Jewish legislation gave the biggest firms 
of Nazi Germany the opportunity to increase their profits through non-productive, 
anti-competitive means. This “Aryanization” of German business, as Neumann 
pointed out, was a “powerful stimulant to capital concentration and monopoly…” 
(1942, p.100). With significant undistributed profits at their disposal, only the 
biggest firms had the means to increase their holdings in this manner. For instance, 
the policies that followed the vom Rath murder and Kristallnacht created 
monopolistic business opportunities that had nothing to do with labour time, 
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technological efficiency or productive output. A mixture of ideology and 
authoritarian law redistributed national income, and the gap between the holdings 
of big and small firms widened as a result of what was essentially an ethnic/racial 
daylight robbery.  
  
Marcuse on Automation and the Substance of Capitalist Rationality 
 
 While Marcuse certainly grounded his critical theory within a Marxist 
framework, he also showed little hesitance to modify the tone and colour of political 
economic ideas. “A theory which has not caught up with the practice of capitalism,” 
writes Marcuse, “cannot possibly guide the practice aiming at the abolition of 
capitalism” (Marcuse 1972, p.34). 
 Marcuse’s approach to a political economy of advanced capitalism differs 
from those of Pollock and Neumann. Marcuse generally assumes that capital is a 
productive magnitude, but he also speaks of productivity in such a way that capital 
is simultaneously an “element” of power and control over society at large. The 
“technical apparatus of production and distribution,” by virtue of its new size and 
scope, has obliterated “the opposition between the private and public existence, 
between individual and social needs” (Marcuse 1991, p.xlvii). A quotation from 
Counterrevolution and Revolt also demonstrates Marcuse’s unique application of 
economic terminology: 
… in the internal dynamic of advanced capitalism, “the concept of productive 
labour is necessarily enlarged,” and with it the concept of the productive 
worker, of the working class itself. The change is not merely quantitative: it 
affects the entire universe of capitalism…. The enlarged universe of exploitation 
  
 
41 
is a totality of machines—human, economic, political, military, educational. 
(Marcuse 1972, p.13) 
 
 Marcuse saw that rigid analytical divisions in theoretical analysis would 
prevent us from understanding how advanced industrial society “contains no facts 
which do not communicate the repressive power of the whole” (Marcuse 1991, 
p.11). For instance, political and economic categories must be reconsidered in light 
of how “the productive apparatus tends to become totalitarian…” (Marcuse 1991, 
p.xlvii). Moreover, the determinate negation of contemporary society is both 
material and ideological:  
Validated by the accomplishments of science and technology, justified by its 
growing productivity, the status quo defies all transcendence. Faced with the 
possibility of pacification on the grounds of its technical and intellectual 
achievements, the mature industrial society closes itself against this alternative. 
Operationalism, in theory and practice, becomes the theory and practice of 
containment. (Marcuse 1991, p.17)  
 
 From the edifice of his own critical theory, Marcuse experiments with an 
abstract idea of capitalist power. This experimentation comes in bursts, and it is 
sometimes qualified with reminders about his political and philosophical 
commitment to a critical Marxism. But these experimental moments are still there 
for us to consider because, as Christopher Holman comments, Marcuse treated 
“Marxist theory as a living body of ideas constantly in flux, as a lively bundle of 
forces and tendencies that recombine and reorganize themselves in various ways…” 
(Holman 2013, p.5).  
 First, Marcuse argues that the implementation of automation in productive 
processes makes the Marxist labour theory of value an anachronistic concept:  
The technological change which tends to do away with the machine as 
individual instrument of production, as “absolute unit,” seems to cancel the 
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Marxian notion of the “organic composition of capital” and with it the theory of 
the creation of surplus value. According to Marx, the machine never creates 
value but merely transfers its own value to the product, while surplus value 
remains the result of the exploitation of living labor. The machine is 
embodiment of human labor power, and through it, past labor (dead labor) 
preserves itself and determines living labor. Now automation seems to alter 
qualitatively the relation between dead and living labor; it tends toward where 
productivity is determined “by the machines, and not by the individual output.” 
… [T]he very measurement of individual output becomes impossible…. 
(Marcuse 1991, p.28) 
 
Quoting at length, a few pages later, Marx’s own prescience about the death of his 
labour theory of value at the hands of automation,3 Marcuse then reconsiders the 
economic meaning of modern technology’s replacing of the “extensive utilization of 
human labor power in material production” (Marcuse 1991, p.37). When labour 
time becomes irrelevant to the output of automated production processes, the 
transfer of value to a commodity is indeterminate. Moreover, the multiple inputs 
and multiple outputs of automated technology “transubstantiate” labour power. 
Individual labour cannot be isolated in this conceptual soup of “joint” production; in 
fact, it is not exactly clear how new capitalist production processes still depend on 
the direct exploitation of human labour. 
 To be sure, Marcuse connects the implementation of automation to the 
Marxist thesis that capitalists attempt to raise “the productivity of labor” through 
advances in technology (Marcuse 1991, p.37). His conclusions about automation, 
however, are certainly unorthodox with respect to the economics-politics 
separation in Marxism. By undermining the economic rationale for capitalism’s 
reliance on labour power, the institution of automation suggests that the class 
struggle between the wage labourer and the capitalist is now much more about 
                                                        
3 The quotation is from the Grundrisse, and Marcuse provides his own English translation in One-
Dimensional Man (Marcuse 1991, pp.35–36). 
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authority and control than productivity, even on the factory floor. If “the very 
measure of individual output becomes impossible” in light of automated technology, 
the purchase of variable capital (labour) through the wage contract is an 
indeterminate measure of individual exploitation and the extraction of surplus 
value.  However, when capitalism is understood as a “system of domination,” the 
purchase of workers through the wage contract can be interpreted another way. 
Capitalists “value” the working class for what they refrain from doing when work is 
tightly controlled: using their power in numbers and their collective human 
creativity to disturb technological rationality and the pecuniary interests of the 
ruling class (Marcuse 1991, p.35).  
 Second, Marcuse reconceptualizes the implicit separation between 
economics and politics in Weber’s distinction between formal and substantive 
rationality. On the basis of Weber’s definition of formal rationality, the economy 
appears to be its own sphere. The quantitative terms of economic rationality are 
formal, and processes such as profit opportunities and the distribution of goods can 
be calculated in “value-free scientific purity” (Marcuse 1968a, p.210). Conversely, 
there is no purely formal logic of political power. Politics contains irrational 
elements like charisma, and political decisions always have social values and morals 
embedded in them. Hence, politics operates according to substantive rationality. 
 Marcuse updates Weber’s presentation of how formal and substantive 
rationalities relate to each other in modern society. For Weber, these two types of 
rationality keep touching because economic rationality also refers, by virtue of being 
formalistic and abstract, to the “external source” that defines the ends of its 
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instrumental calculations. For Marcuse, Weber was correct to think that the 
“external source” of economic rationality is political. However, for Marcuse, political 
power is no longer “outside” economic activity; no longer is substantial rationality 
something that is reserved for governments, courts and other political authorities. 
The seemingly formal rationality of business enterprise is also substantive. Giant 
firms do not simply calculate profits and losses, nor do they produce according to 
the “value-free” ends of a market. Rather, they themselves have the institutional 
means to create a technological apparatus that is the “congealed spirit” of their own 
vested interests.  Thus, Marcuse concludes that capitalism, “no matter how 
mathematized and ‘scientific,’ remains the mathematized, technological domination 
of men [and women]” (Marcuse 1968a, p.215). 
 Marcuse’s description of capitalist rationality is similar to his concept of 
technological rationality, which he developed 20 years earlier. Technological 
rationality also blurs the line between economics and politics because, again, the 
techniques of economics do not comprise a sub-system that is oriented by a political 
power that is either above or outside it:  
As the laws and mechanisms of technological rationality spread over the whole 
society, they develop a set of truth values of their own which hold good for the 
functioning of the apparatus—and for that alone. Propositions concerning 
competitive or collusive behavior, business methods, principles of effective 
organization and control, fair play, the use of science and technics are true and 
false in terms of this value system, that is to say, in terms of instrumentalities 
that dictate their own ends. (Marcuse 2005b, p.146)  
 
Both of Marcuse’s essays note the historical change of business enterprise in the 
twentieth century—the increasing size and scope of large-scale industry, which 
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supersedes, among other things, the small individual entrepreneur (Marcuse 1968a, 
p.224).  
  
Using the Frankfurt School to Look Beyond Marxism 
 
 So far, we have seen how Pollock, Neumann and Marcuse renovated the 
theoretical separation between economics and politics in order to better understand 
the role of power in capital accumulation. This type of renovation gives us a 
platform to look beyond Marxism. A reconceptualization of the economics-politics 
separation should extend to the definition of capital itself.  
 As mentioned above, the Frankfurt School had no explicit intention to break 
from historical materialist philosophy. However, its analysis of capitalist power 
cannot help but become entangled with Marxism’s assumptions about the economic 
nature of capital; there is an underlying incompatibility between the Frankfurt 
School’s approach to historical materialism and the Marxist understanding of capital 
because the latter roots economic activity in the productivity of labour, not 
institutional power.  
 Secondary studies commonly attempt to reconcile, in one way or another, the 
Frankfurt School’s interest in capitalist power with the Marxist concept of capital. 
One type of approach, which Marramao’s and Postone’s theory represent, argues 
that a “return” to Marx’s labour theory of value can temper the Frankfurt School’s 
enthusiastic reconfiguration of politics and economics. Pollock’s interest in state 
capitalism, Neumann’s concern with fascism and Marcuse’s Welfare-Warfare state 
are all historically grounded, but this characteristic, ironically, irritates Marxist 
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approaches that maintain that capital accumulation during this period was 
misunderstood: the labour theory of value and its theoretical truths only appeared 
to have been superseded by totalitarianism and state power. Another approach 
credits the Frankfurt School and a few others, like Lukacs and Korsch, for 
developing a more holistic method than classical Marxist theory (Jay 1984; Kellner 
1989). The concept of totality, according to this approach, replaces the base-
superstructure model, which is what led classical Marxism to make unhelpful 
economics-politics splits.  
 Although these two secondary interpretations have different methods of 
reconciliation, both fail to adequately consider the Frankfurt School’s inadvertent 
effect on the economic assumptions of Marxism. The Marxist framework requires 
that, when needed, the economics of labour, production and value creation be 
conceptually isolated from concepts of power, including ideology and state 
repression; otherwise, the mixture of politics and economics makes it impossible to 
claim that only the exploitation of productive labour is directly responsible for the 
creation of surplus value.  
 In fact, Pollock, Neumann and Marcuse challenge the assumptions of Marxist 
economics in ways that other political economists, who say so much more about the 
technical details of monopolization and the structure of the modern corporation 
than the Frankfurt School, do not. For example, the materialist underpinnings of 
Marxist political economy led Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy to retain the economics-
politics separation in their theory of Monopoly Capital. On the one hand, Baran and 
Sweezy developed their own theory of monopoly capital because, hitherto, the 
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existence of monopolies had only been theorized as “quantitative modifications of 
the basic Marxist laws of capitalism.” In our contemporary age, we need to 
understand how monopolization has introduced a qualitative difference:  
Today the typical economic unit in the capitalist world is not the small firm 
producing a negligible fraction of a homogeneous output for an anonymous 
market but a large-scale enterprise producing a significant share of the output 
of an industry, or even several industries, and able to control its prices, the 
volume of its production, and the types and amounts of its investments…. It is 
therefore impermissible to ignore monopoly in constructing our model of the 
economy and to go on treating competition as the general case. (Baran & 
Sweezy 1966, p.6) 
 
On the other hand, the Monopoly Capital theory does not let its interest in power 
undermine its belief that the structural laws of monopoly capitalism rest on the 
productivity of material production. The power for a monopoly or coordinated 
oligopoly to acquire a profit greater than is possible in a competitive market is still, 
in Baran and Sweezy’s framework, a secondary phenomenon of accumulation; 
income signifies “an economic surplus,” which is still an “index of productivity and 
wealth” (Baran & Sweezy 1966, p.9). 
 Thus, in juxtaposition with Baran and Sweezy’s theoretical approach, 
Neumann’s own characterization of monopoly power does not liberally blur the line 
between politics and economics because Behemoth is about Nazi Germany, a 
totalitarian society whose business practices Horkheimer would describe as 
“gangsterism” (Horkheimer 2005c; Kellner 1989). Rather, the slight but significant 
difference between Neumann and Baran and Sweezy lies elsewhere. The latter’s 
interest in the destructive (institutionalized waste) and ideological (the sales effort) 
processes of giant corporations do not change the theoretical centrality of labour, 
production and material stock (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.51). Institutionalized waste 
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and the sales effort of modern advertising are designed to counterbalance monopoly 
capitalism’s inability to absorb the wealth of a growing economic surplus (Baran & 
Sweezy 1966). By comparison, Neumann is exploring how concentrated ownership 
and monopolistic organization create profit opportunities that have little to do with 
productivity or any index thereof; he is open to the idea that organized capitalists 
can accumulate through gangsterism. 
 
Reincorporating the Labour Theory of Value 
 
 Marxist political economists will sometimes put the Frankfurt School “in 
context” by pointing out its political economic blind spots. Writers such as Neumann 
and Pollock, it is argued, experienced an exceptional phase of twentieth century 
capitalism. The size and reach of state institutions were easy to see in the 1930s and 
1940s, but totalitarian politics also hid the economic contradictions of capitalism 
from view (Marramao 1975). Consequently, the Frankfurt School overstated its case 
when it suggested that, in advanced capitalism, the growth of political power and 
the intensification of social domination had transformed the character of capital 
accumulation. For example, when Pollock inferred that “economics as social science 
has lost its object under state capitalism” this was, according to Marramao, a 
mistake. Pollock was experiencing “the illusory character of the ‘alien power’ of the 
fetishized forms of the economic process, while accepting as reality the 
uncontradictory and ‘one-dimensional’ facade of socialized despotism” (Marramao 
1975, p.74). In other words, Marramao deems the theoretical reconciliation of 
Marxism and the Frankfurt School to be straightforward: the Frankfurt School 
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should never have distanced its analysis from the mode of production and the 
Marxist labour theory of value in the first place.  
 Similarly, Postone argues that the Frankfurt School, like Sweezy and the 
Monopoly Capital theory, imagined a qualitative difference where there was none. 
Advanced capitalism may have jettisoned “the non-conscious, ‘automatic,’ market-
mediated mode of distribution,” but the truth of Marx’s labour theory of value is 
undamaged as capitalism evolves: 
[value] is not merely a category of the market, one that grasps a historically 
particular mode of the social distribution of wealth. Such a market-centered 
interpretation—which relates to Mill’s position that the mode of distribution is 
changeable historically but the mode of production is not—implies the 
existence of a transhistorical form of wealth that is distributed differently in 
different societies. According to Marx, however, value is a historically specific 
form of social wealth and is intrinsically related to a historically specific mode 
of production. (Postone 1996, p.25)  
 
Thus, according to Postone, we must understand that new dimensions of 
contemporary society cannot disturb the “underlying continuity” of value theory. 
Marx’s theory of economic value had already anticipated historical change.  
These criticisms of critical theory put the cart before the horse. They seem to 
acknowledge that advanced capitalism possesses new qualities, but they do not 
allow these changes to the nature of capitalism to test the validity of Marx’s logical 
structure. Rather, the logic of the labour theory of value is some sort of 
transcendental “corrective” that tells Postone that the appearances of state 
capitalism or totalitarian capitalism are just that: misleading appearances of 
something more essential. The essence of exchange value is now a permanent 
economic truth that will exist as long as capitalism continues. Capitalist societies can 
oscillate between market fundamentalism and repressive authoritarianism; the 
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technological infrastructure can multiply in size and complexity; and monopoly 
power can grow with the concentration of ownership and the depression of market 
competition—but any form of capitalist domination will necessarily obey the same 
temporal logic of labour time: the “magnitude of value of an individual commodity 
is… a function of the socially necessary labor time required for its production” 
(Postone 1996, p.193). 
 As Alfred Schmidt argues (in his critique of Althusser), arguments about the 
logical structure of Marxist theory can easily misrepresent Marx’s dialectical method 
(Schmidt 1981). For Marx, a theoretical framework becomes “poorer in definition” 
as more and more historical moments are deemed “external,” “accidental” or 
“inessential” to the theory (Schmidt 1981, p.68). Thus, it is hardly victory for 
Marxism if Marramao and Postone show us where the Frankfurt School’s historical 
insights diverge from Marx’s labour theory of value. In fact, the burden of proof is on 
Marxism to demonstrate that its theory of value is still usable when visible changes 
to the structure of capitalism suggest that labour cannot adequately explain capital 
accumulation.4 On this point, Marramao and Postone are going sideways rather than 
                                                        
4 There is certainly no shortage of contemporary academics working to bring the labour theory of 
value into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Updates involve the expansion of the world 
market (Mandel), economic and financial crises (Foley 2012) and the evolution of technology and the 
need for capitalists to employ immaterial labour (Dyer-Witheford 1999). Similarly to Postone, many 
of these scholars simply assume that the economic exploitation of productive labour has to be the 
theoretical touchstone on which everything rests. Either longstanding forms of productive work are 
now exploited more intensely (Braverman 1998) or new avenues of exploitation are found in labour 
that has been subsumed under capitalism, such as intellectual and cultural work (Shapiro 2009). The 
centrality of productive labour is also seen in the negative: many of the crises of the twentieth 
century revolved around the structural compulsion for capitalists to realize surplus value (Kliman 
2012). 
 
Our critique is not about the political aspects of the class struggle; Marx provided a very rich picture 
of how, in the history of capitalism, the treatment and conditions of the proletariat are visible 
expressions of capitalism’s repressive and irrational tendencies. Rather, the issue is about the theory 
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forward. Not once is the labour theory of value empirically tested for its role in 
capital accumulation. 
 How do we justify claiming that the productivity of labour is primary or 
essential when advanced capitalism has other methods of capital accumulation? 
Consider, for example, the modern phenomenon of inflation. In the era of classical 
political economy, inflation was not a key factor. Instead, the theoretical 
frameworks of great theorists like Marx were, according to Nitzan and Bichler, 
developed in a “deflationary context” in which “consumer prices in Great Britain and 
wholesale prices in the United States both dropped by more than one third.” Thus, it 
“was only natural to concentrate on production and the coercive discipline of 
‘market forces’ and to ignore inflation” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.367). Yet classical 
theories about the value of productivity are now, at the very least, partially outdated 
as a result of the contemporary phenomena of ongoing inflation and powerful 
trends of stagflation (inflation + stagnant growth). Furthermore, the ability to 
accumulate through inflation is much more consistent with a theory that 
emphasizes institutional power, not production. As Nitzan and Bichler demonstrate, 
the power of dominant firms to establish higher-than-average markups is not only a 
significant means of income redistribution, but also “positively related to firm size…. 
[The] larger the firm, the greater and more systematic its differential gains from 
inflation” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.374). 
                                                                                                                                                                     
of economic value. How much is capital accumulation in advanced capitalism explained by the 
productive output of labour? One-hundred percent? Fifty percent? Even less? Marxist political 
economy often gives an unconvincing answer to this question because its reasons for applying the 
labour theory of value are far more philosophical than historical and empirical—i.e., on the basis of 
how Marx defined capital accumulation, it is safe to assume that the historical evolution of capitalism 
will never have anything other than productive labour as the essential magnitude of value. 
  
 
52 
 
Critical Theory and the Marxist Concept of Totality 
 
As much as Postone critiques the Frankfurt School for its political economic 
ideas, he also recognizes that the writings of the Frankfurt School helped twentieth 
century Marxists rejuvenate the dialectical method of historical materialism. 
Moreover, Postone follows in the footsteps of the Frankfurt School and uses 
dialectical logic to construct a concept of the capitalist totality. The capitalist totality, 
in the words of Postone, “refers to the domination of people by abstract, quasi-
independent structures of social relations, mediated by commodity-determined 
labor, which Marx tries to grasp with his categories of value and capital.” 
Consequently, the study of the entire capitalist universe will relate to the details of 
its grain of sand, the capitalist mode of production: 
… the Marxian critique is a critique of labor in capitalism, rather than merely a 
critique of labor’s exploitation and mode of social distribution, and… the 
fundamental contradiction of the capitalist totality should be seen as intrinsic to 
the realm of production itself, and not simply a contradiction between the 
spheres of production and distribution. (Postone 1996, p.124) 
 
Other Marxist theorists commend the Frankfurt School for resuscitating the 
philosophical rigour of Hegel and Marx, and for replacing the base-superstructure 
model with a concept of totality (Ollman 1976; Jay 1984; Jay 1996; Kellner 1989). 
With respect to the economics-politics separation, this type of remodelling is often 
deemed to be sufficient. The base-superstructure model is what kept economics and 
politics separate, and any politics-economics dualism is a bad habit. According to 
Bloch, it is the “vulgar” Marxists who forget “that the economy, which can never be 
isolated, is made by human individuals, as is politics, which can never be isolated” 
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(Bloch 1988, p.27). From this perspective, the Frankfurt School’s concept of totality 
helps keep politics and economics in a good dialectical relationship, which enables 
us to understand how production and power are mutually constitutive.  
 However, is the Marxist concept of totality, and all that it implies 
methodologically, sufficient to answer our critique of the politics-economics 
separation in political economic theory? In order to clarify that the issue is not 
dialectics as such, let us briefly address the dialectical method and the foundations 
of critical theory. The problem is that, in order to be able to say something specific 
about capital accumulation, the Marxist concept of capital requires that economics 
always be cleanly isolatable. Otherwise, all of this talk about the capitalist totality—
with its multiple social dimensions—can obscure a theory of value that delimits 
productive labour as the only source of surplus value while excluding otherwise 
important power processes as unproductive.  
 The concept of totality is methodologically crucial for any critical theory of 
society. Capitalism is not just a mode of production; it is mode of being, a society and 
a way of life. The idea of totality requires that we ground seemingly disparate facts 
in the same social condition. For Lukacs, a concept of totality is dialectical thinking 
unleashed: “… the dialectical conception of totality can enable us to understand 
reality as a social process” (Lukacs 1968, p.13). Marx’s method is holistic largely 
because it is dialectical. “The concrete is concrete,” writes Marx, “because it is the 
concentration of many determinations, hence unity of the diverse” (Marx 1993, 
p.101). This “concentration of many determinations” is conceptualized when theory 
searches for the social reality that each thing or idea presupposes. Exchange value, 
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for example, “presupposes population, moreover a population producing in specific 
relations; as well as a certain kind of family, or commune, or state, etc. It can never 
exist as an abstract, one-sided relation within an already given, concrete, living 
whole” (Marx 1993, p.101). The concept of a capitalist totality overcomes the bad 
habit of dividing society into strict analytical categories. Fallacies accumulate when 
we think that spheres of society have clearly demarcated boundaries—almost as if 
institutional structures and networks of social relations self-align according to the 
rigid division of academic disciplines. 
 To develop their concepts of the capitalist totality, members of the Frankfurt 
School took their research in all sorts of directions, including science, aesthetics, 
psychoanalysis and philosophy. The school also considered the epistemology of 
holistic social analysis. These studies of epistemology have a distinct flavour. As 
described by Martin Jay, the general tenets of critical theory were, from its 
inception, “expressed through a series of critiques of other thinkers and 
philosophical traditions” (Jay 1996, p.41). For example, Horkheimer’s critique of 
“traditional theory” was the first major project of the Frankfurt School. This critique 
enabled Horkheimer to propose that an alternative “critical theory” could build a 
much more holistic analysis of social and political domination.   
 Traditional theory is defined by its ignorant relationship with the larger 
social processes that condition each branch of knowledge. This ignorance is not the 
same as conceptual isolation, which is often required for scientific activity to focus 
its experiments on particular variables. Instead, the ignorance of traditional theory 
rests in the social values, structures, institutions and relations that condition the 
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application of theoretical knowledge. Consequently, traditional theory prides itself 
for its intellectual self-sufficiency or value-free neutrality, but it also lacks a 
“concrete awareness” of its role in the greater social division of labour (Horkheimer 
2002b, p.216). For Horkheimer, it is telling that the value-free neutrality of 
traditional theory and its place and function in society contradict. The “real social 
function of science is not made manifest; it speaks not of what theory means in 
human life, but only of what it means in the isolated sphere in which for historical 
reasons it comes into existence” (Horkheimer 2002b, p.197). 
 With respect to its formal structures, critical theory is similar to traditional 
theory.  “The critical theory of society,” writes Horkheimer, “also begins with 
abstract determinations.... In critical theory, as in traditional theory, specific 
elements must be introduced in order to move from fundamental structure to 
concrete reality” (Horkheimer 2002b, p.225).5 However, critical theory consciously 
seeks to overcome traditional theory’s ignorance. Capitalist society runs on an 
engine of particular social values—class, wealth, profit, power, modern technology, 
etc.—and traditional theory is unable to recognize “its positive role in a functioning 
society, [its] indirect and obscure relation to the satisfaction of general needs, and 
[its] participation in the self-renewing life process” (Horkheimer 2002b, p.216). 
Thus, critical theory reminds itself that a theory becomes one-sided when the 
complex totality of modern society is lost from view:  
                                                        
5 In similar fashion, Marcuse thinks that the abstractness of critical theory is not unique: “... critical 
philosophic thought is necessarily transcendent and abstract. Philosophy shares this abstractness 
with all genuine thought, for nobody really thinks who does not abstract from that which is given, 
who does not relate the facts to the factors which have made them, who does not—in [her] mind—
undo the facts. Abstractness is the very life of thought, the token of its authenticity” (Marcuse 1991, 
p.134). 
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… separated from a particular theory of society as a whole, every theory of 
cognition remains formalistic and abstract. Not only expressions like life and 
promotion, but also terms seemingly specific to cognitive theory such as 
verification, confirmation, proof, etc., remain vague and indefinite... if they do 
not stand in relation to real history and receive their definition by being part of 
a comprehensive theoretical unity. (Horkheimer 2005a, p.426)  
 
 To my knowledge, Horkheimer did not use the term “traditional theory” in 
any published writing other than “Traditional and Critical Theory.” However, the 
term clearly inspired Horkheimer to continue critiquing theoretical systems for not 
overcoming  “the one-sidedness that necessarily arises when limited intellectual 
processes are detached from their matrix in the total activity of society” 
(Horkheimer 2002b, p.199). For example, he detected one-sidedness in the 
metaphysical systems of Western philosophy. From the heights of metaphysics, the 
details of history are almost invisible. And similarly to traditional theory, 
metaphysics then reifies what its methods cannot adequately describe: it “takes the 
most general characteristics, the elements as it were, which are common to all men 
in all times and calls them ‘concrete’” (Horkheimer 2002a, p.18). 
 Horkheimer and other members of the Frankfurt School also argued that the 
base-superstructure model was producing a one-sidedness within Marxist theory 
(Kellner 1989, p.11). In Counterrevolution and Revolt, Marcuse argues that the base-
superstructure model is an impediment to dialectical thought because it freezes 
historical analysis in a manner similar to traditional theory: “To isolate the identical 
capitalist base from the other sectors of society leaves Marxian theory at its very 
foundation with an unhistorical, undialectical abstraction” (Marcuse 1972, p.33). In 
the section of Minima Moralia titled “Baby with the Bath Water,” Adorno takes a 
similar stance. Addressing the problematic way in which culture is stripped of any 
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autonomy in the base-superstructure model, Adorno criticizes those who put all of 
their theoretical and practical energy into the so-called objective tendencies of the 
capitalist economy (Adorno 2005, p.44). 
  
Is the Marxist Concept of Totality Satisfactory? 
 
 In light of the growing number of holistic Marxist approaches,6 the Frankfurt 
School’s position on the base-superstructure model can no longer be considered 
unorthodox. In fact, defenders and critics of Marxism can actually agree that the 
base-superstructure model is far too rigid for any theory that calls itself “dialectical.” 
For instance, Castoriadis’s criticism of Marxism mirrors Terry Eagleton’s defence of 
a Marxist approach that can mix economics with everything else:  
… there is not, nor has there ever been, an inertia of the rest of social life, nor a 
privileged passivity of the “superstructures.” These superstructures are no 
more than a fabric of social relations, neither more nor less “real,” neither more 
nor less “inert” than the others, and just as “conditioned” by the [base] as the 
[base is] by them, if the word “conditioned” can be used to designate the mode 
of coexistence of the various moments or aspects of social activities. 
(Castoriadis 1998, p.20) 
 
As opposed to: 
 
Politics, culture, science, ideas and social existence are not just economics in 
disguise…. They have their own reality, evolve their own histories and operate 
by their own logic…. The traffic between economic “base” and social 
“superstructure” … is not just one way. (Eagleton 2011, p.113) 
 
Bertell Ollman too wants to dissuade us from associating Marxism with economic 
determinism. While determinism appears to surface in places like the preface to A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, many of Marx’s writings, according 
                                                        
6 A list of holistic Marxist approaches would likely include the theories of Adorno, Bloch, Gramsci, 
Korsch, Lefebvre, Lukacs, Marcuse and Merleau-Ponty (Ollman 1976; Jay 1984).  
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to Ollman, are not fundamentalist about the linearity of the base-superstructure 
model. In fact, when Marx’s method is understood in the proper light, “‘Economic 
Determinism’… appears to be a caricature foisted upon Marxism by readers who 
misread [Marx’s] general claims” (Ollman 1976, p.9).  
 Yet the deterministic relationship between base and superstructure is not 
the only barrier to a more dialectically robust theory of capitalism. A radically 
holistic method can easily undermine labour’s privileged position in capital 
accumulation. Therefore, in Marxism, the necessity to isolate production in general 
and labour in particular demarcates the limit of dialectical mediation, even without 
the base-superstructure model.  
 Interestingly, this point is sensed by one of Marxism’s most esteemed writers 
on the place of culture in historical materialism: Raymond Williams. While Williams 
believes theorists should study much more than the economic structure of 
capitalism, he also thinks Marxism should recognize that the idea of totality can 
undermine the core purpose of Marxist theory: 
The totality of social practices was opposed to this layered notion of base and a 
consequent superstructure.… Now the language of totality has become common, 
and it is indeed in many ways more acceptable than the notion of base and 
superstructure. But with one very important reservation. It is very easy for the 
notion of totality to empty of its essential content the original Marxist 
proposition. For if we come to say that society is composed of a large number of 
social practices which form a concrete social whole, and if we give to each 
practice a certain specific recognition, adding only that they interact, relate and 
combine in very complicated ways, we are at one level much more obviously 
talking about reality, but we are at another level withdrawing from the claim 
that there is any process of determination.... If totality is simply concrete, if it is 
simply the recognition of a large variety of miscellaneous and contemporaneous 
practices, then it is essentially empty of any content that could be called 
Marxist. (Williams 2005, pp.35–36) 
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The general thrust of Williams’ concern is warranted; weak or missing theoretical 
principles will produce amorphous theories. Yet Williams is also defending what we 
are critiquing. He argues that Marxism has the theoretical principles to prevent itself 
from becoming a formless analysis of capitalism. Starting from the assumption that 
economic exploitation is a definable process, Marxism can then branch out and 
explain the existence of the state, the military, the church and the educational 
system; it can help us see the ideological character of affirmative culture, positive 
philosophy and common sense; and it can include the developments of technology, 
science, art and language. Moreover, this concept of totality does not relapse into a 
simple concept of superstructure because this complex of social relations—the 
totality—is not, according to Williams, “secondary” to the economy. Rather, our 
political and cultural values saturate the “consciousness of society,” including our 
economic behaviour (Williams 2005, p.37).7   
 Yet if the Marxist concept of capital is assumed to be correct, the mixture of 
politics and economics produces an additional methodological step: we need to 
demonstrate that, from within this mixture, Marxism’s categorical distinction 
between power and productive processes will help us say something specific about 
capital accumulation. Unfortunately, Marxism’s assumption that value is a 
productive magnitude makes it difficult to demonstrate what, from a more holistic 
perspective, political activity adds to our understanding of accumulation and its 
denomination in labour time.  
                                                        
7 Williams’ argument is inspired by Gramsci’s concept of hegemony (Williams 2005, pp.37–40). 
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In “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses,” for instance, Althusser relies 
on the Marxist definitions of economic value and the reproduction of labour power 
to mix his presentation of ideology and institutional power with material production 
(Althusser 2001). The basis for this particular politics-economics mixture is Marx’s 
claim that the market value of labour power is always tied to what social 
reproduction means in each culture. In agreement with Marx and Engels, Althusser 
states that the “quantity of value (wages) necessary for the reproduction of labour 
power is determined not by the needs of a ‘biological’ Guaranteed Minimum Wage… 
alone, but by the needs of a historical minimum…” (Althusser 2001, p.88). Althusser 
then paints a picture in which almost every social institution, except for the police 
and the military, is a factor in the ideological reproduction of the worker.  
 To be sure, Althusser’s presentation initially appears to be an impressive 
showcase of how ideological social reproduction and material labour are not 
separate but, rather, mutually constitutive elements in a dialectical whole. But 
Althusser’s enthusiastic mixture of ideology and labour time actually does Marxist 
economics no favours. The economic aspect of the argument must somehow 
decipher how this multitude of ideological state apparatuses affects the quantitative 
level of the wage rate, the value of which is expressed as “a definite quantity of the 
means of subsistence” (Marx 1990, p.276). Forgetting for the moment the more 
important problem that the wage rate is expressed in prices, and not in abstract 
labour time, the exchange value of labour power, both simple and complex, now 
somehow refers to an ideological complex of media, religion, law, education and 
family. But which political and cultural aspects of social reproduction are 
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simultaneously economic factors, and how do we calculate the value of ideology as a 
means of subsistence? We have wage data in prices, but to know the value of labour 
power, we must first know what constitutes the “means of subsistence” in advanced 
capitalism. What aspects of advanced capitalism allow the “owner of labour-power” 
to maintain what Marx called the “normal state as a working individual”? (Marx 
1990, p.275) For instance, as of 2014, 116.3 million American homes have a 
television (Nielsen 2014). Does this popularity make television consumption a 
necessary factor in the ideological reproduction of the contemporary worker? If so, 
the cost of reproducing contemporary labour power must include the economic 
value of television sets. This example means that we must also have definitive views 
on the role of a great multitude of commodities, as social reproduction might also 
include cinema, religion, family, coffee, alcohol, cars, sports, the Internet and so on.  
 Because of the economics-politics separation in Marxism, the role of ideology 
in capital accumulation must pass through a confusing two-step method, whereby 
politics and culture are unproductive themselves, but they are also the “social 
conditions” of productive processes. The confusions about this two-step method 
multiply as institutional power and ideology increase in importance and complexity. 
Note, for instance, that Althusser is not simply saying that capitalists can accumulate 
through ideology. Rather, ideology is unproductive political and cultural power that 
is indirectly productive; ideology is somehow a large, multi-sided factor in the value 
of labour power, which then determines how long it will take a rate of exploitation 
to create a surplus of value.  
  
 
62 
 Conversely, a holistic Marxist theory will also pay a heavy price if it is 
unwilling or uninterested in applying, in more historically specific terms, the 
assumptions about what is and is not included in magnitudes of value. When boldly 
journeying into the realms of politics and culture without a clear distinction 
between political power and economic exploitation, the Marxist framework is able 
to produce only abstract descriptions of capital accumulation. Marcuse sometimes 
draws, for example, an imprecise picture of the accumulation of surplus value in 
advanced capitalism:  
The directing and organizing power of Gesamtkapital [(capital as a whole)] 
confronts the productive power of the Gesamtarbeiter (collective labour force): 
each individual becomes a mere fragment or atom in the coordinated mass of 
the population which, separated from control of means of production, creates 
the global surplus value. (Marcuse 1972, p.11)  
 
Similarly, Postone seems content to speak about economic exploitation at a high 
level of abstraction. With little interest in being more specific about how we 
measure capital accumulation in a social totality that is comprised of economics, 
politics and other dimensions, Postone can only use Marx’s concepts of use value, 
exchange value, commodification and labour time as general social-philosophical 
terms. Consider part of Postone’s answer to an interviewer who wants to know how 
we can avoid “slipping into a kind of metaphorics” when describing the dual 
character of the commodity: 
Marx grounds the form of production in capitalism as well as its trajectory of 
growth with reference to his analysis of the dynamic nature of capital. I tried 
to work out the general character of the dynamic as a treadmill dialectic. It’s 
this treadmill dialectic that generates the historical possibility for the abolition 
of proletariat labor. It renders such labor anachronistic while, at the same 
time, reaffirming its necessity. This historical dialectic entails processes of 
ongoing transformation, as well as the ongoing reproduction of the underlying 
conditions of the whole. As capital develops, however, the necessity imposed 
by the forms that underlie this dialectic increasingly remains a necessity for 
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capital alone; it becomes less and less a necessity for human life. In other 
words, capital and human life become historically separated. (Postone & 
Brennan 2009, p.314) 
 
Similarly to the abstractness of metaphysics, here we have truth claims stacked on 
top of truth claims about a historical process that should have concrete, observable 
details.  
When the methodological implications of the economics-politics separation 
are overlooked, secondary interpretations of the Frankfurt School can also imply 
that abstract ideas about the capitalist totality are sufficient to explain capital 
accumulation. Jameson, for example, states that Adorno’s presentation of the social 
division of labour and the mechanization of human beings in capitalist production is 
“itself dialectical and includes Marx’s analysis of the organic composition of capital 
as such” (Jameson 2007, p.71). To a Marxist political economist, this identification of 
Adorno with the organic composition of capital is at best misleading. The organic 
composition of capital is fundamentally a quantitative relationship (c/v) that is 
related to the rate of surplus value (s/v) and the rate of profit (s/(c + v)). 
Furthermore, the organic composition of capital is a weak concept when presented 
in the abstract; Marx argued that historical circumstances, such as foreign trade and 
the depression of wages below the value of labour power, could act as 
“counteracting tendencies” to the falling rate of profit.8 Adorno’s writings are 
monumental in importance, but nowhere in them do we find such a commitment to 
                                                        
8 Fine and Saad-Filho explain how “counteracting tendencies” also have a quantitative relationship to 
the organic composition of capital: “If we write r = s/(c + v), it follows that anything that reduces c or 
v, and anything that increases s, tends to increase r. The production of relative surplus value does all 
these, because the increase in productivity implies a reduction in the value of c and v (whether 
directly in the wage goods sector or indirectly through its use of lower valued raw materials) and an 
increase in s, through the reduction of v (given the real wage)” (Fine & Saad-Filho 2004, p.113). 
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the technical details of value theory. Even his repeated use of the category 
“exchange-value” is not meant to clarify how the quantification of exchange value 
would be measured. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Although the Frankfurt School is not free from some of the methodological 
problems that are being criticized in this chapter, Pollock, Neumann and Marcuse 
are influential for recognizing that theories of capitalism, prevailing at their time, 
might not have been keeping pace with the types of historical development that 
began in the early decades of the twentieth century. In fact, their curiosity about the 
nature of capital accumulation in advanced capitalism is a testament to how critical 
theory understands itself to be dialectical. “The name of dialectics,” writes Adorno,  
says no more… than that objects do not go into their concepts without leaving a 
remainder, that they come to contradict the traditional norm of adequacy…. 
Dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity. It does not begin by taking a 
standpoint. My thought is driven to it by its own inevitable insufficiency, by my 
guilt of what I am thinking. (Adorno 1973, p.5) 
 
No longer can an abstraction stand as a “timeless eternal” form; a concept is only 
valid if it is relevant to a social reality and “the practice of the associated 
individuals” (Marcuse 1968e, p.87).  
 The Frankfurt School disrupts our impulse to assume that, in capitalism, 
economic categories should specifically or mostly focus on the productivity behind 
the creation and distribution of value. When power processes intervene in the 
theoretical link between capital accumulation and material production, it cannot be 
true that production and power are distinguished by virtue of what the former 
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explains and the latter does not: the so-called “real” productive engine of profit. 
Such a separation lingers within Marxism, despite its intention to provide a critique 
of capitalist processes and their effects on individuals inside and outside of work. 
The Marxist framework, even when holistic, still forces an unhelpful split between 
economics and politics.  
 Alternatively, the political economic adventures of the Frankfurt School give 
us a greater opportunity to rethink the economics-politics relationship. If capitalists 
can accumulate through power, then we can redefine the concept of capital 
according to the modern business functions of monopoly, command, automation, 
ideology and so on. Such a redefinition might leave some of Marxism’s key economic 
assumptions behind, but this might be the cost of better understanding social 
domination under advanced capitalism. And as Marcuse’s reflections on his studies 
of Heidegger show, a self-reflective, curious attitude can reveal to us where 
conceptual barriers lie: 
To me and my friends, Heidegger’s work appeared as a new beginning: we 
experienced his book... as, at long last, a concrete philosophy: here there was 
talk of existence, of our existence, of fear and care and boredom, and so forth.... 
Only gradually did we begin to observe that the concreteness of Heidegger’s 
philosophy was to a large extent deceptive—that we were once again 
confronted with a variant of transcendental philosophy (on a higher plane), in 
which existential categories had lost their sharpness, been neutralized, and in 
the end were dissipated amid greater abstractions. That remained the case later 
on when the “question of Being” was replaced by the “question of technology”: 
merely another instance in which apparent concreteness was subsumed by 
abstraction—bad abstraction, in which the concrete was not genuinely 
superseded but instead merely squandered. (Marcuse 2005a, p.176)  
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Chapter 2 
The Marxist Concept of Capital and the Study of Mass Culture 
 
Introduction 
 
 In 1961, Leo Lowenthal was concerned with the deficiency of research on the 
“negative” sides of mass culture. “It seems to me,” he wrote, “that the splendid 
isolation of the social researcher is likely to reinforce a common suspicion, namely, 
that social research is, in the final analysis, nothing but market research … a tool 
with which to prepare reluctant customers for enthusiastic spending.”  It is doubtful 
whether a social researcher would come to the same conclusion about the state of 
contemporary research. Because of academics like Lowenthal, there is no longer a 
shortage of studies that critique mass culture for its role in reinforcing unjust social 
relations. Hollywood cinema, for example, is studied for its role in legitimating 
nationalism, imperialism or orientalism (Said 1997; Kellner 2010); for reproducing 
problematic images of gender, race and class (hooks 1996; Ryan & Kellner 1988); 
and for masking its political elements with a facade that mass culture is harmless, 
apolitical fun (Adorno 1976, p.21). 
 Unfortunately, a different deficiency now lingers in contemporary research. 
Explanations of mass culture often fail to adequately explain how capital is 
accumulated from culture. Marxism is the platform for many studies of mass culture 
and, just like neoclassical economics, this framework treats valuation and 
accumulation as magnitudes of productivity. This productivist-economic approach 
obscures our understanding of capital accumulation because the concept of 
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productivity is besieged by logical and empirical problems, and these problems in 
turn make valuation and accumulation immeasurable. Concretely for our purpose 
here, these problems make it impossible to know how and to what extent socially 
necessary abstract labour time is behind the production, sale and profit of cultural 
commodities.  
 Problems with the labour theory of value arise from Marxism’s decision to 
separate power from its definition of economic value. Power is an important term in 
the Marxist framework—it helps describe the function of the state, the media, 
education, ideology, etc. Yet power only ever conditions and supports the economic 
sphere, which is where Marxism assumes that capital is valorized through the 
exploitation of labour. Consequently, Marxism must commit to its demarcation of 
economics when it claims to explain (1) the nature of value, the source of 
equivalency between commodities; (2) what produces economic value, in 
distinction from what only uses or transfers already existing value; (3) how much 
value each productive entity contributes.  
 This chapter explores the extent to which the Marxist labour theory of value 
might impede our ability to understand how the social relations of mass culture 
relate to capital accumulation. In order to empirically account for the actual 
historical processes of valuation and accumulation, Marx’s labour theory of value 
must be able to do three things: (1) reduce concrete labour to a universal unit of 
measure, socially necessary abstract labour; (2) determine what types of labour are 
productive; and (3) explain how prices reflect a chain of labour inputs. In practice, it 
is difficult if not impossible to objectively satisfy any of these three tasks. Moreover, 
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these theoretical/empirical dilemmas exist at the root of the Marxist method; they 
precede any subsequent modification to the labour theory of value. This 
predicament makes is difficult to claim that socially necessary abstract labour time 
is the universal “essence” behind the heterogeneous appearances of commodities, 
prices and profit.  
 This chapter is composed of three main parts. The first part examines 
whether we can objectively measure socially necessary abstract labour time. This 
examination is crucial since Marxism treats socially necessary abstract labour time 
as an objective value measure on which the entire capitalist mode of production and 
its associated class system rest. In fact, Marx sought to use his value theory, in the 
words of Joan Robinson, in order to “escape from sentiment and win for [his 
approach] the status of a science” (Robinson 1964, p.25). His theory doesn’t simply 
offer a moral critique of capitalism—it uses economic categories to explain the 
contradictory laws of capitalism and the logic of capital (if a, then b). 
 The next two parts subject the Marxist value theory to a “stress test”: it 
examines how this theory performs in the mass culture sector. Mass media is now 
big business, and a theory of capital accumulation should be able to explain how 
profit can be made from artworks and cultural practices. In addition, a theory of 
value that has traditionally emphasized material labour must keep step with the 
increasingly ubiquitous immaterial and ideological aspects of mass culture. 
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Theoretical Assumptions about Capitalist Production 
 
  Even when it is assumed to be true that value is the objective substance of 
capitalism, explaining why is not easy. For Marx, capital is not a “thing,” and neither 
is the objective nature of value found outside the historical movements of capitalist 
societies (Harvey 2006, p.38; Postone 1996, p.124). Nevertheless, the exchange of 
commodities refers to quantities of labour time (five hours of labour, two days of 
labour…) and each exchange value is, under competitive conditions, independent of 
the buyer and seller’s wills: 
The division of labour within society brings into contact independent producers 
of commodities, who acknowledge no authority other than that of competition, 
of the coercion exerted by the pressure of their reciprocal interests, just as in 
the animal kingdom the “war of all against all” more or less preserves the 
conditions of existence for every species. (Marx 1990, p.477) 
 
The value of each commodity on the market refers to the socially necessary labour 
time of production, which is a system-wide expression of average productivity. And 
just as the mouse cannot appeal to the hawk to arrest the natural law of predation 
and the “circle of life,” individual capitalists cannot buck system-wide competition 
over material productivity. As Paul Baran explained to Herbert Marcuse, the 
averaging of socially necessary labour time is an objective force that acts upon 
individuals: 
The fact that all profits are subject to averaging in the arithmetical sense is not 
the issue. Ex post for purposes of some calculations you can average out the 
profits of your corner grocer and of GM—this is of no consequence. Marx 
assumed—and rightly so for a competitive economy—that the averaging out 
process takes place in reality (not merely in statistics), i.e. that equal capitals 
earn equal returns in different employments in reality. (Baran 1954) 
  
 This chapter critiques Marxist approaches to mass culture for their concept 
of value: Marxism’s theoretical robustness depends on the objectivity of its concept 
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of value, yet in practice that concept is hardly if ever objective. For some Marxists, 
the objective validity of the labour theory is presumed rather than explained. At one 
end of the spectrum, we find theorists who jump right into the formal logic of value 
theory. Here we have arguments about logical consistency and discussions of 
different models—from simple commodity production to expanded reproduction 
(e.g., Wolff 1981; Harris 1972). These applications, though, tend to already 
presuppose that value is objectively measured in labour time and that this 
objectivity allows us to examine the resulting difference between the value of labour 
power and the value that is created during production.  
 At the opposite end, we find the labour theory of value being treated as just 
another quality of Marx’s social philosophy. This treatment is common in critiques 
of mass culture that integrate or rethink Marxist categories. Shane Gunster, for 
example, introduces his otherwise excellent study on the Frankfurt and Birmingham 
Schools with the following remark:  
“It is impossible to measure with any precision the extent to which human 
cultural activities are actually commodified....”  
 
An interesting claim, especially in light of what immediately follows:  
 
“… we can, however, say that the systematic pressure to harmonize culture 
with commodity is inescapable.” (Gunster 2004, p.4) 
 
But how can a theory of culture remain Marxist while denying the measurability of 
cultural commodities? Overly qualitative descriptions of labour and capital 
accumulation still rely on the quantitative dimension of Marx’s theory, regardless of 
how the latter is sometimes hidden in very abstract language. Indeed, Marxist social 
philosophy continues to orbit around the concepts of equivalent commodity 
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exchange and exploited labour time. It still assumes that capital is about the growth 
and appropriation of more and more surplus value, which is the remainder of a 
greater sum of produced value. And it continues to stress the structural imperative 
to increase the exploitation of labour—for example, Braverman’s argument that 
workers will often “thwart efforts to realize to the full the potential inherent in their 
labour power” (1998, p.69). Things fall apart if the implied quantities of these 
descriptions can never be measured explicitly. 
 Therefore, we have reason to question the objectivity of Marx’s concept of 
labour value and reassess the implication for his theory of accumulation. For the 
remainder of this section, let us consider what the Marxist labour theory of value 
presumes to measure.  
 First, value is always counted in units of abstract labour time. Whether we 
are considering constant capital, the means of subsistence or any other expression 
of value, labour time is the unit of value:  
How, then, is the magnitude of [abstract human labour] to be measured? By 
means of the quantity of the “value-forming substance,” the labour, contained in 
the article. This quantity is measured by its duration, and the labour-time is 
itself measured on the particular scale of hours, days etc. (Marx 1990, p.129)  
 
As Castoriadis argues (1984b, p.270), this “value-forming substance” must have an 
invariant unit of measurement. Otherwise, it would be impossible to apply the 
measure of labour time so broadly and consistently to include different capitalist 
processes under the same “economic laws” of productivity.  For example, the 
organic composition of capital can rise or fall with time; but this change can only 
exist, let alone be understood, if two points in the history of capitalism can be 
compared with exactly the same set of formulas and units of measure. Similarly, if 
  
 
72 
Canadian and Japanese labour are each examples of “variable capital,” they must be 
identical with respect to the unit of measurement, which is labour time.1 
 Second, socially necessary abstract labour time acts as an objective force on 
individual capitalists, just as “gravity asserts itself” when objects fall to the ground. 
It was no accident that Marx, the critic of commodity fetishism and reification, chose 
to argue that “labour-time socially necessary to produce [commodities] asserts itself 
as a regulative law of nature” (Marx 1990, p.168). The notion of commodity 
fetishism was, among other things, directed at the misinformed bourgeois 
economist, who had no explanation for why two commodities were equal in value. 
In fact, the critique of commodity fetishism confirmed that a social system could 
shape the behaviour of individuals as if it were an objective force: “… different kinds 
of private labour… are continually being reduced to the quantitative proportions in 
which society requires them” (1990, p.168).  
 Third, Marx repeatedly quantified labour time to demonstrate that the 
contradictions of the capitalist mode of production would still hold true when every 
commodity, including labour power, was exchanged at its value. These deliberate 
references to the quantifications of labour power can be held to account for their 
argumentative power. As Aristotle argues (1999, bk.1, 3, 1094b), “the educated 
person seeks exactness in each area to the extent that the nature of the subject 
                                                        
1 The magnitudes of Canadian and Japanese labour power can certainly differ from each other 
because the reproduction of labour power, for Marx, depends “on the level of civilization attained by 
a country.” Yet it is also Marx’s point that we are comparing value with value, like with like: “The 
value of labour-power can be resolved into the value of a definite quantity of the means of 
subsistence. It therefore varies with the value of the means of subsistence, i.e., with the quantity of 
labour-time required to produce them” (Marx 1990, p.276). In other words, when we compare the 
value of labour powers in different countries, we apply the same formal method: “in a given country 
at a given period,” we break the means of subsistence down into smaller quantities of labour time. 
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allows…. [I]t is just as mistaken to demand demonstrations from a rhetorician as to 
accept [merely] persuasive arguments from a mathematician.”2 Thus, Marx’s 
arguments can be judged on the exactness they strived for:  
Let the value of the linen remain constant, while the value of the coat changes. 
If, under these circumstances, the labour-time necessary for the production of 
the coat is doubled, as a result, for instance, of a poor crop of wool, we should 
have, instead of 20 yards of linen = 1 coat, 20 yards of linen = ½ coat. If, on the 
other hand, the value of the coat sinks by one half, then 20 yards of linen = 2 
coats. (Marx 1990, p.145) 
  
Furthermore, labour time is added, subtracted, multiplied and divided to yield 
quantitatively meaningful results. For example, Marx claims that we can add 
commodities together to find the “total labour-power of society, which is manifested 
in the values of the world of commodities…” (1990, p.129). We can also divide the 
value of the means of subsistence by the values contained in a bundle of 
commodities (1990, p.276). Likewise, since labour time is a measure of (productive) 
duration, an hour of abstract labour can be broken down into minutes of labour, just 
as hours can be aggregated into days, and days into weeks. 
 Lastly, Marxism differentiates the social substance of value from the symbolic 
expressions of a price system. This differentiation of value and price need not take 
us all the way to the infamous “transformation problem.” Rather, the philosophical 
foundation of Marx’s framework is just as significant. As Castoriadis reminds us 
(1984b, p.265), Hegel’s influence on Marx was such that the latter did not use the 
terms “appearance,” “substance” and “essence” naïvely. For Marx, value is the 
essence behind the appearance of equivalence—in contrast to other economists 
                                                        
2 The use of this quotation is inspired by Castoriadis’s interpretation of Aristotle (1984b). 
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who mistakenly confused the value-form of commodities with the value of 
commodities (Harvey 2006, pp.9–13).  
In line with this distinction between value and its appearance, we can find in 
Marx’s writings claims about value that could never be corroborated through price 
alone. For example, jobs of all types remunerate work, but only some forms of 
labour will produce value; some commodities have prices but no value; or, some 
commodities, like diamonds, have value but their prices might never be 
“proportional” to their values (Marx 1990, p.130). In fact, divergences between price 
and value are likely because the ratio between money wages and profits and the 
rate of exploitation, measured in labour time, can fluctuate independently of each 
other (Robinson 1976, pp.38–42). Therefore, Marxist political economy needs a 
measurable unit of value in order to determine whether values remain constant 
when nominal prices remain constant, or if, beneath a stable level of prices, values 
are growing, shrinking or staying the same.  
 
Concrete Labour to Simple Abstract Labour 
 
 So for Marx, value represents the invariant entity of socially necessary 
abstract labour time. This is true for any productive process in the capitalist mode of 
production, whether it takes place on a movie set, a car factory or a chemical plant. 
Consequently, the concept of abstract labour is a keystone of the Marxist framework. 
It is the basis for the exchange of two commodities that are otherwise 
incommensurable with respect to their use values and the “formative” elements of 
their concrete labour. For example, the concreteness of tailoring and weaving can be 
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abstracted away, which then lets us see how they are the same in the “physiological 
sense”: they are each “a productive expenditure of human brains, muscles, nerves, 
hands, etc.” (Marx 1990, p.134). 
 The concept of abstract labour produces a common standard through which 
to measure productive duration. However, using the concept of abstract labour as 
this common denominator is not as straightforward as it first appears. There are 
methodological questions concerning how one reduces concrete labour to abstract 
labour. With respect to mass culture, a key methodological problem involves the 
nature of artistry and the use of creativity in cultural production. These aspects 
confound the meaning of abstract labour and, consequently, Marxist approaches to 
the economics of mass culture. 
 
Creativity and Artistry? 
 
 The creative, artistic and immaterial elements of cultural production turn 
abstract labour into an unwieldy concept. No doubt, the creativity of the human 
imagination is not exclusive to cultural or artistic labour. (How is a biological 
yardstick—brains, nerves, muscles—helpful when the concrete labour of a doctor or 
a shoemaker is always a complex composite of our biological capacities?) Yet, in the 
realm of art and culture, the problem of reducing concrete creativity to abstract 
labour appears especially acute.  
 By formulating a general theory of capital, Marx excluded works of art for 
being exceptional commodities. Artistic labour was not yet, in the eyes of Marx, 
formally subsumed under capital. Instead, artistic labour was in a “transitional” 
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stage (Marx n.d.). Only some artists valorized capital because only some members of 
the artistic community performed “joint-work” for the benefit of a capitalist. Thus, 
as an umbrella category, artistic labour remained a tricky grey area because it still 
included artists such as Milton and Balzac, who were neither alienated nor exploited 
like the proletariat.  
 Because the “transitional stage” of Marx’s time has carried over into the 
contemporary era of artistic work, this tricky grey area in the definition of artistic 
labour continues to nag theories of whether and how such work is reduced to 
socially necessary abstract labour time. For example, what can the labour time of 
Picasso tell us about the exchange value of Guernica? How do Picasso’s artistic skills 
rate against the socially average degree of artistic skill? What was, in 1937, the 
socially average degree of artistic skill? It matters little if Guernica took ten days or 
ten years to be completed; with no other Guernicas for comparison, it can never be 
determined whether the time it took Picasso to paint this unique artwork was 
socially necessary. And without a determinable quantity of value on the basis of 
abstract labour time, the exchange value of Guernica cannot be expressed as x coats, 
y yards of linen, z pounds of coffee, etc.3 
 Just as significantly, theoretical confusions also affect our understanding of 
the role of “joint-work” in mass culture. Rather than making it easier to claim that 
artistry and creativity are beholden to socially necessary abstract labour time, joint-
work in mass culture retains aspects of classical bourgeois art. For each branch of 
                                                        
3 For a critique of theoretical assumptions that root the price of art on its production, see Suhail & 
Phillips (2012). Similarly to this dissertation, Suhail and Phillips develop this critique from the 
perspective of the capital-as-power approach. 
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mass culture—music, film, theatre, etc.—some artists draw (high) wages because 
their proper names are famous—just like Milton, Balzac or Picasso. John Cleese, for 
instance, is an exemplary comedian who cannot be substituted with even Michael 
Palin or Terry Jones, two other members of Monty Python.  
 When translated into the language of Marxist political economy, these 
obvious points about the ubiquity of modern celebrities reveal the difficulty in using 
the concept of abstract labour for mass culture. According to Marx, two labour 
processes can produce quantities of the same “homogeneous labour” because an 
abstraction is made from their “particular qualities,” including “the formative 
elements in the use values.” When talent and skill border on singularity, however, it 
is not so easy to abstract the homogenous element from labour that is intimately 
and publicly associated with a concrete individual. For instance, you are left with 
nothing meaningful if you remove all of Cleese's singular traits from his ability to 
produce laughter as a use value. He was on the BBC because his brain, his nerves and 
his muscles produced comedy.  
Some do not find the singularity of some artistic creativity to be a 
methodological problem. In fact, the irreducible concreteness of artistic labour is 
said to explain the accumulation of capital from culture. For instance, Ryan argues 
that art’s incompatibility with the Marxist definition of abstract labour creates a 
particular labour-capital relationship: 
The key to understanding the artist-capitalist contradiction lies in grasping the 
fact that as historically and ideologically constituted, the artist represents the 
special case of concrete labour which is ultimately irreducible to abstract value. 
This is because the structures of art make artists incompatible with the 
structures of capital. The employment of artists in whatever technical form 
necessitates recognizing and preserving their named, concrete labour. They 
  
 
78 
cannot be employed as labour-power, as anonymous production factors 
functioning under the sway of capital. (Ryan 1992, p.44) 
 
Art can certainly create friction between different social interests, as there is no a 
priori necessity that the intentions behind an artist’s work will resonate with 
established social values. Ryan, however, transforms this possible friction into a 
structural contradiction of capitalism. From a Marxist perspective, Ryan finds the 
struggles between artists and capitalists in mass culture to have a common 
characteristic: 
Unlike many other types of workers, capital is unable to make the artist 
completely subservient to its drive for accumulation. The reason is simple. Since 
art is centred upon the expressive, individual artist, artistic objects must appear 
as the product of recognizable persons; the concrete and named labour of the 
artist is always paramount and must be preserved. As socially constituted, 
artists appear to capital as the antithesis of labour-power, antagonistic to 
incorporation in the capitalist labour process as abstract labour. (Ryan 1992, 
p.41) 
 
Although artworks are the objectification of expended labour, the concrete 
particulars of artistic production cannot, for Ryan, be flattened into simple abstract 
labour. 
However, much like a drop of ink in a glass of clear water, the very idea that 
some creative labour is irreducible to abstract labour dirties the whole picture of 
contemporary cultural production. Who is an artist and who is not? I agree with 
James Agee’s (2005) praise for the four most recognizable comedians in the era of 
silent cinema—Charlie Chaplin, Buster Keaton, Harold Lloyd and Harry Langdon—
but where is the objective platform for me to state firmly that none of their concrete 
labour translates into socially necessary abstract labour time? What if someone 
thinks that, of the four, only Chaplin and Keaton are artists? This second 
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discrimination implies that the labour times of Lloyd and Langdon were formally 
subsumed under capital as abstract labour time. Or what of artists who, while 
exceptional in their craft, will never have the same publicity as prize-winning 
writers, movie stars, pop singers or fashion designers? The whole idea of 
“irreducibility” plays on our imagination that recognizable artists stamp their 
“signatures” on the artworks they create. Consequently, how will value theory 
account for the “background” work of exceptional film composers, make-up artists, 
set designers and others? How do we decide which background artists are famous 
enough for their labour to fall outside of abstract labour? Does the theoretical place 
of someone like Hans Dreier depend on whether moviegoers recognize his name? 
To some, these questions might appear as nitpicking. However, a solid 
definition of abstract labour is key to Marxism’s argument that labour subsumed 
under capital is measured against socially necessary labour time. The latter is a 
competitive benchmark; it forces capitalists to keep designing and redesigning their 
manufacturing processes on the basis of what, at each moment in time, is deemed 
socially necessary. Moreover, these redesigns can only be said to follow the laws of 
value if it is possible to find where productive processes, denominated in abstract 
labour time, deviate from competitive averages. For instance, Marx argued that if a 
“capitalist has a foible for using golden spindles instead of steel ones, the only 
labour that counts for anything in the value of yarn remains that which would be 
required to produce a steel spindle, because no more is necessary under the given 
conditions” (Marx 1990, p.295). Therefore, if it is unclear how artists of various 
types are even treated as abstract labour, it is also unclear how the derivation of 
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socially necessary labour time is the system-wide mechanism that determines what 
is “excessive” in the production of mass culture. This issue resurfaces when we come 
to the concept of productive labour. 
 
Complex Labour 
 
Even if we assume that artistic creativity poses no problems for the 
accumulation of capital from mass culture, methodological issues still plague the 
concept of abstract labour. For example, the use of abstract labour requires that 
complex labour be reducible to simple labour.  
Anticipating that abstract labour time would be the common denominator of 
differently skilled jobs, Marx argued that skilled labour time is only ever a multiple 
of simple labour (1990, p.135). Simple labour is “the labour-power possessed in his 
bodily organism by every ordinary man, on the average, without being developed in 
any special way.” Simple labour may vary “in different countries and at different 
cultural epochs, but in a particular society it is given.” It is crucial that the simple 
labour of a particular society can be measured. Every type of complex labour is only, 
according to Marx, “intensified, or rather multiplied simple labour, so that a smaller 
quantity of complex labour is considered equal to a larger quantity of simple labour” 
(Marx 1990, p.135). 
Two methodological issues obscure the simple-complex connection. First, it 
is far from straightforward how we can establish which type of labour is simple 
labour. Does society possess an existing labour process that lacks even the smallest 
  
 
81 
degree of skill? Moreover, is simple labour even isolatable?4 If simple labour is 
mixed with any amount of complex labour, we cannot count hours of work and treat 
them as a benchmark for simple labour (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.141). Instead, we 
must first know the quantitative relationship between complex labour and simple 
labour—i.e., by how many multiples complex labour is a quantity of simple labour.5 
Second, it is problematic to reduce complex labour to simple labour from 
both the input and output sides of production. Reduction from the input side relies 
on the costs of education and training. For example, Hilferding (1966) argued that 
the ratio of complex to simple labour is equivalent to the costs required for labour 
power to develop its skills. However, Hilferding presumes not only that education 
and training can already be counted in units of simple labour, but also that the only 
“hours” of education that can be counted are the ones that capitalists eventually pay 
for. In other words, my formal university education can hypothetically be broken 
down into labour time (x hours of education multiplied by y years of schooling) 
because it is a commodity with a price tag. But the exchange value of any informal 
education or the layers of socialization from one’s family, community and culture 
are all obscure because they are free (Harvey 1985; Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.143). 
The presence of free, indirect and non-commodified education undermines 
the logic of equating the complexity of skill with its costs of development. And with 
respect to the skilled labour pool of mass culture, the issue is even more dizzying. 
                                                        
4 For a critical examination of the Marxist skilled labour-unskilled labour relationship, see (Nitzan & 
Bichler 2009, pp.141–144). 
5 “Socially necessary labour-time is the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the 
conditions of production normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity 
of labour prevalent in that society” (Marx 1990, p.129). 
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Assuming that Hilferding’s argument applies to any artistic training that comes at a 
cost, what of internships, apprenticeships or any other training that is not exactly or 
only partly paid for by a future employer? Just as problematically, Hilferding sees 
the transfer of education to skilled labour as a linear process:  
Regarded from its standpoint of society, unskilled labour is latent as long as it 
is utilized for the formation of skilled labour power. Its working for society 
does not begin until the skilled labour power it has helped to produce 
becomes active. Thus in this single of the expenditure of skilled labour a sum 
of unskilled labours is expended, and in this way there is created a sum of 
value and surplus value corresponding to the total value which were requisite 
to produce the skilled labour power and its function, the skilled labour. 
(Hilferding 1966, p.145) 
  
But what if, from year to year, the line between work and education is increasingly 
blurred? Film directors could have gone to film school, but they can also receive a 
lifelong “informal” education from an endless love of old and new cinema. Or an 
artist can join an intellectual milieu, such as the one described by Stefan Zweig in his 
memoir, The World of Yesterday (1943). In such an atmosphere, the linearity of skills 
development is transformed into a repetitive cycle; artists learn from their frequent 
interaction with each other. Aristotle might call this artistic development 
“habituation” (Aristotle 1999). 
Reducing skilled labour from the output side is also problematic. As Nitzan 
and Bichler point out (2009, p.142), wage income is the only quantitative measure 
available to compare qualitatively different skills. Consequently, we would be using 
price differentials to explain the distribution of complex labour power, rather than 
the other way around. And if we create price differentials for labour in mass culture, 
the great inequality of wage income suggests that a celebrity earning $20 million per 
year is producing 250 times the value of someone earning $80,000 per year, who 
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herself is producing four times the value of someone earning $20,000 per year. The 
implication that a celebrity is creating 1,000 times more value than someone who 
earns $20,000 is not problematic simply because the multiple is large. Without a 
means to measure abstract labour directly, we actually cannot determine whether 
this multiple is too big or too small. And depending on the celebrity, our estimated 
ratio is undermined even more; the celebrity might never have paid for artistic 
training, whether because there is no school to become famous or because their 
talent is extraordinary.  
According to Harvey (2006), these criticisms of the complex-to-simple-
labour reduction  miss the mark because they take the wrong perspective. Too much 
focus on skilled labour, according to Harvey, risks overlooking how the “reduction 
from skilled to simple labour is more than a mental construct; it is a real observable 
process, which operates with devastating effects upon the labourers” (Harvey 2006, 
p.59). In other words, capitalism’s real push to mechanize and de-skill labour will 
eventually short-circuit the complex-simple problem: 
The essential measure of the reduction of skilled to simple labour lies in the 
degree to which capitalism has created skills that are easily reproducible 
and easily substitutable. All of the evidence suggests that this has been the 
direction in which capitalism has been moving, with substantial islands of 
resistance here and innumerable pockets of resistance there. To the extent 
that the reduction of skilled to simple labour is still in the course of being 
accomplished, we have to conclude that capitalism is in the course of 
becoming more true to the law of value implied in its dominant mode of 
production. (Harvey 2006, p.119) 
 
While it is good to critique any systemic process that is repressive, is our 
methodological problem about simple labour erased by this argument? No. At least 
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with respect to mass culture, the need for some degree of artistic skill dirties the 
cleanliness of Harvey’s argument.  
For Harvey, Marx’s method of only using measures of “simple labour” is 
“reasonable” because the capitalist system breaks and represses any skill that the 
worker could monopolize (2006, p.119). For the case of mass culture, however, 
Harvey’s rationale is contradicted by Ryan’s description of the capital-labour 
relationship in cultural production. The business of mass culture seems to embrace 
and exploit rather than repress and destroy the class of artists who have a virtual 
monopoly on their fame, image and singular qualities (Ryan 1992). To be sure, for 
the majority of creative work that falls outside of this exclusive class of artists, 
artistic labour is a much more anonymous and precarious activity (Gill & Pratt 
2008). At issue, however, is the theoretical implication that the laws of capitalism 
compel businesses in mass culture to fight against any form of labour that can act as 
a monopoly on skill. Therefore, the reduction to simple labour remains a 
methodological problem because the business of mass culture deviates from the 
universalization of simple labour by needing the concrete labour of identifiable, 
famous talent.6  
                                                        
6 With respect to the Hollywood film business, some would argue against the usefulness of the star 
system for profitability. Leaver, for example, is very pessimistic about the effects of “star power” on 
sector-wide profitability. For Leaver, stars and directors are essentially “value skimming” from the 
studios that hire them. They force firms to redistribute wage compensations upwards, to the upper 
echelons of the star system and its network of agents and producers. Consequently, according to 
Leaver, the “untrammelled power of stars (occupying a key structural position outside the firm as a 
vital input) allows them to skim more value than the major studios can accommodate over the 
medium to long term” (Leaver 2010, p.475). 
 
Is this an argument in support of Harvey? Unfortunately, two obstacles—one theoretical and the 
other historical—block a quick and easy jump to the conclusion that Hollywood has an interest in de-
skilling and repressing the monopoly power of stars and directors. Theoretically, the reduction of 
wage costs and compensation to movie stars is not automatically an avenue to higher profits because 
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Furthermore, we should be skeptical of Harvey’s claim that skilled labour is 
being reduced to simple labour in reality. Harvey’s interpretation of simple labour 
builds from Marx’s main object of study: nineteenth-century industrial 
manufacturing. Because labour processes in the “dark satanic mills” of the 
nineteenth century were often simple and monotonous, it was reasonable for Marx 
to assume that the labour power of each worker is easily substitutable within this 
process. Since Marx’s time, however, it has become difficult to assume that simple 
labour will become a universal characteristic of every modern labour process. For 
example, in the last hundred years, engineering, law, medicine, science and 
technology have become complex jobs, even in their most “simplified” or controlled 
forms. Indeed, according to Lewis Mumford, the great need for complex wage labour 
has also inaugurated a change in the relationship between worker and machine. The 
“qualities the new worker needs,” writes Mumford, “are alertness, responsiveness, 
an intelligent grasp of the operative parts: in short… an all-round mechanic rather 
than a specialized hand” (2010, p.227). 
 
Productive versus Unproductive Labour 
 
 The Marxist labour theory of value requires that theorists be able to 
discriminate between productive and unproductive labour. In this case, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
the ubiquity and fame of its stars might very well be essential to Hollywood’s revenues. Destroying 
its own star system without depressing its level of revenues is a big “if,” and this is a possible reason 
why Leaver—who otherwise claims that Hollywood is an “allegory of modern capitalism under 
financialisation”—concludes that the Hollywood business model is, at most, “unresolved.” This 
logical issue is exacerbated by historical fact: the behaviour of the major Hollywood studios does not 
indicate that there is a systemic interest in crushing all of its skilled labour down into simple labour. 
From the early days of the Hollywood studio system, celebrities have been used as branded products 
to distinguish singular names from anonymous labour (Hozic 2001). 
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“productive” refers specifically to the creation of surplus value, and never simply to 
the physical or mental production of use-values—only under socialism would the 
idea of productivity change (Mandel 1976, p.33). Consequently, Marxism cannot 
neglect the theoretical distinction between productive and unproductive labour in 
capitalism. Besides helping us distinguish which labour processes valorize capital, 
this distinction is fundamental to the overall coherence of historical materialist 
philosophy (Mohun 1996, p.31).  
 Just as it did for abstract labour, cultural production complicates the 
distinction between productive and unproductive labour. Theoretically, the Marxist 
definition of productive labour should be consistent across business sectors, 
including cultural production. In fact, Marx sought to be consistent by explaining 
why a “literary proletarian” is productive, while John Milton, the great epic poet, 
was unproductive: 
Milton, for example, who did Paradise Lost, was an unproductive worker. In 
contrast… the writer who delivers hackwork for his publisher is a productive 
worker. Milton produced Paradise Lost in the way that a silkworm produces 
silk, as the expression of his own nature. Later on he sold the product for £5 and 
to that extent became a dealer in a commodity. But the Leipzig literary 
proletarian who produces books, e.g. compendia on political economy, at the 
instructions of his publisher is roughly speaking a productive worker, in so far 
as his production is subsumed under capital and only takes place for the 
purpose of the latter’s valorization. (Marx n.d.) 
  
Unfortunately, Marx’s example does not help explain productive work in mass 
culture. Even if all productive cultural work were “hackwork” created for profit, the 
lines between production, circulation and, for some, consumption have been 
blurring since the early decades of the twentieth century, which in turn makes it 
difficult to assess when and how different types of cultural activity are even 
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subsumed under capital. Advertising and marketing firms, for example, act as 
intermediaries for productive processes that “create” value directly. But are they 
themselves productive or unproductive?  Moreover, the ideological and social 
dimensions of mass culture involve the imaginations and desires of its consumers. 
These aspects of consumer activity create, reproduce and circulate the meaning, 
symbols and images of culture, but are these aspects economically productive? 
  
Three Definitions of Productive Labour 
 
 By reviewing some of the existing literature, we find three general methods 
to define productive labour in cultural production. Unfortunately, each of these 
definitions has a set of methodological problems. 
 In order to retain the universality of value theory, the first definition of 
cultural production tinkers with classical Marxism as minimally as possible 
(Starosta 2012; Mohun 1996). This definition assumes that we can apply the 
concept of “immediate producer” to culture and art just as we do to the production 
of physical commodities like corn and grain. Terms like “immaterial labour” or 
“cognitive labour” are small but reasonable modifications that account for the 
particularities of cultural work. Overall, this definition draws clear lines between 
productive and unproductive labour: productive cultural work is distinguishable 
from cultural activity during “free-time,” and immaterial, cognitive or artistic labour 
can valorize capital when it is exploited directly (Starosta 2012; Mohun 1996).7 
                                                        
7 Knowing whether labour can valorize capital or not is significant because, according to Marx, 
valorization only begins at a quantifiable point in the labour process—when production is carried 
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Moreover, this definition does not modify Marx’s important distinction between the 
production of value and the mere circulation of value. For example, intellectual 
property rights are unproductive because they do not create surplus value (Starosta 
2012). 
  The second definition of cultural production considers how quantitative 
increases in advertising and marketing have transformed the mode of circulation 
since Marx’s time. Baran and Sweezy summarize the change:  
The tremendous growth of the sales effort and the spectacular intensification of 
its sway stem from its having undergone a far-reaching qualitative change. Price 
competition has largely receded as a means of attracting the public’s custom, 
and has yielded to new ways of sales promotion: advertising, variation of the 
products’ appearance and packaging, “planned obsolescence,” model changes, 
credit schemes, and the like. (Baran & Sweezy 1966, p.115) 
  
Because of this structural transformation, the second definition deems the mode of 
circulation to be productive. Ryan, for instance, argues that processes of circulation, 
like advertising and aesthetic design, are productive because they are indispensable 
“for the conservation of use-value of commodities” (Ryan 1992, p.64). “Immediate 
producers” still exist, but large segments of labour now have the job of mediating 
the relationship between immediate producers and consumers. 
 In contrast to the first definition, this conceptualization of productive labour 
seeks to address the broader social world of mass culture. As Bohm and Land argue, 
such a modification to the definition of productive labour has been necessary 
because unproductive labour, as it was defined in classical Marxism, included far too 
much: 
                                                                                                                                                                     
beyond “the point where the value paid by the capitalist for the labour-power is replaced by an exact 
equivalent” (Marx 1990, p.302). 
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Teaching and education in general are clearly part of the reproduction of 
capitalist value, and should therefore not simply be regarded as “unproductive 
labour.” In a similar way, feminist writers have pointed to the usually unwaged 
reproductive labor of women doing housework and care work. Equally, we 
would suggest that artists and cultural workers contribute to the production of 
capitalist value while falling outside traditional Marxist categories of “labour.” 
(Bohm & Land 2009, p.87) 
  
If the second definition expands beyond traditional Marxist categories by one 
or two degrees, the third definition’s expansion is much more significant. In the 
second definition, the valorization of cultural commodities still takes place in the 
“hidden abode” of privately owned firms, even if this abode now includes 
advertising, marketing and other aspects of the corporate sales effort. By 
comparison, the third definition of cultural production demolishes the analytical 
walls between production, circulation and consumption. Here, consumption and 
consumer participation in mass culture produce value (Arvidsson 2005b; Bohm & 
Land 2012), especially if cultural meaning is esoteric or a mark of distinction—i.e., 
where artists and patrons cherish their privileged knowledge of and access to a 
specific cultural scene or genre (Bordieu 1984). 
 The third definition includes much more cultural activity than the other two 
because it assumes that work and “free-time” are indistinguishable in the realm of 
culture (Gill & Pratt 2008). According to Arvidsson, this mixture of work and free 
time is subsumed under capital by brand management; the latter incorporates the 
“context of consumption” as a productive factor in valorization (Arvidsson 2005a, 
p.244). Furthermore, the ideological and social dimensions of mass culture have 
radically redefined productivity. For instance, the attitudes, emotions and desires of 
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consumers factor into the valorization of capital (Lazzarato 1996; Gill & Pratt 2008; 
Haiven 2012).  
  
Problems with the Three Definitions 
 
 The first definition preserves a strict distinction between production and 
circulation at the cost of ignoring the social dimensions of culture. For Guido 
Starosta, for example, the mechanical and digital reproduction of culture can never 
add value; these processes can only mediate the value that was first created in the 
production of prototypes or the “first” copies of artworks:  
The value of the aggregate product [i.e., all the reproductions of a commodity] 
no longer represents the simple addition of its constituent elements. Instead, 
the total value is determined “first” and then shared out equally by each 
individual commodity, which now contains a proportional fraction of the 
former. (Starosta 2012, p.374) 
 
Similarly, for Simon Mohun, any form of labour that “brings buyers and sellers 
together” is unproductive because this form of labour “produces nothing in addition 
to what is already in existence” (Mohun 1996, p.44). Granting, for the sake of 
argument, that production and circulation can, in fact, be strictly separated, how 
could this distinction ever be applied in empirical research?  
 For instance, how should we apply value theory to the production of 
something as complex as the Star Wars universe? On the one hand, George Lucas 
originally created characters, environments, objects and images for the production 
of the first three Star Wars films (A New Hope, The Empire Strikes Back and The 
Return of the Jedi). On the other hand, the meaning of the Star Wars universe has 
expanded with every creative addition since the first three films. Is the value of the 
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first Star Wars trilogy the “original” commodity establishing that every subsequent 
commodity of the franchise is an aliquot part of total value? How do we account for 
the reuse of established characters, such as Luke Skywalker or Darth Vader? Is value 
being created when reproduction takes place in another medium, such as when the 
image of Han Solo (Harrison Ford) is printed on t-shirts or movie posters? Or is this 
just unproductive advertising? When more characters, places and things are added 
to the Star Wars universe, which aspects are new (productive) and which ones are 
“already there” (unproductive)? For instance, Darth Maul was a new villain for 
Episode I: The Phantom Menace, but he is also a particular version of past universal 
concepts (e.g., Jedi, the “Darth” prefix, lightsabers, the Force). What is the proportion 
between the creation of new value and the transfer of past value? 
 It is impossible to deconstruct the creation of the Star Wars universe 
according to a distinction between productive and unproductive labour because, as 
Nitzan and Bichler point out, the line between productive and unproductive moves 
every time something manifests advertising-like qualities: 
... take advertising. Undoubtedly, this activity is designed to promote sales. But 
what about the incessant remodeling of automobiles, clothing, detergents, 
cosmetics, architecture, news media and what not—remodeling that according 
to some estimates accounts for over 25 per cent of the cost of production? Given 
that the main purpose here, much like in advertising, is to enhance circulation, 
shouldn’t we consider the labour put into such remodeling to be unproductive 
as well? Paradoxically, even a positive answer would not solve the problem 
here. After all, any new product characteristic can persuade people to buy, so 
how do we distinguish between the advertising-like aspect of remodeling that 
merely circulates existing values and its productive aspect that by definition 
creates new values? (2009, p.113) 
 
The second definition of cultural production claims to rectify the problem of 
unproductive labour by stating that the mode of circulation is, in fact, productive. 
  
 
92 
However, we now face another difficult question: how would we know when and to 
what extent labour in the capitalist mode of circulation is productive? 
 As we saw above, some Marxist theorists argue that the mode of circulation 
is productive because marketing, branding, artistic creativity and design are 
currently necessary parts in the creation of value. The so-called necessity of it all, 
however, is difficult to determine. Take, for example, the decision to pay someone 
like Tom Cruise $20 million to star in the next big action-adventure blockbuster. On 
top of this high wage cost, there are the added costs of promoting Cruise’s 
involvement. Does all labour surrounding Tom Cruise add value to the commodity, 
the movie? How does one definitively determine how much value the aura of Tom 
Cruise adds to the movie? Step one is to determine whether the capitalist purchase 
of Tom Cruise’s labour power was necessary. Unfortunately, this determination 
requires that we first know the subjective attitudes of consumers. If the commodity 
in the mind the average customer was “a Tom Cruise movie,” then the cost of hiring 
Tom Cruise was necessary for accumulation. And if the labour to promote and 
advertise Tom Cruise changed people’s minds about seeing “a Tom Cruise movie,” 
then this labour might be considered productive as well. But if it is also possible that 
moviegoers will watch the movie for entirely different reasons—e.g., “I just wanted 
to watch a good popcorn movie and don’t care who the lead actor is”—then it is less 
clear whether all of the labour necessary to circulate the aura of Tom Cruise was 
necessary and, thus, a productive input.8  
                                                        
8Although I am using my own hypothetical example, this point comes from the insights of Nitzan and 
Bichler, who use “Mexican flowers” as their example (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.116). 
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 As we will see with the third definition, Marxism seems to rely on the 
neoclassical concept of revealed preferences to incorporate subjective desire into its 
theory of value. To foreshadow what is problematic about the use of revealed 
preferences, let us add one more comment about the second definition of cultural 
production. 
 Methodological confusions about the productivity of circulation occur 
because the coercive structures of capitalism unravel any simple one-to-one 
relationship between consumer behaviour and the labour costs of corporate sales 
efforts. People are certainly bombarded with advertisements every day, but it is also 
possible that the length of the working day, stagnant wages, the social division of 
labour, a high concentration of capitalist ownership and other structural aspects of 
capitalism are making consumers buy into mass culture. For instance, the business 
of mass culture benefits from what Marx discovered in 1844, namely, that the 
persistence of alienated labour causes us to estrange and degrade our capacity to 
express our species being. In such a situation, human labour is a “mere means” to 
existence, and time away from work is a sanctuary from both physical and mental 
activity (Marx 1988, p.76).  Additionally, mass culture relies on the depth and 
breadth of surplus repression in modern civilization—i.e., “the restrictions 
necessitated by social domination” (Marcuse 1966, p.35). Through the family unit, 
social taboos and a hierarchical distribution of scarcity, both material and 
immaterial, the instinctual energies of a population are modified and deflected into 
socially acceptable forms of sexuality and pleasure. In fact, atomized, immediate 
  
 
94 
forms of satisfaction are heightened when the same social system bars technological 
innovation from satisfying the whole of society as one community (McMahon 2011).  
 These structural aspects of capitalism can effectively limit the range of 
possibility during free time. Therefore, social power and its effect on consumer 
behaviour make it difficult to determine whether exercises in glossy advertising or 
branding are necessary, partially necessary or superfluous to capital accumulation.9 
This indeterminacy is exacerbated in the third definition of cultural production. It 
assumes that consumer activity is also a productive input in the valorization of 
cultural commodities. To explain why this assumption is untenable, let us first 
consider the rationale for including the ideology and the subjectivity of consumers 
in a theory of capital accumulation. 
 The third definition of cultural production includes consumer attitudes, 
desires and emotions as productive factors in the valorization of capital. This 
ideological dimension of consumer activity is considered productive because 
consumer attitudes are integral to making certain images, ideas, symbols and values 
function as a meaningful system of brand culture. Essentially, individuals reproduce 
shared cultural imaginaries. As Bohm and Land argue, brands and the symbols and 
images of mass culture are never “so much things—material artifacts and 
commodities—as social relations, signifying complexes, frames of action and 
subjectivity” (2012, p.231). Likewise for Max Haven, the value of Pokémon cards is a 
good example of why the value of popular cultural objects cannot be found in the 
                                                        
9 It is noteworthy that Adorno, one of the fiercest critics of mass culture, came to a similar conclusion 
about the ideological strength of consumerism: “… the culture industry has… become total,” but it is 
“doubtful whether the culture industry and consumer-consciousness can be simply equated with 
each other” (2004c, p.195). 
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costs of material production: “The value of Pokémon cards is clearly imagined. Even 
in their initial, commodified form, a slip of mass produced, coloured cardboard is by 
no stretch of the imagination ‘worth’ the money children pay for them” (2012, p.15). 
 Society, according to this third definition, is one big “social factory” (Gill & 
Pratt 2008). Heavily influenced by the school of autonomous Marxism, this 
understanding of cultural production now includes “the extent to which emotions, 
feeling, relationships are ‘put to work’ in post-Fordist capitalism” (Gill & Pratt 2008, 
p.15). For instance, Bohm and Land argue that consumer desire for Apple 
computers can explain the high value of the brand:  
Through friendship, play, sex and even love, the production of this cultural, 
brand value lies beyond the direct control of its owner and managers. Rather, 
the reproduction of the cultural values and meanings invested in the brand, and 
its related communities, is secured by the active labour of those consuming the 
brand and thereby valorizing the brand and contributing to its value. (Bohm & 
Land 2012, p.230) 
 
Consequently, consumers are being treated as a part of mass culture’s “workforce” 
(Lazzarato 1996). For Arvidsson, the productive contributions of consumers explain 
why material manufacturing processes and brand valorization are separated from 
each other in the age of “informational” capitalism. A physical factory can make 
material things, but much “of the value of brands derives from the free (in the sense 
of both the unpaid and autonomous) productivity of consumers” (Arvidsson 2005b, 
p.130). Capitalists can extract value from the productivity of consumers “by positing 
the brand as a kind of virtual factory, by giving labour a place where its autonomous 
productivity more or less directly translates into feedback and information” 
(Arvidsson 2005b, p.130). 
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 As with the second definition, the methodological problem with the third has 
little to do with the rationale for renovating the Marxist labour theory of value. 
Rather, the issue revolves around the nature of valorization. By sticking to a theory 
of productivity, the big question is: how much value do ideology, desire and 
consumer participation add to the total value of a commodity? Unfortunately, the 
way adherents of this definition seem to answer the question is by using a modified 
version of revealed preferences. Coined by Paul Samuelson, “revealed preferences” 
is a neoclassical term that purports to explain the utilitarian values of goods even if 
utility cannot be measured directly. Assuming that “utility drives behavior,” the 
prices of goods in perfectly competitive equilibrium indirectly “reveal” their utility. 
Thus, like the detective of Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Purloined Letter” the neoclassicist 
must deduce the whereabouts of its lost item (utility) from things it can observe 
(prices). Yet, unlike a letter and its owner, the claimed existence of universal utility 
completely depends on the utility-price relationship. Without the ability to ever 
independently verify the utilitarian calculation, the proof runs into problems. For 
instance, the neoclassicist must determine that the market is in a state of perfectly 
competitive equilibrium—prices would not, without this condition, cleanly reveal 
utility. Moreover, the revelation of preferences uses prices to determine utility, even 
if utility is meant to be the subjective cause of prices. By going in reverse, the proof 
for the existence of utility is simply an assumption that it must exist because people 
are purportedly willing to pay for goods at certain prices. The same form of 
reasoning could be used to argue that ghosts must exist because a part of the 
population believes in them. 
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 The third definition is forced to retreat to an explanation of revealed 
preferences because so much of its so-called consumer valorization is obscure—as 
even proponents of the third definition admit (Bohm & Land 2012, p.130). Value 
cannot be observed, even indirectly, through revealed preferences, because, apart 
from everything else, the “labour” of consumers is unpaid—in fact, consumers often 
pay to participate in a cultural process they are also said to valorize! Moreover, the 
quantitative categories of productivity, such as labour time, are inapplicable to the 
desires and emotions of consumer behaviour. Two people own Adidas shoes, for 
example. Do they valorize the Adidas brand equally? Do obsessed fans of the Harry 
Potter novels produce more value than those who read and enjoy the stories with 
much less intensity? Does so-called value-producing consumption need to be 
reduced to simple labour? Is consumption a skill that can be possessed to varying 
degrees? 
 As a consequence of these dark spots, the makeshift solution is to work 
backwards, by first looking at prices. One method is to treat immaterial value as a 
residual, where brand value is a firm’s market price minus its tangible assets. Or, at 
the level of individual consumption, the desires and emotions of consumers are 
revealed through the “premium” price they are willing to pay because this 
“premium” is the new use-value of cultural commodities: 
On a first and most basic level, consumers pay for access to a brand. Within 
marketing and accounting literature this is usually conceived as the “premium 
price” that consumers pay for a branded item, with respect to a “comparable” 
non-branded item (a Nike shoe versus an anonymous shoe, for example). What 
consumers pay for is access to the communicative potential of the brand, the 
possibility of inserting the brand in their own assemblage of compatible 
qualities. The use-value of the brand for the consumer is its value as a means of 
communicative production. (Arvidsson 2005a, p.250) 
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To look at price and work backwards, however, is to employ a faulty logic whereby 
the value of ideology and other immaterial qualities must be revealed through the 
prices people pay for consumer goods. The explanation is supposed to go the other 
way: how do ideology, desire and other immaterial aspects of consumer behaviour 
cause prices? Can the so-called productive value of consumer behaviour be verified 
independently of market prices? Moreover, defining a premium price in contrast to 
an “anonymous shoe,” for example, is problematic if it is not so easy to find a “pure” 
brand-less item that can act as an objective benchmark for differences in value, 
which we have still not found. For instance, many countries associate luxury and 
pleasure with the ownership of expensive cars, but where is the generic, anonymous 
car to reveal to me the value differential of a BMW, Mercedes or Lexus? Even the 
“average” car, whatever that may be, is branded property. 
  
Conclusion 
 
 The methodological issues involving simple labour and productive labour 
derive from Marxism’s presupposition that capital is fundamentally about material 
productivity. Marxism assumes that value is a quantity of labour time, but, 
unfortunately, it lacks an objective measure of that quantity. And in the case of mass 
culture, the issue of what should or should not be included in the concept of 
valorization seems irresolvable, at least objectively.  
 One road to a methodological solution, we will now argue, starts with a 
reconsideration of the economics-politics separation, the primary assumption that 
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informed Marx’s decision to, like Smith and Ricardo, exclude power from his 
measure of capital. By putting power at the centre of a theory of capital, we might be 
able to develop a more robust theory of mass culture. Moreover, breaking the 
dualism between economics and politics, this thesis will suggest, might help 
refurbish many of the reasons for theorists to consider the social and ideological 
dimensions of mass culture. 
 
  
  
 
100 
Chapter 3 
An Alternative Approach: A Power Theory of Mass Culture 
 
Introduction 
 
 So far, our theoretical meditations have primarily focused on the limitations 
of the Marxist framework. While we have been critical of fundamental assumptions 
in Marxist economics, we have not sought to reject the social philosophy of 
historical materialism in toto—the insights of Marx have generated many fruitful 
meditations on the political, cultural and philosophical dimensions of capitalism in 
particular and modernity in general. Rather, our main critique has involved 
Marxism’s method of defining the economics-politics relationship in capitalism. The 
Marxist concept of capital privileges labour on the assumption that magnitudes of 
capital are essentially measures of economic productivity—in this case, labour time. 
For all of its dialectical insights, and despite the contemporary desire for Marxism to 
account for many social dimensions of capitalist society, economics and politics 
must ultimately be analytically separable according to this assumption. In the final 
analysis, surplus value, the object of capitalist appropriation, is defined as the 
product of exploited labour time, nothing else. Therefore, Marxism has, by its own 
definition of capital, committed itself to the argument that, within the dense 
composition of capitalism, nothing other than the abode of production, however 
defined, is the so-called “real” source of value. Other aspects of modern business, 
like finance, are deemed to operate with quantities of fictitious capital, and the state 
and other institutions of civil society are understood to only ever promote or assist 
capital accumulation as external forces. 
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 As with neoclassical economics, the logical difficulties faced by Marxism in 
explaining the relation between nominal prices and real economic values are 
connected to the empirical problem of isolating a pure measure of productivity in 
reality. Unlike the conservative presentation of “distortions” in neo-classical 
economics, however, Marxism inadvertently hides this logical/empirical problem 
about the nature of economic value within a dialectical framework that aimed at 
studying the social dynamics of power in capitalist society.  
 With respect to studying the political economy of mass culture, Marxism’s 
well-intentioned inclusion of ideology and institutional authority is undermined by 
the assumption that the so-called economic facet of mass culture is rooted in 
material productivity. Labour is certainly an important factor to any comprehensive 
study of capitalist mass culture, but it is our assumptions about economic 
productivity and not the ubiquity of wage labour that tells us we have to look at the 
latter in terms of productive output. Therefore, if we use entirely different 
assumptions, we might be able to create stronger links between profitability, 
creativity and the social composition of mass culture. This chapter takes this latter 
route. It uses an alternate set of assumptions about capital to develop a power 
theory of mass culture. 
 
Intellectual Precedents to a Power Theory of Mass Culture 
 
 While the path to breaking the dualism between economics and politics lies 
in a concept of capital that is different from what is found in Marxist frameworks, 
there are actually some intellectual precedents for this path contained in the latter. 
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Within a broader methodological debate about how to theorize culture, Marxist 
political economy often presents itself as the best method for studying the effect of 
power on the cultural aspects of capitalism. This interest in power, despite our 
deeper issue with the labour theory of value, is still useful for research on the 
political economy of mass culture. It can help explain the role of control and 
authority in the creation and circulation of cultural significations. Thus, by 
reviewing some of these Marxist approaches to power and culture in capitalism, we 
construct a stepping-stone of intellectual precedents that can then be used for our 
analysis of an alternative concept of capital, which is mainly derived from Veblen 
and Nitzan and Bichler.  
 
Cultural Studies v. Marxist Political Economy 
 
 In the March 1995 issue of Critical Studies in Mass Communication, a 
“Colloquy” between academics addressed a categorical division in leftist theories of 
culture. On the one side was political economy and on the other was cultural studies.  
 One of the participants, Nicholas Garnham, made the case for Marxist 
political economy. For Garnham, the discipline of political economy is effective in 
criticizing the capitalist character of culture and communication (Garnham 1995). 
Marxist political economy performs this function by connecting the ideological 
qualities of culture to its historical mode of production. This theoretical link 
between ideology and material structure is the means to investigating how “a 
delimited social group, pursuing economic or political ends, determines which 
meanings circulate and which do not, which stories are told and about what, which 
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arguments are given prominence and what cultural resources are made available 
and to whom” (Garnham 1995, p.65). 
 Garnham uses his understanding of Marxist political economy to correct 
what he thinks cultural studies misunderstands in this debate over methodology. 
Cultural studies is similarly interested in power, but its analyses of culture have, in 
the eyes of Garnham, hastily rejected the methods of Marxist political economy. 
Because of the dislike scholars of cultural studies exhibit toward the “economistic” 
or “reductionist” aspect of Marxist political economy (Garnham 1995, p.62), their 
view of economic determinism biases their interpretation of how Marxism looks at 
capitalism’s superstructure, the “place” that houses cultural activity. Cultural 
scholars like Stuart Hall and Angela McRobbie, as cited by Garnham, believe that 
there is a correlation between Marxism’s economic determinism and its problematic 
arguments about the so-called “false consciousness” of ordinary people (Garnham 
1995, p.62). 
 Robert Babe, who refers to this colloquy in his book Cultural Studies and 
Political Economy, returns to this war over method because, as of 2009, “the fields 
remain riven” (Babe 2009, p.6). According to Babe, cultural studies is a 
“multidisciplinary study of culture” that “refers to arts, knowledge, beliefs, customs, 
practices and norms of social interaction.” This approach differs from political 
economic theories of culture, which focus on “the economic, financial and political 
causes and consequences of culture” (Babe 2009, p.4). Similarly to Garnham’s 
argument in 1995, Babe claims that the poststructuralist turn within cultural studies 
was the unfortunate effect of other scholars believing that political economists had 
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mishandled the immaterial aspects of culture. As had Garnham, Babe argues that 
political economy is unfairly indicted for engaging in economic reductionism, for not 
“inquiring into the ideological and interpretive practices of audiences” (Babe 2009, 
p.5). 
 The arguments of Garnham and Babe certainly aim to defend their 
interpretations of Marxist political economy.1 Beyond their more particular 
interests in Marxism, however, they make a particular argument that interests us 
here—that cultural studies and political economy should reconcile and integrate 
their methods. According to Garnham, an analysis of the “structure of domination” is 
the solution to problematic instances when “the source of power remains, in 
general, opaque” (1995, pp.67–69).  The “cultural industries” are examples of these 
“structures and organization of power” and their mysteries are clarified through 
sophistication: they create a link between the “power relations embedded in the 
production, distribution and consumption of cultural forms as commodities” and 
“the use-value of that commodity to the consumer.” With such a link, political 
economy is able to juggle both the symbolic and material aspects of culture in a 
single unified theory. Similarly, Babe argues that a holistic method is effective at 
                                                        
1 Garnham’s and Babe’s respective styles of argumentation are cut from a larger cloth. When 
something is of interest to poststructuralism (subjectivity, knowledge, language), Marxism often 
launches a critique by presenting itself as the better method to analyze the same phenomenon. Its 
methodology, so the argument goes, has a sharper blade for a social critique of power because it 
grounds various social phenomena in the same principles of historical materialism. Compare, for 
example, the argumentative styles of David McNally’s critique of poststructuralist theories of 
language (2001) and John Sanbonmatsu’s critique of postmodern subjectivity (2010). 
 
Something is also noticeable about the debate within which Garnham’s and Babe’s arguments 
occurred: with respect to the details of Marxist political economy, much of it was superficial. In fact, 
Garnham and Babe did not have to be very technical because the primary issue was one of the more 
flagrant misinterpretations of Marxism: the immovability of false consciousness and the gravity of 
economic determinism. This debate is a significant distance from the technical details of the labour 
theory of value. 
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analyzing modern culture as a political economy of power and control: “… the 
median and dialectical position… acknowledges mutual interaction and mutual 
dependency in the systems theory sense among culture, economy, and polity/policy” 
(Babe 2009, p.8). 
 
Adorno 
 
 According to Babe, a prototype of a political economy of power can be found 
in the cultural writings of Adorno. The interdisciplinary qualities of Adorno’s 
writings on culture demonstrate that it is  
insufficient merely to depict general relations between various cultural 
products (say, musical genres) and social life. Rather one needs to explore how 
cultural products help organize society (allocate leisure time and promote 
passivity and conformity in audiences, for example), and address in detail the 
production, reproduction, distribution, exchange and consumption of cultural 
commodities. (Babe 2009, p.24) 
 
And while Adorno’s theory of culture is still Marxist, it is moving outwards. By 
abandoning both the “basic tenets as class warfare between capital and labour” and 
the idea that the materialist dialectic in capitalism is the inevitable “working out” of 
contradictions on the way to socialism, Adorno is, according to Babe, able to outline 
the new “fundamentals” for a “critical political economy of media and culture.” This 
critical political economy is much more holistic, as it includes: 
the claim of marked asymmetries in the distribution of communicatory power; 
an emphasis on the oppression, manipulation, and control through media by an 
elite; the notion of domination of media as a prerequisite to attaining and 
maintaining political-economic power; media as devices for influencing if not 
controlling consciousness and limiting resistance; economic power as affecting 
cultural production, including both scholarship and commercial culture; 
transformations wrought by commodification (exchange value suppressing use 
value); critique of science, technology and instrumental reason; creative arts as 
a possible but waning key to critical understanding; emphasis on the social 
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totality; and the importance of contradiction, reflexivity and dialectics. (Babe 
2009, p.31) 
 
 Babe, like other sympathetic readers of Adorno (Cook 1996, pp.103–105), is 
not trying to credit Adorno for doing more than he does. Adorno outlines important 
components of a political economy of power—all of which would then need to be 
developed with more historical and empirical research on mass culture.2 In other 
words, much of his writing on culture could be considered foundational, in the sense 
that it explores the very notion of analyzing mass culture through a concept of 
institutional power.  
 For example, there is Adorno’s presentation of the dialectic between culture 
and administration. This conceptual presentation illustrates why the autonomy of 
cultural creation is simultaneously a struggle against external control. Just as 
enlightenment is never ultimately separate from myth in the dialectic of 
enlightenment, culture is never separate from administration. Equally importantly, 
the latter two concepts, while intertwined, still cannot be reduced to the same 
common denominator. Between culture and administration, there is a tension of 
non-identical purposes:  
Whoever speaks of culture speaks of administration as well, whether this is his 
intention or not. The combination of so many things lacking a common 
denominator—such as philosophy and religion, science and art, forms of 
conduct and mores—and finally the inclusion of the objective spirit of an age in 
the word “culture” betrays from the outset the administrative view, the task 
which, looking down from on high, is to assemble, distribute, evaluate and 
organize. (Adorno 2004a, p.105) 
 
The lack of a common denominator is the effect of culture being irreducible to the 
means-ends logic of instrumental reason. The objectification of culture in art, 
                                                        
2 Babe’s awareness manifests itself in his decision to merge the ideas of Adorno and Harold Innis. 
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symbols, imagery and meaning can certainly be treated as means to the ends of 
dominant social interests—e.g., cultural production for the purposes of glory, 
prestige or profit. But culture can also be created without any regard to “functional 
relationships within society.” Conversely, administration can never disregard these 
functional relationships, as its very purpose is to control social relationships 
according to some mandate, whether official or tacit (Adorno 2004a, p.108). Thus, 
writes Adorno,  
The demand made by administration upon culture is essentially heteronomous: 
culture—no matter what form it takes—is to be measured by norms not 
inherent to it and which have nothing to do with the quality of the object, but 
rather with some type of abstract standards imposed from without, while at the 
same time the administrative instance—according to its own prescriptions and 
nature—must for the most part refuse to become involved in questions of 
immanent quality which regard the truth of the thing itself or its objective bases 
in general. (2004a, p.113) 
 
 No solution to the cultural effects of administration can be found in wishing 
that cultural creation could reject administration “en bloc” (Adorno 2004a, p.121). 
Instead, highlighting the traces and effects of administration on the scope of cultural 
creativity allows for matters of art and culture to be opened for political 
deliberation. Through the lens of political categories like freedom and happiness, we 
can debate the legitimacy of and necessity for an administrative power to control 
and sometimes constrain the historical possibilities of aesthetics and meaning.3 
Indeed, politics can make autonomous what would otherwise be heteronomous in 
the assumption that power has no effect on the dynamics of culture: the institution 
of a culture through authority. In other words, self-reflexive criticism of the culture-
administration dialectic derives from an awareness that artistic and institutional 
                                                        
3 Here, Adorno refers to the work of Benjamin as an example of how authority’s effect on culture can 
be critiqued. 
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interests will diverge at points: “Culture is the perennial claim of the particular over 
the general, as long as the latter remains unreconciled to the former…. 
[Administration] necessarily represents—without subjective guilt and without 
individual will—the general against the particular” (Adorno 2004a, p.113).  
 In this respect, Adorno’s apparent “pessimism” about mass culture is related 
to the amount of theoretical work that is required to put power back into the mix—
so that we can then analyze and talk about the power structure of culture in 
capitalism. As with one-sided notions of enlightenment, where the very possibility 
for enlightenment to revert to myth is buried within impulsive affirmations of 
technological progress and scientific knowledge, a one-sided concept of mass 
culture is resistant to the language of power when nothing about leisure time and 
modern entertainment appears to be worthy of a serious critical eye.4 For example, 
part of Adorno’s criticism of mass culture relates to myths surrounding the 
historical transformation of artistic production from patronage to bourgeois 
liberalism. The bourgeois ideals of purposeless art, “pure works of art… simply 
following their own inherent laws,” l’art pour l’art, and other such notions where art 
is postulated as its own autonomous sphere, are all formally different from 
patronage,5 where artists are, by virtue of the patronage relationship, “subject to the 
patrons and their purposes…” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, p.127). However, a 
simplistic narrative positing mass culture as the child of artistic freedom born 
during the decline of European patronage in the eighteenth century will likely hide 
                                                        
4 The spirit of Adorno is found in serious criticisms of entertainment, such as Maltby (1983). 
5 For a theory of how patronage can affect the form and content of artistic creativity, see Bram 
Kempers’ (1994) historical analysis of Italian Renaissance art from the thirteenth to the end of the 
sixteenth century. 
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the key structural development of institutional power in advanced capitalism: “The 
triumph of the giant corporation over entrepreneurial initiative is celebrated by the 
culture industry as the perpetuity of entrepreneurial initiative” (Horkheimer & 
Adorno 2002, p.120).  
 As is shown in two supplementary commentaries to the 2002 English 
translation of Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno’s descriptions of monopoly capital 
and institutional power were entangled in various problems of terminology, some of 
which concerned how Marxist terminology would be interpreted in juxtaposition 
with the realities of Soviet Marxism and authoritarian forms of socialism (Noerr 
2002; Reijen & Bransen 2002). Nevertheless, we can offer two reasons why this 
emphasis on institutional power is a useful precedent for our delineation of a 
concept of capital that stresses power, not productivity. 
 First, the “culture industry” (Kulturindustrie), perhaps the Frankfurt School’s 
most well-known concept, denotes the control of cultural production and 
distribution, rather than the productivity of these processes. In “Culture Industry 
Reconsidered,” for example, Adorno clarifies what he means by the term 
“industrial”: “It is industrial more in the sociological sense, in the incorporation of 
industrial forms of organization even when nothing is manufactured—as in the 
rationalization of office work—rather than in the sense of anything really and 
actually produced by technological rationality” (Adorno 2004b, p.101).  
 Second, Adorno describes the Kulturindustrie in such a way that the most 
emphasized facet of modern corporate activity in mass culture is the ability to 
control the shape and style of culture through exclusion and repression:  
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The explicit and the implicit, exoteric and esoteric catalog of what is forbidden 
and what is tolerated is so extensive that it not only defines the area but wholly 
controls it. Even the most minor details are modeled according to this lexicon. 
Like its adversary, avant-garde art, the [Kulturindustrie] defines its own 
language positively, by means of prohibitions applied to its syntax and 
vocabulary. (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, p.101) 
 
The motives for this control are “economic,” but the efficient cause has more to do 
with the negation of other competitors. For example, corporate advertising is 
transformed into a negative principle when “the free market is coming to an end….” 
What was once about “orienting the buyer” in a competitive market is now a 
“blocking device” for firms that can out-spend much smaller firms. In an 
environment in which a lot of money is used to advertise and promote the most 
dominant firms, “anything which does not bear its [money’s] seal of approval is 
economically suspect” (Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, p.131). Furthermore, the so-
called economics of advertising changes qualitatively when consumers are already 
informed about the most popular commodities on the market: “Advertising becomes 
simply the art with which Goebbels presciently equated it, l’art pour l’art, 
advertising for advertising’s sake, the pure representation of social power” 
(Horkheimer & Adorno 2002, p.132). 
  
Marcuse 
 
 Compared to Adorno’s conceptual outlines, the writings of Marcuse appear to 
be even further removed from a historically detailed political economy of mass 
culture. If Adorno refers to monopolization, invents a term like “the culture 
industry” with Horkheimer and highlights, in his collaborations and conversations 
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with Horkheimer and Benjamin, the ownership and control of modern aesthetic 
techniques, Marcuse’s interests in culture seem to be much more about its 
ideological character. However, Marcuse’s conceptualization of ideology is an 
important complement to Adorno’s project. Marcuse’s critical theory, with its 
mixture of aesthetic and political theory, produces a picture in which ideology is the 
emergent property of institutional power and its grip on society. Such a 
presentation of ideology is an inspiration to us. It suggests that we can include 
ideological aspects of culture in a theory of capital accumulation, but without having 
to take the problematic step of claiming that the desires of consumers are sovereign, 
or even productive as such. Rather, the production of cultural signification is also 
connected to the social institution of limitations, constraints and taboos. 
 As much as ideas, beliefs and values are, so to speak, a matter of the human 
mind, Marcuse’s conceptualization of ideology is primarily interested in the ways in 
which an established social universe of discourse and action can serve as an 
objective limit on the dynamics of thought. This objective limit is predominately 
social. It is mainly the product of vested interests and institutional power repressing 
historical possibilities through the control of society’s intellectual and technological 
development. Limiting technological and intellectual development according to the 
established goals and values of dominant powers in society is also the other side of 
any affirmative rationalization of these goals and values. By circumscribing the 
scope of technology, work and creativity according to the goals of society’s vested 
interests, the “ideas, aspirations and objectives” of thought, even when expressed 
through cultural creation, become what Marcuse describes as “one-dimensional.” 
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One-dimensional thought can subsist even in light of capitalism’s many 
irrationalities because thought is barred from finding rational solutions in the realm 
of meaningful social alternatives. The material and intellectual capacities to usher in 
a qualitatively different, more humane society are either limited by the demands of 
capitalist society or made ineffectual through attenuation.  
 Marcuse’s interest in culture is an outgrowth of his more universal concept of 
one-dimensional thought (Marcuse 1991). Included under the category of one-
dimensional thought are modes of thinking that certainly differ in their formal 
attributes. Yet different systems of thought in philosophy, science, politics and 
culture can all be manifestations of one-dimensional thought because the term 
describes the social function of thinking. Logical positivism is not the same as 
idealist philosophy, and these two are not the same as operational behaviourism in 
business management. However, all can be one-dimensional on the basis of what 
they achieve: they reconcile thought with existing modes of behaviour in an 
established social order. It is this reconciled relationship that is ideological, rather 
than specific thinking per se. For Marcuse, the  
concept of ideology has meaning only when oriented to the interest of theory in 
the transformation of the social structure. Neither a sociological nor a 
philosophical but rather a political concept, it considers a doctrine in relation 
not to the social conditions of its truth or to an absolute truth but rather to the 
interest of transformation. (Marcuse 1968c, p.140) 
 
 For example, we might watch a film and conclude that it is ideological for 
what we see to be problematic or apologetic content. Yet, according to Marcuse’s 
critical theory, the ideological quality of the film is never simply about the film itself. 
The ideological quality is the mediated quality of what its content refers to at a 
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higher degree of analysis: a greater historical project that may or may not have a 
vested interest in rationalizing, rather than addressing, injustice, alienation and 
unhappiness in society. For instance, misogynist imagery is less of an ideological 
issue if it is actually an unfortunate exception to a greater anti-misogynist culture 
(which is not to say that problematic content is beyond all political critique). 
Conversely, this very same content is ideological when it stands, like other 
misogynist films, as a particular representation of an established culture of cinema 
that has no interest in transforming the art of cinema into something better (in 
other words, the particular and the universal are identical here). One of Marcuse’s 
own examples is also illustrative. An empirical analysis of political polling is not 
ideological simply by virtue of the fact that it is concerned with the data and facts of 
an established society.6 Such a study is ideological when the theoretical scope of its 
quantitative analysis is limited by an idea of democracy that merely assembles 
aspects of democratic societies in their already existing forms (Marcuse 1991, 
p.118). In this case, there is no tension between the idea of democracy, which has a 
long intellectual history, and the facts of the polling research. Without any tension 
between concept and object, these facts appear to be “adequate,” and there is also 
no intellectual room to judge whether or not actual democratic processes fulfill the 
“historical intent of democracy” (Marcuse 1991, p.117). This hypothetical study on 
                                                        
6 Horkheimer established in the early years of the Frankfurt School that critical theory had an 
empirical component. The difference between traditional theory and critical theory was a matter of 
logical structure, which determined how empirical facts would relate to theoretical propositions. For 
instance, in “Materialism and Metaphysics” Horkheimer considers the role of sense experience: “The 
requirement that every existent manifest itself through the senses does not mean that the senses... 
are to be regarded as fixed cornerstones of the world. If the evidence of sense experience is part of 
the grounds for existential judgments, such experiences are far from identical with the constant 
elements of the world. [Critical theory] is always more than sensibility alone and cannot be totally 
reduced to sensations” (Horkheimer 2002a, p.42). See also Horkheimer (2002b, p.224ff). 
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political polling is one-dimensional because it has become “circular and self-
validating. If ‘democratic’ is defined in the limiting but realistic terms of the actual 
process of election, then this process is democratic prior to the results of the 
investigation” (Marcuse 1991, p.116). 
 According to this conceptualization of ideology, a critique of ideology 
examines how the reconciliation between thought and society is false. With respect 
to culture, what is of concern is its spiritual dimension, broadly conceived. While the 
broad spiritual dimension of culture acts as the “background” of a society, cultural 
values are susceptible to becoming one-dimensional when their “oppositional, alien 
and transcendent elements” no longer have an antagonistic relationship with the 
established social reality. For Marcuse, this is a worrisome situation because many 
cultural values are, in fact, oppositional by virtue of being ideals and beliefs about 
how a social order should function. As a “background” that frames the meaning of 
actual social behaviour, culture, says Marcuse, “thus appears as the complex of 
moral, intellectual, aesthetic goals (values) which a society considers the purpose of 
the organization, division, and direction of its labor—‘the good’ that is supposed to 
be achieved by the way of life it has established” (Marcuse 1965, p.190). 
 Cultural values sometimes have a loose, almost intangible connection to the 
social order that is meant to embody these values. But like the examples of cinema 
and democracy above, the ideological issue is defined by the ways in which the non-
coincidence between historical possibilities and actual social behaviour are 
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handled.7 Culture is one-dimensional, for example, when its spiritual character is 
perceived as a matter unto itself, when the possibility for a “better material 
existence” has no effect on how we collectively value the institution of cultural 
signification. Culture is also one-dimensional when unrealized cultural ideals do not 
create a tension between the ideas of the Good Life and the established social reality 
(Marcuse 1968d, p.121). Here, the separation between spiritual activity and 
everything else in civilization is exalted, but in a manner that makes cultural values 
harmless. No longer is art an effective means of highlighting how historical 
circumstances have deviated from society’s own transcendental ideals about the 
meaning of life in a political order.8 
 To be sure, Marcuse’s definition of culture is narrow, as it seeks to highlight 
the political quality of cultural values. Such a definition of culture, however, allows 
Marcuse to point to the elements of culture on which vested interests and 
institutional power can have great impact. Culture can be made to be one-
dimensional because it “involves the relation of values to facts, not as a logical or 
epistemological problem, but as a problem of social structure” (Marcuse 1965, 
p.191).  In other words, there are moments in history in which the social structure 
enables the sphere of art to point to the untruth of its greater social conditions; or, 
at the very least, art is a means of protecting the truth of culture’s contradiction or 
                                                        
7 In “A Redefinition of Culture,” Marcuse offers a more concrete formulation of the problem: “… how 
are the literature, arts, philosophy, science, religion of a society related to its actual behavior?” (1965, 
p.191). 
8 Marcuse’s approach to culture is strongly influenced by the German philosopher Johan Gottfried 
von Herder. As Raymond Williams notes, Herder was the first to use the singular plural, “cultures,” as 
a means to distinguish spiritual configurations from the greater civilizations of which they were a 
part (1981, p.10). Herder’s core idea—that “spiritual values belong to the definition of culture in 
contrast to mere civilization”—points to the problem that Marcuse thinks needs serious investigation 
(Marcuse 1968d, p.103). 
  
 
116 
incompatibility with the present, “the unhappy consciousness of the divided world, 
the defeated possibilities, the hopes unfulfilled, and the promises betrayed” 
(Marcuse 1991, p.61). Conversely, the repression of historical alternatives and the 
institution of external constraints can create, sustain and even intensify the 
ideological quality of culture.  
 This effect of institutional power on culture is clearer in some of Marcuse’s 
more focused analyses, when he is interested in how needs and wants are satisfied, 
how values and ideas coordinate the behaviour of a community and how the 
aesthetic dimension is objectified as art. For the remainder of this section, we will 
analyze how the transformation of transitive meaning into intransitive meaning 
contributes to the pacification of the tension between cultural values and the facts of 
social existence.  
 The problem of transitive meaning becoming intransitive can be seen in the 
obverse, through the lens of Marcuse’s arguments in favour of conceptual thinking. 
According to Marcuse, concepts mediate the transitive properties between 
apparently disparate aspects of a social universe. This type of mediation is 
especially important when, in a social universe that is “broken in itself,” there are 
“modes of being in which men and things are ‘by themselves’ and ‘as themselves,’ 
and modes in which they are not—that is, in which they exist in distortion, 
limitation, or denial of their nature (essence)” (Marcuse 1991, p.125). For Marcuse, 
a concept  
is taken to designate the mental representation of something that is 
understood, comprehended, known as a process of reflection. This something 
may be the object of daily practice, or a situation, a society, a novel. In any case, 
if they are comprehended, they have become objects of thought, and as such, 
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their content and meaning are identical with and yet different from the real 
objects of immediate experience. “Identical” in as much as the concept denotes 
the same thing; “different” in as much as the concept is the result of a reflection 
which has understood the thing in the context (and in the light) of other things 
which did not appear in the immediate experience and which “explain” the 
thing (mediation). (Marcuse 1991, p.105) 
 
Here we can see the influence of Hegel’s philosophy on Marcuse’s critical theory.9 
For Hegel, a concept is a “movement of knowing” (Hegel 1977, sec.166) and it 
sublates two limited moments of a thought process. The first moment is a limitation 
that manifests itself through naïve or stubborn attempts to overdetermine and 
inflate a partial truth. The second limitation is expressed in the partial overcoming 
of the first, when consciousness, on the one hand, grasps the partial-truth as partial-
truth, but, on the other hand, still “does not know how to free it of one-sidedness, or 
to maintain it as free….” As Yirmiyahu Yovel explains, these two limitations are 
arresting to a consciousness that is “driven by the law of non-contradiction… to 
exclude one moment because of the other” (Hegel 2005b, p.68). Conceptual 
thinking, for Hegel, is the movement of self-consciousness, which is no longer 
stymied by the law of non-contradiction. Self-consciousness works through a 
“double object” (Hegel 1977, sec.167). It sees a partial-truth as both a moment (e.g., 
                                                        
9 There is also an illustrative example in Spinoza’s Ethics, which is a key precedent to Hegel’s 
philosophy. For Spinoza, intransitive meaning can become an obstacle to affirming knowledge with 
certainty. The issue with intransitive meaning is that there is nothing “beyond” the image or object to 
cause our imaginations to “waver,” or to make us doubt that the ideas we hold are “confused and 
fragmentary.” Instead, the barrier to certainty is that intransitive “imaginings of the mind, considered 
in themselves, involve no error.” The stand-alone image of a winged horse, for example, never tells us 
what about this image is false. Rather, it is the movement of thought that causes us to doubt the 
existence of this imagined creature: “For if the mind should perceive nothing apart from the winged 
horse, it would regard the horse as present to it, and would have no cause to doubt its existence nor 
any faculty of dissenting, unless the imagining of the winged horse were to be connected to an idea 
which annuls the existence of the said horse, or he perceives that the idea of the winged horse is 
inadequate. Then he will either necessarily deny the existence of the horse or he will necessarily 
doubt it” (Spinoza 2006, pt.II, P49, Schol). 
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rationalism) and as a moment “in conflict and in opposition with itself” (e.g., 
rationalism in conflict with and opposition to empiricism) (Hegel 2005b, p.68).  
 Conceptual thinking, as proposed by Marcuse, is a tool to uncover 
problematic intransitive logics in everyday language—e.g., my gas consumption in 
North America has nothing to do with wars in the Middle East. Indeed, this habit of 
bracketing and separating social spheres of activity into mutually exclusive spheres 
exacerbates, in the words of Marcuse, “a new ideology which undertakes to describe 
what is happening (and meant) by eliminating the concepts capable of 
understanding what is happening (and meant)” (Marcuse 1991, p.178). Our 
experiences of individual pleasure are good examples of how mass culture is 
ideological in this sense. Discourse around our experience of mass culture tends to 
be the effect of accepting that, in capitalism, pleasure is separate from reason, or 
that play is structurally different from labour. Indeed, our language about mass 
culture need not refer to the more “serious” issues of society because pleasure is 
affirmed as something “exclusively subjective” (Marcuse 1968b, p.167), while the 
terms and values of the greater social reality are deemed to be of another, loftier 
type. Consequently, the properties of mass culture become resistant to criticism as 
the meaning of individual pleasure is satisfied through the closed language of 
modern consumerism: “Describing to each other our loves and hatreds, sentiments 
and resentments, we must use the terms of our advertisements, movies, politicians 
and best sellers. We must use the same terms for describing our automobiles, foods 
and furniture, colleagues and competitors—and we understand each other 
perfectly” (Marcuse 1991, p.194). 
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   Again, the issue is not that individuals can find pleasure in the world of mass 
culture. Rather, mass culture, along with all of its pleasures, is structured as a social 
sphere of “non-interference.” The meaning of individual pleasure does not touch, 
nor is it touched by, real differences between consumptive affluence and the general 
unhappiness of historical circumstances. To allow pleasure to be framed in the 
context of greater political problems would open the realm of pleasure to “the 
historical demand for the general liberation of the individual” (Marcuse 1968d, 
p.101).  
 Moreover, this non-interference of mass culture is predominantly 
institutional.10 For Marcuse, individuals tend to acquiesce to the contradictory ways 
in which capitalism “delivers the goods” because industrial techniques and our pool 
of intellectual knowledge are currently under the capitalist form of social 
organization (Marcuse 1968e). Small degrees of individual pleasure can be found in 
types of work in which the social division of labour is less dehumanizing, precarious, 
monotonous or alienating than in other jobs. Yet the structural administration and 
systematic ownership of social creativity in capitalism still generally bifurcate work 
and play into two separate spheres of modern life. The former is generally “a whole 
dimension of human activity and passivity [that] has been de-eroticized. The 
environment from which the individual could obtain pleasure—which [he or she] 
could cathect as gratifying almost as an extended zone of the body—has been rigidly 
                                                        
10 Both Adorno and Marcuse consider that art will always, by virtue of creating an imaginary 
dimension of meaning and ideas, have some degree of non-interference with society at large. 
Whether surrealist or positivist in style, art’s freedom to represent reality through the imagination 
comes with an added cost. Truth in the aesthetic dimension can be ignored as “metaphysical” or even 
as the idle play of fantasy.   
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reduced” (Marcuse 1991, p.73). The play of immediate gratification, in contrast, is 
marked by its allocation to a delimited space-time of social life. The great range of 
pleasures available to the modern consumer is repressive to the extent that 
sublimated activity (e.g. work) is not a place to create a less repressive structure for 
the sublimated activity of human beings. As the “scope of sublimation” is both 
restricted and prevented from being transformed, the immediacy of gratification—
i.e., desublimation—is intensified to the point that it appears that individual 
pleasure equals desublimated activity (Marcuse 1991, p.73).11 
 
A Preliminary Concept of Capitalist Power 
 
 As intellectual precedents to a power theory of capital, the ideas of Garnham, 
Babe, Adorno and Marcuse are limited to the extent that they are still connected to 
Marxist economics and the problems inherent to it. Thus, a gap remains between 
where we are now (institutional power in historical materialism) and where we 
hope to go (a power theory of capital). We can traverse this gap with a preliminary 
                                                        
11 One-Dimensional Man follows Eros and Civilization and asks how increasing the opportunities for 
immediate gratification—i.e., desublimation—is nevertheless repressive. Repressive desublimation is 
a concept in One-Dimensional Man, and its psychoanalytic name is not incidental. Repressive 
desublimation emphasizes once more that increasing satisfaction through consumption does not 
liberate Eros if the latter is nevertheless “deprived of the claims which are irreconcilable with the 
established society” (Marcuse 1991, p.75). 
 
If we were to extend our analysis of how the repressive characters of sublimation and desublimation 
are related, there would be two important steps. The first would involve Marcuse’s crucial distinction 
between basic and surplus repression. This distinction is a corrective to the fatalistic character of 
Freud’s metapsychology. The second step would consider Marcuse’s theorization of non-repressive 
sublimation. Put simply, non-repressive sublimation is the idea that the pleasure principle is not 
automatically “redirected” to a substitute object or goal because sublimation could exist without 
“desexualization” (Marcuse 1966, p.208). For more on Marcuse’s psychoanalytic theory and its 
relationship with political transformation, see Horowitz (1977; 1987), McMahon (2011) and Holman 
(2013). 
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concept of capitalist power. The outlines of this concept will draw from the ideas of 
Cornelius Castoriadis. Castoriadis helps us present the political and philosophical 
elements of capitalist power, which, according to Nitzan and Bichler, is a historical 
mode of power (Nitzan & Bichler 2009).  
 Capitalist power seeks to aggrandize itself through the accumulation of more 
power. Its form of accumulating power is also, as a specific mode in history, defined 
by the mechanisms and goals of capitalism. Thus, we can start to look at mass 
culture with the concept of power that is relevant to it. Its major institutions are 
business enterprises. And in the interests of profit, the scope and capacity of social 
creativity are controlled through the rights of ownership, which is a type of 
authority that rests on the greater social system of private property. Capitalist 
power and its control over social creativity are certainly never about the total 
mastery of culture and its many social relations. Instead, this power over social 
creation is the expression of vested interests attempting to impose social 
signification “from above” and repress the potential for a radically democratic form 
of social creation. 
 Reference to a political term like radical democracy is a by-product of 
needing to look at social creativity through the lens of institutional power, whether 
it is capitalist or of another mode. The presence of power in society makes the 
human capacity to create forms and meanings (vis formandi) a political matter. To 
be sure, humans possess a bare ontological capacity to be creative; this opening of 
spaces for the institution of new forms is an inherent characteristic of historical 
time: 
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The perpetual self-alteration of society is its very being, which is manifested by 
the positing of relatively fixed and stable forms-figures and through the 
shattering of these forms-figures which can never be anything other than the 
positing-creating of other forms-figures. (Castoriadis 1998, p.372) 
 
The politics of creativity is about the social application of this bare ontological 
capacity to create other forms and figures. Thus, the political character of human 
creation circles around questions of how and why. How and why is the “otherness-
alteration” of creativity being affirmed or denied by society and its major 
institutions?12  
 With respect to matters of radical creation in culture, Castoriadis thinks that 
autonomous democratic societies can use art to affirm “the fact that brute reality is 
not fixed, but bears within it immense interstices which allow of movement, 
assembling, alteration, division; and the fact, too, that man [sic] is able to insert 
himself as a real cause in the flux of reality” (Castoriadis 1984a, p.240). Here, the 
novelty and indeterminacy of social-historical creation is treated as a vitamin for a 
democratic cultural project, rather than an allergen: “When an artist begins a work, 
and even when an author begins a theoretical book, he both does and does not know 
what he is going to say—even less does he know what that which he will say will 
actually mean” (Castoriadis 1998, p.74). Under different political circumstances, 
however, the potential of autonomous creation can be perceived as a threat to what 
Castoriadis calls “an explicit power.” Whether it be legislative, executive, judicial or 
even what we are calling capitalist power, an explicit power has an instrumental 
                                                        
12 Otherness is not difference: “… to say that figures are other (and not simply different) has a sense 
only if figure B can in no way derive from a different arrangement of figure A—as a circle, ellipse, 
hyperbole or parabola derive from one another and so are the same points arranged differently—in 
other words, only if no identitary law, or group of laws, is sufficient to produce B starting from A” 
(Castoriadis 1998, p.195). 
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orientation to how social creativity is being applied: its particular conservatism 
against the “perpetual self-alteration of society” is “rooted in the necessity [for the 
explicit power] to decide what is and is not to be done with respect to the more or 
less explicit ends which are the objects of the push and drive of the society 
considered” (Castoriadis 1991, p.155).   
 Capitalist power bears the markings of heteronomy to the extent that the 
logic of capital is antithetical to the openness of radical creation. Just as Plato 
monopolized the term poiesis by reducing all creation to imitation (mimesis), 
capitalism reduces social creativity in mass culture to a “coherent set of already 
produced means (instruments) in which this power is embodied” (Castoriadis 1998, 
p.195). This certainly does not mean that examples of great technical and artistic 
skill are absent from modern culture. Instead, it means that the popular conception 
of capitalism relying on creativity or even a “creative class” to achieve economic 
growth is missing a very important aspect of social creativity. Applied creativity 
tends to adhere to the same set of fundamental values: the making/doing of 
individuals is currently oriented “toward the antagonistic maximization of 
consumption, of power, of status, and of prestige” (Castoriadis 1993, p.302). 
 All of this language of power and control might still seem far removed from 
the financial language of business enterprise, which would be hard pressed to speak 
about the employment of creative labour in stark political terms. Yet business 
enterprise relies on the control of social creativity, which necessarily breaks the 
separation between economics and politics. If the business of creativity were simply 
economic—on the assumption that economics and politics are analytically 
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separable—the vis formandi of human beings would be less about business limiting 
and controlling human potential. Instead, issues regarding creative labour could 
simply remain matters of economic policy; they could revolve around the allocation 
of creative labour to meet market demand for employment, innovation or skill. In 
fact, the effects of market competition would only put weak boundaries around 
economic creativity and innovation—boundaries that are many degrees weaker 
than the strong arms of an external political force, which has the authority to 
institute laws and customs through command.  Indeed, if a free, competitive market 
essentially determined the limit of social creativity, great financial successes could 
go to any type of creative innovation that successfully met market demand, 
especially when the supply of that type of creativity was still below what it “should” 
be. 
 Unfortunately, there is a thorny methodological issue in this separation of 
politics and economics. Take the theory of creative destruction in the business of 
mass culture. As Gillian Doyle points out (2010), Schumpeter’s concept of creative 
destruction is a metaphor for beneficial economic dynamism. The history of 
creativity in mass culture, for example, appears to make a lot of sense; its 
hyperactivity in artistic and technological progress is seemingly rational because 
creative destruction will kick-start another cycle of income. For example, writes 
Doyle, 
creative destruction [appears to relate] to the music sector where the progress 
of time has been marked by a succession of advances in audio formats, from 
gramophone to vinyl records to the arrival of CDs which are now being usurped 
by MP3 digital files. Each successive innovation has brought opportunity, 
success and growth for some players. (2010, p.250) 
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The thorn in the side of this story comes in follow-up questions. Why did the new 
replace the old in that way and at that time? We can clearly see the signs of 
dynamism in mass culture, but how do we know that creative destruction is 
beneficial to society? In Doyle’s terms, what is the social value that tells us that 
creative destruction is “good” rather than “destructive destruction”—“i.e. a phase in 
which businesses are eradicated but without any positive benefits being created”? 
(2010, p.251). 
 These questions demand an answer that goes beyond a tautological 
reference to prices—e.g., any technological progress that is profitable is creative 
destruction, while the evolution of technology is merely destructive and wasteful 
when it is not. Neither is the answer satisfied by counting creativity in the amount of 
stuff that is made or how many times an artistic or technological method is 
renovated by innovation—this would suggest that any quantitative iteration is ipso 
facto useful. Instead, the answer is found in the very place that, according to Doyle, 
makes the economics of culture a problematic theory.  What is or is not beneficial, 
pleasurable or useful about cultural objects depends on what cultural and political 
ideas hold court at a certain moment in time. Similarly, the meaning of creativity is 
defined by a system of social significations that frame, in the words of Castoriadis, 
what “is and is not, what is relevant and what is not, [and] the weight, the value… of 
what is relevant” (Castoriadis 1998, p.234). 
 The social meaning of culture, especially its symbolic meaning (Doyle 2010, 
p.246), opens the floodgates to methodological problems in attempts to keep an 
economic definition of creativity separate from politics and power. In a historical 
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circumstance in which a creative endeavour has the choice to affirm what already 
exists as much as it has the capacity to, in the more philosophical language of 
Castoriadis, become the radical creation of other forms, the business of culture is 
never simply about what gets produced, but about the scope of creativity: why are 
some ideas approved, and why are others rejected or severely modified for the 
purposes of business? Are some ideas inherently unprofitable? Even in the 
hypothetical situation in which firms are so small that they are necessarily passive 
with respect to the needs and wants of consumers, the business of mass culture still 
needs to make decisions that will refer to an established world of social 
signification. Thus, even a weak decision about what gets produced is already 
marked by the existence of social power. Unless the world of social significations is 
the product of the demos autonomously limiting itself around a set of values, the 
business of mass culture is faced with the fact that the meaning of its creativity is 
less about consumer sovereignty and more about what cultural and political values 
are reinforced by the presence of society’s major institutions—e.g., education, 
religion, science, government and the military. What sort of cultural commodity 
should a firm produce when dominant groups in society have clear preferences for 
only some ideas, values and norms?  
 When some capitalist firms are themselves large enough to actively 
participate in the very construction of social meaning, the presumed societal 
benefits of creative destruction become even more opaque. Note that for 
Schumpeter, the practice of creative destruction by big business was meant to be a 
substitute for what was traditionally accomplished by small entrepreneurs in a less 
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concentrated market. Lest big business become a “perfectly bureaucratized giant 
industrial unit” that “ousts the small and medium-sized firm” (Schumpeter 2008, 
p.134), capitalism must stay true to what it always exalted as its key economic value 
in society:  
… capitalist practice turns the unit of money into a tool of rational cost-profit 
calculations…. [Primarily] a product of the evolution of economic rationality, the 
cost-profit calculus in turn reacts upon that rationality; by crystallizing and 
defining numerically, it powerfully propels the logic of enterprise. (Schumpeter 
2008, p.123) 
 
Theoretically, this key economic value of cost-profit analysis would, at the least, 
bind the rate of technological change to the amortization schedules of old 
investments. Thus, the giant firm, even when in a monopoly position, “will always 
adopt a new method of production which it believes will yield a larger stream of 
future income per unit of the corresponding stream of future outlay, both 
discounted to the present, than does the method actually in use” (Schumpeter 2008, 
p.97).  
 The partial truth of Schumpeter’s writing lies in the fact that these 
calculations are a matter of prices and profit, not much else. Yet even the largest 
firms are compelled, according to Schumpeter, to make beneficial contributions to 
technological progress because “the capitalist engine in motion comes from the new 
consumer’s goods, the new methods of production or transportation, the new 
markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise creates” 
(Schumpeter 2008, p.83). What Schumpeter neglected, however, were the 
opportunities for dominant firms to transform the principle of creative destruction 
  
 
128 
itself by significantly influencing the very social-historical meaning of “new” 
technological improvements.  
This ability of dominant firms to shape the fundamental social significations of 
creativity is hidden when, as Nitzan and Bichler argue, we continue to assume that 
the market is like a Newtonian container:  
Its particles—the utility maximizing investors-consumers—act and react on 
one another according to the rules of the market, but they have no bearing on 
the rules as such. These rules are eternally fixed, making market space 
independent and absolute. (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.279) 
 
Things look different when a social space like the market is not independent of the 
bodies that move and interact within it, but rather is the “order of the things” (Nitzan 
& Bichler 2009, p.278). In other words, when some firms are significantly larger 
than others, their gravitational force can bend the curvature of the social space they 
and other firms occupy together.  
 With respect to mass culture, capitalist power allows some firms to 
significantly bend the social space in which they also produce culture for pleasure 
and profit. Thus, while the largest firms rely on the creative powers of their labour 
force, the means and ends of controlling social creativity change when firms can 
take advantage of a world of culture that is significantly defined by their own 
behaviour. Mass culture necessitates technological development and artistic skill, 
but its oligopolistic structure allows for the repetition, stagnation and repression of 
social creativity to be called by other names: e.g., inventive, imaginative, exciting 
and, most importantly, new. This effect of redefining the boundaries of mass culture 
is not just about what is massively popular—e.g., pop music, blockbuster film, 
primetime television, etc. It is also about dominant firms having great influence as a 
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result of their ability to reject, deny or modify the desire of creative labour to 
experiment, pursue alternatives, and even dislocate meaning through “otherness-
alteration.” It is the contemporary version of what Castoriadis described regarding 
the beginnings of the bourgeois era:  
The result was the appearance, for the first time in history, of the phenomenon 
of the avant-garde and of an artist who is “misunderstood,” not “by accident” 
but of necessity. For, the artist was reduced at that time to the following 
dilemma: to be bought by the bourgeois of the Third Republic—to become an 
official pompier-style artist—or to follow his/her own genius and to sell, if 
lucky, a few canvases for five or six francs. (Castoriadis 1995, p.109) 
 
 When a firm’s ability to negate the potential of creativity is this influential, 
the separation between economics and politics is wholly untenable. Investment will 
still involve some type of production, but it can now also depend on the ability of 
alternative forms of human ingenuity to be neglected, marginalized or repressed by 
the authority of others. Labour and the costs of production still matter, but the 
strategies of business enterprise have an authoritative element when large firms 
can also set the terms of social creativity. Furthermore, this power can be 
specifically characterized as capitalist power the more we pull away from the 
assumption that institutional power is secondary or external to the “real” story of 
economic productivity, however measured. Indeed, as Garnham argued, we should 
use political economy to understand power in modern culture because giant 
conglomerates in the business of culture are able to profit from their active 
influence over the manner in which meaning is created, stories are told and social 
creativity finds its means to objectify itself in art. 
 Below, we conclude with a few examples of institutional power from the 
world of Hollywood cinema. These examples gesture yonder towards what will be 
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the main subject of Part II: risk in the political economy of Hollywood. They also 
demonstrate how the actuality and potentiality of human creation are welded 
together through capitalist power. In advanced capitalism, the creativity and human 
labour behind an established culture is entangled with firms and cooperative 
institutions that stand as barriers to the creation, autonomous or otherwise, of other 
social significations. In other words, there is a dialectic of power and creativity.  
 On the one hand, there are still some aspects of Hollywood that can 
demonstrate how creative and artistic skills are needed for its business enterprises 
to be successful. In fact, there are certainly instances of big Hollywood firms 
performing creative destruction, which Schumpeter thought monopolies would 
need to perform on a regular basis. For example, the creativity of what many 
scholars call “New Hollywood,” a period from roughly 1968 to 1977, could be 
labelled “creative destruction.” Because of falling profits in the 1960s, the largest 
Hollywood firms purposefully gave young filmmakers autonomous creative 
control—from project approval to final cut. Indeed, the Hollywood film business 
wanted New Hollywood filmmakers such as Hal Ashby, Robert Altman, Peter 
Bogdonovich, John Cassavetes, Francis Ford Coppola, William Friedkin, Sidney 
Lumet, Arthur Penn and Bob Rafelson to supersede old Hollywood fare with an 
American New Wave style.13  
 On the other hand, the assumption that Hollywood can only meet the 
demands of society when it allows the best and brightest talent to stretch their 
creative capacities to the fullest is an illusion. The relationship between the qualities 
                                                        
13 See Chapter 7. 
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of film production and the needs and wants of film consumers is held together by 
the weight of capitalist power. There are also many instances that demonstrate both 
Hollywood’s ability and financial desire to stagnate social creativity in cinema. The 
effect of Hollywood on the social relations of cinema can advantage its investments, 
while simultaneously disadvantaging the pursuit of business and art with 
alternative methods. Hollywood’s power over filmmaking, in this sense, is not about 
the productivity of labour. Neither is it necessarily the case that Hollywood has to 
perform creative destruction over and over again. 
 
Example #1: When Hollywood Gets Repetitive 
 
 Much of this interest in capitalist power can be extracted from the visible 
repetitiveness of Hollywood cinema. The use of film genres in Hollywood, for 
example, is much more than a philosophy of aesthetic forms; it is an industrial 
technique that can sometimes, in the Hollywood system, act as a form of structural 
constraint on the scope of creativity (Neale 2000). A new film project in Hollywood 
will usually obey the divisions that prevent some genres from being mixed 
together—“horror western” anyone? The same film project might, like so many 
other Hollywood films before it, insert a romantic element into the story because 
this type of mixture is considered standard. A new film, situated within a particular 
genre, might also be pressured to affirm the tropes and clichés of that genre—so as 
to conform to what audiences have been conditioned to expect.  
 Some readers may now be thinking of notable exceptions in Hollywood 
cinema. Nevertheless, while we can disagree about particular differences between 
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Hollywood films, we can still stumble towards questions about structural pressures 
and its effects on art. Is it in Hollywood’s financial interest to be repetitive and 
formulaic? Is the injection of small changes into well-used aesthetic formulas or 
styles the best that Hollywood can do creatively? Are instances of repetition a 
function of business strategy, or does Hollywood overuse formulaic filmmaking 
techniques when it lacks sufficient creative talent? 
 In his sardonic language, playwright, screenwriter and film director David 
Mamet argues that the formulism of Hollywood film production is rooted 
institutionally, in the corporate relationship between script readers and their 
bosses: 
The entry level position at motion picture studios is script reader. Young folks 
fresh from the rigours of the academy are permitted to beg for a job 
summarizing screenplays. These summaries will be employed by their betters 
in deliberations. 
 
These higher-ups rarely (some, indeed, breathe the word “never”) read the 
actual screenplay; thus, the summaries, called “coverage,” become the coin of 
the realm. 
 
Now, like anyone newly enrolled in a totalitarian regime, these neophytes get 
the two options pretty quickly—conform or die. Conformity, in this case, 
involves figuring out what the studios might like (money) and giving them the 
illusion that the dedicated employee, through strict adherence to the 
mechanical weeding process, can provide it. The script reader adopts the notion 
that inspiration, idiosyncrasy, and depth are all very well in their place but that 
their place has yet to be discovered and that he would rather die than deviate 
from received wisdom. 
 
The mere act of envisioning “the public,” that is, “that undifferentiated mass 
dumber than I,” consigns the script reader to life on the industrial model. He or 
she now is no longer an individual but a field boss, a servant of “industry”…. 
Deprived of the joys of whimsy, contemplation and creation, they are left with 
prerogative. So script coverage is brutal and dismissive. 
 
Why would this canny employee vote for the extraordinary? The industrial 
model demands conformity, and the job of the script reader is not to discover 
the financially, and perhaps morally, the questionable “new” but to excel in 
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what, for want of a better word, one must call hypocrisy. (Mamet 2007, pp.77–
78) 
 
Mamet’s critical opinion of the Hollywood business structure, which was formed 
through his first-hand experiences in Hollywood, is rationalized by the “creative 
instability hypothesis” of Peter E. Earl and Jason Potts (2013). For Earl and Potts, it 
is rational for business managers to remain within the aesthetic mainstream and 
only allow the creative envelope to be pushed with conservative hesitation. 
Similarly to Mamet’s view that there is a lot of creative talent that Hollywood 
ignores or is hesitant to hire (Mamet 2007, p.79), Earl and Potts admit that the issue 
of creative instability is not about a deficit of ingenuity and creativity in labour. 
Rather, artistic novelty, complexity and even playful experimentation are business 
risks because they can exacerbate competition in the form of “overshooting.” 
Overshooting, the “other side” of “Schumpeterian competition” (Earl & Potts 2013, 
p.153), is the destruction of demand through Hollywood firms’ allowing its creative 
labour too free a hand in innovation and complexity—all of which Earl and Potts 
acknowledge can be good for art (2013, p.154). 
 From Adorno’s perspective, Earl and Potts are admitting that it is necessary 
for business to separate its instrumental goals in cultural creation from the truth of 
art. Mamet also thinks that such a separation is latent in the way film ideas are 
developed in Hollywood. While script readers, producers and their bosses “may 
subjectively (and legitimately) dislike any given script on its merits,” the more 
important point for the Hollywood film business is whether the script is disliked 
because of the “purely mechanical operation of the development process” (Mamet 
2007, p.78). But for Earl and Potts, the instrumental control of creativity is not a 
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window into a possible critical perspective about the possibilities of art. For them, 
the tight control of social creativity can be rationalized; it is a perceived necessity of 
doing business in mass culture.  
 First, the pecuniary value of artistic complexity is “mediated by the dynamics 
of consumer attention relative to producer creativity” (Earl & Potts 2013, p.165). 
Second, the “overshooting” of creativity in the business of mass culture is “not 
uncommon” because management (“the suits”) can only really act upon producer 
creativity. Consumer attention, according to Earl and Potts, is the independent 
variable that requires business to be conservative about the potential of aesthetics: 
… it is to be expected that a product will be rejected if consumers cannot “get 
into” it because it requires too much skill in discerning patterns in, and 
construct meaning from, the flow of information associated with it. If products 
are highly complex, many potential customers may fail to give attention to them 
after initially failing… to discern plot, theme, melody and so on. The human 
tendency to make evaluations relative to prior reference points and to suffer 
from loss aversion will limit the willingness of customers, as well as suits and 
creative, to take risks with products that seem to be straying too far from 
familiar territory. (Earl & Potts 2013, p.161) 
 
As much as the creative instability hypothesis can be applied to the actual behaviour 
of the Hollywood film business, it also hides the role of capitalist power in the 
process. Earl and Potts refer to the behavioural psychology of consumers in a very 
matter-of-fact style. In fact, their low estimation of each consumer’s cognitive 
capacities helps reify consumer attention and the need for business to control social 
creativity. In the hands of Earl and Potts, the story of management controlling 
producer creativity ignores the ways in which dominant firms could have a hand in 
shaping and nurturing consumer attention.  
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 Therefore, in the case of the Hollywood film business, the creative instability 
hypothesis ignores pertinent questions about capitalist power. Does the global 
presence of Hollywood cinema have no effect on consumer predilections? Are some 
films or film project ideas deemed too alien, confusing or weird by virtue of how 
Hollywood cinema socializes and habituates our film-watching skills? Earl and Potts 
claim that “consumers can develop their skills in appreciating creative products by 
successfully trying more challenging works” (2013, p.161)—but does this aesthetic 
education take place in a vacuum, or is it the sole responsibility of the consumer? 
Does Hollywood have a hand in affecting the production, distribution and exhibition 
of “challenging” cinema? By ignoring these type of questions, Earl and Potts come to 
the conclusion that the business and creative sides of modern entertainment share 
the same “rational” perspective about art, creativity and risk: “In working out how 
far the creative envelope should be pushed, both suits and creatives will, if acting 
rationally, take account of the need to ensure that the product that is offered aligns 
with the consumption capabilities of potential customers” (2013, p.161). But if the 
“consumption capabilities of potential customers” are said to be more about the 
natural limits of human psychology than they are about social power, Mamet’s script 
reader is technically behaving rationally when she envisions the public as “that 
undifferentiated mass dumber than I.” This version of creativity and risk changes 
the more we reconsider the role of power in he Hollywood film business. 
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Example #2: When Hollywood Gets Biblical 
 
The case of Ridley Scott’s Exodus: Gods and Kings is a telling example of 
Hollywood rationalizing its so-called inability to widen the boundaries of its creative 
labour. Much of the pre-release journalism on Exodus concerned the contentious 
decision to cast white Hollywood actors in the story of Moses opposing the Pharaoh 
and leading the Israelites out of Ancient Egypt (Child 2014; Palmer 2014; Anon 
2014). As much as it is standard practice for Hollywood studios to keep casting 
within the hierarchies of its own star system, Christian Bale’s attempts to diffuse 
some of the criticism inadvertently reveals how these decisions about the style of 
Exodus were not made for lack of historically available alternatives: “I don’t think 
fingers should be pointed, but we should all look at ourselves and say, ‘Are we 
supporting wonderful actors in films by North African and Middle Eastern 
filmmakers and actors, because there are some fantastic actors out there’” (Anon 
2014). The obvious rationale for not casting fantastic North African or Middle 
Eastern actors instead of Bale and other white Hollywood actors is rooted in the 
financial goals of Hollywood—even Bale acknowledged this. However, such a 
rationale does not merely obscure the racist element of this story; it actually 
obscures how Hollywood’s modus operandi transforms a controversial choice about 
casting into a so-called “rational” business decision. For instance, when Scott 
defended his film with the argument that he had to assemble the “best possible 
cast... on a budget of this scale [~$140 million],” he admitted to Hollywood’s interest 
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in profit but glossed over the main reason that all of these decisions about aesthetic 
quality are “necessary” business strategies.14  
 If we start to ask follow-up questions about the aesthetic decisions of the 
film, it starts to become clearer that the size and influence of Hollywood in modern 
cinema has a hand in making these decisions become instrumentally rational under 
specific historical conditions. Is it necessary for a film about the Book of Exodus to 
cost $140 million? Is it necessary that, for the sake of entertainment, Moses bear a 
sword rather than a staff, or that the Red Sea be made red from man-eating 
crocodiles sent by God? Is it necessary that Moses be portrayed as an atheistic 
warrior—where God might be the hallucinatory consequence of a concussion—
rather than the eventual lawgiver of God’s commandments? If the answer to these 
questions is “no,” we actually catch a glimpse of how the casting of Bale fits into a 
larger political economy of power. Hollywood is bending the curvature of modern 
cinema in such a manner that there is a financial disincentive for it to cast a film 
about Moses more appropriately, which is what Bale would personally hope for: “To 
me that would be a day of celebration. For the actors it would be wonderful. It 
would be a wonderful day for humanity, but also for films and for storytelling in 
general” (Anon 2014). 
 
 
                                                        
14 Scott also rationalized the business decisions of Exodus with much blunter language: “I can’t mount 
a film of this budget, where I have to rely on tax rebates in Spain, and say that my lead actor is 
Mohammad so-and-so from such-and-such. I’m just not going to get it financed. So the question 
doesn’t even come up” (Child 2014). 
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Example #3: When Hollywood Gets Moral 
 
Similarly to the Production Code Administration’s “Seals of Approval,” an 
infamous aspect of Hollywood’s classical studio system, the Motion Picture 
Association of America’s (MPAA) film-rating system is mostly known for informing 
consumers about how much or how little “objectionable” content is in every 
released film. But the rating system is also a non-governmental means of making 
sure that the potential open-endedness of artistic labour is channelled into a system 
that hopes to deliver content at different “levels” of morality. The contracts that 
allow film directors to direct in Hollywood effectively tether film production to the 
MPAA film-rating system, even before anything is shot. As John Lewis notes, 
contracts oblige directors to “deliver their film as G, PG, PG-13 or R” (2013, p.43). 
Film directors must also do whatever the MPAA’s Classification and Rating 
Administration says is needed for the final cut of the film to meet that contractual 
obligation. 
 
Example #4: When Hollywood Determines what is Taboo 
 
 The MPAA example is not just about the creative labour that already works in 
Hollywood. It is also a means for Hollywood to produce a significant financial 
disincentive for any form of filmmaking that tries to play the game another way. NC-
17, the rating that is technically available to films deemed more sexually graphic 
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than R-rated films,15 is effectively a taboo rating. Hollywood wants nothing to do 
with this rating, even though the major studios of Hollywood comprise the MPAA. 
Major theatre chains and big retailers like Wal-Mart refuse to offer any film rated 
NC-17 (Lewis 2013, p.43). 
 In fact, the cinematic styles that Hollywood likes are popular enough to 
create financial disincentives for radically alternative cinematic forms. As Jonathan 
Rosenbaum argues (2000), the Hollywood film business affects the way film 
journalism promotes good cinema. Excluded from the category of “good” cinema are 
films that editors think will be too alien to their readership. The independent, avant-
garde or just plain weird can often find some degree of journalistic coverage, 
especially in the age of the Internet, but Rosenbaum’s experience at film festivals, 
The Chicago Tribune and his guest television appearances on Chicago Tonight all 
reveal the nature of the problem. Not only does mainstream journalism choose to 
stay within the boundaries that Hollywood helps define, but film critics also turn 
into pseudo-marketers: 
Consider what might happen if Roger Ebert couldn’t find a single movie to 
recommend on one of his weekly shows. Or let’s assume that this has already 
happened once or twice. How much freedom would he have to assign a thumbs-
down to everything three or four weeks in a row without getting his show 
canceled? And for all the unusual amount of freedom I enjoy at the Chicago 
Reader, how long could I keep my job if I had nothing to recommend week after 
week? For just as Communist film critics were “free” to write whatever they 
wanted as long as they supported the Communist state, most capitalist film 
critics today are “free” to write anything as long as it promotes the products of 
multicorporations; the minute they decide to step beyond this agreed-upon 
canon of “correct” items, they’re likely to get into trouble with their editors and 
publishers. (Rosenbaum 2000, p.54) 
 
                                                        
15 According to some Hollywood filmmakers in the documentary This Film is Not Yet Rated, film 
studios and the MPAA have tended to place the representation of female sexual pleasure and 
homosexual acts in the NC-17 category. 
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Rosenbaum’s criticism is similar to what Adorno said about the power of scale in 
modern advertising: large capitalist firms can advertise their products to such a 
degree that we come to associate the quality of an object with the amount of 
advertising or publicity it gets. This power of scale also binds the profession of film 
criticism to a business that is not in the habit of admitting to the quality of what lies 
beyond its own boundaries. For instance, the journalistic conspiracy of silence 
regarding Bela Tarr’s seven-hour-long Sátántangó was, according to Rosenbaum, a 
means of ignoring hard truths about the institutional repression of aesthetic 
potential. If other film critics, like Rosenbaum, thought the film’s long shots and 
extremely slow pace excellently captured the philosophical themes of nihilism and 
authoritarianism, it would challenge, even in some small way, the rationale of the 
mainstream film business (Rosenbaum 2004, p.48). If its length of seven hours is not 
excessive at all, the high quality of Sátántangó shakes the illusion that Hollywood’s 
shorter films are the reflection of universal laws about the duration of good films. 
Additionally, the film reveals that there is an implicit business risk to artists making 
great films: “If great films invent their own rules,” writes Rosenbaum, Bela Tarr 
demonstrates that one can create a type of masterpiece that cannot be covered by 
the national media (2004, p.48).  
 
Example #5: When Hollywood Finds Ways of Celebrating Itself 
 
 Rosenbaum gives another relevant example (2000, pp.91–106). In his 
opinion, the American Film Institute (AFI) betrays its mandate to honour “the most 
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outstanding motion pictures”16 because its acts of honouring American cinema 
hardly ever stray from the films of major Hollywood studios. This produces a 
redundancy in the AFI’s lists of “top” films. Some of the listed films are outstanding 
in their own right, but the AFI uses its institutional power to tell people what they 
already think—that Casablanca, The Wizard of Oz, Gone with the Wind, E.T., The 
Godfather and Star Wars are outstanding films in the history of cinema. As should be 
the case in film journalism, so should it be the case with the AFI: neglected films in 
independent, alternative or foreign cinema should be pulled out from under the 
shadows of Hollywood, rather than get pushed deeper into the darkness. Even 
though the AFI is only concerned with American cinema, Rosenbaum claims that it is 
not difficult to produce much more representative lists of what has been 
outstanding in all of its history.  
 
The Capital-as-Power Approach 
 
The capital-as-power theory, first developed by Shimshon Bichler and 
Jonathan Nitzan, is a political economic approach that makes power the conceptual 
centre of capital. First, by building from Castoriadis’s critique (Castoriadis 1984a) of 
Marx’s interpretation of Aristotle, Nitzan and Bichler argue that equivalence in 
exchange is not rooted “in the material sphere of consumption and production, but 
in the broader social-legal-historical institutions of society” (Nitzan and Bichler 
2009, 148). Second, they argue that a concept of capital must go to the roots of the 
capitalist imaginary, which, in parallel to Castoriadis’s critique of Marxism, does not 
                                                        
16 This phrasing is taken from AFI’s website: http://www.afi.com/about/whatis.aspx 
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lie in an isolatable “economic” sphere. Third, the capital-as-power approach allows 
us to conceptualize the ownership and management of modern cultural production 
as an institutional mechanism of power, not productivity. While this presentation of 
power over creation has several clear theoretical lineages in the history of political 
economic theory, especially Marx’s analysis of power in the division of labour in 
manufacturing (Marx 1990), it is most explicitly connected to Veblen. The capital-as-
power approach builds on three aspects of Veblen’s political economic theory: (1) 
his distinction between business and industry, (2) his concepts of strategic sabotage 
and (3) capitalization. By reviewing these aspects of Veblen’s writings, we can 
identify where the capital-as-power approach will be useful. Nitzan and Bichler can 
help explain how the profits of Hollywood depend on the ability to control both the 
relationship between filmmakers and their audience and the relationship between 
radical creation and already accepted significations. 
 
Veblen’s Concept of Capital 
 
 In the interest of breaking the theoretical dualism of economics and 
politics—a dualism that is often exclusively reserved for capitalist societies—we 
must be willing to rethink our concept of capital. If capital is forever an economic 
magnitude anchored in production, then power and control will both be externally 
related to the process that creates value. 
 Thorstein Veblen’s approach is useful because from the word “Go!” he rejects 
the productivist-economic approach. To be sure, the nature of productive activity is 
important to Veblen, particularly with the rise of the Industrial Age. However, in his 
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mind, people misunderstand capitalism when they deem productivity to be the 
substance of profit. Veblen points to the problem inherent in focusing so much 
attention on productivity: 
It has commonly been assumed by economists, without much scrutiny, that the 
gains which accrue from invested wealth are derived from and (roughly) 
measured by the productivity of the industrial process in which the items of 
wealth so invested are employed, productivity being counted in some terms of 
material serviceability to the community, conduciveness to the livelihood, 
comfort, or consumptive needs of the community.... The aggregate gains of the 
aggregate material capital accrue from the community’s industrial activity, and 
bear some relation to the productive capacity of the industrial traffic so 
engrossed. But it will be noted that there is no warrant in the analysis of these 
phenomena as here set forth for alleging that the gains of investment bear a 
relation of equality or proportion to the material serviceability of the capital 
goods, as rated in terms of effectual usefulness to the community. (Veblen 
2006a, pp.353–354) 
 
While Marxists laugh to themselves that neoclassical economics assumes that price 
is a reflection of the utility generated by a good, they also assume a material 
substance of their own: socially necessary abstract labour time. Capitalism in 
Marxism is understood through the interaction of two layers: nominal price 
(appearance) and real value (essence). While rejecting one “real” measure (utility), 
the Marxist economist accepts another (labour time). 
 Veblen has his own duality, industry and business, but his dualism avoids the 
problems of both neoclassical economics and Marxism. It does not regard capital, 
which belongs entirely to business, as a two-sided affair of nominal and so-called 
real economic value. Rather, an asset “is a pecuniary concept, not a technological 
one; a concept of business, not of industry.”  The same can be said of so-called 
tangible capital goods:  
Capital goods, which typically make up the category of tangible assets, are 
capital goods by virtue of their technological serviceability, but they are capital 
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in the measure, not of their technological serviceability, but in the measure of 
the income which they may yield to their owner. (Veblen 2006a, p.359)   
 
Veblen does not deny the influences of technological efficiency and the sweat of 
labour on the success of business—indeed, production is a necessary condition for 
business. But capitalization does not measure the level of technology or the 
efficiency of the production process; it measures the ability to make a profit, which 
certainly includes the ways and means of technology and labour—but not directly, 
only or even mainly. What is capitalized is the “income stream” that is attached to an 
object through ownership. Note the absence of material productivity in this 
definition of capital:  
The capital value of a business concern at any given time, its purchase value as a 
going concern, is measured by the capitalized value of its presumptive earnings; 
which is a question of its presumptive earning-capacity and of the rate or co-
efficient of capitalization currently accepted at the time; and the second of these 
two factors is intimately related to the rate of discount ruling at the time. 
(Veblen 2004, p.219)   
 
 What do these observations mean for the measurement of capital? Nitzan 
and Bichler point to Veblen’s essential insight: prices and earnings do not reflect 
“productivity per se,” but “the control of productivity for capitalist ends” (Nitzan & 
Bichler 2009, p.223).  In capitalism, business is the power of private ownership over 
industry (Nitzan & Bichler 2000, p.78). The owner derives an income from his or her 
legal rights to sabotage industry, to “keep the work out of the hands of the workmen 
and the product out of the market” (Veblen 2004, p.66).  Nitzan and Bichler 
emphasize that sabotage through the right of private ownership need not be 
exercised: “What matters is the right to exclude and the ability to exact terms for not 
exercising that right” (2009, p.228). Moreover, the sabotage of industry is strategic. 
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The best strategy for business is to charge what the traffic will bear—to use one of 
Veblen’s favourite phrases. Charging what the traffic will bear, for Veblen,  
consists, on the one hand, in stopping down production to such a volume as will 
bring the largest net returns in terms of price, and in allowing so much of a 
livelihood to the working force of technicians and workmen, on the other hand, 
as will induce them to turn out this limited output. It evidently calls for a 
shrewd balancing of production against price, such as is best served by a hard 
head and a cool heart. (2004, p.67)  
 
Elsewhere in Absentee Ownership, Veblen emphasizes this point by calling sabotage 
“A Conscientious Withdrawal of Efficiency” (2004, p.218).  Conscientiousness in this 
case is not insignificant, as too little sabotage can be just as disastrous for 
capitalization as too much. While the community at large may benefit from a free-
run of industrial production, business would not. 
 
The Hollywood Film Business: The Strategic Sabotage of the Industrial Art of Film 
 
  Having challenged the usefulness of existing methods, it is necessary to offer 
a substitute for the study of the political economy of mass culture. First, while the 
production of culture certainly matters, we need not obsess about productivity. 
Veblen—with the additions of Nitzan and Bichler—sidesteps the issue of whether 
the creative labour of artists, writers, actors, playwrights, designers, copy editors, 
etc. create “real” economic value. To be sure, from the perspective of industry and 
the interests of the community at large, all of their work may or may not be 
beneficial, pleasurable or useful. Nevertheless, according to Veblen, the gains of 
business are differential gains related to the socio-legal institutions that determine 
the distribution of industrial production (Veblen 2006b, pp.324–351). By itself, the 
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output of industry is not the “real” essence of value, as a stock of technology, 
knowledge, energy or human creativity says nothing about how its material benefits 
are distributed amongst members of a community. In fact, even if capitalist society 
creates incentives for so much daily human exchange to be mediated by prices and 
private property, the material and intellectual benefits of modern production can 
always be distributed for free. Similarly, by virtue of how some material and 
intellectual benefits of industrial civilization are automatically distributed to society 
at large, they cannot be treated as exclusive pieces of property, as a result of which 
their positive industrial value translates into zero business value.  
 Capital is a pecuniary magnitude that refers to the ability to control—and 
limit—the production and social distribution of industry. Under capitalism, the pace 
and direction of industry is the prerogative of the business interests that have a 
vested claim on production. The capitalist owners that have a claim on natural 
resources, technology, labour and knowledge loosen or tighten their grip on what 
they own according to the logic of business, which is not the same as the art of 
industry. Business looks at industry differently from how industry looks at itself. For 
Veblen, the  
motives of the business man are pecuniary motives, inducements in the way of 
pecuniary gain to him or to the business enterprise with which he is identified. 
The end of his endeavors is, not simply to effect an industrially advantageous 
consolidation, but to effect it under such circumstances of ownership as will 
give him control of large business forces or bring him the largest possible gain. 
(Veblen 2006c, p.36) 
 
 To substantiate these general theoretical claims, let us tighten our focus and 
look closely at one sector of mass culture: the major Hollywood firms. Having 
critiqued some Marxist assumptions in Chapters 1 and 2, and then having turned to 
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an alternative theory of capital in this chapter, we can now theorize the relationship 
between the Hollywood film business and the more general social relations of mass 
culture differently. Using the insights of Veblen and Nitzan and Bichler, our method 
of study can be radically political, and capital can be taken as a “broad power 
institution” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.80). 
 In order to exist, business enterprise must be able to threaten to withhold the 
products of industry it controls, because, as Nitzan and Bichler remind us, free 
limitless production is not a sound business strategy:  
The only way... spending [on productive capacity] can become profit-yielding 
investment is if others are prohibited from freely utilizing its outcome. In this 
sense, capitalist investment—regardless of how “productive” it may appear or 
how much growth it seems to “generate”—remains what it always was: an act of 
limitation. (2009, p.233) 
 
The details, the specific ways and means of a particular business-industry 
relationship depend on the types of industry being controlled by business. The 
sabotage of art differs in its details from the sabotage of the production of cars. And 
within the realm of art, the sabotage of cinema differs from that of music. With 
respect to the production and distribution of films, there are requisite conditions 
that make the film business possible.  
 To have any price attached to a film, whether profitable or not, there must be 
an effective claim of ownership on that film. The claim of ownership must mean 
something to the particular person or group that holds it, and it must be embedded 
in a general system of private property, where there is an ability to exclude and keep 
what is mine separate from what is yours. Abstracted from the social structures that 
support them, claims of ownership are useless pieces of paper or empty 
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entitlements. The real ability to keep everyone else’s hands off of your claim is 
nothing but social power that is expressed through the state, laws, the courts, the 
police and an established culture of private property and exclusive rights (Nitzan & 
Bichler 2009, p.228). 
 Seen through the prism of the film business, the division of society through 
private property and the forms of exclusion associated with it takes on specific 
characteristics. At the core of the film business is the principle that the products of 
the film industry should be private property and sold to the consumer at a price. 
While the absentee owner-investor may know next to nothing about how a film is 
made (as that is a matter of industrial technique), he or she may nonetheless be 
interested in how the material properties of the produced film will serve the goals of 
strategic sabotage.  
For instance, relevant to the film business is the indivisibility of the film 
image. Indivisibility refers to how one person’s consumption of a film does not 
exhaust the physical capacity for someone else to watch in tandem (Sedgwick & 
Pokorny 2005, p.13). Certainly, the indivisibility of a film is not infinite. There are 
technological and physical limits to how many people can watch the same image 
from the same screen (even though the Internet is breaking all sorts of spatial 
barriers to how people can access motion pictures). However, unlike the physical 
properties of a car, which excludes potential passengers with a rigid steel frame, 
there is no way for the light of the film image to selectively transmit to the eyes of 
some and not others who can also see the screen. The number of people who can 
watch a rented DVD in a friend’s living room depends on the size of the living room 
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and not the DVD. 
 From the earliest days of film, the business side has needed means of 
exclusion to manage this “problem” of indivisibility. For instance, from the 1900s to 
the late 1910s, the major power to stanch the possibility of indiscriminate 
exhibition—indiscriminate according to business principles—was the Motion 
Picture Patent Company, the “Edison Trust.” Spearheaded by Thomas Edison himself, 
the Edison Trust leveraged its pool of patents over film technology to set prices. The 
Trust also attempted to control how many movies were made, what types of movies 
were made, and where movies were shown (Litman 1998, p.10; Wu 2010, p.64). Tim 
Wu explains the consequence of such power:  
In the name of avoiding “ruinous” competition, [the Motion Picture Patent 
Company] pooled sixteen key patents, blocked most films exports, and fixed 
prices at every step of filmmaking and exhibition. There was, for instance, a 
set price per foot of film that distributors would pay producers, another 
price (originally $2 per week) that exhibitors paid for use of patented Trust-
owned projectors, and so on. (2010, p.64) 
 
To benefit from the blessings of the Trust, producers and exhibitors (owners of 
nickelodeons) were required to align themselves exclusively with the Trust and not 
acquire independent or foreign technology for the production and exhibition of films 
(Litman 1998, p.10).  
Another example of indivisibility, this time from the sphere of law, concerns the 
demarcation of what is to be considered socially acceptable exhibition. Copyright 
law has become an especially important subject for cinema over the last 30 years. A 
central concern has been the evolution of film exhibition, through the inventions of 
VHS, DVD and Blu-ray Disc, which could, if left unchecked, undermine the ability of 
business to strategically sabotage the promise of open-ended viewing. The habits of 
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private viewing must be explicitly separated from what would be deemed acceptable 
“public performance.”  
What distinguishes the law-abiding exhibitor from a law-breaking individual is 
a license for public performance. The MPAA summarizes public performance based 
on the Federal Copyright Act, as follows: 
Neither the rental nor the purchase of a copy of a copyrighted work carries 
with it the right to publicly exhibit the work. No additional license is required to 
privately view a movie or other copyrighted work with a few friends and family 
or in certain narrowly defined face-to-face teaching activities. However, bars, 
restaurants, private clubs, prisons, lodges, factories, summer camps, public 
libraries, daycare facilities, parks and recreation departments, churches and 
non-classroom use at schools and universities are all examples of situations 
where a public performance license must be obtained. This legal requirement 
applies regardless of whether an admission fee is charged, whether the 
institution or organization is commercial or non-profit, or whether a federal or 
state agency is involved. (Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. n.d.) 
 
At first sight, this limitation may seem counter-intuitive. Does a movie company not 
want as many people as possible to see the films they release to the public? Yes, but 
only at prices that are profitable to the company. The latter requires limitation, 
sabotage and exclusion.  
Modern societies rely on such large technological apparatuses that it is 
difficult to comprehend just how creative the sum of our technologies is. But 
business looks at the creativity of industry differently than a community would. A 
technological development in food production of may be of great benefit to 
communities that suffer from hunger, but beyond a certain point this increased 
capacity in food production may be bad for the business of food. Business interests 
and non-business interests see facts about technology and material capacities from 
different perspectives. According to Veblen, we can see this difference when we 
  
 
151 
think about what “overproduction” actually means. Based on his split between 
business and industry, Veblen notes that overproduction applies “not to the material, 
mechanical bearing of the situation, but to its pecuniary bearing” (Veblen 2006c, 
p.215). The output of industry may not exceed the “consumptive capacity of the 
underlying population,” but the same level of output may threaten prices that 
concern the vested interests of business (Veblen 2004, p.213). 
 According to Veblen, industrial stagnation and the occasional depression are 
important to business because businessmen and businesswomen “do not see their 
way to derive a satisfactory gain from letting the industrial process go forward on 
the lines and in the volume for which the material equipment of industry is 
designed” (Veblen 2006c, p.213). With this in mind, we can start to think of 
situations that would be beneficial to the art of film but nightmarish for the business 
of film. From the standards of aesthetics and democratic principles, free public 
performances and an open culture of sharing could energize the world of cinema. 
Free public access to motion pictures, for instance, could be the condition for an 
engaged assembly of moviegoers; and that engaged assembly could in turn enliven 
those in the film industry who know that the principle of producing “cheaply and 
interestingly made distractions” (Bloch 1988, p.27) has nothing to do with 
aesthetics and everything to do with profit. Could absentee owners of film property 
ever embrace these alternative, democratic principles?  
In the words of Adorno, owners are all too happy for freedom during leisure 
time to be “functionalized, extended and reproduced by business” (Adorno 2004c, 
p.190). Prices and income depend on how the art of film serves the order of 
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business. This “harmony” is never without power. We saw how power is used to 
manage the material indivisibility of the film image. In addition, film businesses 
must manage and control the material quality of reproducibility. As Walter Benjamin 
notes, in principle all art is reproducible: “Man-made artifacts could always be 
imitated by men.” However, the techniques of mechanical reproduction represent 
something new for artistry (Benjamin 1968, p.218). While the methods of founding 
and stamping go back to the time of Ancient Greece, the more contemporary 
methods of reproduction are revolutionary in at least one important respect: 
reproduction is now inherent in the very technology of artistic creation. This feature 
is especially true for films and photography. The uniqueness and permanence of an 
authentic artwork have been superseded by mass production, where there is no 
concern that an original artwork precedes the reproduction of facsimiles. Benjamin 
explains: “From a photographic negative, for example, one can make any number of 
prints; to ask for the ‘authentic’ print makes no sense” (1968, p.224). If Benjamin 
sees in film production an opportunity for the demos to reject ritual and any 
heteronomous reverence for the aura of tradition, the film business that he fails to 
adequately consider sees something else. For the film business at large, the 
reproducibility of the film image is a potentiality that needs to be tamed and kept at 
reasonable levels. Power from above is needed to repress the promise that Benjamin 
sees in the film image and contemporary art: the indeterminate, radical potential of 
mechanical reproduction. 
 In more recent times, this conflict over the effects of mechanical reproduction 
connects to business’ struggle against piracy in digital culture. The modern notion of 
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piracy has deep origins. Adrian Johns notes the connection to the much older idea of 
seafaring pirates. Thucydides understood that the stability of the Greek city-states 
depended on their ability to repress peiratos, “seagoing coastal warlords” (Johns 
2009, p.35). And since the seventeenth century, there has been a new breed of 
pirates, those who violate someone else’s privilege to reproduce or withhold a work. 
At stake in this violation is the power relationship between “creativity, 
communication, and commerce” (Johns 2009, p.5).  
 Ignoring for the moment the morality of cultural piracy—some of Europe’s 
greatest thinkers, such as Newton and Hume, put up no resistance when they 
learned that their work was shared with the public through piratical means—
Europe’s earliest pyrates, from the late 1600s to the 1800s, ignored everything from 
exclusive patents given through royal decree to common customs of registration. As 
a consequence, many sectors, but particularly in bookselling, used privilege and 
property rights to repress technological alternatives to “authentic” works. For 
example, English booksellers purchased rights to print from an author, had a royal 
patent, or belonged to an organization like the Company of Stationers. Johns 
describes the latter: “... the Stationers’ Company received its royal charter... in 1557 
from Queen Mary. The company was to embrace all participants in the trade, 
binders, booksellers, and printers alike.... It had a remit to police its members to 
forestall seditious printing” (Johns 2009, p.24). Contained in Stationers’ Hall was a 
registry book that the Company used to determine who had registered a text first. 
The Company also held court to decide between competing claims over the same 
book or similar enough texts. However, formal rules were not the only means open 
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to the Company. Employing tactics similar to those of Charles II, the Company 
focused on associating the bookseller with the moral codes of a noble gentleman; his 
virtue was meant to provide a differential advantage in bookselling. Moreover, 
authors would sometimes personally sign copies of their books to undermine false 
editions—at the extreme, Lawrence Sterne signed over 12,000 copies of Tristram 
Shandy (Johns 2009, pp.33–49). 
 Compared to the complexity of current intellectual property laws, the early 
methods of defending against piracy through ideas of honour and nobility seem 
embarrassingly unsophisticated. However, there is a clear connection with present 
techniques: back then, outsiders, renegades, anti-imperialists, and anti-
monopolists—many of whom resided in Dublin, before English copyright laws were 
successfully applied to Ireland—were violating a major taboo of modern times by 
circumventing the reach of intellectual property law and custom (Johns 2009, 
pp.145–147). 
 For the sellers of cinema, the unlawful reproduction of a film, in whole or in 
part, is perceived to be a drain on the power of related propriety claims. The MPAA 
lists the types of theft that concern Hollywood firms: camcorder theft, peer-to-peer 
(P2P) theft, streaming theft (“watch for titles that are ‘too new to be true’... trust 
your eyes and ears... [and] be cautious when websites make offers that are too good 
to be true”), optical disc theft, theatrical print theft, screener theft, signal theft, 
broadcast theft, and illegal public performances (Motion Picture Association of 
America, Inc. n.d.). Furthermore, new technologies that allow the private citizen to 
watch a film at home must not subsequently create new avenues for illegal recording 
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and copying—again, the technological creations of industry can threaten business if 
the latter does not put the clamp on the former. For example, before intellectual 
property rights caught up with Betamax, the major distributors that had hitherto 
relied on theatrical exhibition were hostile to Sony, Betamax’s owner. As Maltby 
recounts, “Jack Valenti [the president of the MPAA] declared that [Betamax] was a 
parasite likely to kill moviegoing, and in 1976, Universal and Disney brought a 
lawsuit against Sony claiming that its Betamax machine encouraged infringement of 
copyright and arguing that its manufacture should be prohibited” (Wu 2010, p.192). 
Through this behaviour, Hollywood was involved in what Tim Wu calls the Kronos 
Effect: “… the efforts undertaken by a dominant company to consume potential 
successors in their infancy” (Wu 2010, p.25). When Betamax eventually succumbed 
to VHS, the latter was no longer perceived as a threat because the dominant business 
interests had by then adapted and incorporated home viewing through changes to 
copyright law.17 
 
The Capitalization of Mass Culture 
 
As an aspect of business, this power over the pace and direction of industry is 
connected to the common terms and symbols of modern finance, the formal 
language of business enterprise. If capital is an index of strategic sabotage, as Nitzan 
and Bichler argue, the quantities of capital are a symbolic representation of a power 
struggle, “a conflict between dominant capital groups, acting against opposition, to 
shape and restructure the course of social reproduction at large. In this struggle, 
                                                        
17 In 1986 the Supreme Court deemed that home recording was “fair use” (Maltby 2003, p.192). 
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what gets accumulated is not productivity as such, but the ability to subjugate 
creativity to power” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.218). 
 Nitzan and Bichler readily acknowledge that such claims about capital cannot 
be made trivially. So much of our common language about capital accumulation 
implies that the true foundation of magnitudes of capital lies in the realm of 
productivity. However, Nitzan and Bichler build from the insights of Veblen, who was 
deeply sceptical that the quantities of capital could ever be measures of industrial 
production: 
If capital and capital goods were indeed the same “thing,” [Veblen] asked, how 
could capital move from one industry to another, while capital goods, the 
“abiding entity” of capital, remained locked in their original position? Similarly, 
how could a business crisis diminish the value of capital when, as a material 
productive substance, the underlying capital goods remained unaltered? Or how 
could existing capital be denominated in terms of its productivity, when 
technological progress seemed to destroy its pecuniary value? (Nitzan & Bichler 
2009, p.231) 
 
According to Nitzan and Bichler, Veblen’s distinction between business and industry 
carries over into the quantitative dimension of capital. The quantitative dimension 
of capitalist power is the “pecuniary capitalization of earning capacity. It consists not 
of [what is owned] … but of the present value of profits expected to be earned by 
virtue of such ownership” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.231). 
 Strategic sabotage, according to Nitzan and Bichler, is the institutional 
backbone of capitalization. Capitalization is quantitative in form and forward-
looking in orientation. Capitalization is the discounting of expected future earnings 
to present prices.18 In this sense, capitalists are looking to the overall state of society 
in order to judge how expected earnings will eventually translate into actual 
                                                        
18 For a concise anthropology of capitalization, see Nitzan & Bichler (2009, pp.147–166). 
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earnings, what risk premium they should factor in and what should be considered 
the normal rate of return.  
 According to Nitzan and Bichler, the order of a capitalist society, from its 
institutions to its communities and individuals, all factor into the capitalization 
formula:  
Capitalists routinely discount human life, including its genetic code and social 
habits; they discount organized institutions from education and entertainment 
to religion and the law; they discount voluntary social networks; they discount 
urban violence, civil war and international conflict; they even discount the 
environmental future of humanity. (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.158)  
 
The “eye of capitalization,” say Nitzan and Bichler, looks everywhere, because the 
movements of society could influence the very circumstances that capitalists are 
trying to discount. 
 Investors in mass culture, whether their ownership is exercised directly 
though stocks or indirectly through hedge funds, investment portfolios or loans,19 
are also discounting social habits, especially those having to do with leisure time. 
The rituals of discounting the particular environment of leisure time are the same as 
those that discount other social environments, although the particular impact in 
each case may differ greatly. Work, unemployment, inflation, religion, social trends, 
war, piracy, technology and the presence of competing leisure activities—these are 
just a few things that could determine whether the customs and habits of consumers 
include a “healthy” dose of mass culture. The question for the forward-looking 
capitalist is whether businesses can deliver the goods they promise and whether 
people will pay to watch what is being sold. For instance, is the film industry 
                                                        
19For a clear but uncritical analysis of how an independent film is financed, before a major studio 
purchases the rights to distribute, see Wiese (1991). 
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sabotaged enough, are the habits of individuals predictable enough and is the 
general order of society stable enough to signal to the studio executive that it is 
prudent to green-light a $100 million motion picture about talking animals? 
An equally important question for the discounters is how the changing state 
of the world can disturb the profitability of the culture business. What countries 
offer cheap labour? Are there tax incentives for producing culture in a certain 
country? How much security is needed to keep on-location work on schedule? Did 
MGM discount the risk of street rioting halting production of its TV series, Maya, 
which was filmed in Srinigar, Kashmir in the late 1960s? Did any executive or head of 
production from 20th Century Fox in 1966 consider that the widening and damming 
of a small river in Castle Combe, England, for the purpose of filming Dr. Dolittle, 
would anger its residents to the point that two young Englishmen attempted to blow 
up the dam?20 Taken from a recent annual report of DreamWorks Animation SKG, 
Inc., the following is a list of potential future risks identified by the company: 
 laws and policies affecting trade, investment and taxes, including laws and policies 
relating to the repatriation of funds and withholding taxes and changes in these 
laws;  
 differing cultural tastes and attitudes, including varied censorship laws;  
 differing degrees of protection for intellectual property;  
 financial instability and increased market concentration of buyers in foreign 
television markets;  
 the instability of foreign economies and governments; and 
 war and acts of terrorism. (Dreamworks Animation SKG, Inc. 2010, p.21) 
 
DreamWorks’ vested interest in the future of the world is not insignificant when 
nearly 49 percent of its theatrical revenues come from outside the United States. 
 
                                                        
20The last two examples are taken from Dunne (1998, pp.34, 129). 
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What about the Value of Work, Industry and Social Creativity? 
 
 So far, it appears that the capitalization of mass culture depends very much 
on the social relations of mass culture. Moreover, much of mass culture could be 
described as productive labour in a more sociological sense: people make, shape, 
consume and circulate meaning through their ideological and material activities, 
both inside and outside of work. However, there is a slight but crucial difference 
between the capital-as-power approach and frameworks that want to incorporate 
technology, labour and consumer activity into their theories of value. While the 
latter frameworks will commonly offer convincing reasons for a political economic 
theory of culture to include creativity, desire, meaning and context in its concept of 
capital accumulation, they will also maintain that, ultimately, an expanded or 
inclusive concept of capital is still rooted in the productivity of its inputs.  
 Take, for example, the two-stage argument that splits the apparent difference 
between brand value and brand equity. Descriptions of brand value are, essentially, 
definitions of capitalization: Brand value is the 
financial valuation given to a branded product, service or company in terms of 
income, potential income, reputation, prestige, and market value. (Willmott 
2010, p.525) 
 
In practice, income-based models typically use a discounted cash flow (DCF) of 
the value of brands, in which future cash flows are discounted to a “net present 
rate” using a discount rate intended to reflect the risk of those cash flows. (Moor 
& Lury 2011, p.442) 
 
The next step in the argument is to claim that brand value is the process of 
monetizing brand equity, which is a complicated and sometimes obscure measure of 
a firm’s immaterial wealth. In other words, brand value is the pricing of the future 
earning potential and risk of brand equity, which is comprised of all of the 
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productive processes, both inside and outside the firm, that go into establishing 
brand loyalty and consumer preferences. 
 Many of the same social elements can be found in the capital-as-power 
approach. A noticeable similarity is the scope of capitalization:  
… we can say that in capitalism most social processes are capitalized, directly or 
indirectly. Every process—whether focused on the individual, societal or 
ecological levels—impacts the level and pattern of capitalist earnings. And when 
earnings get capitalized, the processes that underlie them get integrated into 
the numerical architecture of capital. (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.166) 
 
However, an important difference lies in what capitalist ownership involves, or, more 
importantly, what it does not involve. An investment, whether it includes production 
in a factory, involves the use of an immaterial idea or relies on social knowledge or 
the behaviour of individuals in social settings, is simply the legal right to claim 
future earnings from ownership. The valuation of this claim is only ever financial 
because, at any point in time, it refers to earnings that may or may not come in the 
future. But in contrast to the conventional perspective, the process of capitalization 
rests on a fundamental act of exclusion, and never on the underling productivity as 
such. Not only is the right to profit privately owned, but prices are also determined 
on the basis of how otherwise free, communal production and creativity are to be 
withheld through the restrictive institution of private property. 
 This description can be substantiated through a critique of an argument 
based on productivity. We will use Willmott’s theorization of YouTube’s worth: 
YouTube was acquired by Google for $1.65bn in 2006 when it had just 65 
employees. That is a potent illustration of how the labour of user-consumers 
built the brand equity of YouTube that was turned into brand value. The 
proceeds of the sale of YouTube were shared amongst those legally credited with 
owning the site… to the exclusion of those who provided its content and built its 
reputation. The capitalist state ensured that, legally, the co-producers of 
YouTube’s brand equity had no entitlement to the dollar value generated by 
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their labour. (Willmott 2010, p.527) 
       
Willmott is updating a Marxist theory of appropriation: the shareholders of YouTube 
were making it rich on the appropriation of labour values, which in this case was the 
work of users making and uploading content for free. There are theoretical 
problems, however, with the suggestion that Google paid $1.65 billion for the sum of 
all contributing productivity.  
 Essentially, the issues concern the idea that value was appropriated from the 
people who helped make YouTube a cultural space of meaning, socialization and 
individual participation. Certainly, YouTube depends on its popularity among 
Internet users. Yet the presumed appropriation of “value” also implies that labour 
could have been paid for its inputs if it had not been appropriated as surplus value. 
How would this $1.65 billion be paid out in the form of royalties to the productivity 
of labour? Veblen demonstrates why these royalties could also never be measures of 
the so-called “real” productive input that presumably generated them. As with other 
processes in modern industry, the labour of cultural goods cannot simply be 
deconstructed into atomistic, definable factors of a production function. Rather, the 
production of any YouTube video borrows inputs from the larger free “common 
stock” of knowledge and ideas—which is necessary for any individual object to be 
produced (Veblen 2006b, p.328).  
For instance, the making and uploading of a basketball video on YouTube 
would never simply be about the labour time of the filmed basketball players or the 
user who makes, edits and uploads the content. Rather, this productive process of 
sharing a video on the Internet is dependent on an enormous complex of factors in 
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computer, electrical and mechanical engineering. Moreover, a video on basketball 
depends on the existence of this sport, which was invented and developed from 
knowledge in material science, organizational behaviour and the biological 
capacities of human beings. Additionally, any commentary in the video would rely on 
a shared human language, such as English or Japanese. 
 The simple idea that the maker of the YouTube basketball video is tacitly 
relying on the productivity of semi-conductors, binary logic, the invention of 
synthetic rubber, language, mathematics and so much other modern technology to 
create and upload a single digital product is Veblen’s point. These aspects are the 
technological and industrial foundations of, from smaller to larger scale, the video, 
basketball, YouTube itself, the Internet, etc. Much of this industrial creation is also, 
by virtue of being shared knowledge, free to all, including businesses. Capitalization, 
in contrast, stands on the aspects of industrial capacity that have been made 
exclusive through the social-legal institution of private ownership. These aspects—
the exclusive right to advertise and sell data to others—are what make YouTube an 
asset to Google. The future earnings of YouTube still depend on all of the social 
relations that are relevant to making this website a virtual community, but the 
capital value is attached to the copyrights, patents and ownership titles that allow 
Google to sell access to certain exclusive services.  
 
The Capitalization of Cinema: Power over the Industrial Art of Filmmaking 
 
 Working through the example above helps elucidate how Nitzan and Bichler’s 
approach to capital will be useful to a political economic theory of Hollywood 
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cinema. As an industrial art, filmmaking is an integrated composite of human 
knowledge and social activity. The eye of capitalization would include some of this in 
its calculations about future earnings. Yet ownership claims attach to the aspects of 
cinema that are commodified as distinct pieces of private property. As was shown 
above, the indivisibility and reproducibility of the film image are threats to the film 
business because it needs to be able to attach prices to what it can withhold as 
privately owned assets.  
 Similarly, our critique of the YouTube example helps illustrate how 
capitalization would apply to the social creativity of film production. As an industrial 
art, filmmaking is a clear expression of how every act of production will draw from a 
huge well of social creativity. Each modern film relies on the historical development 
of human knowledge about light, sound, storytelling, verbal and nonverbal 
communication and so on. Each film draws from the development of ideas about 
style, setting and mood. Each new film can draw freely from the many sharable 
aspects of cinematic art: its methods, techniques, philosophies and even many of the 
ideas involved in making a film. For filmmaking as a business concern, however, many 
of these productive elements in art have zero earning potential because their use and 
application cannot be protected through copyrights or other means of exclusion. For 
example, there is no copyright for the genre of horror or the idea that a good story 
involves a protagonist and an antagonist. Thus, the capitalization of cinema looks 
out into the world of culture, but it does so with an eye to the claims of ownership 
that can actually be capitalized.  
As an example, take the first Star Wars film. On the one hand, Lucas was able 
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to create parts of Star Wars by freely appropriating myths and ideas that are in the 
public domain (Decherney 2012, p.17). On the other hand, there are all of the 
copyrighted elements of Star Wars, which Lucas successfully registered under the 
“Star Wars Corporation.”21 First, we have the motion picture itself, which was 
initially owned by three parties: the Star Wars Corporation, Twentieth Century-Fox 
Licensing Corporation and General Mills Fun Group, Inc. We then have the elements 
that Lucas publicly registered as his property. Luke Skywalker, for instance, can be 
treated as an asset (now under Disney) because it is copyrighted as “Visual 
Material.” This is the institutional mechanism of exclusion that allows owners to 
command a price from all of the Luke Skywalker imagery that does not fall under 
“fair use.” There are also many other copyrighted elements, from the obvious (e.g., 
Han Solo, Darth Vader, Ben Kenobi) to the seemingly trivial (e.g., “X-Starfighter 
attacking Death Star,” “Front view of Corellian starship,” “Imperial storm troopers 
confronting Han Solo, Luke Starfiller and Chewbacca the Wookiee,” “Princess Leia 
Organa awards the heros [sic] of the rebellion”).22  
These pieces of cinema can be bought and sold as commodities. Their 
pecuniary value can also rise and fall for reasons other than the price of hiring 
labour power to produce and distribute culture for a profit. As Figures 3.1 and 3.2 
show, too much emphasis on the productivity of labour will likely produce severe 
empirical blind spots in a political economy of Hollywood. In Figure 3.1, we have a 
benchmarked comparison of two series: the average operating profits of the major 
                                                        
21 These examples of what aspects of Star Wars are protected by copyright were found in the United 
States Copyright Public Records (http://cocatalog.loc.gov/). 
22 It is not a typo that Luke Skywalker is listed as “Luke Starfiller.” Some of the Star Wars copyrights 
were registered as early as 1974. 
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Hollywood studios (which will be called “major filmed entertainment” in Part II) and 
the average employee compensation for U.S. motion pictures. The bottom series is a 
ratio of the two. This ratio helps visualize the significant movements in the operating 
income of Hollywood that do not seem to appear in the level of compensation. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Major Distributors v. Labour in Hollywood, 1950 – 2003 
 
“Real” Income per Firm = 
Major Filmed Entertainment Operating Income per firm
U.S.  CPI
 
 
“Real” Income per Employee = 
(
Compensation of Employees,   Motion Pictures
Employed,   Full & Part Time,   Motion Pictures
)
U.S.  CPI
 
 
Note: Both "Real" Income per Firm and "Real" Income per Employee are shown as 3-year moving 
averages. 
Source: COMPUSTAT through WRDS for operating income and revenues of Major Filmed 
Entertainment, 1950-1992. Annual reports of Disney, News Corp, Viacom, Sony, Time Warner 
(Management’s Discussion of Business Operations for information on their filmed entertainment 
interests) for operating income of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1993-2003. Global Insight for U.S. CPI, 
Compensation of Employees and Employed, Full & Part Time. 
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 Figure 3.2 confirms that there is no correlation between the rate of change of 
operating income and the rate of change of employee compensation. Hollywood’s 
profitability is moving up and down for some reason or reasons, but its profitability 
does not correlate with changes to the cost of its labour (Pearson’s r = -0.003). 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Major Distributors v. Labour (Rates of Change) 
 
Note: Both series are smoothed rates of annual changes (5-year trailing averages). 
Source: see Figure 3.1. 
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Conclusion 
 
When combined, the three chapters of Part I produce a theoretical meditation 
on the place of power in political economic theory. Looking forward to Part II, this 
mediation will help us explore various aspects of Hollywood cinema without having 
to arbitrarily decide which parts of culture are productive and which are not.  It will 
help us situation ideological and aesthetic dimensions of cinema in the context of 
capital accumulation. And its emphasis on strategic sabotage and capitalization will 
help guide our research into the historical transformation of risk in the Hollywood 
film business. 
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Part II  
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Chapter 4 
Applying the Capital-as-Power Approach to Hollywood 
  
Introduction 
 
 To our benefit, the influence of Marx pushed Marcuse, Adorno, Garnham and 
Babe to look for signs of institutional power in the production and distribution of 
mass culture. To our deficit, however, the insights of their analyses were ultimately 
undermined by the political economic foundations of Marxism, which, in our view, 
are shakier than they at first appear. Marxist political economy makes too many 
problematic assumptions about the nature of capital. Contrary to what Marxist 
political economy assumes, economic processes in capitalism cannot be isolated 
from political power and prices are hardly straightforward reflections of labour 
time. Therefore, even the best Marxist analyses of mass culture still struggle to 
pinpoint the effect of power on capital accumulation, the goal of all capitalist 
investment.   
Up to this point in this dissertation, the job has been to clear theoretical 
ground for an alternative study of the political economy of Hollywood. But if we 
hope to develop a critical political economy of Hollywood outside the Marxist 
framework, how should we proceed? How do we apply the capital-as-power 
approach to the Hollywood film business? What are we looking for? How do we 
explain capital accumulation? What makes Hollywood run? 
 This chapter serves two purposes. First, it explains how the capital-as-power 
framework orients our analysis of the Hollywood film business. Building on the 
presentation of the capital-as-power approach in Chapter 3, capitalization and the 
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measure of capital accumulation are now described in greater detail. Second, this 
chapter explains why the rest of the project focuses on risk in the Hollywood film 
business. In the capital as power approach, risk is conceptualized as an elementary 
particle of capitalization: it is the degree of confidence that capitalists have about 
future earnings (of Hollywood cinema, in this case). In the interest of lowering risk 
and increasing their degree of confidence, Hollywood’s business interests attempt to 
predetermine how new films will function in an already instituted order of cinema, 
which includes the creativity of filmmakers and the habits of moviegoers. 
 Considering that Chapter 4 is the hinge on which Part II swings from Part I, 
this chapter outlines the following key aspects of my research methods: 
1. The Object of Study: Major Filmed Entertainment 
2. The Logic of Prices: Capitalization and its Elementary Particles 
3. The Measure of 
Capital Accumulation: 
 
Differential Accumulation 
 
By covering these details first, the rest of Part II will have a toolset to study the 
effects of risk on the Hollywood film business. Additionally, we can, by the end of 
this chapter, have a better understanding of how the capital-as-power approach 
functions as a critical political economic theory of capitalism. 
 
Major Filmed Entertainment 
 
Part II of this dissertation describes and analyzes the capital accumulation of 
what will be called major filmed entertainment. As Table 4.1 shows, this category 
comprises the six major studios in Hollywood: 20th Century Fox, Columbia, Disney, 
Paramount, Universal and Warner Bros. These studios were key players in the 
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studio era of Hollywood, and they dominated film distribution for the years I am 
primarily researching (1950-2013).  
  
Table 4.1 
Major Filmed Entertainment: 1950 – 2013 
 
Studioa Parentb Available Financial Data 
(Source) 
Columbia Coca-Cola (1982 – 1987) 
Sony (1989 – 2013) 
1950 – 1981 (COMPUSTAT)c 
1995 – 2013 (Annual 
Reports)d 
Disney  1993 – 2013 (Annual 
Reports) 
Paramount Gulf + Western (1966 – 1989) 
Paramount Communications (1989 
– 1994) 
Viacom (1995 – 2013) 
1950 – 1955 (COMPUSTAT) 
1957 – 1994 (COMPUSTAT) 
1995 – 2013 (Annual 
Reports) 
Twentieth Century 
Fox 
News Corporation (1985 – 2012) 
21st Century Fox (2013) 
1951 – 1980 (COMPUSTAT) 
1982 – 1992 (COMPUSTAT) 
1996 – 2013 (Annual 
Reports) 
Warner Bros. Warner Bros.-Seven Arts (1967 – 
1969) 
Kinney National Company (1969 – 
1971) 
Warner Communications (1972 – 
1989) 
Time Warner (1990 – 2013)  
1965 – 1966 (COMPUSTAT) 
1972 – 1988 (COMPUSTAT) 
1994 – 2013 (Annual 
Reports) 
Universal MCA (1964 – 1989) 
Matsushita (1990 – 1995) 
Seagram Inc. (1995 – 2000) 
Vivendi (2000 – 2011) 
GE (2004 – 2012) 
Comcast (2009 – 2013) 
1954 - 1989 (COMPUSTAT) 
   
Notes:   
 a. For histories of the Hollywood film business and profiles of the major studios after the 
Paramount case of 1948, see Cook (2000), Langford (2010), Maltby (2003), Prince (2000) 
and Wasko (1994; 2003). 
b. For details on the conglomeration and ownership structure of Hollywood, see Bagdikian 
(2004), Compaine & Gomery (2000), Kunz (2007) and Thomas & Nain (2004). 
c. COMPUSTAT was accessed through Wharton Research Data Services. 
d. The relevant annual reports were accessed through company websites, the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission EDGAR database 
(http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/companysearch.html) and the New York Stock 
Exchange (https://www.nyse.com).  
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 I have chosen to use “major filmed entertainment” over other, more 
commonly used terms, such as “major film studios” and “Hollywood film 
distribution,” for two reasons. First, “major filmed entertainment” is a language 
marker that helps remind the reader of the political economic assumptions that 
frame my empirical research on Hollywood’s behaviour and performance. Some of 
the facts and data have been drawn from other sources in film studies and political 
economy, but I do not want my terminology to imply that there is an automatic 
agreement over the theoretical meaning of the data.  
 Second, “filmed entertainment” is a term that reflects the scale of the 
available financial data from 1950 to 2013. The business of cinema has, in the last 
few decades, diversified its methods of gaining income—e.g., exhibition windows 
after theatrical exhibition (DVD, Blu-Ray, Internet streaming), intellectual property, 
franchising—and there are serious obstacles involved in trying to isolate the 
business of cinema in this age of conglomeration. At one end of the scale, we must 
still distinguish filmed entertainment operations from the different activities of 
Hollywood’s corporate parents. For example, GE acquired NBC Universal from 
Vivendi in the early 2000s. For the period when GE had a full or partial stake in 
media entertainment (Comcast had a 51 percent stake in NBC Universal from 2009 
to 2013), this giant of corporate America was also investing in the business of 
appliances, aviation, gas, industrial motors, weapons and wind turbines, among 
others. Consequently, the market capitalization or net income of GE, the 
conglomerate firm, gives us far too much noise for our purposes. At the other end of 
the scale, data for the film studios proper are not always available. “Filmed 
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entertainment” signifies that some of the data will sometimes include other filmed 
operations, like television or animation. 
 Other researchers echo these limitations to empirical research on the 
financial aspects of Hollywood (Wasko 2003; Leaver 2010). As a consequence of 
these limitations, my empirical methods aim to be multi-sided. At the centre of my 
analysis is the “de-conglomerated” data on major filmed entertainment. As is shown 
in the third column of Table 4.1, the source of data changes from COMPUSTAT to 
annual reports in the early 1990s. This choice is made in light of when much of the 
COMPUSTAT data on the Hollywood studios end: in the conglomeration wave that 
swept up Hollywood film studios in the 1980s (Prince 2000; Kunz 2007).  Rather 
than continue the series with data on the conglomerate parents—which repeats the 
problem of the GE example above—I have used the conglomerates’ annual reports 
to extract data on each of their various business operations. The advantage of this 
method is that we can ignore the conglomerates’ operations that are not relevant to 
specific arguments about Hollywood cinema. The disadvantage, however, is that our 
market capitalization data end when we switch from COMPUSTAT to annual 
reports. 
 I also use data on film releases, film attendance, theatrical grosses, opening 
theatres, ticket prices and other related facts. On their own, many of these data sets 
share the same shortcoming for our purpose: they do not provide information on 
profit. Yet they can supplement our core data on major filmed entertainment. Like 
the parable of trying to discern the outline of an elephant through touch alone, the 
Hollywood film business is big enough to offer enough “touch points”—an array of 
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perspectives that will sharpen our understanding of capital accumulation in the 
realm of cinema.  
Therefore, while media conglomeration is certainly significant to a history of 
contemporary Hollywood and mass culture, our decision to focus specifically on film 
operations is purposeful. Film is still a distinct cultural commodity in capitalist 
society, and even when we limit ourselves to studying the role of capitalist power in 
Hollywood cinema we have more than enough research questions to juggle. Take 
Avatar as an example. Seen from the heights of media conglomeration, Avatar is 
valued for being malleable intellectual property, which allows for its copyrighted 
images to be licensed and sold in fast-food chains, retail stores and amusement 
parks. Yet Avatar started as a film, and its function as intellectual property derives 
from this original incarnation. Consequently, to understand the eventual 
superstructure of earnings and capitalization built on this film, we have to delve 
deep into its creation and ramifications. For example, how does the cinematic design 
of this 3-D blockbuster affect its business performance? Was the style and content of 
Avatar-the-film instrumental or incidental to News Corp’s ultimate interests in 
intellectual property and franchising? Can any Hollywood film or cinematic style 
support subsequent expansions into the broader realms of modern entertainment, 
or does multimedia franchising prefer certain filmmaking techniques and styles? 
The answers to these questions require a new analytical approach, to which we turn 
now. 
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Capitalization and its Elementary Particles 
 
 The concept of capitalization was first introduced in Chapter 3. Capitalization 
is the numerical architecture of capital. It is, according to Nitzan and Bichler, “the 
algorithm that governs and organizes prices.” In other words, capitalization is a 
generative force; it is the key logic that, denominated in prices, creates and recreates 
the capitalist order. 
 The scope of capitalization widens as forms of ownership broaden, forms to 
which a business enterprise attaches “income streams.” In fact, the formal 
universality of capitalization first interested neoclassical economics in the early 
twentieth century. Irving Fisher, for example, argued that every productive activity 
can be directly or indirectly capitalized because the logic of discounting expected 
future earnings applies to every claim on ownership that is treated as an “income-
generating asset” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.156). 
 In our case, the logic of capitalization is the lens through which the multi-
faceted, qualitative world of cinema, art and culture become, to major filmed 
entertainment, objects and relations that need to be discounted to present prices. In 
other words, these qualities are transformed into what Marcuse describes more 
broadly as the “quantifiable qualities” of technological rationality. Many of these 
qualitative aspects of cinema, art and culture are not owned by major filmed 
entertainment directly, but the latter is trying to discount what it does own: claims 
of ownership whose expected income streams can be affected by the social 
composition of mass culture and the dynamics of consumption, leisure, pleasure and 
meaning in society. 
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 According to Nitzan and Bichler, this logic of capitalization can be 
deconstructed into its “elementary particles”: earnings, hype, risk and the normal 
rate of return, which, like a treasury bill or a government bond yield, is a rate of 
return that “all capitalists believe they deserve” at minimum (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, 
p.239).1 The relationship between these variables can be presented this way: 
 (4.1)  𝐾𝑡 =  
𝐸 ×  𝐻
𝛿 ×  𝑟𝑐
 
Capitalization at any given time (Kt) is equal to the discounted value of future 
earnings (E) multiplied by hype (H), which measures the extent to which capitalists 
are “overly optimistic or overly pessimistic about future earnings” (Nitzan & Bichler 
2009, p.189). The numerator is discounted by two variables: a rate of return that 
capitalists feel they can confidently get (rc) and the risk coefficient (δ). Because risk 
is in the denominator, a smaller δ indicates a greater degree of confidence and 
therefore a larger capitalization, and a larger δ indicates the opposite. If, for 
instance, there is growing uncertainty about the size and pattern of a future stream 
of earnings, δ will increase and the asset in question will be discounted to a lower 
present price.2  
 Over the long term, earnings are the main anchor of capitalization (Nitzan & 
Bichler 2009, p.186). The second part of this chapter and the rest of Part II 
demonstrate that, in the case of Hollywood, risk (δ) is also of crucial significance. For 
                                                        
1 The normal rate of return can fluctuate, but, according to Nitzan and Bichler, this rate is perceived 
as “normal” because state power has made this a universal condition of business—e.g., government 
bonds guarantee a return that capitalists can then seek to beat through private investment. In fact, 
the normal rate of return is a foundation for strategic sabotage: if your firm cannot make a 
“reasonable profit”—i.e., something as least as high as the “normal” rate—limit production or shut 
down. For more on the power underpinnings of the normal rate of return, see (Nitzan & Bichler 
2009, pp.243–248). 
2 For an expanded version of this explanation, see (Nitzan & Bichler 2009; McMahon 2013). 
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now, though, it is helpful to move from capitalization to differential accumulation. 
 
Differential Accumulation 
 
Differential accumulation is rooted in capitalization. More specifically, it is 
rooted in the relative differences between capitalized properties. There is an 
implicit differential measure between any two magnitudes of capitalization. For 
example, on January 16, 2015, Apple’s market capitalization ($622.8 billion) was 1.6 
times larger than Google’s ($383.8 billion), and Google’s was 2.3 times larger than 
Disney’s ($160 billion). Taken at a single point in time, these multiples are static 
measures of differential capitalization. Differential accumulation measures how 
differential capitalization changes over time. Treated as a dynamic process of 
redistribution, firms accumulate differentially when their capitalization rises faster 
than that of others and  “their distributive share” becomes “bigger and bigger” 
(Nitzan 2001, p.230).  
Similarly to how capitalization can be broken down into elementary 
particles, differential accumulation can be broken down into the elements of 
differential capitalization (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.327): 
 (4.2)   𝐷𝐾 =
𝐾𝑎
𝐾𝑏
=  
𝐸𝑎
𝐸𝑏
 ×
𝐻𝑎
𝐻𝑏
𝛿𝑎
𝛿𝑏
 
 
Like Equation 4.1, Equation 4.2 deconstructs capitalization into future earnings, 
hype, risk and the normal rate of return, which is effectively cancelled out because it 
is common to the capitalization of both the entity in question (a) and the benchmark 
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to which it is compared (b).3 By making each element the ratio of two entities, we 
have a platform to investigate the extent to which a firm or set of firms can 
accumulate differentially. The capitalization of a can rise faster than the 
capitalization of b through a rise in differential profit (?̇?𝑎 > ?̇?𝑏), a rise in differential 
hype (?̇?𝑎 > ?̇?𝑏) or a decrease in differential risk (?̇?𝑎 < ?̇?𝑏).  
  
The Differential Accumulation of Major Filmed Entertainment 
 
Since we are looking primarily at the longer-term trends of Hollywood 
cinema, hype (H), a mostly cyclical, shorter-term variable, will be kept hidden as a 
part of expected earnings (EE).4 Furthermore, the measure of differential 
accumulation has major filmed entertainment in the numerator (set a in Equation 
4.2) and dominant capital as a whole in the denominator (set b in Equation 4.2):  
 (4.3)    𝐷𝐾 =
𝐾𝑀𝐹𝐸
𝐾𝐷𝐶500
=  
𝐸𝐸𝑀𝐹𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐷𝐶500
𝛿𝑀𝐹𝐸
𝛿𝐷𝐶500
 
 
Dominant capital here pertains to the U.S. It is defined, for each year, as the top 500 
firms on COMPUSTAT, sorted by the market capitalization of all firms that are listed, 
but not necessarily incorporated, in the United States. This 500-firm index of 
dominant capital is meant to be similar to the S&P 500, which is a standard 
benchmark for the performance of large U.S.-based corporations. Moreover, I have 
accounted for what major filmed entertainment data can measure (see Table 4.1).  
                                                        
3 The entities a and b do not necessarily have to be single firms; they can be the total or average 
capitalization of a set of firms. More on this below. 
4 EE = E * H.  
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For example, my key measure of major filmed entertainment is operating income, 
rather than net income. Thus, dominant capital’s operating income is used to create 
a proper measure of differential operating income. 
 Why not put a set of filmed-entertainment firms in the denominator of 
Equation 4.3? Or can we hypothetically put any firm or set of firms in the 
denominator? Of course, we can do either. But the more important consideration is 
what exactly we, the researchers, seek to understand with the differential-
accumulation method. Take, for example, a piece of major filmed entertainment’s 
historical performance: in 1996 the average operating income per firm of major 
filmed entertainment was $504 million. For the same year, its average revenues per 
firm were $4.5 billion. Are these magnitudes large or small? Now consider other 
relevant questions. How would investors, who could always put money in sectors 
other than film and media, regard these numbers? How does Hollywood know if it is 
doing well or not? When is the financial performance of major filmed entertainment 
cause for celebration, and when is it a reason for distress?  
 As Nitzan and Bichler explain, the modus operandi of actual capitalists is to 
find and use relevant benchmarks for their performance. The relative performance 
of an investment can be gauged when it is measured against a meaningful average: 
A capitalist investing in Canadian 10-year bonds typically tries to beat the Scotia 
McLeod 10-year benchmark; an owner of emerging-market equities tries to beat 
the IFC benchmark; investors in global commodities try to beat the 
Reuters/Jefferies CRB Commodity Index; owners of large US corporations try to 
beat the S&P 500; and so on. Every investment is stacked against its own group 
benchmark—and in the abstract, against the global benchmark. (Nitzan & 
Bichler 2009, p.309) 
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I posit that major filmed entertainment’s meaningful benchmark is dominant capital 
as a whole, rather than an index of average filmed entertainment. Figure 4.1 
illustrates why. For the last 50 years, the major Hollywood studios have held a very 
large share of all income in the American film sector.5 This means that a chasm in 
the film business divides the large firm from the small. It also means that beating the 
average solely within the filmed-entertainment sector is meaningless since major 
filmed entertainment is so large that it is the average of that sector. 
 Before outlining Part II’s focus on risk, it is prudent to briefly consider the 
broader relationships between differential accumulation and some of the theoretical 
issues that were studied in Chapters 2 and 3. One point to address is the seemingly 
“phenomenal” nature of differential accumulation—i.e., the fact that prices are only 
being benchmarked against other prices. A Marxist theorist would likely have a 
problem with this apparent aspect of the differential-accumulation method.  
 The other point to consider is differential accumulation’s usefulness to our 
broader interest in capitalist power.6 The concept of differential accumulation helps 
us see capitalist power as a relation, not a thing in and of itself. This perspective on 
the nature of social power is important if, as Marxism first argued, capital 
accumulation both creates and feeds from the contradictions and conflicting 
interests of capitalist society. From the perspective of differential accumulation, we 
                                                        
5 This has been one of the main points of many studies that define Hollywood film distribution as an 
oligopoly (Litman 1998; Hozic 2001; Maltby 2003; Wasko 2003). 
6 Here, the usefulness of differential accumulation will only be spoken of generally, in terms of 
developing true abstractions of capitalist power’s emergent properties. The rest of the dissertation 
aims to strengthen the link between the quantities and qualities of major filmed entertainment and 
its orientation to the social relations of cinema. 
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can outline how a dominant firm is driven to augment its power in such historical 
conditions. 
 
 
Figure 4.1 American Film Production and Film Distribution:  
Percent of Total Operating Income 
 
Note: Series are shown as 10-year trailing averages 
 
Note: The firms of minor filmed entertainment were selected according to either their Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) code or their code under the more contemporary North American 
Industry Classification System (NAICS). Four codes were used: SIC 7812 (Services-Motion 
Picture & Video Tape Production); SIC 7822 (Services-Motion Picture & Video Tape 
Distribution); NAICS 512110 (Motion Picture and Video Production); NAICS 512120 (Motion 
Picture and Video Distribution). 
 
Sources:  For a list all of general classifications, see U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
“CF SIC Code List,” n.d., http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm. For a detailed 
breakdown of each NAICS code, see US Census Bureau, The Economic Classifications 
Development Branch, “NAICS - North American Industry Classification System Main Page,” n.d., 
http://www.census.gov/eos/www/naics/. COMPUSTAT through WRDS for operating income of 
Major Filmed Entertainment, 1969-1992. Annual reports of Disney, News Corp, Viacom, Sony, 
Time Warner (Management’s Discussion of Business Operations for information on their filmed 
entertainment interests) for operating income of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1993-2009. 
COMPUSTAT through WRDS for operating income of Minor Filmed Entertainment, 1969-2009. 
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Is There Even a “Real” Benchmark for Accumulation? 
 
 As does Marxist philosophy, the capital-as-power approach argues that 
conceptual abstractions should be constructed from the complicated, often 
mediated historical context of capital accumulation. Without qualitative 
descriptions of a social order that is stratified by hierarchies and comprised of 
labour, technology, politics, culture, morals, religion, law and other social 
dimensions, facts and data about the quantitative magnitudes of capital are no more 
than one-sided abstractions of what should be a more rounded, concrete history of 
capitalist society. Yet are measures of differential accumulation somewhat deficient 
in this regard? As a ratio of nominal magnitudes, does this type of measure remain 
at the level of appearances? Should political economists seek to go “deeper” in 
search of an objective measure of so-called “real” value?  
 By comparing price with price, income with income, etc., differential 
accumulation only ever rests on the formal identity between everything that is 
incorporated into the symbolic architecture of capitalization. In other words, the 
identity between differential capitalization and power, argue Nitzan and Bichler, is 
“only figurative. [The logic of capitalization] consists of converting quality into 
quantity, of translating and reducing the heterogeneous processes of capitalist 
power into the universal units of differential capitalization. And this conversion… is 
not an objective process” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.312). From a Marxist 
perspective, this quality-quantity aspect of differential accumulation might appear 
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deficient, while, by comparison, the depth of Marx’s approach would seem to be all 
the more thorough. As Marx argues in the third chapter of Capital, the “price or 
money-form of commodities is, like their form of value generally, quite distinct from 
their palpable and real bodily form….” If separated from the latter, a system of 
prices, or the money-form of commodities, is “purely ideal or notional….” Since 
prices are not what render “commodities commensurable,” Marx claims that there is 
a heavier anchor than the price of a commodity: “Money as a measure of value is the 
necessary form of appearance of the measure of value which is immanent in 
commodities, namely labour-time” (Marx 1990, p.188).   
 In contrast to the appearance-essence distinction of Marxist political 
economy, the concept of differential accumulation looks barebones. Yet, seen from 
another perspective, the “thinness” of the concept proves to be very beneficial to a 
theoretical distinction between appearance and essence.  Like any research method, 
the capital-as-power approach acts as a set of predefined ideas to orient subsequent 
research. Yet this method gives empirical and historical analysis the breathing room 
to properly test and substantiate its concepts. Research on differential 
accumulation, to Nitzan and Bichler, is the telling of a “scientific story” (2009, p.313) 
because the correspondence between appearance and essence is historically 
specific—it must be explained over and over, time and again.  
 The formal identity of capitalization and power does not explain the 
historical particularities of capital accumulation: “… individual or groups of 
capitalists secure their claims through particular organizations, institutions and 
processes, so the content of their power is always qualitatively unique” (Nitzan & 
  
 
184 
Bichler 2009, p.311). Thus, an explanation of capitalist strategy, of the ways and 
means of accumulating capital, is contextual, and only so much can be said about the 
universal means of capital accumulation. What is common to all material production 
in capitalism—labour, technology, efficiency, rationalization, etc.—is certainly 
relevant for accumulation, but these general properties are too unwieldy as 
historical concepts. For instance, even if they both purchase labour power, GM is a 
leviathan in comparison to my local auto-repair shop; some business enterprises 
profit from war and regional violence, while others are ersatz pacifists, as they seek 
to profit from the decadences of peaceful leisure time; some firms oppress masses of 
cheap, precarious labour, and some retain an exclusive pool of very skilled 
employees on high salaries; some firms control industrial processes that can be 
automated down the line, but others have less of a choice about how much or how 
little human labour will be employed; various consumer goods are hyped through 
advertising, yet some goods, like gasoline for automobiles, appear to be an 
unavoidable “necessity” of modern times, and the desires or false consciousness of a 
consumer have less to do with its purchase. 
 Moreover, measures of differential accumulation account for historical 
changes to the benchmarks themselves. According to Nitzan and Bichler, modern-
day capitalists have had little choice in substituting “Newtonian differentials” for 
“Archimedean absolutes.” The flux of historical time and the dynamic changes of 
capitalist society “leave no absolute yardstick standing.” Thus, the goal of 
differential accumulation “is not to maximize but to exceed, not to meet but to beat. 
To achieve a 5 per-cent profit growth in a recession is success; to gain 15 per cent 
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when others make 30 is failure. Even declining profit can be a triumph, provided it 
‘outperforms’ the average” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.309). 
 Conversely, a methodological constraint is produced by the assumption that 
labour has been, throughout the existence of the capitalist mode of production, the 
only true engine of valorization. As Equation 4.4 shows, the appearance-essence 
schema of Marxism is rigid because this theory of value relies on a correspondence 
between not just one but two quantitative abstractions: 
(4.4)   
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐴
=
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐵
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐵
=  
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶
𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝐶
=  
…
…
  
At the level of the numerators, the formal abstraction of a price system is 
straightforward since regardless of what object is being priced, $5 = $5, $5 > $4 and 
$5 < $6. Yet Marxism also claims that this formal abstraction is a reflection, more or 
less, of another abstraction: a system of value. This system of value is, by definition, 
universal; the movements of the entire capitalist mode of production produce it. 
Moreover, as a group, capitalists can only ever draw value from one source: 
exploitation of human labour through the purchase of labour power.  Therefore, 
socially necessary abstract labour time is, according to Marx, the one substantial, 
real benchmark of every contemporaneous process; it is the backbone of the ratio 
between prices and values. Thus, Hollywood, big auto companies, supermarkets, oil 
barons and even coffee shops, salons, convenience stores and family restaurants are, 
according to this logic, obedient to a law of commodity exchange that functions on 
the principle that, in addition to the formal equivalence between prices, five hours of 
socially necessary abstract labour time of commodity A is equal to five hours of 
socially necessary abstract labour time of commodity B, etc.  
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 Unfortunately, key components of this “real” economic substance—
valorization, surplus value, socially necessary abstract labour time—remain obscure 
because there is no effective method of measuring Marxism’s definition of value. In 
practice, the best Marxism can do is what everyone else does: look at prices to 
understand the quantities of accumulation. But by only ever looking at prices, 
Marxists are repeatedly making logical leaps from the precipice of their own belief 
in “real” value. One such leap is to assume that, despite having no means to 
empirically test the claim, the general correspondence between prices and labour 
values is nevertheless true. A more common leap occurs when the labour theory of 
value is only implied or the quantitative dimension of valorization is downplayed. 
Yet, as the unexplained correspondence between price and value moves further 
from the mind of the researcher, many qualitative, historical aspects of capitalist 
society are analyzed without any inkling of the greater theoretical problems at the 
heart of value theory. A few illustrations from the world of cinema follow. 
For example, the authors of Global Hollywood 2 (Miller et al. 2005) infuse 
unnecessary theoretical claims into their otherwise excellent study of the 
Hollywood film business. They use the general framework of Marxist political 
economy to define a two-level project. First, Hollywood is bolstered by “corporate 
and state domination, with the US government instigating and facilitating capital 
accumulation generally and screen trade in particular.” Second, films are 
“commodities whose value is derived from the labour that makes them” (2005, p.5). 
When combined, these two conceptual levels of Global Hollywood 2 cover a great 
amount of historical detail: the involvement of the U.S. government in Hollywood’s 
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global ambitions, international trade agreements (e.g., GATT), the power of 
copyright, “runaway production” (location shooting that only appears to have been 
filmed in the stated locale), the division of labour on a Hollywood film project, and 
the marketing and surveillance of consumer behaviour.  Yet, as impressive as this 
scope is, the inclusion of the labour theory of value implies that labour time is the 
productive backbone of Hollywood’s so-called economic dimension. And that 
implication is hard to support. 
As an assumption that hangs over each page of Global Hollywood 2, the 
Marxist concept of value seeps from the background to the foreground, colouring 
the particular facts with a larger theory of capital. To be sure, the collage of well-
researched historical details in Global Hollywood 2 is not the problem. Rather, the 
nagging issue is the absence of any demonstration of how the manifold historical 
descriptions, which include prices and wages, connect to a concept of capital that, 
according to its own definition, denotes accumulation in quantities of labour time. 
Therefore, as historical details fly this way and that, the theoretical structure of 
Global Hollywood 2 is unable to ultimately explain what is and is not a component in 
the engine of capital accumulation. Is it surplus value from labour alone, and if so, 
what is the correspondence between Hollywood’s rate of profit and its rate of 
exploitation? What effects do the state, ideology and law have on the level of value 
produced in this sector? Labour is defined at the beginning of the book as the de jure 
source of value; however, by the time we reach the conclusion, we have travelled 
through a complex de facto story of how a film becomes a means for profit, and that 
story goes far beyond labour as such. The story of the Hollywood film business 
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includes massive state investment, major diplomatic negotiations, copyright 
protection, monopoly restrictions, ideologies of pleasure and Americanism, etc. 
(Miller et al. 2005, p.363). 
A keen reader might reply that Global Hollywood 2 is doing what good 
Marxist political economy does well: it looks at all of the historical conditions that 
underpin and surround capital accumulation. She may go on to reiterate the 
authors’ point that they “blend disciplinary perspectives” because “historically, the 
best critical political economy and the best cultural studies have worked through 
the imbrication of power and signification…. Hollywood’s cultural products travel 
through time, space and population…” (Miller et al. 2005, p.6). Yet if the political 
economy of Hollywood is this diverse, what is the purpose of stating in the 
introduction that only one universal quality, human labour, is the basis of value? 
Because of the book’s rigour and breadth, we can say that Global Hollywood 2 is 
trying to study the economic and power dimensions of capital accumulation in 
Hollywood. But if that is indeed the case, the labour theory of value causes undue 
friction. It relies on the assumption that an economic magnitude is distinguishable 
from political power.  
For example, the authors of Global Hollywood 2 note that the production of 
the Star Wars prequels took advantage of the nominal price difference between 
average wages in Hollywood and Australian film production ($635 v. $400-430 daily 
pay);7 but how is this presumed exploitation measured in “real” terms, and should 
                                                        
7 In fact, the Star Wars prequels example is, by itself, not just about that wage cost of labour. The 
example spills over from productivity into power because the “below-the-line” labour is embroiled in 
conflicts over royalty schemes and profit sharing, which are matters of contract negotiation and 
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we assume that Australian workers are therefore exploited more than their 
American counterparts? Similarly, the statement that “establishing scarcity through 
exclusivity is one of the enduring aims of copyright protection” is suggestive of 
accumulation-through-power (Miller et al. 2005, p.227); but does this statement 
mean that legal institutions and state power are, far from being mere addendums, 
directly responsible for the capital accumulation of Hollywood? Or is copyright 
protection still just a mechanism of the capitalist superstructure, which only 
supports the mode of production rather than being integral to it? It is confusing to 
implicitly take away with one hand—i.e., value is only rooted in labour—what the 
other hand offers explicitly—i.e., copyright protection is a key function in profit 
seeking from cultural ideas and images.  
If we commit to radical left politics, to which Marxism has contributed 
greatly, we should be prepared to overcome problematic assumptions that limit our 
research. The capital-as-power approach offers the advantage of openly affirming 
what Marxist political economy is forced to admit tacitly: namely, that, in the age of 
advanced capitalism, ideology, desire, signification, intellectual property rights, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
union strength (Miller et al. 2005, p.145). Take note, for example, of Leaver’s argument and its roots 
in hierarchy and sabotage:  
 
In organisational terms Hollywood may now host a global image business which 
penetrates multiple geographical and product markets; it may also remain an industry 
that exerts market power on weaker players within the sector, to the detriment of those 
smaller players. But in financial terms Hollywood is a machine that enriches a small 
number of individuals with privileged structural positions, with little or no profit for the 
majority of publicly listed firms operating within it. This value skimming by a small, 
well-placed elite has ramifications for others in the sector when majors have little 
option but to adjust below-the-line costs, resulting in an expansion of runaway 
productions and off-shoring to lower labour cost areas like Canada, Prague and 
Bucharest…. Meanwhile, star power is only increasing as the claim on residuals from 
cable TV, foreign markets and internet media is the next target for the Screen Actors 
Guild. The likely result is increased top-to-bottom inequality within the 
profession.(Leaver 2010, p.472).  
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nationalism and many other political processes are just as important for 
accumulation as labour and machines are.  
 
A Historical Concept of Social Power 
 
Like Marxism, the capital-as-power approach assumes that there is an 
important theoretical link between the quantity-quality and appearance-essence 
relationships in capitalism. In contrast to the Marxist approach, however, the 
quantities of differential accumulation are measurable. The researcher can easily 
mimic the historical benchmarks that capitalists create and try to beat again and 
again. The quantities of differential accumulation, by themselves, are certainly never 
the whole story. Yet, if deeper assumptions about “real” value—i.e. the notion that 
labour time is the backbone of nominal prices—start to hamper even a rudimentary 
study of prices and profit, a theory of political economy will, down the line, keep 
running into an appearance-essence obstacle. This obstacle, as Marcuse notes, is 
also what hampers idealist philosophy: “The two dimensions of thought—that of the 
essential and apparent truths—no longer interfere with each other, and their 
concrete dialectical relation becomes an abstract epistemological or ontological 
relation” (Marcuse 1991, p.135).  
As a method of analysis, the study of differential accumulation can serve the 
apparent goal of other political economic studies of power. Like Global Hollywood 2, 
my analysis of major filmed entertainment assumes that the ability to make a profit 
is contextual and often complicated: the sabotage of industry depends on the type of 
industry that is under the heel of business enterprise. In the case of major filmed 
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entertainment, this sabotage, I hypothesize, manifests itself through the relationship 
between the pecuniary goals of the film business and the production of cinematic 
meaning. With this hypothesis in mind, I research how various aspects of mass 
culture bear on the differential accumulation of major filmed entertainment.  
But in what way is the capital-as-power approach a method of critiquing 
capitalist power? This question brings us to our second point about differential 
accumulation. The concept of differential accumulation allows us to develop what, in 
his critical theory, Marcuse calls “true abstractions”:  
… there are false and true abstractions. Abstraction is a historical event in a 
historical continuum. [A true abstraction] proceeds on historical grounds, and it 
remains related to the very basis from which it moves away: the established 
societal universe. Even where the critical abstraction arrives at the negation of 
the established universe of discourse, the basis survives in the negation 
(subversion) and limits the possibilities of the new position. (Marcuse 1991, 
p.134) 
 
Grounding concepts in historical circumstances bind the otherwise opposing 
qualities of abstractness and concreteness in dialectical tension: “When historical 
content enters into the dialectical concept and determines methodologically its 
development and function, dialectical thought attains the concreteness which links 
the structure of thought to that of reality” (Marcuse 1991, p.141).   
The challenge of developing historically grounded abstractions is an ongoing 
one for any social theory. For any theory of institutional or organized social power, 
there is an added level of difficulty. Social power must be conceptualized in 
abstraction because power, in a sense, is invisible or “supersensible.” Power is a 
relation, not a thing. As Hegel acknowledged early on in the Phenomenology, in the 
chapter titled “Force and Understanding,” postulating universal laws about the 
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emergent properties between things is very difficult because particular phenomena 
do not express these laws at every moment (Hegel 1977, chap.3, §132–165). For 
example, storm clouds produce thunder and lightning, but, here and now, outside 
my window, clouds could be white or the sky could be a clear blue. Or even during a 
storm, the power of lightning is only expressed through the effects of a strike, and 
the latter is the relation between lightning and its struck object. 
Differential accumulation guides the capital-as-power approach in its political 
goal, which is to theorize how and why capitalist interests control, direct and often 
repress autonomous social creativity. Differential accumulation also puts an 
investigation of capitalist power on solid empirical ground: insofar as differential 
accumulation is a manifestation of power, and given that it measures the extent to 
which firms beat their relevant benchmarks, this phenomenon is a symbolic 
expression of capitalist power being expanded or intensified faster than the power 
of others, including other capitalists.8 According to Bichler and Nitzan, differential 
accumulation is logically related to distributional power: 
One important feature of distributional power is that it [is] clearly bounded. 
Given that no group of capitalists can ever own more than there is to own in 
society, distributional power can never exceed 100 per cent. Similarly, since no 
owner can own less than nothing, distributional power cannot fall below 0 per 
cent. The movement between these lower and upper bounds, though, can follow 
many different patterns. (Bichler & Nitzan 2012, p.29) 
 
                                                        
8 To untangle the historical development of differential accumulation, Nitzan and Bichler develop two 
sub-concepts: breadth and depth. These two terms will be used in the second part of this chapter. 
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In other words, somebody has to lose or gain power for a distributional share to 
shrink or grow.9 And a historical analysis of capitalist firms offers an explanation of 
how redistribution occurs.  
In a sense, differential accumulation is a strong clue that lightning struck and 
had an effect on something, whatever this “something” turns out to be. Indeed, 
Nitzan and Bichler purposefully adopt Hegel’s principle that “force is nothing apart 
from its effect,” and for good reason.10 It is an important empirical corrective to our 
theoretical imaginations about the potentials of social power. Even if thought should 
not limit itself to what is actual, the depths of potentiality are not infinite, nor can 
the subject arbitrarily posit what is potential. Marcuse helps explain how dialectical 
thought moves between these “two dimensions” of reality: 
Hegel now introduces the concept of force to explain how the thing is held 
together as a self-determining unity in this process. The substance of the thing, 
he says, can only be understood as force.  
 
The concept of force takes in all the elements that philosophic analysis has so 
far found to be characteristic of the real object of knowledge. Force itself is a 
relation, the elements of which are distinct and not yet separate from each 
other; it is in all conditions not contingent but necessarily determined by 
itself.... 
 
If we take the substance of things to be force, we actually split reality into two 
dimensions. We transcend the perceptible properties of things and reach 
                                                        
9 For more on the logic of this argument, see Nitzan and Bichler’s paper “The Asymptotes of Power.” 
The metaphor of an asymptote—a mathematical term—is used to orient our imaginations towards 
the limits of redistribution. If there were no upper limit on accumulation, it would be theoretically 
possible for the linear or exponential growth of capitalists to carry on “until the resistance [to capital] 
is totally crushed and capitalists appropriate the entire national income. The end result itself is 
socially impossible (the non-capitalists, having lost their income, perish) or non-capitalistic (the 
losers end up living on handouts from the winners).” Our intuitive response that capital 
accumulation would never get that far as long as the capitalist system still functions actually speaks 
to the reason behind Nitzan and Bichler’s use of the asymptote metaphor. For example, in the Occupy 
Wall Street movement, the group of people known as “the Top 1%” was rebuked by a mass of citizens 
who were angry over how wealth has been distributed. In this regard, the asymptote of power 
highlights the difficulty of the Top 1% increasing its distributive share, currently around 45 percent, 
even more (Bichler & Nitzan 2012). 
10 The phrasing of this principle is taken from Herbert Marcuse’s Reason and Revolution (1999). 
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something beyond and behind them, which we define as “the real.” For, force 
is not an entity in the world of perception; it is not a thing or quality we can 
point to, such as white or cubical. We can only perceive the effect or 
expression of it, and for us its existence consists in this expression of itself. 
Force is nothing apart from its effect; its being consists entirely in this coming 
to be and passing away. (Marcuse 1999, p.109) 
 
Seen from this viewpoint, measures of differential accumulation are strong 
empirical foundations for us to jump into theoretical claims about the broader, often 
qualitative, social effects of capitalist power, which might include the sometimes-
inexact concepts of alienation, repression, violence, sabotage and waste. For 
instance, the peaks and troughs of differential income and capitalization reflect the 
changing confidence of capitalists using institutional resources and means of 
sabotage in the face of potential social resistance. Here, Nitzan and Bichler’s more 
philosophical definition of social power is crucial. They define social power as 
“confidence in obedience” because rulers actively shape their society when 
“confidence is high.” In such a state, the imposition of power over society at large is 
viewed as “customary and natural,” and forms of political resistance from below are 
treated as “mere disturbances” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.17).  
From this theoretical perspective, we can, for example, translate one of 
Neumann’s observations about the political economy of Nazi Germany.11 Like 
Marcuse and Pollock, Neumann surmised that capital accumulation is not strictly 
dependent on increases in material productivity. Neumann’s analysis of how big 
business in Nazi Germany profited from anti-Jewish legislation and the 
“Aryanization” of German business is very much about confidence in obedience. The 
                                                        
11 This example is described in more detail in Chapter 1. 
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boldness of redistributing income through government-sanctioned robbery and 
anti-Semitism would carry its own future expectations about whether such a power 
process would face significant social resistance from German society, Europe and 
possibly the rest of the world. And for the period during which the social obedience 
and widespread fear of German society under the Nazi party were palpable, German 
monopoly interests would have judged their own aggressive strategies of 
differential accumulation against their confidence that this level of social obedience 
would hold.12 
There is much room for the capital-as-power approach to grow as a critique 
of capitalism, and its methodological principles will likely evolve with the 
meditations and criticisms of interested researchers. With respect to its keen 
interest in trying to understand capitalist power from the perspective of those who 
wield it over society, the approach can make stronger connections with the history 
of political thought. For instance, Machiavelli’s The Prince mirrors the perspective 
and sensibility of an actor who carries the authority to impose a political order. 
Indeed, Machiavelli’s “gift” to Lorenzo de Medici is that what has been learned about 
princes from the perspective of the people will be re-translated for the prince. This 
“translation” is necessary because the prince’s perspective of a political order is 
“from above,” like that of a person who sees lowlands from the heights of a 
mountain (Machiavelli 1999, p.4). 
Machiavelli’s descriptions of princely strategy are also relatable to the 
capital-as-power approach. First, a prince must always consider the potential 
                                                        
12 The level of obedience and fear of political resistance in Nazi Germany is portrayed to terrifying 
effect in Hans Fallada’s Every Man Dies Alone (2009). 
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ramifications of his decisions because the present strength of a principality is 
evaluated in light of what will possibly come in the future. The future has no 
guaranteed outcome, and a wise prince is aware that shifts in the surrounding 
political environment will ultimately reveal how his decisions were either prudent 
or impetuous.13 Some political strategies, such as coming to power by means of 
crime and violence, are effective in the short term, but they ultimately damage the 
stability of a principality, especially when the obedience of its citizens is tested: 
In disturbed times… men whom the prince can trust will be hard to find. So such 
a prince cannot rely on what he has experienced in times of tranquility, when 
the citizens have need of his government. When things are quiet, everyone 
dances attendance, everyone makes promises, and everyone would die for him 
so long as death is far off. But in times of adversity, when the state has need of 
its citizens, there are few to be found. And this test of loyalty is all the more 
dangerous since it can only be made once. Therefore a wise prince must devise 
ways by which his citizens are always and in all circumstances dependent on 
him and on his authority; and then they will always be faithful to him. 
(Machiavelli 1999, p.35) 
 
Moreover, the future expectations of the prince are doubly imaginary because, like 
the rituals of capitalization, the instrumental calculations of the prince are always 
one step removed from the object of his calculations: society at large. While the 
prince clearly needs and even benefits from the obedience of the citizen body, the 
latter is not the author of a principality’s laws and institutions; this authorship falls 
on the shoulders of the prince alone. Similarly to how the strategic sabotage of 
industry can engender social unrest, the prince must decide how to keep his acts of 
(imposed) authority from transforming social obedience into hatred of him and his 
political position.      
 
                                                        
13 “Time sweeps everything along and can bring good as well as evil, evil as well as good” (Machiavelli 
1999, p.12). 
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The Main Objective of Part II: Risk in the Hollywood Film Business 
 
In light of what has been covered above, we can now outline the main 
objective of Part II in more detail. Our focus is on the role of risk in the differential 
accumulation of major filmed entertainment. Risk does not tell the whole story of 
the capitalist character of Hollywood, but it is an elementary particle of the logic of 
capitalization. Risk is a partly subjective, partly objective factor that shapes the way 
a claim on future earnings is assessed. If capitalization discounts the size and 
pattern of a future stream of earnings, risk is the expression of the “degree of 
confidence capitalists have in their own predictions” of those earnings (Nitzan & 
Bichler 2009, p.208). Risk can also be expressed as a differential measure (e.g., 
𝛿𝑀𝐹𝐸
𝛿𝐷𝐶500
 
in Equation 4.3), which lets us inquire how a firm or set of firms, like major filmed 
entertainment, lowers its risk at a faster rate than others. 
The decision to focus on risk is motivated by the relationship between the 
two series in Figure 4.2. The first series presents the differential market 
capitalization of major filmed entertainment from 1950 to 1994. Here, the average 
market capitalization of major filmed entertainment is benchmarked against the 
average for dominant capital as a whole, proxied by the top 500 firms in the entire 
COMPUSTAT database. As was mentioned when we first introduced the term “major 
filmed entertainment,” the capitalization data for this group end at 1994; from this 
point onward, available data pertain to the market capitalization of Hollywood’s 
parent conglomerates, rather than the subsidiaries we are interested in. The second 
series measures the differential operating income of major filmed entertainment, 
which is likewise benchmarked against dominant capital as defined above. Unlike  
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Figure 4.2 Differential Capitalization and Differential Operating Income 
of Major Filmed Entertainment 
 
Note: Both series are 5-year trailing averages. See Table 4.1 and Chapter 4 for an explanation of why 
Differential Capitalization ends at 1994. 
 
Source: COMPUSTAT through WRDS for common shares outstanding (CSHO) and Price (PRCC_F) of 
Major Filmed Entertainment, 1950-1992. COMPUSTAT through WRDS for operating income, common 
shares outstanding (CSHO) and Price (PRCC_F) of Dominant Capital 500, 1950-2011. Annual reports 
of Disney, News Corp, Viacom, Sony, Time Warner (Management’s Discussion of Business Operations 
for information on their filmed entertainment interests) for operating income of Major Filmed 
Entertainment, 1993-2013.  
 
 
 
market capitalization, this series is available for the entire 1950-2013 period, since 
operating income for major filmed entertainment can be obtained from their annual 
reports and COMPUSTAT. The juxtaposition of the two series shows that, for the 
years for which there are data for both series, the differential earnings of major 
filmed entertainment are insufficient to explain differential capitalization. Most 
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significantly for our purpose is the fact that, from 1980 to 1994, differential earnings 
declined significantly while differential capitalization soared. Although there can be 
no comparison made for years subsequent to 1994, it is clear that differential 
capitalization depends not only on earnings, but also—and possibly far more so—on 
differential risk.  
The study of risk also accounts for historical shifts in capitalist power. As 
Nitzan and Bichler suggest, capitalization is not a crystal ball that can see the future. 
Rather, it is a social ritual, one that attempts to estimate how a stream of income and 
its underlying social conditions will carry into the future (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, 
p.187). The difference between prophecy and estimation is significant. Social norms, 
values and behaviour can change, and business enterprise, which is trying to 
estimate this future, can never find an Archimedean point that is outside of society 
or safe from the winds of history. Consequently, there is always “risk” that business 
estimates will turn out to be wrong. Moreover, risk can change as social actors, 
including capitalists, strengthen or weaken the continuity of established social 
relations.  
 As stated above, Nitzan and Bichler understand power as “confidence in 
obedience: it represents the certainty of the rulers in the submissiveness of the 
ruled” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.398). Thus, if we translate δ into the more 
philosophical language of power, the capitalist degree of confidence (1/ δ) refers to 
the perceived duration and strength of obedience and the likelihood that future 
social behaviour will function for capitalist ends. For instance, capitalist confidence 
can increase when individuals have internalized the goals of a repressive society, 
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when the persistence of fear, violence and poverty has actually helped social power 
acquire an “unshiftable weight” (Castoriadis 1998, p.109). Yet, however strong 
obedience may appear to be, it is always threatened by the possibility that individual 
or even social autonomy will resurface in the future. Even for the largest empires 
and the most repressive political regimes, there is never an absolute guarantee that 
social obedience will carry on indefinitely. Therefore, risk is the product of the 
inability of a ruling class to fully extirpate the potential for individual and group 
autonomy to resurface in the future.14  
 With respect to the forward-looking nature of the Hollywood film business, 
risk perceptions account for the possibility that the future of culture will be 
different—and perhaps radically different—from what capitalists expect it to be. 
This logic of capitalist accounting, while quantitative in expression (prices, income, 
volatility, etc.), is social in essence. For this reason, the risk perceptions of major 
filmed entertainment cannot overlook any social dimension of cinema, be it 
aesthetic, political or cultural. The eye of capitalization searches for any social 
condition that could have an impact on “the level and pattern of capitalist earnings” 
(Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.166). 
 As Bill Grantham notes, this thorough evaluation of risk is evident at the level 
of project financing: “… film risk is variable and the degree of risk is subject to 
                                                        
14 While Spinoza did not use the same terms, we can find the germ of this idea in his Theological-
Political Treatise: “A person’s judgment, admittedly, may be subjected to another’s in many different 
and sometimes almost unbelievable ways to such an extent that, even though he may not be directly 
under the other person’s command, he may be so dependent on him that he may properly be said to 
be under his authority to that extent. Yet however much skillful methods may accomplish in this 
respect, these have never succeeded in altogether suppressing men’s awareness that they have a 
good deal of sense of their own and that their minds differ no less than do their palates” (Spinoza 
2007, chap.20, §2). 
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structural considerations as well as the greater or lesser degree of ‘riskiness’ 
inherent in any project’s subject matter, or associated with its writer, director, stars, 
and so on” (Grantham 2012, p.200). But based on what was said above, Grantham’s 
use of the word “inherent” is potentially misleading. Here, “riskiness” is a term of 
business, not art. We may be tempted to label a film “risky” if it challenges social 
taboos, or if, like Věra Chytilová’s Daisies (1966), it uses the cinematic medium to 
critique political regimes. A filmmaker can also be said to be taking an “aesthetic 
risk” when he or she develops an untested cinematic style. However, indeterminate 
creativity in the realm of aesthetics or the development of political cinema can both 
exist separately from the logic of capital. In fact, it is Veblen’s point that pecuniary 
value does not simply reflect political, cultural or aesthetic quality. Rather, when 
cinema is a business concern, vested interests flip the definition of value. Under 
their logic of capital, the potential of creativity, both anthropological and 
technological, are judged according to the terms of capitalist investment: a risky 
movie is one that fails not business’s aesthetic criteria but its financial 
expectations.15 
 
Framing Empirical Research on Risk in the Hollywood Film Business 
 
Our overarching hypothesis for the rest of Part II is the following: 
Hypothesis: The drive to reduce risk—and the central role of 
strategic sabotage in this reduction—shapes 
Hollywood’s orientation toward the social-
                                                        
15 According to Jonathan Rosenbaum, film journalism helps perpetuate the idea that a movie’s quality 
is signified by its financial success. He points to a recent worrying trend in film journalism that 
conflates two business terms—“turkeys” (bad movies) and “bombs” (financial disasters). This 
conflation perpetuates a sort of shorthand for the general audience, where a film must be a turkey 
because the financial data tell us it was a bomb (Rosenbaum 1997a). 
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historical character of cinema and mass culture. 
Major filmed entertainment uses its oligopolistic 
control of distribution to create what we can call 
an order of cinema. An order of cinema is the 
product of a cinematic universe—social relations 
and all—being valued as a deterministic social 
system. As an object of instrumental calculation, 
the orderliness of cinema is defined by the way 
various properties of cinema predictably 
function in the goal of differential accumulation.  
  
Hollywood cinema can be treated as an order because cinematic creativity and 
social meaning are bound together—and in important ways shaped and 
controlled—by major filmed entertainment’s strategies of capital accumulation, its 
strategies of filmmaking and the social consequences of these strategies. “Risk” in 
this context reflects the degree of confidence investors have that this order of social 
relations will generate predictable earnings. In other words, it reflects how much 
the future of this three-part relationship between accumulation strategies, 
filmmaking strategies and their social consequences is determinable in the present. 
Now, since risk perceptions are a major component of capitalization, reducing risk is 
a major driver of accumulation. This reduction, we will try to demonstrate, is 
accomplished by making the articulation and determination of the order of cinema 
ever more predictable.  
The future is, of course, always unknown. Yet major filmed entertainment, 
like other business enterprises, translates its control of industry and the historical 
trajectories of society into forecasted instrumental calculations about its claims of 
ownership. If we break down the overall confidence of major filmed entertainment 
into smaller building blocks of means and ends, we acquire a keener sense of how 
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strategic questions about the control of social creativity will underpin the 
capitalization of cinema. For example: which film projects should be nurtured, 
developed and then green lit for production? Which film ideas should be rejected, 
and according to what criteria? Should creativity in filmmaking obey standards 
about form and content, and, if so, what should these standards be and how should 
they be instituted? What will happen to earnings if filmmakers are allowed to 
explore new ideas or experiment with untested filmmaking techniques? Will 
consumers welcome—i.e., pay for—forms of cinema that engage with social taboos 
or controversial subjects? What about political films? Overall, will people pay to 
watch what we decide to make? Can we make them pay—and if so, how?16 
 Our hypothesis—that major filmed entertainment tries to reduce risk 
through the control of cinema—also relates to the relationship between theatrical 
attendance and major filmed entertainment’s output. On the one hand, it appears 
that, based on evidence of U.S. attendance per capita, major filmed entertainment 
has experienced a stagnant level of yearly attendance per capita since the 1960s. On 
the other hand, major filmed entertainment (though not firms outside of this group) 
has kept its yearly film releases at low or negative rates of growth for the same 
period.  Is it possible that, instead of adopting a strategy of increasing theatrical 
attendance by significantly increasing its quantitative output of films, major filmed 
entertainment is looking for a habituated audience, one that is ready and willing to 
keep gravitating around small sets of films, year after year? 
                                                        
16 If these questions seem to hint at a theory of consumer sovereignty, the first part of Chapter 6 will 
argue that it is problematic to put consumer sovereignty at the heart of an analysis of risk in the 
Hollywood film business. 
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 To explore this possibility, let’s begin with the relationship between 
theatrical attendance and major filmed entertainment’s output.  
  
Looking for a High Degree of Confidence 
 
 Figure 4.3 compares two series. The first series measures U.S. movie 
attendance per capita. After a sharp decline that was most likely caused by the 
advent of television, U.S. attendance per capita has stayed at roughly the same level 
since the 1960s. The second series presents the yearly total of all films released in 
America. Major filmed entertainment’s share changes from year to year, but it is 
responsible, on average, for roughly 42 percent of the released films. Figure 4.3 
helps illustrate how risk reduction might be a top priority if, from 1980 onwards, 
more and more movies are technically available, but in practice the average 
American is still only seeing about five films in theatres per year. In this context, the 
challenge for major filmed entertainment might be to determine which five films the 
average moviegoer sees; and more specifically, to create a determinable order of 
cinema that keeps the spotlight directly on its own films. Hollywood may certainly 
try to expand the market, pushing people to see more films in theatres. However, 
with U.S. attendance per capita having remained constant for over 50 years, the 
alternative strategy is for major filmed entertainment to redistribute the market: to 
ensure that moviegoers see mostly their own blockbusters (Cucco 2009). 
 Digital technology and the Internet support the strategy of redistributing 
theatrical consumption. For instance, Epagogix is a consulting firm that sells data 
analysis to the Hollywood studios. The firm uses a database of film scripts to  
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Figure 4.3 Theatrical Releases in the U.S. and Theatrical Attendance Per capita 
 
Note: For 1943-1959, attendance per capita = (total box-office receipts/average ticket 
price)/U.S. population 
 
Sources: Joel Finler, Joel W. Finler, The Hollywood Story, 3rd ed. (New York: Wallflower Press, 
2003) 376-377, for box-office receipts from 1943-1959; Bradley Schauer and David Bordwell, 
“Appendix: A Hollywood Timeline, 1960-2004,” in The Way Hollywood Tells It: Story and Style 
in Modern Movies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 191–242, for total 
attendance 1960-2004; http://natoonline.org/data/admissions/ for attendance 2005-2012. 
Global Insight for total United States population. Joel W. Finler, The Hollywood Story, 3rd ed. 
(New York: Wallflower Press, 2003) 376-377, for total U.S. releases from 1933-2002; MPAA 
Theatrical Market Statistics for total U.S. releases from 2003-2012. 
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each element, as if the film were one big neoclassical production function. Malcolm 
Gladwell witnessed Epagogix’s process in 2006:  
[Copaken, the co-founder of Epagogix,] started with the first film and had the 
neural network make a guess: maybe it said that the hero’s moral crisis in act 
one, which rated a 7 on the 10-point moral-crisis scale, was worth $7 million, 
and having a gorgeous red-headed eighteen-year-old female lead whose 
characterization came in at 6.5 was worth $3 million and a 9-point bonding 
moment between the male lead and a four-year-old boy in act three was worth 
$2 million, and so on…. (Gladwell 2006, p.143) 
 
The New York Times recently covered a similar company named World Wide Motion 
Picture Group (Barnes 2013). By running its own database and surveying the tastes 
of moviegoers, World Wide advises about the final construction of a Hollywood film. 
For example, it argues that it is financially risky for any film to have a bowling scene. 
Or, if you make a superhero movie, it is better for the bottom line that the 
protagonist is a “guardian superhero” rather than a “cursed superhero.” 
 Google is doing something similar. Focusing on the Internet use of potential 
moviegoers, Google understands that managing risk is a top priority in the 
capitalization of cinema. For example, a 2013 Google Whitepaper begins with a 
problem scenario: 
It’s Friday night and you’re thinking about seeing a movie. Your thought process 
might sound a little like this: What’s in theaters right now? What’s that new 
movie my friend was just talking about a couple days ago? That trailer I saw for 
another film a few weeks ago looked interesting. Another movie review I read 
sounded promising... what should I see? (Google 2013, p.1) 
 
The “problem” is that leisure time is too open-ended. Google’s solution, however, is 
more for the capitalist than the moviegoer who uses the Internet to make a decision 
on Friday night. To help quantify the financial risk of moviegoer decision-making, 
Google tracks searches, YouTube views and advertisement clicks. It keeps data on 
searches for specific titles, especially big names like The Dark Knight or The 
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Avengers. Google also analyzes how the search criteria of potential moviegoers 
become less specific and more generic in slow periods between blockbuster films.  
 Google claims to lend confidence to Hollywood’s future expectations in two 
ways. First, the data provided by Google can tell marketing teams how to adjust 
marketing strategies to “either capture the attention of the ‘curious’ moviegoer, or 
deepen audience engagement with a blockbuster title” (Google 2013, p.3). Second, 
and more significantly, Google states that Internet data help Hollywood predict 
future movie sales. For instance, “in the seven day window prior to a film’s release 
date, if one film has 250,000 more search queries than a similar film, the film with 
more queries is likely to perform up to $4.3M better during opening weekend. When 
looking at search and click volume, if a film has 20,000 more paid clicks than a 
similar film, it is expected to bring in up to $7.5M more during opening weekend” 
(Google 2013, p.5). 
 
Major Filmed Entertainment’s Film Release Strategy and its Social Effects 
 
 In light of what Figure 4.3 presents, how did major filmed entertainment act 
during the same period, from 1950 to 2012? Did it release a lot of films, or did it 
curtail its rate of releases per year? These questions pertain to an aspect of cinema 
that major filmed entertainment has direct control over, since it actively makes 
decisions about its own production and distribution strategies.  
 Figure 4.4 shows the extent to which major filmed entertainment has 
restrained and depressed its film releases since the 1940s. The top two series show 
the total number of films released yearly in the United States, as well as the number 
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released by major filmed entertainment only. Both series are presented as five-year 
trailing averages. The bottom series, which is measured by the right axis, is major 
filmed entertainment’s percent share of the total.  
  
 
Figure 4.4 U.S. Theatrical Releases, 1933-2012 
 
Note: All three series are 5-year trailing averages. 
 
Sources: Joel W. Finler, The Hollywood Story, 3rd ed. (New York: Wallflower Press, 2003) 
376-377, for total releases and MPAA releases from 1933-2002; MPAA Theatrical Market 
Statistics for total releases and MPAA releases from 2003-2012. 
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exception, below). To be sure, the other dimension of this historical process is 
certainly the quality of Hollywood’s output, however measured. But if increasing the 
quantity of films is still one method of fulfilling individual needs and desires, and 
perhaps a way to increase attendance per capita, major filmed entertainment is 
going the other way. Counted by the number of films, mainstream Hollywood is a 
shrinking universe. 
 Major filmed entertainment’s strategy of maintaining negative or low rates of 
film output is tied to its risk perceptions, which are in turn part of its quest to 
accumulate differentially. In other words, major filmed entertainment may be trying 
to tailor its quantitative output to the perceived habits of individual moviegoers (~5 
films per year in the United States); but if it does so, it does so in order to increase 
earnings and/or lower risk. Thus, the capitalist’s degree of confidence in his or her 
earning expectations is closely related to the social consequences of how industry is 
strategically sabotaged. 
 One possible consequence of low or negative output by major filmed 
entertainment is uncertainty regarding the extent of the competition from other 
filmmakers, both domestic and foreign. Because of limits on available film-market 
data, the rest of the dissertation will focus mostly on the United States (which 
sometimes includes the box-office grosses of Canada). Yet two figures help us 
understand how Hollywood’s risk perceptions relate to the competition of cinema 
from other parts of the world.  
 Figure 4.5 contrasts major filmed entertainment’s stagnation strategy with 
potential foreign competition. It compares the U.S. film releases by major filmed 
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entertainment to domestic releases in countries other than the United States. Each 
series shows the number of films released per year, expressed as a percent 
deviation of its own ten-year trailing average. This presentation serves to “calibrate” 
the different movements, which otherwise might be of different absolute orders.  
 
 
Figure 4.5 Major Filmed Entertainment vs. The World: Film Releases 
 
Note: Missing data for Canada (Can), Central America (CA), South America (SA), Europe, East 
Asia and World Total film releases are interpolated as linear trends between adjacent 
observations. 
 
Sources: Joel W. Finler, The Hollywood Story, 3rd ed. (New York: Wallflower Press, 2003) 376-
377, for total releases and MPAA releases from 1933-2002; MPAA Theatrical Market Statistics 
for total releases and MPAA releases from 2003-2012. Screen Digest for the film releases of 
Canada, Central America, South America, Europe, East Asia and World Total (1970, 1974-1970, 
1980, 1984-1987, 1990, 1994-1997, 1999-2006, 2009, 2010). 
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 Figure 4.5 demonstrates that the movements of major filmed entertainment 
and the rest of the world tend to be inversely correlated, particularly since the 
1990s. Furthermore, the positive growth rates of major filmed entertainment’s film 
releases in the 1990s were perhaps “special” in light of the drops in the releases of 
other regions. As we saw in Figure 4.4, the prevailing trend since the 1930s has been 
for major filmed entertainment to prefer stagnant or declining output.  
 Figure 4.6 illustrates Hollywood’s dominance of the top tier of the global box-
office in the last few years, which is a period when the rest of the world increased its 
film production and, once again, major filmed entertainment stagnated its output. 
On the Y-axis, the figure plots Hollywood’s average share of the box-office top ten in 
countries other than the United States. This average share is plotted against, on the 
X-axis, the share of total box-office revenues earned by national films. The bracket 
beside each country counts the number of domestic films it released from 2005 to 
2011. Plotting the two series against each other shows the spread of Hollywood’s 
foreign dominance in relation to what might sway its impact: the domestic films of 
other countries. Moreover, a piece of UNESCO’s analysis can frame the data of Figure 
4.6 as an aspect of major filmed entertainment’s risk perceptions. Film consumption 
in countries where it is uncommon or rare for their domestic films to be in the 
national box-office top ten tends to contribute to a more predictable global 
homogeneity: there is a greater likelihood that the top ten grossing films in such 
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countries will be comprised of the same Hollywood films (UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics 2013).17  
 
 
Figure 4.6 Hollywood’s Box-Office Share Outside of the United States, 2005-2011:  
Top Ten v. National Films 
 
Source: UNESCO Institue for Statistics, Cinema Statistics 
http://www.uis.unesco.org/culture/Pages/movie-statistics.aspx 
 
  
                                                        
17 According to Dal Yong Jin (2011), there is also good reason to understand Hollywood’s dominance 
in foreign markets as an expression of the power relations behind some of the free-trade agreements 
that countries have with the United States. Being opposed to the UNESCO convention, which aims to 
“protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions,” the U.S. government seeks to put, and has 
sometimes succeeded in doing so, the matter of foreign cultural production in its free-trade 
agreements. As Jin argues, the result advantages Hollywood: “Domestic film markets in a number of 
countries signing FTAs with the US have shown a demise or rapid decline, with only a few exceptions. 
As the US government and the MPAA expected, countries such as Mexico, Canada, Australia and 
Korea have lost power in their domestic markets, while Hollywood majors have increased their 
control on a large scale” (Jin 2011, p.658). 
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Hollywood’s Depth Strategy 
 
 The ability to redistribute income through stagnant output also depends on 
society at large. The quest of dominant capital to beat a historical average could take 
place in the midst of widespread indifference, social apathy or passivity, but 
redistribution through differential accumulation can also spark public resistance, 
protest or even systemic crisis and systemic fear (Bichler & Nitzan 2010; Kliman 
2011; Bichler & Nitzan 2011). For its part in this potentially unstable social 
environment, major filmed entertainment tends to adopt what Nitzan and Bichler 
describe as a depth strategy. As one of the general means of differential 
accumulation, the strategies of depth involve stagflation (inflation + stagnant 
growth) and cost cutting.   
 The goal of accumulation through depth is to increase the elemental power 
per “unit of organization”—e.g., increase earnings per employee. In Hollywood’s 
case, its strategy to accumulate through depth also involves increasing earnings per 
film during periods when the rate of film releases is stagnating or even decreasing. 
During these periods of stagnation, earnings per film become central to major filmed 
entertainment’s elemental power. The place of earnings per film in the overall 
earnings of major filmed entertainment can be presented algebraically:  
 (4.4)   𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝐹𝐸 = 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑚𝑠 ×
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠
𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑚𝑠
= 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑚𝑠 ×  𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐹𝑖𝑙𝑚 
More generally, accumulation through depth can trigger and fuel resistance 
from below because its methods of achieving higher earnings put greater stress on 
capitalism’s social hierarchies and inequalities: a firm might attempt to sell a 
commodity with a bigger markup; a firm might try to depress industrial production 
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below its technological capacity to meet social needs; a firm might cut wages or lay 
off a part of its workforce. These strategies are all contentious and conflictual, 
making differential accumulation through depth often “uncertain” and “seemingly 
far more risky than breadth,” the other general means of differential accumulation 
(Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.19). By contrast to depth, accumulation through breadth 
seeks to increase the organizational size of a firm and involves green-field 
investment and mergers and acquisitions. The socio-political effects of breadth, at 
least on the surface, are far less confrontational and divisive.18 
  Firms are not eternally bound to either depth or breadth. In fact, Nitzan and 
Bichler claim that depth and breadth, at least in the U.S. and the U.K., tended to be 
cyclical strategies in the twentieth century (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, p.384; Francis 
2013; Bichler & Nitzan 2013). And this alternation of depth and breadth, along with 
the pronounced differences between them, can help explain how major filmed 
entertainment combines strategic stagnation and risk reduction to create and 
sustain an order of cinema. In the midst of a depth strategy, major filmed 
entertainment relies on the stability of the social relations that underpin its 
confidence; its limited number of films might not be sufficient to satisfy the desires 
and habits of moviegoers. To be sure, mainstream Hollywood cinema is unlikely to 
fall into crisis when the entire cycle of production, distribution and consumption 
functions as major filmed entertainment expected—i.e., when the blockbusters that 
were estimated to be financially successful indeed went on to become big hits on 
release. Yet it is always possible that consumers will see even fewer films in the 
                                                        
18 For a detailed comparison between depth and breadth regimes of accumulation, see the “Breadth” 
and “Depth” chapters in Capital as Power (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, pp.334–382).  
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future, or that they will become tired of how Hollywood concentrates on 
blockbuster cinema at the expense of so many other possibilities in filmmaking.19 
Like Machiavelli’s prince, major filmed entertainment must pursue its own 
particular goals, but without losing the hearts and minds of its “people.” The 
purpose of “depth” is to achieve this goal: it relies on consumers gravitating to its 
limited set of films (stagnating film releases), in order to increase its earnings per 
film. 
 Figure 4.7 estimates the relationship between major filmed entertainment’s 
differential profits and its reliance on the habits of moviegoers. The darker line 
measures the average differential operating income of major filmed entertainment 
(relative to dominant capital as whole). The lighter line measures major filmed 
entertainment’s attendance per film. Both series are expressed as percent 
deviations from ten-year trailing averages. We are looking at per film attendance 
because we are interested in the prevalent depth strategy behind major filmed 
entertainment’s earnings. In other words, when there is a rise in attendance per 
film, attendance is rising faster than the number of films released. The figure 
distinguishes between three different periods, based on the rate of change of film 
releases in Figure 4.4. This periodization shows a positive correlation for the two 
depth periods during which major filmed entertainment was generally stagnating its 
film releases (+0.61 and +0.52) and a negative correlation for the breadth period 
during which its film releases were rising (-0.46). Moreover, we can use the data 
                                                        
19 The potential for the social composition of cinema to shift, possibly to the detriment of investors’ 
expectations, will be given bolder conceptual outlines in the next chapter, when we address the risk 
of aesthetic overproduction. 
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Figure 4.7 Differential Operating Income and Attendance per MFE Film  
(Rates of Change) 
 
Note: Both series are smoothed rates of annual change from their 10-year trailing average. 
 
Note: Attendance per MFE film = Revenues per film/Ticket Price. Ticket Price is a weighted 
average of three ticket price series, U.S., UK and Japan. The respective weights for each ticket 
price series--0.76 (U.S.), 0.1 (UK) and 0.14 (Japan)--were based on the historical average size of 
each cinema market, measured by average yearly admissions. 
    
Sources: COMPUSTAT through WRDS for operating income and revenues of Major Filmed 
Entertainment, 1950-1992. Annual reports of Disney, News Corp, Viacom, Sony, Time Warner 
(Management’s Discussion of Business Operations for information on their filmed 
entertainment interests) for operating income of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1993-2011. 
COMPUSTAT for the US dollar exchange rates for the British Pound and the Japanese Yen. 
Motion Pictures Association of Japan (www.eiren.org/statistics_e/) for Japanese theatre 
admissions and ticket prices, 1955-2012. British Film Institute Statistical Yearbooks 
(www.bfi.org.uk/education-research/film-industry-statistics-research) for UK theatre 
admissions and ticket prices, 1960-2011. Box-Office Mojo 
(boxofficemojo.com/about/adjuster.htm) and NATO Online (natoonline.org/data/ticket-price/) 
for U.S. ticket prices, 1960-2011. Bradley Schauer and David Bordwell, “Appendix: A Hollywood 
Timeline, 1960-2004,” in The Way Hollywood Tells It: Story and Style in Modern 
Movies (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), 191–242, for total attendance 1960-
2004; http://natoonline.org/data/admissions/ for attendance 2005-2012. 
 
 
 
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
MFE Attendance 
per Film
Differential Operating Income
ratio:
MFE / DC500
<--- Depth Phase
Avg. Rate of Film Releases: -2%
r: +0.61 
<--- Breadth --->
Avg. Rate of Film 
Releases: 4.9%
r: -0.46
Depth --->
Avg. Rate 
of Film Releases: -2.9%
r: +0.52
  
 
217 
behind Figure 4.7 to count the number of years in which attendance per film 
increased during years of stagflation (stagnation + inflation). These computations, 
presented in Table 4.2, show that this condition fulfilled in 19 years—a full 44% of 
the total. 
 
Table 4.2 
Depth Breakdown for Major Filmed Entertainment, 1970-2012 
Number of years in which…  
… its total film releases had a growth rate of less than 3 percent from 
the previous year:  
 
27 (62%) 
… its attendance per film had a positive growth rate: 30 (69%) 
… differential ticket price had a positive growth rate: 28 (65%) 
… all three of the above conditions applied: 19 (44%) 
  
Note: for differential ticket price, our weighted average of American, British and Japanese ticket prices is 
converted to U.S. dollars and divided by the U.S. CPI. 
 
Note: a 3 percent growth rate, while somewhat arbitrary, was chosen because it means that, for the average 
year between 1950 and 2012, major filmed entertainment would, when adhering to this growth rate, release 
no more than five extra films per year. If we only count the years between 1970 and 2012, a growth rate of 3 
percent would only, on average, produce four new films per year. By contrast, during the breadth phase 
between 1991 and 1999, the output of major filmed entertainment had an average growth rate of roughly 36 
percent. This meant that, for some of the years, major filmed entertainment added more than 10 extra films to 
its yearly output.  For 1995, its level of output was 45 more films than in 1994. 
 
Source: see notes and sources for Figure 4.7 
 
Conclusion: Moving Forward 
 
 In this chapter we set the stage for the rest of Part II. Having moved step by 
step through some of the more technical details of the capital-as-power approach, 
we can now state the main objective of Part II in a more conceptual language: 
  
Main Objective, version 2: Analyze the role of differential risk in the 
differential accumulation of major filmed 
entertainment. 
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The rest of Part II will research the role of risk in the Hollywood film business in two 
ways. First, we are interested in the quantitative dimension of major filmed 
entertainment’s risk reduction strategies. From this perspective we look to find 
empirical evidence of what major filmed entertainment has been able to achieve in 
the film sector. Moreover, measures of differential risk can explain the intensity of 
major filmed entertainment’s behaviour—it seeks a high degree of confidence in its 
ability to redistribute income faster than others, including other dominant 
capitalists and society at large. Second, sections of Part II seek to understand how 
the aesthetic and social dimensions of cinema were affected by major filmed 
entertainment’s push to reduce risk. By linking our study of differential risk to a 
historical and theoretical study of Hollywood cinema, we can connect major filmed 
entertainment’s financial goals to the strategic sabotage of social creativity. 
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Chapter 5 
The Risk of Aesthetic Overproduction 
 
Introduction 
 
The capitalist structure of Hollywood might not extinguish every flame of 
creativity from its film projects, but the interests of business leave scars and bruises 
on the aesthetic dimension of Hollywood cinema. Contemporary filmmaking is 
organized such that the major Hollywood firms have a particularly dominant 
position in film distribution. This position enables the biggest film distributors and 
the other business interests involved, like banks that offer financing and firms that 
are looking for licensing and merchandising opportunities, to stand between film 
production and the market (Wasko 1982). As a consequence of this feature, some 
film projects, on account of their subject matter or style, can be effectively withheld 
from the market because no major firm will purchase the rights to distribute them. 
A film project may be able to find financing, but under a contract that stipulates 
conditions about form, content, budget, cast, crew, etc. A film can be produced, but 
management will have a role in the direction and pace of creation. And if business 
interests are still sceptical about their investment in potentially chaotic artistic 
creativity, the right of film ownership often includes the right of “final cut,” i.e., the 
right to modify a film before it is released but after the director presents his or her 
final version (Bach 1985).  
 But must the dominant Hollywood firms purposefully stand between the 
professional filmmaker and the moviegoer? Is the answer to this question binary, or 
is there an issue of extent here?  To what degree should the business of film 
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distribution shape and limit the social creativity of filmmaking? How is that degree 
determined? 
This chapter analyzes the structure of Hollywood film distribution through 
the lens of risk. In both its technical and conceptual senses, risk is relevant to the 
study of how Hollywood, as a business, utilizes social creativity. The conventional 
wisdom is that cinema is a very risky business enterprise, which means that even 
the biggest Hollywood firms are uncertain about their financial success (a point that 
will be elaborated in Chapter 6). Yet, Hollywood appears to have devised strategies 
to limit and restrict social-historical creativity, strategies that enable it to reduce the 
possibility that the future of culture will be radically different from what capitalists 
expect it to be. This making of order does not eliminate risk entirely. Rather, from 
the perspective of capitalization, the industrial art of filmmaking and the social 
world of mass culture can be made sufficiently orderly for film projects to be 
weighable and calculable. Under such historical conditions, estimations of a film’s 
social significance can, with a degree of confidence, be translated into concrete 
expectations about future streams of income.  Furthermore, certain strategies affect 
risk perceptions as much as they affect earnings: the repetition of genres, sequels, 
remakes; the cult of movie stars; the institution of false needs and wants through 
the sales efforts of business; and the dual ability to make movies resonate with 
established desires and to ready the industry of filmmaking for potential changes in 
social desire.  
In the interest of lowering risk, Hollywood firms attempt to predetermine 
how new films will function in an already instituted order of cinema, which includes 
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the creativity of filmmakers and the habits of moviegoers. For instance, if a major 
studio is trying to determine, with some degree of certainty, the potential theatrical 
attendance for a new romantic comedy, there is a benefit if the larger social 
relations of cinema in which this comedy is embedded—both the creation and 
consumption of films—are determinable because they are orderly. And if the social 
relations of cinema are determinable because they are orderly, Hollywood’s biggest 
distributors can then select and capitalize upcoming film projects with a greater 
degree of confidence. 
 The first part of this chapter analyzes how the pace and direction of social 
creativity has a bearing on major filmed entertainment’s degree of confidence, 
which refers to the ability of capitalists to make predictions about future earnings. It 
also examines how major filmed entertainment strategically calibrates its effect on 
the social creativity of cinema—how it controls the pace and direction of filmmaking 
but without suffocating it completely.  
 The second part argues that the repetitive, habitual qualities of Hollywood 
cinema are a defence against the possibility of aesthetic overproduction. Importantly, 
the term “overproduction” is being used in the same way that Veblen uses it. 
Aesthetic overproduction is the language of business, not art; it occurs when 
aesthetic decisions undermine the profitability and capitalization of a film, 
regardless of how they shine in the light of aesthetic, cultural and political judgment. 
 The third part applies the concept of aesthetic overproduction to a period of 
Hollywood when creative self-censorship was not only prevalent, but also openly 
advertised to placate the moral outrage emanating from parts of the United States 
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and the rest of the world. The Production Code Administration (PCA) era of 
Hollywood (1934-1950) and the public scandals that led up to the publication of the 
Production Code (1920-1930) are interesting examples of risk and capitalist power. 
As much as Hollywood was initially forced to react to growing public displeasure 
about the sex, violence and immorality in its films before 1930, the PCA and the 
moral proscriptions of the Production Code became convenient quality-control 
systems. They bounded the creative desires of filmmakers and the expectations of 
audiences to the same rules about the aesthetics of cinema. 
  
The Social World of Cinema and the Capitalist Desire for Order 
 
 A film’s relationship to other films and the social habits of consumers, who 
watch some films at the expense of others, automatically produces a simple financial 
order. This process is automatic under capitalism because, at any given time, the 
composition of the cinematic world can be stratified according to the quantities of a 
universal language: price. For example, one can go to a website like 
boxofficemojo.com and arrange the world of cinema according to box-office gross 
revenues, where the biggest theatrical grosses are at the top and the lowest are at 
the bottom. The same financial stratification is implied when a film is capitalized. 
When a film is given an expected theatrical revenues plateau (e.g., $20 million, $70 
million, $300 million), the Hollywood film business is making an estimate about the 
future popularity of the film (Litman 1998, p.44). This financial estimate 
automatically positions a film among other films. The meaning of $200 million 
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expected revenues, for example, is relative, as it depends on how other 
contemporary film projects are capitalized (McMahon 2013). 
A more substantial concept of order includes the social actors and 
institutions that can, to differing degrees, have an effect on the financial 
stratification of films. There are firms that try to boost their investments through 
advertising and public relations. There are film critics and media personalities who 
can extol some films and criticize others. There are consumers who prefer certain 
types of films over others, or maybe they want to use their leisure time for 
something other than cinema. This more substantial concept of order also includes 
the form and content of films. The films at the top of the financial pyramid may 
touch upon common themes, or adopt similar cinematic styles. The financial order 
of cinema may also be stratified according to how society values the political 
function of art. If people expect art to be more entertaining than confrontational, it 
could be difficult or impossible for politically contentious subjects, like abortion, or 
traumatic human behaviour, like genocide, to be top performers financially.  
 This more substantial order of cinema frames the risk perceptions of major 
filmed entertainment. When some aesthetic qualities of cinema are perceived as 
riskier investments than others, Hollywood has a financial interest to be strategic 
about which expressions of human creativity it will affirm and which expressions it 
will mould, shape, modify or even deny. This same strategy manifests itself when 
some film projects are given bigger budgets than others—some ideas, regardless of 
their artistic value, will never be profitable if production costs grow to the size of a 
Hollywood blockbuster. Hollywood also needs to account for the possibility that the 
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behaviour and attitudes of moviegoers can change. A popular film might inspire a 
wave of sequels or copycats—but is mimicking past financial successes always an 
effective strategy? 
Plenty of examples illustrate how the social dimensions of film affect the risk 
perceptions of major filmed entertainment. Some examples are found in the annual 
reports of the relevant firms. Time Warner, the owner of Warner Brothers Studios, 
lists risk factors relating to filmed entertainment and leisure time: 
[Time Warner] must respond to recent and future changes in technology and 
consumer behavior to remain competitive and continue to increase its 
revenues…. [Time Warner] faces risks relating to increasing competition for the 
leisure and entertainment time and discretionary spending of consumers, which 
has intensified in part due to technological developments and changes in 
consumer behavior…. The popularity of [Time Warner’s] content is difficult to 
predict, can change rapidly and could lead to fluctuations in the Company’s 
revenues, and low public acceptance of the Company’s content may adversely 
affect its results of operations. (Time Warner 2011, p.13) 
 
This “public acceptance of content” is important. If a film property is to be valued as 
an asset, its form and content must be evaluated—even before the film is made—in 
the light of social meaning (Vogel 2011, pp.99–106). For example, on account of its 
style and subject matter, a film property may lose its relevance (i.e. pecuniary value) 
as social meaning changes with the passage of time:  
…war epics, for instance, might be very popular with the public during certain 
periods but very unpopular during others. Some humor in films is timeless; 
some is so terribly topical that within a few years audiences may not 
understand it. In addition, because everything from hair and clothing styles to 
cars to moral attitudes changes gradually over time, the cumulative effects of 
these changes can make movies from only two decades ago seem rather quaint. 
(Vogel 2011, p.101) 
 
The changing values of cultural and political meaning are not simply external factors 
that stand outside the reach of corporate strategy. Rather, a firm’s labour force can 
be so innovative and original that its creativity undermines the pecuniary value of 
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older assets—they are suddenly “out-of-date” because artistic labour has 
inaugurated a new cultural environment (Earl & Potts 2013). 
On the problem of treating a film as a long-lived asset, Stephen Prince is 
correct to argue that part of the uncertainty relates to the technological changes in 
distribution (theatre, VHS, DVD, etc.). “Determining the profitability of a given film,” 
writes Prince, “can be an elusive undertaking because so many revenue sources 
figure into this determination…” (Prince 2000, p.xx). However, part of the reason 
that so few films are released into the public domain, regardless of technological 
changes, is that every significant shift in social-historical relevance gives major 
filmed entertainment another opportunity to re-capitalize its old film property. The 
tragic death of an actor can make his or her filmography popular again (on DVD); a 
new channel of TV distribution, like Turner Classic Movies, can open future income 
streams for films that have not been distributed in decades; or, genres, like science 
fiction and musicals, can suddenly rebound in significance. These examples 
contextualize the valuation of film libraries, which are often key assets in the 
mergers and acquisitions of media conglomerates (Vogel 2011; Kunz 2007).1 
Indeed, Casablanca is still an asset (for Time Warner), and would expectations about 
its future earnings not incorporate its mythological position in popular histories of 
cinema? How would one re-capitalize Casablanca if the American Film Institute, in 
its next round of publishing lists of great American films, knocked this film down in 
rankings, or removed it completely from “AFI’s 100 Years… 100 Movies”? 
                                                        
1 For a selection of important film library transfers between 1957 and 2010, see Vogel (2011, 
pp.104–105). 
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 Although changes to the order of cinema occur infrequently, they can be so 
abrupt that great uncertainty surrounds the capitalization of film property. One 
such abrupt change was the transition from silent film to sound in the late 1920s. 
For example, uncertainty over whether silent films would still have a place 
alongside “talkies” forced Albatross, a medium-sized French company, to 
temporarily stop all film production, as it was unable to price its own property: 
We have not been able to do it [assess the book value of completed films], 
because the sudden shock that shudders through the motion picture markets 
because of the apparition of sound film, makes every estimate, even 
approximately, impossible, especially for the older films. At present, most 
foreign countries have stopped nearly completely to buy them. We must put on 
hold all film production until the situation becomes clear. (Conseil 
d’Administration, April 25, 1929, quoted in Bakker 2004, p.64) 
 
Although the uncertainty caused by the advent of sound cinema had a less severe 
effect on the studios that actively developed sound technology than it did on 
Albatross, it affected them as well.2 Because the aesthetics of sound cinema were 
still too open-ended during its nascent period, the major studios agreed to place a 
temporary moratorium on their own research and development. To really pursue 
sound cinema as a business enterprise, Hollywood studios first needed to decide if 
they were going to export American “talkies” in English, or whether they would be 
more accommodating to the languages of other countries.3 Just as significantly, they 
did not yet know what a sound film should even look like (Hanssen 2005, p.102). 
Music and sound effects could be retrofitted onto films that were originally silent; a 
                                                        
2 In a partnership with Western Electric, Warner Brothers was developing a “sound-on-a-disc” 
system in 1926. The Fox Film Corporation, which was to merge with Twentieth Century Pictures in 
1935, was the first to develop a means of putting sound on film stock (Hanssen 2005, p.90). 
3 As Kristin Thompson notes, “In early 1928, Louis B. Mayer declared that he was not worried [about 
the language problem]; he assumed that the popularity of American films would lead to the use of 
English as a universal language” (Thompson 1985, p.158). 
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film could be released in two versions, one silent and another in sound; or a film 
could be silent for the majority of its running time, except for a few scenes that have 
dialogue or singing (e.g., The Jazz Singer).  
 Certain journalists have been fortunate enough to witness how the risk of 
social significance manifests on a film set or the studio lot, when studio executives, 
producers and directors argue over the form and content of film projects. In Lillian 
Ross’s Picture, a book that was a product of her reporting on the filming of The Red 
Badge of Courage, we find the recurring theme of the conflict between creativity and 
risk.4 Many of the daily struggles over filming The Red Badge of Courage were the 
consequence of MGM’s uncertainty about whether Americans in 1951 were even 
interested in seeing a film version of an 1895 book about the Civil War (Ross 2002). 
John Gregory Dunne spent one year investigating the workings of Twentieth 
Century-Fox in 1967. One of Dunne’s stories is crass yet illustrative of how even the 
smallest details of a film can become subject to risk perceptions. Dunne describes a 
meeting at which Twentieth Century executives were talking about the studio’s plan 
to distribute Tony Rome in Israel. The film, a detective story starring Frank Sinatra, 
is heavy on American slang. Two people in the meeting, Harry Sokolov and Stanley 
                                                        
4 Reporting on the MGM’s filmed adaptation of The Red Badge of Courage, Ross intelligently focuses 
on Gottfried Reinhardt, the producer of the film. Being half-artist and half-manager, the struggle 
between art and commercial interests was acute for Reinhardt. In 1951, with The Red Badge of 
Courage yet to be released, and with MGM growing anxious over the film’s expected profitability, 
Reinhardt described his experiences in the food chain of managers and artists: “[Louis B. Mayer, the 
head of MGM,] says to me the picture is no good because there is no story. I tell him we are adding 
narration to the picture, but he says narration won’t help what isn’t there. L. B. is a dangerous man. If 
you’re his enemy, he destroys you. If you’re his friend he eats you.... I don’t know why it is; every time 
I go to lunch, I have to run into L. B. Today, on my way to lunch, he came at me like a battleship: ‘Mr. 
Reinhardt!’ Then he told me the same things all over again. ‘Why don’t you want to make a hit? Why 
don’t you want to make money for the studio?’ Today I said to him, ‘When John Huston [the director 
of The Red Badge of Courage] comes to me and says he wants to make a picture, I am honored. You 
hired him. I didn’t.’ He didn’t hear me. He talks about the picture as though it were refrigerators” 
(Ross 2002, p.210). 
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Hough, were concerned that much of the dialogue would not resonate with an 
Israeli audience. Richard Zanuck, who at the time was executive vice president in 
charge of worldwide production, worried less about the translation of English 
dialogue to Hebrew. He felt it was always possible to “dub it in local slang.” As 
Dunne then notes, Owen McLean, the head of casting, remained uneasy about a 
scene he feared was untranslatable: “… there was a scene in the picture based on the 
double-entendre of an old woman calling her cat a ‘pussy’” (Dunne 1998, p.154). 
 Uncertainty about the effectiveness of a double-entendre is not an 
insignificant concern. In fact, a PricewaterhouseCoopers report gives us a sense of 
how a shift in what is considered funny or entertaining can create real financial 
problems for those who are on the hook for a film’s costs. A change in the world of 
cinema can cause a “pre-release” write-down, which happens when the costs of the 
film become larger than its future expected earnings. As the report states, “pre-
release write-downs generally occur when there is an adverse change in the 
expected performance of a film prior to release.” Of the five examples about what 
can adversely change the future expectations of an individual film, four relate to the 
social relations of cinema: 
 “Market conditions for the film that have changed significantly due to timing or 
other economic conditions”; 
 “Screening, marketing, or other similar activities that suggest the performance of the 
film will be significantly different from previous expectations”; 
 “A significant change to the film’s release plan and strategy”; and 
 “Other observable market conditions, such as those associated with recent 
performance of similar films.” (Anon 2009, p.26)  
 
 It is also possible to speculate as to how quantitative changes to the order of 
cinema affect risk perceptions. Figure 5.1, for example, compares the output of 
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major studio film distribution in the United States with independent U.S. 
distribution from 1933 to 1986. The two bottom series are rates of changes from 
five-year trailing averages. What we see is a noticeable change to the pattern of 
independent film distribution from the late 1950s onwards.  
  
 
Figure 5.1 U.S. Films Released, 1933 – 1986 (Numbers and Rates of Change) 
 
Note: Both rates of change series are presented as percent changes from 5-year trailing 
averages. 
  
Source: Joel W. Finler, The Hollywood Story, 3rd ed. (New York: Wallflower Press, 2003) 
376-377, for independent releases and MPAA releases from 1933-1986. 
 
 
 
 On its own, Figure 5.1 cannot tell us how risk perceptions changed in this era; 
it can, however, help us visualize how the composition of American film distribution 
has changed over time, which is in turn relevant to risk perceptions. For one thing, 
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the new size and pattern of independent film releases from 1960 to 1986 is a sign of 
the transformed relationship between major filmed entertainment and independent 
filmmakers. Up until the 1950s independent filmmaking appears to have been 
“stabilized” by its marginalization from the studio system, which had the power to 
keep independent fare out of America’s premier theatres. After a 1948 Supreme 
Court decision forced Hollywood’s major studios to begin divesting of their theatre 
holdings, independent cinema’s film releases fluctuated much more on account of 
new opportunities to exhibit films in mainstream theatres. As Schatz describes, 
major filmed entertainment also changed its strategies by financing and distributing 
certain independent productions: 
Adopting and modifying the UA model, the studios concentrated on financing 
and distribution rather than production. Lacking the financial resources and 
contract talent to mass-produce movies for a declining market they no longer 
controlled, the studios now relied on independent producers to supply 
“packaged” projects that the studios would “green light” for production, putting 
up some portion of the budget in exchange for the distribution rights, and often 
leasing out their production facilities as well. This meant ceding creative control 
to independent producers and freelance directors, and also to top stars whose 
“marquee value” gave them tremendous leverage and a share of the profits. 
(Schatz 2008, p.16) 
 
 
The Threat of Aesthetic Overproduction 
 
 Major filmed entertainment’s control of film distribution is not simply about 
the level of future earnings. Confidence, or low risk perceptions, derives from major 
filmed entertainment’s ability to be the ultimate arbiter of the future of cinema. If 
major filmed entertainment is unable to stand between the filmmaker and the 
consumer, the administered relationship between the aesthetic dimension of 
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cinema and established social meaning breaks down, risk perceptions rise and 
capitalization tanks.  
 Risk perceptions cannot overlook the aesthetic dimension of cinema because 
each decision about film design has an effect on the overall degree of confidence. 
Nitzan and Bichler’s argument about the eye of capitalization explains why a film’s 
many qualities—e.g., its genre, style, story, cast, director, production quality—and 
its possible resonance with established cultural and political attitudes would all be 
“integrated into the numerical architecture of capital”: many dimensions of cinema 
can impact “the level and pattern of capitalist earnings” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, 
p.166). The Hollywood film business may or may not succeed in creating an order of 
cinema through the control of filmmaking—that is yet to be determined 
empirically—but, according to its own logic, it must translate the political, cultural 
and aesthetic qualities of cinema into the quantitative and forward-looking logic of 
capital.  
 A film project is translated into the logic of capital in its germinal stages, well 
before the first day of filming.  Expectations about future earnings are being 
discounted to present prices when some scripts are sold while others are ignored, 
when some projects are properly developed while others sit idle and when some 
projects are produced while others never make it out of “development hell.”5 As 
Janet Wasko points out, in contrast to popular belief, “Hollywood films do not begin 
when the camera starts rolling, but involve a somewhat lengthy and complex 
                                                        
5 A project is in “development hell” when “a script is in development but never receives production 
funds” (Wasko 2008, p.53). In his “how-to” book about film financing, Michael Wiese estimates that 
major filmed entertainment produces one film for every 50 projects that remain forever in purgatory 
(Wiese 1991, p.32). 
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development and pre-production phase during which an idea is turned into a script 
and preparations are made for actual production followed by post-production” 
(Wasko 2008, p.43). A project begins as a film concept, usually in the form of a full 
script in its first draft. If approved by management, the project then goes into 
development, which is still far from the production stage (Wasko 2008, p.45). In 
development, the film concept is polished, the script is edited and re-edited, 
sometimes even rewritten completely, and producers and agents start talking about 
the film’s possible “players” (main cast and director).  
 Risk perceptions permeate all along the line because a calculation of the 
expected earnings of cinema must work with, and sometimes in spite of, another 
logic: the logic of art. More specifically, the Hollywood film business must determine 
how it will strategically sabotage the creativity of those for whom cinema is 
primarily an art form. Such a characterization of social creativity is not meant to 
suggest that every artist or moviegoer is critical of the creative limits that are 
imposed by business.6 Instead, the industrial art of filmmaking, with all of its 
aesthetic qualities, puts the Hollywood film business in a particular business-
industry relationship, with specific features that cannot be ignored. The ways and 
means of any particular business-industry relationship depend on the type of 
industry being controlled by business.  
                                                        
6 As was visible in Powdermaker’s anthropological study of different jobs in Hollywood, there is a 
mixture of attitudes about the aesthetic value of Hollywood film production. Some of the 
interviewees seemed not to care about the ideals of art at all. Rather, fame was their main concern. 
For others, especially screenwriters who had originally hoped to become successful novelists, 
Hollywood cinema was perceived more as a mediocre art form (Powdermaker 1950). 
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 The freedom of cinematic art to evolve in unforeseen ways can potentially 
threaten the financial goals of major filmed entertainment. Creativity is a wild 
animal, and major filmed entertainment wants to harness it in order to develop, 
finance, produce and distribute the “right” set of films. In this sense, “right” and 
“wrong” both refer not to aesthetic standards but to earnings. Fundamental to 
capitalist investment is the confidence that, if needed, firms are able to steer social 
creativity in new directions, but with investors never losing control.  
If we imagine for argument’s sake that the control of social creativity is 
unnecessary for capitalist ends, it will seem that film studios make bad films because 
they lack “creative” labour. Instead, however, the repetitive, even cautious, quality of 
Hollywood’s imagination indicates that the film business aims to keep creativity in 
the film industry within a limited bandwidth. In its own way, a 2003 article in The 
Economist recognized that unharnessed artistic creativity troubles the Hollywood 
film business. The article characterized the business-industry struggle in Hollywood 
as that between “suits” and “ponytails”:  
That the [film] industry tends over time to swing too far in favour of the 
ponytails, only to swerve back too far in favour of the suits, shows how hard it is 
to find a middle way. Devising a habitat in which creativity can flourish, yet 
within tight operational constraints: there lies a sequel for the entertainment 
industry worthy of a Hollywood blockbuster. (Anon 2003a) 
 
Of course, there are historical examples of business dictating that filmmaking travel 
in one direction when it should have, in business hindsight, taken another. For 
instance, the popularity of The Sound of Music (1965) was mistakenly taken as a sign 
that the major studios should say “Yes!” to more musicals when, outside of 
Hollywood, radical changes to the political values and cultural attitudes in America 
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were pointing in a very different way. To be sure, eventually Hollywood would come 
to its business senses and enthusiastically embrace the 1960s student, civil-rights 
and anti-Vietnam War movements,7 but not before releasing a long string of 
unpopular musicals: Camelot (1967), Doctor Dolittle (1967), Chitty Chitty Bang Bang 
(1968), Hello, Dolly (1969), Paint Your Wagon (1969), Star! (1968), Sweet Charity 
(1969) and Darling Lili (1970). The financial failure of Darling Lili was particularly 
bitter: in an explicit attempt to re-exploit The Sound of Music, Darling Lili stars Julie 
Andrews, who plays a singing spy in the First World War (Cook 2000, p.12). 
  Business decisions about the form and content of Hollywood films are 
haunted by the spectre of aesthetic overproduction. Two things about the concept of 
aesthetic overproduction should be noted immediately. First, the term is my own 
tailoring of Veblen’s generic concept of “overproduction.” Second, overproduction 
applies “not to the material, mechanical bearing of the situation, but to its pecuniary 
bearing” (Veblen 2006c, p.215). Thus, overproduction does not mean that the 
material and intellectual capacities of a workforce are overtaxed, nor does it mean 
that a community is physically or mentally unable to consume what is in supply. 
Overproduction is a “question of prices and earnings”; it refers to a level or type of 
production that is inexpedient purely on “pecuniary grounds.” Aesthetic 
overproduction is itself a consequence of how the business accounts of art “are kept 
in terms of the money unit, not in terms of livelihood, nor in terms of the 
serviceability of the goods, nor in terms of the mechanical efficiency of the industrial 
or commercial plant.” Thus, regardless of what a film project could mean in political 
                                                        
7 Chapter 6 of this dissertation analyzes how Hollywood briefly embraced New Wave Cinema and the 
political ideals that inspired it. 
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terms, or regardless of the potential for creative film design to strengthen the social 
importance of cinema, film projects are, like other assets, “capitalized on the basis of 
their profit yielding capacity” (Veblen 2006c, p.85). 
 In the case of Hollywood cinema, the threat of aesthetic overproduction cuts 
across the spatial and temporal divisions between film production, distribution and 
exhibition.8 Indeed, the business interests of Hollywood might glimpse the spectre 
of aesthetic overproduction well before a film is completed and distributed. For 
instance, the brevity of Hollywood “pitch” meetings, which determine whether a film 
project will even get funds for production, is a pre-distribution hurdle that many 
film ideas have to clear (Elsbach & Kramer 2003). What is said or left unsaid during 
a pitch meeting can foreshadow the uncertainties of acquiring, developing, 
producing and then distributing a project that is potentially too “weird” or 
“complex” for an audience (Wyatt 1994; Mamet 2007). Conversely, the financial 
failures of distribution can go back upstream and define aesthetic overproduction 
for those readying new film projects. The infamous failure of Waterworld, for 
instance, serves as a sober warning for those who think a new project has all the 
“right” elements for high grosses—e.g., big movie star, lots of action, expensive and 
elaborate sets. 
 The threat of aesthetic overproduction tells us a few things. First, the 
autonomous creation of new social significations is, in general, antithetical to 
capitalist interests.  Again, the potential for artists to openly redefine the meaning 
                                                        
8 The spatial and temporal divisions between production, distribution and exhibition are, 
nevertheless, still relevant to strategic sabotage. In this regard, Aida Hozic’s analysis of how the 
control of film production significantly changed when filmmaking started to move from studio lots to 
location shooting is relevant (Hozic 2001). 
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and ends of art does not threaten cinema as a cultural-political activity—free from 
the repressive demands of business enterprise, cinema could support a political 
project of open, democratic cultural creation (Holman & McMahon 2015). Yet the 
unpredictability and openness of artistic creation can undermine the instrumental 
calculation of expected future earnings. The capitalization of film falls apart if either 
the telos of a film or its relationship to an already instituted social imaginary is 
obscure to the point of being non-determinable. 
 Second, major filmed entertainment has a real incentive to sustain a form of 
cinema that is conservative because it is repetitive and formulaic. Even if there is a 
technological/anthropological capacity for the art of filmmaking to go well beyond 
the “limits” that are imposed in Hollywood cinema, guideposts like the star system 
and film genres help keep everybody involved from veering too far off the well-
beaten path. To be sure, these guideposts are not meant to suffocate all forms of 
artistic innovation—film production requires large amounts of creative and 
technical skill. Rather, genre and the Hollywood star system “save” filmmakers the 
trouble of yearning for, and then abandoning, unconventional filmmaking 
techniques that could jeopardize distribution with one of Hollywood’s dominant 
firms (Rosenbaum 2000).   
 This foreclosure of alternatives through institutional norms is a defence 
against the first point, the potential for autonomous creation. By obeying its own 
instituted formulas of filmmaking, Hollywood reinstitutes the “canonical and 
vacuous tautology” that is, according to Castoriadis, hidden within many notions of 
creativity. Social institutions often define the ends of human activity in such a way 
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that “the new is no more than the actualization of a possible which was given (to 
whom?) from the start…” (Castoriadis 1984a, p.234). For Castoriadis, this version of 
creativity is less threatening to an established social order because the radical 
creation of new forms is denied. Rather, human imagination is limited to imitative 
production; the scope of creativity is bounded by an already existing Form or Idea 
(Castoriadis 1998, p.197).  
 Third, the repetitive nature of mass culture, of which Hollywood is a central 
part, is about more than ideology. Risk perceptions partly determine the level of 
capitalization, and confidence about the size and pattern of expected earnings is 
likely to increase if moviegoers had a predilection for only a narrow range of film 
types. The threat of aesthetic overproduction is a strong reason why the Hollywood 
business has a vested interest in effectively “pre-selling” new films through stylistic 
repetition. When Hollywood repeats itself, the “new” already has, in the eyes of a 
habituated moviegoer, a familiar, pre-digested quality (Maltby 2003). This cycle of 
repetition also explains why independent filmmakers will sometimes vocalize their 
opposition to having films appeal to the sensibilities of the average audience. 
Making films “for only themselves” or “for nobody” is a form of symbolic resistance 
to all that is implied when Hollywood says it makes films to “please an audience” 
(Ortner 2013, pp.51–53).  
Fourth, if the underlying identity between creation and consumption is 
firmly rooted in capitalist power, Hollywood gains additional flexibility about what 
types of films it will make. As Adorno recognized, the ideology of mass culture can 
become “as internally antagonistic as the very society which it aims to control” 
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(Adorno 2004e, p.181).  In the last few years, for example, Hollywood has 
demonstrated that it has no problems showing rape, poverty, racism and violence 
on the silver screen. As long as these cinematic representations of an unjust reality 
have a determinable relationship to the habits and attitudes of an audience, the 
cultural representation of social contradictions is not antithetical to the goal of 
profit. Mass culture’s weak impact on real social contradictions is consistent and, 
therefore, predictable with respect to risk perceptions.9  
 
Reducing the Threat of Aesthetic Overproduction, 1920 - 1950 
  
 What constitutes aesthetic overproduction is historically specific, just as the 
exercise of strategic sabotage is contextual. We have, as a good example, film 
production and distribution under the classical studio system (1920-1950).  
As Richard Maltby notes in his history of the 1930s, the oligopoly of the 
Hollywood studio system used institutional power to exert a form of “generic 
pressure, comparable to the pressure of convention in a romantic comedy or a 
Western” (Maltby 1993, p.70). The two main institutions were the Motion Picture 
Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA) and the PCA, and both were 
created by the major studios. Having created these institutions, the major studios 
were able to define American cinema with one hand and dictate the terms of socially 
acceptable filmmaking with the other. The risk of aesthetic overproduction was 
                                                        
9 Marcuse finds a similar relationship between cultural representation and social antagonisms in 
bourgeois art of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Marcuse 1968, p.96ff.). 
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reduced to the extent that, under these circumstances, new film projects had to fit 
within a narrow moral and political spectrum. 
 For the American firms that were beginning to establish the Hollywood 
studio system—Warner Bros., RKO, Loew’s Inc., Fox Film and Paramount—events of 
the 1920s had a great influence on the type of entertainment they would sell for the 
next 30 years. Around the start of this decade, these “Big Five”, along with the “Little 
Three” (Columbia, Universal and United Artists), successfully supplanted both the 
Motion Pictures Patent Company (a.k.a. the Edison Trust) and the French firms that 
had a large market share of American distribution before the First World War 
(Bakker 2005). The initial success of the new film business in Hollywood, California, 
however, was undermined by a series of public-relation problems. First, Hollywood 
experienced its inaugural wave of publicized scandals. In roughly the same period, 
Mary Pickford divorced her husband to marry Douglas Fairbanks, Wallace Reed 
overdosed on heroin and, most notoriously, the comedian Fatty Arbuckle was 
charged with the manslaughter of Virginia Rappe (Maltby 2003, p.404). A second 
problem was American anti-Semitism. Many of Hollywood’s original founders were 
Jewish immigrants from Europe, and their successful creation of a West Coast film 
industry had made the film production patents of the Protestant-owned firms in 
New York irrelevant. Prejudiced critics of this change attempted to connect the 
ethnicity of Hollywood’s founders with the perceived immorality of its cinema’s 
content. Consequently, studio founders like Carl Laemmle and Adolf Zukor found 
themselves in the court of public opinion because the films they produced and the 
foreign films they imported were not “self-censored.”  
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 Overall, cities and towns across America reacted conservatively to 
Hollywood’s first boom. The city of Chicago, for example, conducted hearings about 
the effects of cinema on crime and juvenile delinquency.10 State, regional and 
municipal censor boards were also being put in place to clean up Hollywood films 
before they were exhibited; because of a 1915 Supreme Court decision about the 
inapplicability of the First Amendment to film, these boards had a constitutional 
right to cut or ban films within their jurisdiction (Maltby 1993, p.42). 
 Scandals, anti-Semitism and public outcries about violence and immorality in 
Hollywood films were not the only precursors to the PCA and the MPPDA. The U.S. 
government of the time was interested in the international export of American 
cinema. Yet, from its very beginning in the mid-1910s, this Hollywood-Washington 
partnership was strained by the “immoral” content of Hollywood films: 
During World War I, the Committee on Public Information (CPI) coordinated 
boycotts against the showing of entertainment produced by the Central Powers. 
Working through the War Trade Board (WTB), CPI leader George Creel deftly 
banned export of Hollywood entertainment to those theatres continuing to 
show German films. He also threatened similar sanctions against those theatres 
reluctant to show CPI newsreels. Grateful for state intervention against their 
German competition, the leadership of the U.S. film [business] understood that 
Creel’s program entailed costs: in particular, his obstinate denial of export 
licenses for any thrillers dealing with the desperado Jesse James, the skull-
cracking bouncer Harry “Gyp the Blood” Horowitz, and themes of the sordid 
side of North American life. (Trumpbour 2002, p.63) 
 
The international relations of Hollywood cinema continued to run into problems in 
the 1920s. In 1922, Mexico placed an embargo on the importation of U.S. films, and 
Spain and Latin America criticized Hollywood’s stereotyped representations of 
Hispanics (Trumpbour 2002, p.28). Hollywood films had also become unwelcome in 
                                                        
10 There were also two attempts to found film production and distribution trade associations after 
the Edison Trust was dissolved in 1915—the Motion Picture Board of Trade in 1915 and the National 
Association of the Motion Picture Industry in 1916 (Trumpbour 2002, p.23). 
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Europe. For instance, elites in Europe felt that Hollywood created problems for 
“European rule in colonial dominions by showing the white man, particularly figures 
of authority, in scenes thought likely to elicit responses of contempt and ridicule” 
(Trumpbour 2002, p.18).  
 European countries also established film-quota laws to marginalize 
American cinema and promote domestic film production instead. Other authors 
have done an excellent job researching this particular subject in great detail 
(Thompson 1985; Trumpbour 2002). As a graphical summary of some of this 
research, Figure 5.2 gives us a picture of how the institution of new film quotas in 
Britain, France and Germany, and the development of Soviet cinema, reduced 
Hollywood’s share of foreign markets in the 1920s and early 1930s.  
 Hollywood’s major studios erected two new institutions to handle these 
mounting domestic and foreign problems. The first institution was the MPPDA, 
founded in 1922. The studio heads appointed Will H. Hays, former chairman of the 
Republican National Committee and the postmaster general under President 
Harding, as its head.  Hays worked with the State Department and U.S. consulates to 
strengthen Hollywood’s international presence (Trumpbour 2002, p.65). The 
MPPDA also had the task of reorganizing the business-industry relationship in light 
of Hollywood’s domestic controversies. Soon after joining the MPPDA, Hays began 
designing an institutional apparatus that would enable major studios to pre-censor 
social creativity in their own film industry.  
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Figure 5.2 Share of American Films in Foreign Markets, 1921-1932 
 
Source: Thompson, Kristin. Exporting Entertainment: America in the World Film 
Market, 1907-34. London: British Film Institute, 1985. 
 
 
 
 The embryo of the second institution, the PCA, was born in 1924, when Hays 
drafted production guidelines to keep filmmaking away from social taboos. In 1927, 
these guidelines were transformed into a list of “Don’ts and Be Carefuls,” which was 
used by the MPPDA’s Studio Relations Committee. The Studio Relations Committee, 
headed by Jason Joy, was an important predecessor of the PCA. The Studio Relations 
Committee was only able to make recommendations about Hollywood’s behaviour; 
this often-criticized weakness, however, quickly demonstrated to the major studios 
that they had, in the moral climate of the 1920s and 1930s, a political economic 
interest in enforcing harder rules about socially acceptable content.11  
                                                        
11 I am, for the sake of space, glossing over the reasons why the Social Relations Committee proved to 
be ineffective in its advisory role. For a detailed history that presents the nuances of the evolution 
from a pre-PCA Hollywood to a PCA Hollywood, see Maltby (1993, pp.41–48). 
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 The PCA was not established until 1934, but its Production Code was first 
drafted in 1930 by Joy, Irving Thalberg and one of Hollywood’s most public 
protesters, a Jesuit priest named Daniel Lord. An indirect contributor was Martin 
Quigley, the founder of a trade periodical called the Motion Picture Herald. Together, 
but with Lord’s version winning over Thalberg’s less “moralistic” version, they 
published The Motion Picture Production Code in March 1930. The Production Code 
provided guidelines about how films should represent subjects such as murder 
(“revenge in modern times shall not be justified”), adultery (“must not be explicitly 
treated, or justified, or presented attractively”), and religion (“no film or episode 
may throw ridicule on any religious faith”). The Production Code also stated that all 
Hollywood filmmaking would adhere to a general moral spirit, which was embodied 
in three principles: 
1. “No picture shall be produced which will lower the moral standards of those who 
see it. Hence the sympathy of the audience should never be thrown to the side of 
crime, wrongdoing, evil or sin.” 
2. “Correct standards of life shall be presented on the screen, subject only to 
necessary dramatic constraints.” 
3. “Law, natural or human, should not be ridiculed, nor shall sympathy be created 
for its violation.” (Anon 2003b, p.594) 
 
The ability to sabotage autonomous and creative filmmaking in the spirit, rather 
than the letter, of the Production Code pleased both Lord and Quigley. Both felt that 
social and political problems, like divorce and communism, could find their way into 
films that were otherwise “clean” and “correct” in their small details (Maltby 1993, 
p.50).  
 From 1930 to 1934, the Code was not enforced, but was instead used as a 
guideline in consultations between the MPPDA and individual movie producers and 
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directors. The transition from consultation to enforcement began when Joseph 
Breen, the future head of the PCA, came to Hollywood. First hired by the MPPDA to 
oversee its public relations, Breen strongly agreed that the Production Code should 
be made enforceable.12 He, along with Quigley and Lord, hurried the moral crisis 
around Hollywood films. All three of them formally worked for Hollywood, but they 
helped build controversy by urging Roman Catholic groups in major American cities 
to threaten boycotts of Hollywood films. An actual boycott took place in 
Philadelphia, and the Legion of Decency, a Roman Catholic organization headed by 
none other than Daniel Lord, publicly claimed that it had 7 to 9 million Catholics 
committed to a nationwide boycott.  
This “moral crisis” in Hollywood boiled over in 1934. In response, the MPPDA 
renamed the Social Relations Committee as the Production Code Administration, 
and Hays made Breen its director. With the consultation of the Legion of Decency, 
Breen would oversee the review of all scripts and each major studio agreed to only 
release a film for distribution if it had a PCA certificate, which would be displayed on 
every film print. Distribution without a PCA “seal of approval” would result in a 
$25,000 fine for the studio involved (Maltby 1993, p.61). 
 
What Type of Institution was the PCA? 
 
 Histories of this period of Hollywood tend to portray the PCA as a puritanical 
institution that limited the potential of filmmaking in order to protect Christian 
                                                        
12 Breen’s private letters reveal that his anti-Semitism and overall distaste for Hollywood fare fueled 
his strong support for the Production Code. Short quotations from his correspondence can be found 
in Wu (2010, pp.116, 119).   
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values in the United States (Maltby 1983). To be sure, this aspect of the PCA is 
important, and the crusading natures of Breen, Lord and Quigley support this 
interpretation. Nevertheless, only on rare occasions would the PCA reject a film 
project in toto.13 This fact, in combination with humorous examples of Breen trifling 
over small details,14 can be misinterpreted to suggest that creative talent easily 
circumvented the restrictions of the Production Code. If the Production Code is 
viewed in isolation, disembodied from the idea that major filmed entertainment is 
primarily a regime of capital accumulation, it is easy to conclude that the PCA in fact 
failed at keeping taboos from sneaking under the radar.  
 Frank Capra’s It Happened One Night, for instance, shows how some 
filmmakers brilliantly found loopholes in the Production Code’s rules on cinematic 
representations of explicit sexuality. It Happened One Night was PCA-approved and 
has the appearance of being prim and proper. Yet, when viewed with a slightly more 
discerning eye, it becomes obvious that the veil over the extramarital desires 
between Clark Gable and Claudette Colbert is as thin as the “walls of Jericho,” the 
hung bed sheet that separates Gable and Colbert each time they share a motel room 
that has two single beds.15  
                                                        
13 As recorded in Maltby’s essay, one example was the film project Killers on Parole, which was killed 
by Breen: “We have read with utter amazement your script… of your proposed production, Killers on 
Parole. Any… story remotely resembling the story set forth in this script, is certain to result in a 
picture which we will have to reject entirely…. It hardly seems credible that you have seriously in 
mind production of such a picture” (Breen to Harry Zehner, 8 August 1935, quoted in Maltby 1993, 
p.65). 
14 In place of the now-famous last line of Gone with the Wind—“Frankly, my dear, I don’t give a 
damn”—Breen suggested: “Frankly, I don’t care” (Wu 2010, p.116). 
15 For an analysis of the film’s nuances and how they relate to the Production Code, see Mizejewski 
(2010). 
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 Did Breen have to compromise with Capra and other filmmakers? Was the 
PCA ineffective against the intentions of filmmakers? The MPPDA and the PCA could 
not over-censor, lest the American public come to judge the Production Code as 
“political censorship.” Furthermore, Frank Capra was a great Hollywood filmmaker, 
and Columbia Pictures likely compromised with him in order to retain his notable 
talents. However, the Production Code was still an important instrument of strategic 
sabotage for major filmed entertainment. And in order to understand this function, 
particularly during the period from 1920 to 1950, we should think of the Production 
Code not only as a moral and political institution, but, more broadly, as integral to 
the distribution and exhibition strategies of the major studios.  
 
The Political Economic Dimensions of the PCA and the MPPDA 
 
 Because of the international problems and domestic issues buzzing around 
Hollywood’s products, the name of the game for the major studios was to tell 
everybody that cinema was entertainment, and only entertainment. This ideological 
goal was not separate from Hollywood’s drive to accumulate capital.16 Like the 
MPPDA, the major studios used the PCA to institutionalize a type of cultural 
entertainment that had defined creative limits. This power to define creative limits 
gave Hollywood’s biggest studios more control over the threat of aesthetic 
                                                        
16 In their own ways, other authors have recognized the political economic importance of the PCA. 
Thompson (1985) and Trumpbour (2002) both place this institution in an analysis of Hollywood’s 
international business strategy. Even more significantly, Maltby (1993) finds that the ideology of the 
PCA was coeval with the oligopolistic structure of the classical Hollywood studio system, which 
lasted from 1930 to 1948. 
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overproduction, which in turn allowed them to better devise filmmaking and 
distribution strategies according to their financial goals. 
 This sector-wide attitude about the entertainment value of Hollywood 
cinema certainly could have been a rationalization of historical circumstances: other 
countries had censorship boards in place, and in the U.S., the First Amendment did 
not protect films until 1952.17 But regardless of where this attitude toward apolitical 
entertainment came from, Hollywood’s dominant firms used the mantra 
“entertainment, only entertainment” to claim that, even if some Hollywood films 
happened to touch upon some social issues, Hollywood-the-cultural-institution had 
no interest in morality or politics. For instance, Louis B. Mayer wrote to the director 
William Wyler about the anti-German bias in Mrs. Miniver, which was released in 
1942: “This is a big corporation. I’m responsible to my stockholders. We have 
theatres all over the world, including a couple in Berlin. We don’t make hate 
pictures. We don’t hate anybody. We’re not at war” (quoted in Trumpbour 2002, 
p.77).  
 To be sure, in the years between 1920 and 1950 Hollywood was not always 
able to hide behind the claim of having no politics whatsoever. The most famous 
example of this inability was the 1947 investigation of Hollywood producers, 
screenwriters and directors by the House of Un-American Activities Committee 
(HUAC). Indeed, the HUAC investigation paraded around the attention-grabbing 
argument that Hollywood was a subversive threat to America because communist 
                                                        
17 “Mutual Film v. Ohio (1915) served as the landmark decision upholding state and municipal 
censorship boards, with the Supreme Court refusing to hear another movie censorship case until the 
advanced date of 1952. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Justice Joseph McKenna rendered the 
judgment in 1915 that movies were not speech...” (Trumpbour 2002, p.52). 
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ideology had gripped the hearts and minds of its creative talent. Yet, even in light of 
such controversy, the strategy of the MPPDA was to swiftly seek shelter within the 
political mainstream of the United States.  
 Those who were uncooperative with or remained suspicious after the HUAC 
hearings were blacklisted and effectively barred from the Hollywood studios.18 
Studio heads stayed out of the limelight as much as possible, and much of the 
publicized blowback focused on the director Elia Kazan’s cooperation with the 
HUAC hearings. Kazan certainly had things to atone for: he never apologized and his 
career continued because of his testimony. Yet, as Rosenbaum points out in light of 
the controversy of giving Kazan a Lifetime Achievement Award at the 1999 
Academy Awards, the anger has always been targeted at “the facilitators or the 
patsies of the blacklist” and never at “the blacklisters themselves”:  
… I continue to find it inexplicable why Kazan was judged so harshly when the 
perpetrators of the blacklist—the studio heads who refused to hire blacklisted 
individuals—got off with a clean bill of health. Even if all these moguls are dead, 
the industry often granted them accolades and tributes when they were still 
alive, and to the best of my knowledge, not a word of protest was heard against 
their honors because of their behavior during the blacklist. (Rosenbaum 2000, 
p.14) 
 
Additionally, the MPPDA, which was renamed the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA), created a new public-relations committee in 1948. The Motion 
Picture Industry Council (MPIC) was created to respond to the HUAC hearings and 
assure the American public that nobody with radical politics, whether on the left or 
the right, worked in Hollywood (Brownell 2012, p.524). In one of its campaigns to 
repair public perceptions about the entertainment value of Hollywood, the MPIC 
                                                        
18 For a survey of the people who were put on Hollywood’s blacklist, see Humphries (2008). For an 
analysis of the American political climate in 1940s and its effect on the career of Adrian Scott, one of 
the Hollywood Ten, see Langdon (2008). 
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organized a tour called “Movietime U.S.A.” The “Movietime U.S.A.” tour had Eric 
Johnston, the new president of the MPAA, and Hollywood actors such as George 
Murphy and Ronald Reagan stop in small towns across America. At each stop, 
Johnston and his cohort of actors pontificated that Hollywood understood the 
importance of “religion, volunteerism, [the] free market, consumption, and 
anticommunism” (Brownell 2012, p.527). 
 The “Movietime U.S.A.” tour betrays the presence of moral and political 
values in Hollywood’s “harmless” entertainment. This push to align Hollywood 
filmmaking with liberal capitalist values was also political economic in character. 
The PCA and MPPDA helped circumscribe the social creativity of American 
filmmaking according to classical Hollywood’s strategies of film production and 
distribution. More specifically, it helped define aesthetic overproduction for those 
who had a vested interest in major filmed entertainment’s business goals. 
 Major filmed entertainment would not establish an American film-rating 
system until 1968 (Kunz 2007, p.21). Thus, films in the era of the Production Code 
were designed for an undifferentiated audience (Maltby 1993, p.40). For its part, the 
Production Code acted as one abstract set of moral laws for all genres to orbit.  In 
other words, the PCA made each film fit a business strategy that did not deviate 
from the “average” moral sensibility in America. 
 Essentially, there was no opportunity for niche films to explicitly violate the 
Production Code so long as they were, like our R and NC-17 films today, upfront 
about potentially objectionable subject matter. Instead, the Legion of Decency, the 
Catholic organization at the heart of the PCA, used a rating system to narrow the 
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bandwidth of film content. This Legion of Decency rating system sorted all films into 
three general classes: 
Table 5.1 
The Legion of Decency Rating System 
Class A: 
Section I: 
Section II: 
Approved 
Morally unobjectionable for general patronage. 
Morally unobjectionable for adults. 
Class B: Morally objectionable, in part, for all. 
Class C: Condemned. 
  
Source: Powdermaker (1950, p.68) 
 
As Powdermaker argued, there were two key ways for this rating system to act as a 
broad tool to limit creativity. First, the Legion of Decency got tougher with its 
ratings as the years went on. As Figure 5.3 shows for the years between 1936 and 
1949, fewer films received an A rating and there was a significant increase in Class B 
and an increase in Class C. If we can assume that the PCA preferred an A-I rating to 
an A-II rating, the relative decrease of A-I ratings is also considerable. Second, studio 
heads would sometimes use the moral strictness of the Legion of Decency as a 
convenient excuse to reject ideas that they were “certain” would eventually be 
rejected, should they ever be developed and given to the PCA. As one writer 
complained to Powdermaker, he resigned “to think in terms of the Code” because he 
had been forced to accept “in advance that certain themes will be forbidden” 
(Powdermaker 1950, p.66).19  
  
 
                                                        
19 It should be acknowledged that writers developed their own strategies to save their most valued 
ideas from being excised. One such strategy was to pad a script with a lot of material that would 
predictably be flagged and eventually pruned by the PCA. All of these “cuts” to the script would then 
enable screenwriters to bargain for elements to be saved or left alone, which were really what they 
wanted in the first place (Powdermaker 1950, p.66).  
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Figure 5.3 Legion of Decency’s Movie Classifications in the PCA, 1936-1949 
(Percent of all rated movies) 
 
Source: (Powdermaker, 1950, p.68). 
 
 
 
 The PCA’s official line that “movies were entertainment, not vehicles for 
political pontification or controversy” (Langford 2010, p.49) also allowed major 
studios to exploit the formal differences between shots and cuts that purposefully 
produce ambiguous meaning and those filmmaking techniques, such as match-on-
action cutting, that are used for the continuation of the primary action (Bordwell et 
al. 1985, p.46). If a Hollywood film presents itself as harmless, but politics and other 
controversial subjects nonetheless appear as secondary meanings, an illusion is 
created that it is the spectator who finds these meanings through deeper subjective 
interpretation. By no means should this argument suggest that filmmakers in 
classical Hollywood had no taste for political issues, ambiguity or the Freudian 
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unconscious; in fact, some of the best filmmakers in the classical studio system, such 
as Frank Capra, Howard Hawks, Ernst Lubitsch, Douglas Sirk and Preston Sturges, 
mastered the skill of putting a lot of subtext or implied meanings in their PCA-
approved films. Rather, the PCA allowed for the business side of Hollywood to force 
its filmmakers to camouflage their most significant ideas with the same glossy, well-
manicured cover (Maltby 1993, p.41).  
 The theoretical underpinnings of this argument about the difference between 
primary and secondary meanings is influenced by the works of Andre Bazin (2005b; 
2005c), and will be expanded in more detail in Chapter 7. For now, we can surmise 
that this well-manicured cover continues to exist and reduces the threat of aesthetic 
overproduction even today. On the one hand, the moviegoer is “free” to find deeper, 
more sophisticated and complex meaning—maybe even political meaning—in the 
subtext of a Hollywood film. But on the other hand, the order of cinema is much 
simpler and more stable from the perspective of capitalization. The Hollywood film 
business does not need to worry about investing in film projects that are just as 
complex as the multitude of perspectives and attitudes in society. Rather, studios 
can stick to filmmaking formulas through acts of negation: limit the social creativity 
of filmmaking at each point where Hollywood cinema would become explicitly 
political or morally complex. The potential volatilities of deeper consumer desires 
and multiple interpretations are then left to fall on the side of subjective 
interpretation. 
 This surface-level simplicity of Hollywood cinema was especially important 
during the Cold War, when the United States combated the ideology of Soviet 
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communism with idyllic presentations of luxury and happiness in the capitalist 
West. One of Hollywood’s successful on-location films, Roman Holiday, is a good 
example of a movie that is, on the surface, apolitical and simply entertaining. As 
Shaw and Youngblood note, the surface of Roman Holiday has nothing to do with the 
Cold War; it is, rather, a fun, glamorous story in which Gregory Peck’s character, Joe 
Bradley, shows the audience how even the simple, hardworking Westerner is happy 
and free spirited. Interestingly, Roman Holiday, with its apparent lack of political 
ideology, was exactly the type of film that the Motion Picture Export Association and 
the United States European Recovery Program wanted to promote all over Western 
and, when the opportunity arose, Eastern Europe. Moreover, the glossiness of 
Roman Holiday is the product of strategic sabotage. Revisions to its script softened 
the class differences between Peck’s character, an average American, and Audrey 
Hepburn’s, a nineteen-year old princess who is only in Rome for a royal goodwill 
tour. Roman Holiday was also designed to meet the approval of the European 
Recovery Program, which was an aspect of the Marshall Plan. This program 
prevented “negative” Hollywood films, such as John Ford’s The Grapes of Wrath, 
from being distributed in Cold War Europe (Shaw & Youngblood 2010, pp.98–112).  
 This qualitative control of output—i.e., making entertaining films for an 
undifferentiated audience—complemented the quantitative output of the major 
studios. Between 1933 and 1948, the major studio distribution averaged 326 films 
per year. The quick pace of producer-led, not director-led, film production (Maltby 
1993; Balio 1993), combined with the fact that the five most powerful firms during 
this period—Warner Bros. Pictures, Loew’s Incorporated, Paramount Pictures, 
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Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corporation (RKO) and Fox Film Corporation—owned 
around 75 percent of all first-run movie theatres in the United States (Kunz 2007, 
p.25), enabled major studios to dump generic products onto the market with little 
concern about the behaviour of smaller competitors. Not only did non-studio films 
have little chance of exhibiting in first-run theatres, but, as Maltby notes, an 
independent production’s route to exhibition was also obstructed by the major 
studios’ tactic of selling the exhibition rights of its films in blocks: 
Small independent exhibitors had little opportunity to cancel or choose films 
within the block and could not prevent distributors from including films of 
dubious commercial quality in the package. The main purpose of much of the 
majors' low-budget production…was to occupy exhibition time, foreclosing 
entry into the market by independent distributors and maintaining their own 
monopoly. (Maltby 1983, p.45)  
 
This Janus-faced exhibition system, maybe the most notorious feature of the 
classical Hollywood studio system,20 found a partner in the PCA, which used the 
Production Code to force filmmakers to be less experimental and, instead, create 
products that catered to already established moral standards and principles (Maltby 
1993, p.72). There was little incentive for Hollywood to diversify its own creative 
output because, under such oligopolistic conditions, the social consumption of 
classical Hollywood cinema was partially forced. 
 And finally, the MPPDA was a public-relations magnet for a regime of 
accumulation that was replacing the Edison Trust. The Production Code was used to 
convince the public that the political economic domination of an oligopolistic system 
was, in fact, a good thing. As Maltby notes: 
                                                        
20 This practice is often referred as the “block booking system” of classical Hollywood. For more on 
the political economy of block booking, see (Hozic 2001; Sedgwick & Pokorny 2005; Hanssen 2005).  
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Hays presented the MPPDA as an innovative trade association at the forefront 
of corporate organizational development, largely responsible for the industry’s 
maturation into respectability, standing trade practices and stabilizing 
relationships between distributors and small exhibitors through film boards of 
trade, arbitration, and the standard exhibition contract. The establishment of 
“the highest possible moral and aesthetic standards of motion picture 
production” was in one sense simply an extension of this practice, but it also 
implicitly accepted that “pure” entertainment—amusement that was not 
harmful to the consumer—was a commodity comparable to the pure meat 
generated by the Food and Drug Administration. (Maltby 1993, p.42) 
 
Ironically, the MPPDA would use the Production Code to defend the business 
structure of Hollywood against anti-trust claims, just as the Edison Trust, 
Hollywood’s unfriendly predecessor, had used moral arguments to justify its 
monopoly on film patents (Wu 2010, p.72). Yet the larger political climate 
surrounding Hollywood from 1920 to 1950 created new conditions for the major 
studios to publicly justify their tight control over cinema. Indeed, the MPPDA and 
the PCA were said to remove any cinematic “impurities” that could antagonize either 
domestic or foreign audiences.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The period from 1920 to 1950 can be characterized by the attempts of the 
major studios to censor themselves through the MPPDA and the PCA. We can use 
the concept of aesthetic overproduction to see Hollywood’s self-censorship as 
advantageous to business interests because it put definable limits on the industrial 
art of filmmaking. While some of the people involved in the PCA and the MPPDA 
were on a moral crusade, censorship over creative decisions was not simply moral; 
the PCA and the MPDDA were front-line defences in a larger strategy of sabotage. A 
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determinable order of cinema, one with clearly marked aesthetic boundaries, helps 
business be more confident in the social relations of cinema. 
 With this conclusion, we can now shift our focus to the more contemporary 
period. With empirical data from 1950 to 2013, we can turn our theoretical claims 
into more concrete arguments about the threat of aesthetic overproduction. In the 
next chapter, we demonstrate how, since the 1960s, major filmed entertainment has 
managed to systematically decrease its risk, both absolutely and differentially.  
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Chapter 6 
The Rise of a Confident Hollywood 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter focuses on the historical development of risk in the Hollywood 
film business from 1960 to 2013. This development will mostly be presented 
graphically, in a series of figures that give us a better sense of how and to what 
extent major filmed entertainment has increased its degree of confidence through 
the systemic reduction of risk (δ). Our overarching hypothesis is that any increase in 
confidence is a significant factor in major filmed entertainment’s drive to 
accumulate differentially.  
 Due to the scope of the project and the lack of long-term data on the prices, 
revenues and profits of VHS, DVD, Blu-ray and other forms of digital distribution,1 
much of our detailed analysis will focus on major filmed entertainment’s strategy of 
distributing blockbuster-type films for large theatrical openings—i.e., “saturation 
booking.” As will be shown, the twin-engine strategy of saturation booking and 
blockbuster cinema has been a success for major filmed entertainment. First, major 
filmed entertainment has been using, from the early 1980s to 2013, the saturation-
booking strategy more effectively: Hollywood is getting better at predicting which 
films will use their wide releases to outperform their cohorts. Second, changes to 
the volatility of consumer habits have also benefited the blockbusters of major 
                                                        
1 According to Ulin, “the amount spent to open a film is disproportionately large because the 
theatrical launch of a film is the engine that drives all downstream revenues. Accordingly, the money 
spent up front marketing a film, creating awareness, develops an overnight brand that is then 
sustained and managed in most instances for more than a decade” (Ulin 2010, p.499). 
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filmed entertainment. The consumption of the most popular films is becoming 
increasingly less volatile. Third, the duration of saturation booking, measured by 
how many days the average film is in theatres, is shortening, and this reduction 
advantages blockbuster films over those films that receive a lower number of 
opening theatres—i.e., “platform releases.” In fact, the blockbuster-saturation 
booking combination might also be changing the relationship between major filmed 
entertainment’s quantitative output and its share of all U.S. box-office revenues. 
 The evidence provided in this chapter offers an important empirical 
foundation on which we can begin theorizing Hollywood’s behaviour in the 
contemporary period. Indeed, it is curious that long after the collapse of the studio 
system in 1948, visible boundaries on the form and content of Hollywood cinema 
continue to persist (Bordwell 2006; Langford 2010). The art of filmmaking is no 
longer suffocated by the uncompetitive strategies of block booking, and it is no 
longer bounded by the moral standards of the Production Code. Rather, it appears 
that the social relations of Hollywood cinema, on both the business and consumer 
sides, are, technically, much more free: major filmed entertainment has the moral 
and political freedom to make more types of films, and consumers, likewise, have 
the freedom to explore parts of cinema that would have been marginalized or non-
existent under the distribution methods of the classical studio system.  
 But as we delve under this surface, we will see how capitalist power 
continues to shape the art of filmmaking and its potential, and specifically, how this 
transformation has brought about a substantial reduction in risk. The drop in risk 
from 1960 to 2013 parallels the sector-wide transition from American New Wave 
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cinema (higher risk) to the narrowed strategy of blockbuster, high-concept cinema 
(lower risk). While many of the qualitative details of this transition will be 
presented only in Chapter 7, the quantitative research in the current chapter 
establishes that the evolution of Hollywood’s aesthetics in the contemporary age is 
the result of strategic sabotage. Hollywood today has the same political economic 
goal it had when it relied on the studio system, the MPPDA, the Production Code and 
the PCA—to control the social creativity of filmmaking for pecuniary ends. 
 
Steps to Prepare Our Analysis 
 
 To investigate risk empirically with the capital-as-power approach, two 
preparatory steps are necessary. First, it is useful to challenge a theoretical 
assumption that permeates other studies of risk in the Hollywood film business. 
Second, we need to create an empirical starting point by approximating major 
filmed entertainment’s risk coefficient (δ). 
Risk and Economic Assumptions about Consumer Sovereignty 
 
 Risk does have a place in mainstream economic studies of Hollywood, but 
many of these investigations tend to run into one very significant problem. 
Essentially, mainstream approaches tend to ignore the historical development of 
risk. In its place is an ahistorical concept, which is used to set systemic risk at an 
“inherent” level. In the case of the Hollywood film business, risk is often deemed to 
be somewhere between high and very high, which is where it remains. 
Consequently, the particular techniques of major filmed entertainment, such as the 
  
 
260 
repetition of genres, sequels and remakes, the cult of movie stars and the institution 
of false needs and wants, are believed to be unable to affect the level of risk or 
change the social environment about which risk perceptions are made. 
 The ahistorical concept of risk is produced when mainstream approaches 
move from the particular to the universal, when general conclusions about risk in 
the Hollywood film business are drawn from studies of specific risk-reduction 
strategies (De Vany 2004; Litman 1983; Nelson & Glotfelty 2012; Pokorny 2005). At 
the level of specific strategies, many theoretical arguments acknowledge that the 
Hollywood film business can actively reduce risk. Some theorists, for example, 
consider how famous movie stars, with their perceived ability to draw consumers to 
some movies rather than others, are employed to reduce financial risk (Elberse 
2007; Hadida 2010; Ravid 1999). Others point to the blockbuster method of 
filmmaking, which is argued to be Hollywood’s style of choice because it is also a 
way to reduce risk (Litman 1998; Ravid 1999; Denisoff & Plasketes 1990). The tone 
of these theories change dramatically, however, when they take a wider view and 
incorporate their fundamental assumptions about economics and capitalism. At a 
macro level of analysis, according to most of these theorists, the strategies of the 
Hollywood film business are ineffective in reducing the overall level of systemic risk. 
The star system and blockbuster cinema can only mitigate the risk inherent in the 
greater business environment. They cannot significantly curtail it.  
 Why the odd disconnect? The possibility for risk perceptions to change 
significantly over time is out of place in studies that also assume that so-called 
economic actors are, under perfect competition, too small to change the historical 
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circumstances of risk. In other words, risk-reduction strategies, no matter how 
effective at a micro level, never transform the business environment itself (De Vany 
2004, p.270). In part because its oligopolistic character is downplayed or even 
ignored, the Hollywood film business, as a whole, is seen to have an “inherent” level 
of risk that is impervious to historical transformation.  
 In this version of Hollywood cinema, risk-reducing techniques can only do so 
much in the face of consumer sovereignty, which is always a powerful extraneous 
force. In this theoretical narrative, capitalists can affect particular dimensions of 
culture, but they cannot create the overall cultural environment, and certainly not in 
ways that favours their pecuniary interests. The world of cinema can never be made 
to have machine-like regularity when the sovereign consumer is an unalterable 
arbiter, possessing the “economic” freedom to always be fickle when the next film is 
released (Garvin 1981, p.4). 
 The notion that risk has an “inherent”, irreducible level adds an unnecessary 
theoretical obstacle. In order to protect its definition of atomistic economic 
behaviour, neoclassical theory must commit to its notion of risk when it comes 
down to earth, to a world populated, from around 1900 onwards, by trusts, trade 
associations, giant corporations, conglomerates, active governments and other 
social institutions that would have an effect on consumer behaviour. Also, the 
association of inherent risk with consumer sovereignty must treat consumer 
behaviour as a series of “revealed preferences,” even though, as Galbraith notes, the 
hyperactivity of capitalist firms in marketing, advertising, and branding makes it 
difficult to find the sovereign consumer among society’s creators of wants: “So it is 
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that if production creates the wants it seeks to satisfy, or if the wants emerge pari 
passu with the production, then the urgency of wants can no longer be used to 
defend the urgency of the production. Production only fills a void that it has itself 
created” (Galbraith 1997, p.125).  
 With respect to the Hollywood film business, the neoclassical approach, 
particularly its competitive branch, is unable to acknowledge that massive fixtures 
like blockbuster cinema and the star system can create and then sustain a fixed 
horizon of consumer tastes. Thus, what appears to be acknowledged with one hand 
is taken away with the other. A consumer will “form attachments to specific film 
‘markers’ such as stars and genre” and will even “seek a degree of familiarity in their 
film consumption experience”—but, nevertheless, “consumer tastes in film are 
ultimately unpredictable.”2 For some, the permanent autonomy of consumers 
reveals an “inherent” level of risk that is so high that ex ante predictions are actually 
impossible. Arthur De Vany, for instance, uses complex statistical modelling to 
substantiate screenwriter William Goldman’s statement that, with respect to making 
predictions about the future of Hollywood cinema, “nobody knows anything.” 
According to De Vany,  
                                                        
2 Pokorny and Sedgwick argue that the predilections of an average moviegoer will only last so long, 
which is why film producers cannot use these predilections as guidelines for future film production. 
On its own, this argument is perfectly reasonable. However, the problem is that other arguments by 
Pokorny and Sedgwick imply that the habits and desires of film consumers are unstable from film to 
film: “… any film production strategy based on the success of single, one-off film projects is doomed 
to failure. Rather, a more sensible strategy for a rational profit-maximizing film producer is to 
produce a wide range of films annually, in the hope that at least some of these will produce profits 
that will compensate for the losses that a large proportion of these films will inevitably generate. 
That is, we could characterize the successful film studios/distributors as constructing diversified 
annual portfolios of films, diversified according to production budget and genre, and allocation of 
stars, directors and screenwriters. The issue, then, is not so much which of the films in the portfolio 
are profitable, but simply that the portfolio itself is profitable” (Pokorny & Sedgwick 2012, pp.188–
190). 
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revenue forecasts have zero precision, which is just a way of saying that 
“anything can happen”…. The “nobody knows” principle… is revealed in the 
infinite variance and scale-free form of the probability distribution. When the 
probability distribution is scale free it has no characteristic size and there is no 
typical movie. If variance is infinite, the prediction is impossible; one can only 
say that the expected revenue of a movie is X plus or minus infinity. (De Vany 
2004, p.260) 
 
De Vany’s conclusion that “the confidence interval of [a] forecast is without bounds” 
(De Vany 2004, p.71) is unsatisfying because it is embedded in a framework that 
assumes that the Hollywood film business is eternally subject to this extremely high 
degree of uncertainty. It is probably true that Hollywood has experienced great 
uncertainty—for instance, Chapter 5 speaks about the uncertainty of firms during 
the nascent period of sound cinema. But is Hollywood doomed to live in a 
permanent state of extreme risk, such that the variance of expected revenues is 
always infinite? 
 On this point, it is helpful to briefly consider the concept of history that is at 
the core of the capital-as-power approach. For Nitzan and Bichler, societies are 
historical because human beings have the ability to change the foundations of a 
social order through active creation. Nitzan and Bichler capture this point with the 
verb-noun creorder: “Historical society is a creorder. At every passing moment, it is 
both Parmenidean and Heraclitean: a state in process, a construct reconstructed, a 
form transformed. To have history is to create order…” (Nitzan & Bichler 2009, 
p.305). This concept of history draws from the philosophy of Cornelius Castoriadis, 
who offers us the term “social-historical.” For Castoriadis, the hyphenation of social 
and historical signifies that it is  
impossible to maintain an intrinsic distinction between the social and the 
historical, even if it is a matter of affirming that historicity is the “essential 
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attribute” of society or that society is the “essential presupposition” of history…. 
It is not that every society is necessarily “in” time or that a history necessarily 
“affects” every society. The social is this very thing—self-alteration, and it is 
nothing if it is not this. The social makes itself and can make itself only as 
history. (Castoriadis 1998, p.215) 
 
The capital-as-power approach is, therefore, open to the investigation of the social-
historical development of risk. Capitalist power may never be able to make the 
business of culture risk-free, but we put up barriers to our own analysis if we 
assume that risk in Hollywood is inherent because it is also ahistorical.  
 Moreover, in my view, the very idea of “inherent risk” is specious because 
consumer sovereignty in advanced capitalism is a myth. Consumer sovereignty and 
the ideas that spring from this concept are, as noted by Leo Lowenthal, born from 
the “false hypothesis that the consumer’s choice is the decisive social phenomenon 
from which we should begin further analysis” (Lowenthal 1961, p.12). The 
unfortunate effects of this false hypothesis can be seen in analyses of cinema. 
Especially in neoclassical analyses, the financial statistics of movies are often treated 
as transparent indicators of consumer choice. In this model, the financial 
distribution of consumer spending is the quick and easy method of determining 
quality. If sovereign consumers create hierarchies of taste, it follows that both the 
popular, financially successful movies and those that die lonely deaths from under-
consumption are deserving of their respective fates. The people have spoken with 
their wallets. 
 At an even more fundamental level, the false hypothesis of consumer 
sovereignty is rooted in problematic assumptions about the analytical separation of 
economics and politics in capitalism. Take, for example, Barry Litman’s The Motion 
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Picture Mega-Industry. Trying hard to balance theory and historical fact, Litman 
seeks to recognize the existence of both consumer sovereignty and monopoly 
power. On the one hand, he states:  
...effective consumer demand directs supply and strong “consumer sovereignty” 
prevails. This is clearly the case in the motion picture marketplace where movie 
patrons register their dollar votes directly for the kinds of movies they prefer, 
and the differential box office rewards create the financial incentive for the next 
round of motion picture investment. (Litman 1998, p.4) 
 
This theoretical position on the sovereignty of consumers is maintained, on the other 
hand, in a study of the organizational power of Hollywood’s major film distributors. 
To determine whether consumer sovereignty has been undermined by such power, 
Litman takes an “industrial organization approach,” which “begins by examining the 
product and structure of an industry in its basic components—demand, market 
concentration, barriers to entry, vertical integration, conglomerates, and so on in 
order to gain an overall picture of the distribution of current market power and the 
chances for de-concentration in the future” (Litman 1998, p.5). 
 To balance these two conflicting perspectives about the character of capital 
accumulation, Litman argues that the history of the business of Hollywood can be 
split into two periods: the period of organizational power and the subsequent 
period of the sovereign cultural consumer. For Litman, the twilight of Hollywood’s 
monopoly power was the late 1940s. Price fixing and “excess” profits were enjoyed 
up until 1948, when the United States Supreme Court decided on Hollywood’s 
vertical integration of film production, distribution and exhibition in United States v. 
Paramount Pictures. After the Supreme Court’s ruling that the major film studios 
would be required to sell their stakes in film exhibition, a new day dawned:  
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With vertical disintegration and the end of block booking and franchising, 
assured access to theatres was no longer guaranteed: films would have to 
compete according to their intrinsic quality. This naturally opened up the market 
for independent producers and distributors whose products would now be 
judged according to merit rather than percentage. (Litman 1998, p.15) 
 
 In my view, Litman's temporal division is more the product of his theoretical 
leanings than historical facts. Decades of monopoly power in the film business did 
not dissuade Litman from making consumer sovereignty the first principle in his 
study of Hollywood cinema and modern capitalism. To be sure, United States v. 
Paramount Pictures is frequently cited as marking the end of Hollywood’s classical 
studio system (Hanssen 2005, p.89; Maltby 2003, p.129; Langford 2010, p.20). Yet 
we are beyond facts when we argue that people have been free to register their 
“dollar votes” since 1948 (Litman 1998, p.4). Litman’s characterization of the end 
the classical studio system assumes that legal regulation rinsed off political 
contaminants from an economic system that is, at its core, atomistic and 
competitive. Similar to Mancur Olson,3 Litman assumes that there is nothing about 
politics and institutional power that can change the meaning of capital; the 
economy, even when contaminated by external non-economic factors, is strictly 
defined as a rational determination of nominal prices that behave according to 
“real” utility. Monopolies can affect consumer demand, or they can erect arbitrarily 
high barriers to entry on the supply side, but their effect on the revealed preferences 
of consumer sovereignty does not, in this picture, change the definition of what the 
capitalist economy “truly” is.  
                                                        
3 See Chapter 1. 
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 In this sense, the idealization of consumer sovereignty obscures aspects of 
capitalist power in our current social-historical state. Either the power of the 
Hollywood distributors fades and becomes a thing of the past—this first scenario 
implies, to paraphrase Marx, that there has been power, but there is no longer any 
(Marx 1990, p.175)—or, like an eternal flame, consumer sovereignty survives in all 
circumstances, even when a business sector continues to be dominated by a set of 
giant firms. Like the stoic in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the second version of 
consumer sovereignty is indifferent to the very social structures that determine 
whether an individual can be free in the first place (Hegel 1977, para.197ff). Neither 
version is convincing to our analysis of Hollywood and risk. The free, individual 
determination of needs and wants—the purported principle behind consumer 
sovereignty—is an idea that is actually radically democratic at its core: it implies 
individual autonomy. And as Marcuse explains, capitalism is effective at repressing 
autonomy while simultaneously offering a great deal of individual choice:  
Under the rule of the repressive whole, liberty can be made into a powerful 
instrument of domination. The range of choice open to the individual is not the 
decisive factor in determining the degree of human freedom, but what can be 
chosen and what is chosen by the individual. The criterion for free choice can 
never be an absolute one, but neither is it entirely relative. Free election of 
masters does not abolish the masters or the slaves. Free choice among a wide 
variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these goods and 
services sustain social control over a life of toil and fear—that is, if they sustain 
alienation. And the spontaneous reproduction of superimposed needs by the 
individual does not establish autonomy; it only testifies to the efficacy of the 
controls. (Marcuse 1991, pp.7–8) 
 
Thus, while there is no direct, physical coercion to buy and consume commodities 
for pleasure and relaxation, the ability of capitalists to create a realm of leisure time 
through power—the apparent sanctuary of the private individual—should cause us 
to rethink the common understanding of risk in capital accumulation. 
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The Risk Coefficient and a Volatility Index 
 
 The risk coefficient (δ) is a variable in the capitalization equation. It is an ex 
ante variable in the valuation of an asset and not an ex post explanation for why a 
capitalist “deserved” a particular rate of return.4 Risk is a partly subjective, partly 
objective factor that shapes the way a claim on future earnings is assessed. A smaller 
δ indicates a greater degree of confidence and a larger capitalization, and a larger δ 
the opposite.5  
 If we can approximate major filmed entertainment’s risk coefficient, we will 
have an empirical starting point for the analysis that follows. In order to create a 
robust approximation of major filmed entertainment’s risk coefficient, two different 
methods will be used. The first proxy will rearrange the capitalization formula, 
measure/estimate the components on the right, and then solve for δ: 
(6.1)   𝛿 =
𝐸𝐸
𝑀𝐾 ×  𝑟𝑐
 
The second method will measure volatility, which is a common proxy for risk.  
 Using two different methods helps alleviate limitations that would be more 
significant if the methods were applied separately. Solving for δ can represent ex 
ante risk,6 which is consistent with Nitzan and Bichler’s definition. To the method’s 
                                                        
4 Nitzan and Bichler’s concept of risk, which is used here, is different from the neoclassical theory of 
risk. For their critique of the “risk premium” and its role in the construction of the capital asset 
pricing model (CAPM), see Nitzan & Bichler (2009, pp.198–210). 
5 See Chapter 4. 
6 Another method to represent ex ante risk would be to use expected earnings per share and price 
data: 
(6.A)   𝛿 =
𝐸𝐸𝑃𝑆
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 ×  𝑟𝑐
 
Analytically, this is the same as equation (6.1); it just takes the view of someone capitalizing an 
individual stock. I prefer equation 6.1 to equation 6.A for empirical reasons. For the firms that 
comprise major filmed entertainment, “Earnings Per Share from Operations” is unavailable on 
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detriment, however, solving for δ treats risk as a residual in the capitalization 
formula, which, in this case, is deconstructed with an estimate of expected earnings. 
Volatility, while a common proxy for risk, signifies ex post risk, as it measures the 
movements of the past. Past volatility certainly cannot be used to predict the future, 
but there is almost universal agreement that past volatility is still a chief 
determinant in capitalist estimations of future risk (Ricciardi 2004). 
 To solve for δ in Equation 6.1, we must remember that each variable in the 
capitalization formula is “future oriented.” In other words, our approximation of ex 
ante risk must rest on expected earnings, not past earnings. Thus, for each year, the 
expected earnings per firm (EE) need to be estimated from historical data. My 
method stipulates EE as a ten-year linear forecast of operating income per firm. This 
forecast is derived by extending the linear trend of the past ten years of data, which 
have already been smoothed as a ten-year trailing average. 
 Figure 6.1 visualizes the steps taken, beginning from raw data and ending 
with a proxy for EE: the series “Expected Earnings.” From the raw data—operating 
income per firm, 1950–2011—I create a ten-year trailing average. For each point on 
this smoothed series, a ten-year trend-line (linear regression) is forecasted ten 
years into the “future.” For example, take the year 1969. Here, we are trying to get a 
sense of what future earnings a capitalist in 1969 would forecast for the next ten 
years. In retrospect, we, the researchers, know major filmed entertainment’s profits 
in every year till 1978; however, in 1969 the forecasting capitalist did not, and he or 
she was trying to discount into present prices Hollywood’s expected profit for the  
                                                                                                                                                                     
COMPUSTAT, my primary source of data. This is an empirical limitation that makes data on operating 
income my best means to develop a long historical picture of major filmed entertainment.  
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Figure 6.1 A Proxy for Expected Earnings (EE):  
A Graphic Visualization of the Steps Taken 
 
Source: COMPUSTAT through WRDS for operating income of Major Filmed Entertainment, 
1950-1992. Annual reports of Disney, News Corp, Viacom, Sony, Time Warner (Management’s 
Discussion of Business Operations for information on their filmed entertainment interests) for 
operating income of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1993-2013. 
 
 
 
coming decade. Thus, to construct 1978 profits as they might have been estimated 
in 1969, we move in two steps. First we create a linear regression trend-line for the 
relevant ten years, the smoothed data from 1959 to 1968. This step computes what 
the 1969 capitalist would know: the average profit trend of the last ten years. 
Second, this trend-line is extended ten years into the “future,” where EE1969 is equal 
to y in a linear trend line equation where the value of x is 20 (ten years of past 
profits + ten years forecasted):  
1
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(6.2)   𝐸𝐸1969 = 𝑦 = 𝑚(20) + 𝑏 
After the smoothed data from 1959 to 1968 give us the slope (m) and the y-
intercept (b) of the trend-line, the whole process yields a proxy for expected 
earnings in 1969: 
(6.3)   𝐸𝐸1969 = $19.48 million = 0.8868(20) + 1.7521  
 For every year that also has market capitalization data (see Chapter 4), we 
repeat the example of 𝐸𝐸1969 but with the appropriate ten-year window of past 
earnings—e.g., the linear regression of 1979 would be the operating income of 1969 
to 1978, not 1959 to 1978. Figure 6.2 presents our approximation of the ex ante risk 
for major filmed entertainment. It empirically solves for δ by using the “Expected 
Earnings” series constructed in Figure 6.1, market capitalization per firm of major 
filmed entertainment and the United States 10-year Bond Yield for the normal rate 
of return.  
 Figure 6.2 also presents my index for the volatility of major filmed 
entertainment’s earnings per firm; this series signifies ex post risk. This index is 
constructed in two steps. First, for each year, I compute the percent rate of change of 
operating income from its five-year trailing average. Second, I measure, for each 
year, a trailing fifteen-year standard deviation of the computed rates of changes. 
Thus, the larger the standard deviation, the greater the volatility in the earning 
growth rates of major filmed entertainment’s previous fifteen years.  
Note the relative high correlation between our ex ante risk and ex post 
volatility measure. Over the 25-year period, the Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
between them is 0.81. This tight empirical relationship suggests that our conceptual  
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Figure 6.2 Two Measures of Risk for Major Filmed Entertainment 
 
Note: the “Volatility of Earnings” series looks at long-term trends of the average performance of 
major filmed entertainment. The standard deviation is a trailing 15-year standard deviation of 
the annual percent change from a 5-year trailing average (e.g., 1990 = standard deviation of the 
rates of changes from 5-year trailing averages, from 1976 to 1990). 
 
Note: “Ex ante Risk” is our own calculation of δ. See Figure 6.1 to see the steps taken to calculate 
expected earnings (EE). 
 
Source: COMPUSTAT through WRDS for operating income of Major Filmed Entertainment, 
1963-1992. Annual reports of Disney, News Corp, Viacom, Sony, Time Warner (Management’s 
Discussion of Business Operations for information on their filmed entertainment interests) for 
operating income of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1993-2011. COMPUSTAT through WRDS for 
common shares outstanding (CSHO) and Price (PRCC_F) of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1950-
1992. 
 
 
 
approach to risk is pretty robust, and this robustness in turn allows us to draw four 
important conclusions from the data. First, risk for major filmed entertainment was 
at its highest from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. Second, the most precipitous 
fall in risk happened in the following period, from around 1975 to 1980. Third, risk 
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steadily declined from 1980 to the present. And finally, our volatility index suggests 
that, compared to its own history (for which data are available), major filmed 
entertainment is currently in its least risky stage. Each of these four observations 
will be substantiated in this chapter and in Chapter 7. 
 
The Risk Reduction of Major Filmed Entertainment 
 
 Figure 6.2 indicates a long-term historical decline in risk. The next step is to 
historicize this process. How did major filmed entertainment manage to reduce its 
risk so systematically from the 1960s to 2013? 
  In the period during which risk dropped sharply and then steadily declined 
(1975-2013), the Hollywood film business established two important techniques: 
saturation booking and blockbuster cinema. As much as these two techniques are 
well-known characteristics of contemporary Hollywood, the risk perceptions of 
major filmed entertainment relate their successful application. For instance, 
Hollywood must decide how many big-budget films it will produce or finance—all in 
the hopes that each one will become a hit at the box office. Moreover, executives, 
managers and producers must, in the interest of future income, ask questions that 
underpin the capitalization of film projects. For instance, what type of film can reach 
the highest revenues plateau? Does it matter if a film opens on ten screens, 100 
screens or 1,000?  
 After briefly describing the function of saturation booking, we will 
demonstrate that, since the early 1980s, major filmed entertainment has been able 
to make progressively better predictions about its saturation-booking strategy. 
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Second, we will account for the positive relationship between blockbuster cinema 
and saturation booking. And finally, we will demonstrate that major filmed 
entertainment’s continuous use of saturation booking and blockbuster cinema 
might actually be changing the order of cinema. 
 
Saturation Booking 
 
 Saturation booking is a distribution-exhibition strategy that gives a film a 
“wide” release by simultaneously exhibiting the film in as many theatres and on as 
many screens as possible. Saturation booking starts on opening day, continues on 
opening weekend, and remains in place for as long as the film is popular in cities 
and towns all over the country. This wide-release strategy is not simply designed to 
accumulate big revenues; it is designed to accumulate them as quickly as possible. 
For example, the 2001 film The Mummy Returns opened in 3,401 theatres in the 
United States and earned 90 percent of its domestic theatrical revenues in its first 
five weeks. By contrast, O Brother, Where Art Thou? opened in five theatres in the 
same year, and only eventually grew to a maximum of 847 theatres. It took four 
months to earn 90 percent of its domestic theatrical revenues (which were almost 
five times smaller than the box-office gross revenues of The Mummy Returns).7  
 The sector-wide institution of saturation booking has modified major filmed 
entertainment’s orientation to risk and the social world of cinema. In other words, 
even if major filmed entertainment has always sought to control the creation and 
                                                        
7 These two examples, The Mummy Returns and O Brother, Where Art Thou?, are taken from (Maltby 
2003, pp.202, 204). 
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consumption of films for pecuniary ends, the nature of the saturation-booking 
strategy compelled Hollywood to add another consideration to its predictions about 
the expected earnings of a film. Saturation booking is not applied to every film. The 
Hollywood film business must now decide, on the basis of what it thinks will be 
popular, which films will be given wide theatrical releases. The tiered exhibition 
system of classical Hollywood may be no more, but some contemporary films will 
only ever get “platform” releases, which means they will open in a small number of 
theatres, usually in select cities (New York, Los Angeles, etc.). Moreover, not every 
cinematic premise or idea is suitable for the blockbuster style; and since saturation 
booking gives the widest releases to Hollywood’s biggest, most expensive 
blockbusters, not every film is deemed suitable for the saturation-booking strategy.  
 Therefore, a confident decision about a distribution strategy is a confident 
judgment about how a film will rank relative to its cohorts. For example, there is 
historical evidence that top-ranking films, sorted by revenues, have been able to 
outperform other films by a wide margin. In addition, for each decade since the late 
1940s, the share of all box-office revenues that go to the top 1 percent of films, 
ranked by revenues, has grown. Mark Weinstein describes this phenomenon:  
In the late 1940s, the top 1 percent of films represented 2 percent to 3 percent of 
studio revenue; by the early 1960s, this had tripled, to an average of about 6 
percent. This trend has continued in recent years. In 1993 the world-wide 
revenues for the top 1 percent (two films) of 163 major-studio released films 
were 13.8 percent of the total. (Weinstein 2005, p.252) 
 
We can infer, along with Sedgwick, that this widening gap between the revenues of 
the top films and the rest of their cohorts began when Hollywood “became 
increasingly focused on the production of ‘hit’ films,” which require large sums of 
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money for “production values” and “visual and audio innovations” (Sedgwick 2005, 
p.187). This widening gap, however, carries its own risk perceptions. While platform 
releases can sometimes become popular and pull in revenues that few business 
experts and marketing strategists originally expected, wide-release films are 
designed to dominate the top tier.  The difference between wide releases and 
platform releases is decided upon, and a wide release is typically paired with a large 
advertising and promotion budget. Thus, investor confidence in major filmed 
entertainment might drop if unknown films become popular while the wide releases 
that are advertised ad nauseam repeatedly underperform.  
 As Rosenbaum speculates, this fear of giving wide releases to the wrong set 
of films—or rather not giving it to the right set—might explain the reactive co-
optation of The Blair Witch Project by the mainstream media (Rosenbaum 2000, 
pp.45–46). The promotional coverage of Blair Witch by the big media conglomerates 
was aggressive, but, as Rosenbaum notes, it was really a defensive manoeuvre to 
gloss over major filmed entertainment’s ignorance of and non-involvement with a 
film that rapidly accumulated $140 million at the U.S. box-office.  The media blitz 
began weeks after the independent film distributor, Artisan Entertainment, first 
released this low-budget film in 27 American theatres.8  
 A better understanding of saturation booking may shed important insight on 
the risk perceptions of Hollywood. As Figure 6.2 suggests, major filmed 
                                                        
8 The Blair Witch Project was far and away Artisan’s most successful theatrical release. For all the 
films Artisan released from 1997 to 2003—at which point Lionsgate acquired the firm—the 
theatrical revenues of Blair Witch were 17 times greater than the average Artisan release. For the 
same period, the film accounted for 36 percent of Artisan’s total theatrical revenues (see 
http://boxofficemojo.com/studio/chart/?studio=artisan.htm). 
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entertainment’s degree of confidence has increased over the long term. Could this 
increase be the result of an increasingly effective use of saturation booking? Could 
this effect be empirically estimated?  
 
A Predictability Index for the Risk Perceptions of Major Filmed Entertainment 
 
 To answer these questions, I use opening theatres as a proxy for future 
expectations. Opening theatres stand as a proxy for future expectations because the 
decision about the number of opening theatres is made before a stream of box-office 
revenues actually begins to flow. Decisions about what is a good release strategy for 
each film derive from financial expectations about what will happen to each film on 
its opening weekend and onwards. Furthermore, as I established above, the 
Hollywood film business is concerned with the future pecuniary rank of its films, 
which in turn relates to the strategy of giving some films a wide theatrical release. 
Now, the key point to our examination of risk is that not every high-grossing film is 
the product of a wide release strategy. A platform release can, over time, become 
popular and consequently earn a relatively high level of gross revenues. For 
example, Schindler’s List, which opened in only 25 theatres, ended up the ninth-
highest-grossing film of 1993. But major filmed entertainment does not want to wait 
for its wide releases to eventually become popular; it wants to hit the iron when it’s 
hot. It wants to open a select number of films in a large number of theatres—often 
1,500, 2,000 or even more—and to gross as much income as it can and sooner 
rather than later. This strategy, though, requires major film entertainment to be 
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very confident in its particular choices, and the question is where this confidence 
comes from. 
 The first step in answering this question is to establish that major filmed 
entertainment has indeed become more confident about its saturation booking 
strategy. Historical data on opening theatres enable us to create a “predictability 
index” for the success of saturation booking, and that index in turns allows us to 
approximate the evolution of Hollywood’s risk coefficient (δ). Using this index, I will 
demonstrate below that, from 1981 to 2013, Hollywood has improved its ability to 
predict the financial performance of its films. This increased predictability reflects a 
better understanding of and perhaps a greater ability to create an order of cinema 
that is better suited to the strategy of giving some films wide theatrical releases. And 
this greater understanding and ability in turn translate into higher confidence, 
lower risk perception and higher capitalization. 
 As a proxy for future expectations, opening-theatres data can be used to 
compare expected and actual theatrical gross revenues. As an example, Table 6.1 
uses 1986 data from boxofficemojo.com to rank the very top films by their box-
office gross revenues. The table also provides the number of opening theatres for 
each film. Table 6.1 is interesting for a few reasons. What first stands out is Platoon, 
which only opened in six theatres but eventually went on to become the third-
highest-grossing film of 1986, a good example of a highly successful platform 
release. The second and perhaps more important point is that there is no one-to-one 
match between revenue rankings and opening-theatre rankings. For example, the 
two top-grossing films—Top Gun and Crocodile Dundee—did not have the two 
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widest releases of that year. Even on this abridged list, we can see five films that had 
wider releases in 1986. 
Table 6.1  
Films Released in 1986, Ranked by Box-Office Gross Revenues 
 
Film 
Box-Office 
Gross Revenues 
Opening 
Theatres 
Top Gun $176,786,701 1,028 
Crocodile Dundee $174,803,506 879 
Platoon $138,530,565 6 
The Karate Kid Part II $115,103,979 1,323 
Star Trek IV: The Voyage Home $109,713,132 1,349 
Back to School $91,258,000 1,605 
Aliens $85,160,248 1,437 
The Golden Child $79,817,937 1,667 
… … … 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for US theatrical gross revenues and opening theatres. 
 
 Table 6.2 offers a different view of the same year. It sorts films released in 
1986 not by box-office revenues, but by opening theatres. Aside from two films, 
Back to School and The Golden Child, none of the films in Table 6.2 appear in Table 
6.1. The films in Table 6.2 had the widest releases in 1986, but only two of them 
were able to even reach the $50 million plateau. 
Table 6.2  
Films Released in 1986, Ranked by Opening Theatres 
 
Film 
Box-Office 
Gross Revenues 
Opening 
Theatres 
Cobra $49,042,224  2,131 
Police Academy 3: Back in Training $43,579,163  1,788 
Raw Deal $16,209,459  1,731 
The Delta Force $17,768,900  1,720 
The Golden Child $79,817,937  1,667 
Friday the 13th Part VI $19,472,057  1,610 
Back to School $91,258,000  1,605 
Poltergeist II: The Other Side $40,996,665  1,596 
… … … 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for US theatrical gross revenues and opening theatres. 
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 Taken together, Tables 6.1 and 6.2 compare the top-performing films 
(ranked by gross revenues) to what Hollywood expected the top-performing films to 
be (ranked by opening theatres). Figure 6.3 extends this comparison over time. The 
figure contains three time series. Top 10%revenues measures, for each year, the U.S. 
box-office gross revenues of the top 10 percent of all films, ranked by box-office 
gross revenues (comparable to Table 6.1). The revenue data are presented as a 
percent share of all U.S. box-office gross revenues for each year. The second series, 
Top 10%theatres, measures, for each year, the U.S. box-office gross revenues of the top 
10 percent of all films, ranked by opening theatres (comparable to Table 6.2). This 
series is also presented as a percent share of all U.S. box-office gross revenues. 
 In line with Weinstein’s observations, Top 10%revenues demonstrates that the 
top tier of films has, over a 32-year period, increased its share of all U.S. box-office 
gross revenues. The top 10 percent of films in 1981 grabbed approximately 41 
percent of all U.S. box-office gross revenues for that year. In 2013 the top 10 percent 
grabbed a 79 percent share. 
 What is more interesting for our purpose, however, is the relationship 
between Top 10%revenues and Top 10%theatres. From the mid-1990s onwards, their 
fluctuations grow increasingly correlated.9 Additionally, and most crucially, over 
time the two series converge. This second process is illustrated by the third series of 
Figure 6.3, Top 10%predictability. Top 10%predictability presents, from 1981 to 2013, the 
ratio of Top 10%revenues to Top 10%theatres. 
                                                        
9 To present the change in the Pearson correlation coefficient between Top 10%revenues and Top 
10%theatres, the entire period can be broken down into three sub-periods: 1981-1989 (Pearson = 
+0.35), 1990-1999 (+0.74), 2000-2013 (+0.95). 
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Figure 6.3 U.S. Gross Theatre Revenues: The Share of the Top 10% of All Films 
 
Note: Boxofficemojo.com provides, from 1981 to 2013, data for each film released in the 
United States. After grouping every film from 1981 to 2013 by their year of release, I sort 
each year twice: once to rank all films by their gross revenues, and another time by their 
opening theatres. Both times, I measure the Top 10% share of the yearly total of U.S. gross 
revenues. Each year, the measure of Top 10% is adjusted by the annual total of films 
released in the United States. See (McMahon, 2013). 
 
Note: The series that is sorted by opening theatres is not simply measuring opening 
weekend revenues. It measures total theatrical gross of each relevant film. 
 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for number of films released per year, U.S. theatrical 
gross revenues and opening theatres for each film, and the sum of all U.S. theatrical gross 
revenues. 
 
 
 
We can see that, over time, (1) the size of the ratio has decreased, getting 
closer and closer to 1, and (2) the fluctuations in this ratio have lessened. What does 
it mean when Top 10%predictability is close to 1? Technically, it means that Top 
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10%revenues and Top 10%theatres are counting more of the same films. In other words, 
in a year in which Top 10%predictability is close to 1, the highest-grossing films were 
also, more or less, those given the widest releases. Conceptually, the declining ratio 
and fluctuations of Top 10%predictability suggest that Hollywood is getting better at 
predicting which movies will perform better than their cohorts. As the ratio 
approaches 1, the films put up for wide release end up also being the top financial 
performers, which is doubly significant if the top tier of films now grabs the majority 
of all box-office revenues in the United States. 
 For instance, in 2007, the gross revenues of the top 10 percent of films 
accounted for roughly 75 percent of all U.S. box-office revenues. Moreover, the value 
of Top 10%predictability in 2007 was 1.089. Out of a possible 63 films, 46 films are 
included in both Top 10%revenues and Top 10%theatres of that year. We can catch a 
glimpse of this fact in Table 6.3, which reproduces for 2007 an abbreviated version 
of Tables 6.1 and 6.2. As we saw, only two films appear in both Table 6.1 and Table 
6.2—Back To School and The Golden Child. As Table 6.3 demonstrates, five films 
appear in both rankings for 2007. Furthermore, the same five films of 2007 occupy, 
although in different order, both top five spots. 
Figure 6.4 combines different scales to construct a more robust predictability 
index. Applying the methods just described, it presents a weighted average of three 
predictability indices, based on the top 1 percent, top 5 percent and top 10 percent 
of films each year, from 1981 to 2013. As in Figure 6.3, the results of this weighted 
average suggest that major filmed entertainment has been able to predict the future 
shape of Hollywood cinema with a greater degree of confidence. 
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Table 6.3  
Rankings in 2007 
 
Ranked by Box-Office Gross Revenues  Ranked by Opening Theatres 
Spider-Man 3  Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s…  
Shrek the Third  Harry Potter and the Order…  
Transformers  Spider-Man 3 
Pirates of the Caribbean: At World’s…  Shrek the Third 
Harry Potter and the Order…  Transformers 
I Am Legend  Fantastic Four: Rise of the Silver Surfer 
The Bourne Ultimatum  Ratatouille 
National Treasure: Book of Secrets  Bee Movie 
…  … 
Source: www.boxofficemojo.com for US theatrical gross revenues and opening theatres. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Predictability Index for the Top Tier of Theatrical Films  
Released in the United States 
 
Note: The thick series is a weighted average of the Top 1% (0.5), the Top 5% (0.3) and 
the Top 10% (0.2). The methods that were used in Figure 6.3 were applied to the top 
one and five percent of U.S. gross revenues, ranked by gross revenues and opening 
theatres. 
Source: see Figure 6.3 
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The Blockbuster Effect 
 
 Blockbuster cinema, which first emerged in the 1970s, is different from 
“event” films of the past. Hollywood films before the 1970s, no matter how big in 
production value and grand in scale or imagination, did not get wide releases 
through simultaneous exhibition—saturation booking was only used for 
exploitation and pornographic films. Instead, a pre-1970 Hollywood film moved 
through a tiered system that staggered the exhibition schedule. “First-run” 
theatres—movie theatres in metropolitan centres—would get the film first.10 Only 
when the “first-run” was complete would the film move on to the second tier, and so 
on down the line. The actor and director Tom Laughlin broke this convention in 
1971. By using the saturation-booking method for his own Hollywood film, Billy 
Jack, Laughlin helped usher out the classical system of exhibition, which still carried 
on after the 1948 Supreme Court decision forced major filmed entertainment to 
divest its movie-theatre holdings. 
 The relevance of blockbuster cinema to the risk perceptions of saturation 
booking can be understood dialectically. Like the self-reflective movement of 
Reason in Hegel’s philosophy, a more effective use of the saturation-booking 
strategy was an eventual solution to the early shortcomings of saturation booking in 
                                                        
10 While a tiered system was certainly in place, “first-run” theatres lost some of their advantages after 
1948. For example, there was no longer a ticket-price difference between “first-run” theatres and 
lower tiered ones—most likely due to the post-1948 decline of double features (i.e., tickets that sell 
two back-to-back films). Also, the “clearance” tactic—where major studios would remove a film from 
all theatres for a block of time between its “first-run” exhibition and its “second-run”—was deemed 
illegal in the Supreme Court case against Paramount and the other major studios. (Waterman 2005, 
p.57). 
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the 1970s.11 Look beyond the two most obvious financial successes of the 1970s—
Jaws and Star Wars—and there are examples of this decade having qualities that 
undermined the interests of major filmed entertainment. First, if blockbusters were 
to be high-octane fuel for the big engine of saturation booking, major filmed 
entertainment would need to learn how to design enough “must-see” films for the 
top financial tier. This lesson was first taught in 1976, the year that was sandwiched 
between Jaws and Star Wars. Jaws created a new pecuniary standard for high-
grossing films, and in this environment, the great financial success of Rocky—the 
highest-grossing film in 1976—was, as Cook describes, “puzzling and unnerving” 
(Cook 2000, p.52). Rocky was a low-budget project that featured, at the time, a cast 
of unknown actors. Its unexpected success twisted the knife in the side of designed-
to-be-blockbuster films like King Kong (1976) and The Deep (1977), two films that 
could not repeat the financial success of Jaws (Cook 2000, p.44).  
 Second, if the blockbuster style was going to be a mainstay for years to come, 
major filmed entertainment needed the “right” type of creativity. Spielberg and 
Lucas were certainly proving their worth early on, but many of their 
contemporaries in the late 1970s were making auteur/blockbuster hybrids that 
proved to be incompatible with the wide-release strategy. On the one hand, the 
production costs of films like Kubrick’s Barry Lyndon, Peckinpah’s Convoy, Friedkin’s 
                                                        
11 “Spirit gains its truth only through finding itself within absolute rupture. Spirit is that power not as 
a positive which turns away from the negative, as when we say of something that it is nothing or 
false, and having thus finished with it we turn to something else; rather, spirit is that power only in so 
far as it looks the negative in the face and dwells in it. This dwelling is the magic force which converts 
the negative into being” (Hegel 2005b, p.129). Yirmiyahu Yovel, in his running commentary on 
Hegel’s “Preface” to the Phenomenology, describes the self-reflective nature of Reason: “It is essential 
for knowledge to separate itself from the object and thus introduce falsity as a condition of the 
eventual reidentification” (Hegel 2005b, p.141). 
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Sorcerer, Coppola’s Apocalypse Now, Scorsese’s New York, New York, and Cimino’s 
Heaven’s Gate were far too big for a small-release strategy to be profitable; on the 
other hand, the form and content of these films were also too esoteric to ever reach 
the revenues plateau of a Jaws or a Star Wars.12 
 Figure 6.5 helps illustrate the transformation from the 1970s to the current 
era of Hollywood cinema, 1980-2013. The figure is a proxy for the consumer habits 
of American cinema. It presents the volatility of attendance for both the top three 
and top five films per year. Volatility is computed in two steps. For both the top 
three and the top five films per year, the annual growth rates of total attendance are 
computed from the 1940s to 2013. The two series in Figure 6.5 are measures of, for 
each year, a 20-year trailing standard deviation of these growth rates.  
 Interestingly, the volatility of attendance in the 1970s, the first decade of 
blockbuster cinema, was similar to that of the 1960s and even the mid-1950s—two 
periods when saturation booking was not yet a Hollywood strategy. Thus, we can 
surmise that, even if the release of Jaws in 1975 was the first big success of 
saturation booking, the related degree of confidence had not yet begun to increase. 
To be sure, having single-handedly pulled in around 128 million attendances in the 
United States, Jaws was an example to be mimicked immediately. Justin Wyatt 
describes the saturation-booking strategy that followed on its heels: 
Following Jaws, high quality studio films developed even broader saturation 
releases; in 1976, King Kong (with a 961 theater opening); in 1977, The 
Heretic: Exorcist II (703 theaters), The Deep (800 theaters), Saturday Night 
Fever (726 theaters); in 1978, Grease (902 theaters) and Star Trek—The 
Motion Picture (856 theaters) continued to expand the pattern of saturation 
release and intense television advertising. (Wyatt 1994, p.112) 
                                                        
12 Chapter 7’s section on high-concept filmmaking will explicate this point further. 
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Figure 6.5 Volatility of U.S. Theatrical Attendance: Top Three and Top Five Films 
 
Note: Attendance = Total U.S. gross revenues of the top three films / average U.S. ticket price 
 
Note: Each series is a 20-year trailing standard deviation of annual percent rates of changes 
(e.g., 1980 = standard deviation of the rates of changes from 1961 to 1980). 
 
Source: Bradley Schauer and David Bordwell, “Appendix: A Hollywood Timeline, 1960-2004,” 
in The Way Hollywood Tells It: Story and Style in Modern Movies (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2006), 191–242. For years not covered in Schauer and Bordwell, see 
www.boxofficemojo.com for yearly gross revenues of individual films and National Association 
of Theatre Owners for average US ticket price (http://natoonline.org/data/ticket-price/). 
 
 
 
Despite this flurry of wide releases, however, Figure 6.5 illustrates that there is still 
a difference between the 1970s—a decade when blockbuster cinema was still in its 
infancy—and the contemporary period from 1980 to the present—a time when 
blockbuster cinema has become Hollywood’s predominant style. The two series—
“Top Three Films” and “Top Five Films”—both start their decline in the 1980s and 
reach their lowest levels in the 2000s. By 2011, the 20-year trailing standard 
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deviation for the attendance of the top three films was 48 percent less volatile than 
it had been in 1980. The same can be said for the attendance of the top five films. 
 
The Historical Circumstances of Saturation Booking 
 
 Taken together, the increased confidence regarding the expectations of 
saturation booking implied by Figures 6.3 and 6.4 and the reduction in the volatility 
of attendance for the top tier of films shown in Figure 6.5 suggest that, since the 
1980s, the historical circumstances of risk have changed significantly.  
Now let’s go one step further and examine the extent to which major filmed 
entertainment’s push to reduce risk modified the order of cinema. Our argument 
here is that, when paired with the “right” set of blockbuster films, saturation 
booking is a social-historical force; it can bulldoze and reconstruct the historical 
circumstances about which risk perceptions are made. 
 To illustrate this point, consider the next two figures. Figure 6.6 uses the 
National Association of Theater Owners data to illustrate how the Hollywood 
theatrical-release window has changed from 1997 to 2013. With only a few 
exceptions, the theatrical-release window is the period of time when a film is 
exhibited in movie theatres exclusively, before it is made available in other media 
formats. In the chart, “Video Announcement” is the average number of days between 
the opening day of the film and the day when video release plans for the same film 
are announced—a signal that a film’s theatrical-release window is closing or already 
closed. “Video Release” measures the average number of days between opening day 
of the film and the actual release of the video (DVD, Blu-ray and, previously, VHS).  
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Figure 6.6 Average U.S. Theatrical Release Window for Major Studios, 1997-2013 
 
Note: Each series is an 8-quarter moving average of the data for Disney, Twentieth Century 
Fox, MGM, New Line, Paramount, Sony, Universal, and Warner Bros. 
 
Source: National Association of Theatre Owners (http://natoonline.org/data/windows/) 
 
 
 
Therefore, this measure is the sum of two periods: when a film is in theatres, and the 
period when the film is no longer in theatres, but has yet to be released on video. 
 As we can see, both series have trended downward. This shortening of the 
average theatrical-release window is partly a reaction to Internet piracy and 
bootlegging. By releasing its video formats sooner, major filmed entertainment is 
attempting to distribute each product before the respective wave of piracy reaches 
its crest. For our purpose, though, the important point is that this shortening of the 
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theatrical-release window undermines a key aspect in De Vany’s argument about 
the high to extreme levels of risk in the Hollywood film business. According to De 
Vany, consumers, although barraged with advertisements that attempt to control 
their behaviour, can significantly disturb expected financial performance through 
word of mouth. Word-of-mouth behaviour, so goes this type of argument, is an 
unpredictable, inherent risk of consumer sovereignty; it can stop a “hit and run” 
strategy dead in its tracks (Cucco 2009, p.223). For the first few weeks, it may be 
possible for major filmed entertainment to attract audiences simply through 
promotion and advertising, even for its bad films. But after that, according to De 
Vany, an “uninformative information cascade” reaches it limit and the chaos of 
word-of-mouth communication takes over. This latter process, he maintains, always 
makes the future success of a theatrical release extremely uncertain; your unknown 
film can become a hit and your expected hit can become a flop when people start to 
talk (De Vany 2004). 
 The shortening of the theatrical-release window shown in Figure 6.6 cuts the 
word-of-mouth factor off at the knees. After a film has already been in theatres for a 
few weeks, and as the din of manufactured media buzz begins to fade, there is now a 
smaller interval in which word of mouth can potentially put a film on an unexpected, 
financial trajectory. As Cucco notes, this weakening of the word-of-mouth factor 
actually advantages the saturation-booking strategy, which relies on blockbuster 
cinema: 
The expectation of [film] quality can be a risk as far as revenues are concerned, 
especially when speaking about blockbusters. This is why these films have been 
widely released on the opening weekend for almost 30 years now. By showing 
the film in many theatres at the same time, the number of people who watch a 
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movie without reading reviews or hearing opinions beforehand increases. 
(Cucco 2009, p.223) 
 
Just as importantly, the shortening of the theatrical-release window disadvantages 
films that depend heavily on favourable word-of-mouth communication between 
moviegoers. For example, let us return to the difference between the theatrical 
releases of The Mummy Returns and O Brother, Where Art Thou? Both films where 
released in 2001, a year when the average interval between opening day and video 
announcement was 101 days. To earn 90 percent of its theatrical revenues The 
Mummy Returns only needed approximately 35 days, while O Brother needed 
approximately 112 days to accumulate 90 percent of a much smaller amount of 
theatrical revenues. This disadvantage of platform releases in a shorter theatrical 
window is actually much worse than it appears; O Brother was a very successful 
platform release—which is how it could earn 90 percent of its revenues eleven days 
after the theatrical window had already closed for many films in 2001. Overall, 
major filmed entertainment tends not to nurture platform releases that, like 
Jarmusch’s Dead Man, might be artistically thought provoking but financially listless 
(Rosenbaum 2000, p.55). Indeed, platform releases are forced to become dependent 
on word of mouth because business interests have decided to withhold a large 
advertising budget from them (Ulin 2010, p.384). If a platform release fails to 
generate some heat through word of mouth, major filmed entertainment prefers to 
let it languish in obscurity, rather than inject extra marketing and advertising, or 
what is sometimes called “sustained marketing” (Ulin 2010). 
 Figure 6.7 compares two series. The thick line measures the number of major 
filmed entertainment annual releases from 1975 to 2012. It is expressed as a 
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percentage of the total number of films released in the United States. The dotted 
series measures, from 1975 to 2007, major filmed entertainment’s share of all U.S. 
box-office annual revenues. This series is an indirect measure of the struggle 
between major filmed entertainment and theatre owners—there is a finite amount 
of theatrical revenues each year, and it is contract negotiations that determine what 
share goes to the dominant Hollywood film distributors (Vogel 2011). 
 2007 is the last year for which data are available for major filmed 
entertainment’s box-office share. We can create a hypothetical extrapolation of the 
revenues series with details from the Iron Man 3 contract dispute.13 2013 on the 
dotted series is 18 percent higher than the historical average of major filmed 
entertainment’s share of box-office revenues between 1975 and 2007. Eighteen 
percent is, according to what the Los Angeles Times reported, the low estimate of the 
amount by which Disney was attempting to increase its gross revenue share (from 
55 percent to 65 percent). 
 The period from 2007 to 2013 is illuminating. That major filmed 
entertainment’s share of theatrical revenues is likely increasing while its share of all 
film releases is decreasing indicates that the rules of the game might be changing. 
For most of the time span in Figure 6.7, from 1977 to 2006, there is a positive 
correlation (+0.72) between major filmed entertainment’s share of total releases 
and its share of all theatrical revenues. This high correlation corroborates the  
                                                        
13 In 2013, the Los Angeles Times reported a dispute between Disney and two major theatre owners, 
AMC Entertainment and Regal Entertainment. The dispute was over the theatrical release of Iron 
Man 3 and how its theatrical revenues were going to be split between Disney, its distributor, and 
theatre owners. According to the Los Angeles Times, studios “typically collect 50% to 55% of ticket 
sales, depending on the movie.” AMC and Regal were challenging Disney because, for Iron Man 3, 
“Disney was seeking an excessively large take of the box-office revenue—up to 65%” (Verrier 2013). 
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Figure 6.7 Major Filmed Entertainment’s Film Releases and Theatrical Revenues 
 
Note: Both series are 3-year moving averages. 
 
Sources: Joel W. Finler, The Hollywood Story, 3rd ed. (New York: Wallflower Press, 2003) 376-377, 
for total releases and MPAA releases from 1975-2002; MPAA Theatrical Market Statistics for total 
releases and MPAA releases from 2003-2012. Vogel, Entertainment Industry Economics, 88-89, for 
MPAA U.S. rentals % of box-office from 1975-2007. 
 
 
 
research of Robert W. Crandall, who looked at the structure of Hollywood film 
distribution from 1948 to 1967. In regards to this 19-year period, which 
immediately followed the conclusion of the antitrust case against Paramount and 
the other major studios, Crandall recognized that the means for distributors to 
exercise power over exhibitors were still there and, in fact, “were quite 
straightforward—the control over the number of film releases per year” (Crandall 
1975, p.62). By “controlling the only nonsubstitutable input in theatrical 
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exhibition—the film itself—the distributors continued to exercise market power” 
over theatrical exhibition (Crandall 1975, p.62). 
 Major filmed entertainment’s share of all films released in the United States 
has now declined to a level not seen since the late 1980s. However, unlike in the 
1980s, its share of all theatrical revenues might be approaching a historical high. 
Thus, in recent years, major filmed entertainment’s share of theatrical revenues is 
no longer dependent on the extent to which it dominates film releases in the United 
States, at least not in the way it was until only a decade ago. This change might have 
to do with the stable popularity of superhero franchises and other blockbusters. 
This popularity created a situation in which major filmed entertainment has far less 
to worry about the growing number of competing films: they are less relevant to the 
certainty and revenue power offered by its wide-released blockbusters. While few in 
number but big in impact, the most popular blockbuster films lend their distributors 
a high degree of confidence about their gravitational pull. 
 
Conclusion: The Significance of Major Filmed Entertainment’s Strategies 
 
 The aim of this chapter has been to understand how and to what extent 
major filmed entertainment has increased its degree of confidence through the 
systemic reduction of risk (δ). Around 1980, major filmed entertainment began to 
effectively determine the financial trajectory of its most valuable films. Since then, 
Hollywood has gotten better at predicting which films will best use the saturation-
booking strategy to accumulate a greater share of all theatrical revenues. Moreover, 
the volatility of attendance has decreased for the top films, and this historical 
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change is coeval with a shortening of the theatrical-release window, which in turn 
disadvantages platform releases. Overall, the institution of blockbuster cinema and 
the strategy of saturation booking signify a decrease in risk for major filmed 
entertainment. 
This decrease in risk has been a significant factor in major filmed 
entertainment’s drive to accumulate differentially. The reduction of risk was not 
only absolute, it was also differential, relative to U.S. dominant capital more broadly. 
Figure 6.8 presents differential measures for major filmed entertainment’s ex ante 
risk and volatility index. The same methods are applied to our data on dominant 
capital as were applied in Figure 6.2. It is highly significant that the shapes and 
patterns of the two series in Figure 6.8 are very similar to those in Figure 6.2. 
Overall, during the period since the early 1970s, major filmed entertainment has 
been lowering its risk at a faster rate than its benchmark, dominant capital. 
 Figure 6.9 supports our observations. The chart juxtaposes our measures of 
differential risk with the differential capitalization of major filmed entertainment. As 
shown in Equation 4.2, differential capitalization is affected negatively by 
differential risk—i.e., the lower the differential risk, the higher the differential 
capitalization.  That is indeed what Figure 6.9 demonstrates. The pattern of 
differential capitalization was originally presented in Figure 4.2. The remarkable 
divergence, occurring between the early 1980s and the mid-1990s, between rising 
differential capitalization and falling differential income led us to hypothesize that 
this divergence was created by falling differential risk; and to further guess that this 
decline in risk was crucial for understanding the emerging order of cinema in the  
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Figure 6.8 Major Filmed Entertainment’s Degree of Confidence:  
Differential Risk and Differential Volatility 
 
Note: See Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for an explanation of how differential ex ante risk and 
differential volatility were calculated. 
 
Source: COMPUSTAT through WRDS for common shares outstanding (CSHO) and Price 
(PRCC_F) of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1950-1992. COMPUSTAT through WRDS for 
operating income, common shares outstanding (CSHO) and Price (PRCC_F) of Dominant 
Capital 500, 1950-2011. Annual reports of Disney, News Corp, Viacom, Sony, Time Warner 
(Management’s Discussion of Business Operations for information on their filmed 
entertainment interests) for operating income of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1993-
2011.Global Financial Data for normal rate of return: USA 10-year Bond Constant maturity 
Yield (IGUSA10D). 
 
 
 
contemporary period. Figure 6.9 highlights the quantitative importance of the risk 
factor. The differential capitalization of major filmed entertainment stagnated right 
up to the point that differential risk started to drop in the early 1980s. And it started  
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Figure 6.9 The effect of Risk Reduction on Differential Capitalization 
 
Note: See Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for an explanation of how differential ex ante risk and differential 
volatility were calculated. 
 
Source: COMPUSTAT through WRDS for common shares outstanding (CSHO) and Price (PRCC_F) 
of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1950-1992. COMPUSTAT through WRDS for operating income, 
common shares outstanding (CSHO) and Price (PRCC_F) of Dominant Capital 500, 1950-2011. 
Annual reports of Disney, News Corp, Viacom, Sony, Time Warner (Management’s Discussion of 
Business Operations for information on their filmed entertainment interests) for operating 
income of Major Filmed Entertainment, 1993-2011.Global Financial Data for normal rate of 
return: USA 10-year Bond Constant maturity Yield (IGUSA10D). 
 
 
 
to soar, despite falling differential earnings, as differential risk steadily decreased, 
from 1980 to 1994. 
 Moving forward, we can use major filmed entertainment’s drive to reduce its 
differential risk to help conceptualize the more qualitative dimensions of 
contemporary Hollywood cinema. Risk perceptions are critical in framing 
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Hollywood’s orientation to the aesthetic potential of cinema. Only some types of 
films are given wide releases and big advertising budgets. Only some sets of films 
elicit high revenues expectations because their form and content are well suited for 
major filmed entertainment’s pecuniary goals. Big blockbusters might not be 
everything for the Hollywood business, but they prevail by overshadowing other 
forms of filmmaking. This overshadowing helps reduce risk and boost differential 
accumulation, and in order to achieve it, major filmed entertainment must 
strategically sabotage the aesthetic techniques of filmmaking. 
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Chapter 7 
The Institution of High-Concept Cinema 
 
Introduction 
 
 This chapter, which is concerned with the history of American cinema and 
the political philosophy of art, complements the quantitative research of the 
previous chapter. The chapter provides a conceptual analysis of high-concept 
cinema, which is a key component of the contemporary Hollywood film business, 
and it shows how, over the past three decades, the growing hegemony of high-
concept cinema went hand in hand with the ability of major filmed entertainment to 
significantly reduce its risk. 
 High-concept cinema in Hollywood involves the simplification of a film’s 
message for marketing purposes. This strategy, which first emerged in the late 
1970s, is the product of the rise and fall of American New Wave, which was briefly 
embraced during the period of “New Hollywood.” By excising the complexity, 
ambiguity and, dare we say, politics from the aesthetic intentions of American New 
Wave, the application of high-concept cinema by major filmed entertainment has 
been able to realign the aesthetics of Hollywood films with the contemporary 
strategies of saturation booking and blockbuster cinema.  
The chapter explores how the aesthetic form of high-concept cinema 
complements major filmed entertainment’s need to strategically sabotage the 
industrial art of filmmaking. High-concept cinema is a product of “intensified 
continuity”, which is a filmmaking technique that achieves clarity, simplicity and 
straightforward meaning through rapid cutting between shots. Intensified 
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continuity need not be, in and of itself, a function of strategic sabotage. But it can 
become one when the rights of ownership allow major filmed entertainment to 
transform the “raw” material created during film production into high-concept 
cinema. This discrepancy between what is shot during actual production and what is 
finally presented to the audience is possible because American copyright law gives 
major filmed entertainment the right to edit or re-arrange any film that is ostensibly 
completed by its filmmakers.   
 
High-Concept Cinema 
 
 “High concept” is simultaneously an aesthetic and business term. It refers to 
a style of filmmaking that assumes that the essence of a film is broadly marketable 
when its main idea is as simple and straightforward as possible (Wyatt 1994). 
According to the logic of high concept, the idea of a film should be communicated 
easily, as a modern audience is very likely to discover upcoming films through 
trailers and other advertisements. Thus, because of its aesthetic design, short 
descriptions adequately represent what high-concept films are about. (It may 
already appear that “low concept” is a more appropriate term; however, “high 
concept” is the term used by the film business.) 
 Who exactly invented high concept has yet to be settled. Wyatt notes that 
some people credit Barry Diller, while others point to Michael Eisner. Diller first 
used the high-concept standard when he was a programming executive for ABC 
television: “Since Diller needed stories which could be easily summarized for a 
thirty-second television spot, he approved those projects which could be sold in a 
  
 
301 
single sentence” (Wyatt 1994, p.8). Eisner first practiced high concept when he was 
a creative executive for Paramount (he later moved to Disney). For Eisner, it was 
also about whether a film could be summarized briefly (1994, p.8).  
This yearning for brevity is partly a consequence of Hollywood “pitch” 
meetings, which usually give writers or filmmakers only about 20 minutes to sell 
their idea or script to a producer or development executive (Elsbach & Kramer 
2003, p.286). However, as Wyatt points out, the pitch to a studio executive or 
producer is also a hypothetical pitch to an audience that commonly learns about the 
plots of upcoming films through television commercials, movie posters or Internet 
trailers. For example, Steven Spielberg, the most financially successful director in 
contemporary Hollywood and an executive producer of many films, uses the high-
concept style to bridge pitched ideas and their hypothetical final products, the films 
themselves: “If a person can tell me the idea in 25 words or less, it’s going to make a 
pretty good movie. I like ideas, especially movie ideas, that you can hold in your 
hand” (quoted in Wyatt 1994, p.13). 
 Twenty-five words or less is not very much, but as Wyatt points out, 
Hollywood has devised ways to achieve this reduction, whereby the gist of the film 
is expressed in a simple marketable idea. As we show in what follows, this reduction 
in cinematic complexity is coeval with the systematic reduction of risk for major 
filmed entertainment.  
 
  
  
 
302 
The Elements of High-Concept Cinema 
 
 In a high-concept film, one will find character types, a simple narrative or a 
take-away image or style—and sometimes all three elements.  
 High-concept films tend to rely on simple character types to make the 
motivation and goals of characters transparent. High-concept characters may have 
proper names, but they lack the richness and depth that often give individual 
desires, both real and imaginary, an ambivalent, obscure or even unconscious 
foundation. The main point of high-concept characterization is to highlight a single 
property in each character. For instance, in Steven Soderbergh’s Ocean’s Eleven, 
George Clooney plays a thief who steals for more than money, be it for love or 
revenge; Brad Pitt plays a thief who is always the cool counterweight to Clooney; 
and Matt Damon is the thief who is talented but always clueless about the master 
plan, to which Clooney and Pitt are always privy. Physical qualities can also stand in 
for personality and psychological motivation. In Twins, for instance, the narrative 
centres on “the physical difference between the twins,” which, as Wyatt points out, 
“is reinforced by the casting of Danny DeVito and Arnold Schwarzenegger” (1994, 
p.55). This visual contrast between a stocky DeVito and brawny Schwarzenegger 
was also at the centre of the film’s marketing campaign.  
 In Hollywood, complex stories are not always winnowed down to the point 
that they become high concept. Charlie Kaufman, for example, was forced to simplify 
his script for Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, yet the final product is complex 
enough to not qualify as high concept. As the analysis by Bordwell implies, Eternal 
  
 
303 
Sunshine is not easily marketable because its simple narrative structure was buried 
beneath a visible façade of experimental exposition: 
As with the experiments of the 1940s and 1960s, most storytelling 
innovations since the 1990s have kept one foot in classical tradition. Because 
of the redundancy built into the Hollywood narrative system, unusual devices 
could piggyback on a large number of familiar cues. Eternal Sunshine, as 
Kaufman doubtless realizes, tells of boy meeting girl, boy losing girl, and boy 
getting girl. (Bordwell 2006, p.73) 
 
By design, a high-concept film does not hide this simplicity. Instead, a high-concept 
film is the least likely candidate to veer from the established narrative standards of 
Hollywood cinema. With a straightforward premise and a cast of characters that 
lack psychological depth, high-concept films can cleanly and efficiently follow 
standard Hollywood procedure: 
Act 1 introduces the problems faced by the hero, ending with a crisis and the 
promise of major conflict. Act 2 consists of an extended struggle between the 
protagonist and his or her problem, and it ends at a point of even more severe 
testing for the hero. Act 3 shows the protagonist solving the problem. Taking a 
two-hour film as the norm and assuming that one script page equals a minute of 
screen time, [it is recommended] that act 1 run about thirty pages, act 2 about 
sixty pages, and act 3 another thirty pages. (Bordwell 2006, p.28) 
 
This ratio of page count to screen time suggests that Adorno was not exaggerating 
when he stated that the total duration of a Hollywood film “is regulated as if by a 
stopwatch” (Adorno 2004d, p.75).  
 The third element, the high-concept image, can be described as “excessive”. 
In order to explain what that means, though, we need to briefly examine the role of 
images in art films. As will be described later in this chapter, art films, like high-
concept ones, will often delay narrative progression, sometimes by holding a shot 
and creating memorable images. However, there is a qualitative difference between 
high-concept imagery and, for example, the images of perpendicular female faces in 
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Persona and Mulholland Drive. The latter two films use the same type of shot to add 
complexity, mystery and ambiguity to stories that are already discontinuous. As 
Bordwell notes, an art film generally alternates between imagery and narration to 
announce that “life is more complex than art can ever be, and… the only way to 
respect this complexity is to leave causes dangling and questions unanswered” 
(2003, p.43).    
 By contrast, the narrative-imagery relationship of high-concept film aims to 
have the opposite effect. The first job of high concept is to keep the film’s 
marketable qualities on the surface (Wyatt 1994, p.63). Thus, a pause in narrative is 
“excessive” because the style of high-concept imagery is never an alternative road to 
substantial meaning. Thus, having Tom Hanks play the foot-operated piano at FAO 
Schwarz in Big, or John Cryer lip-synch and dance to “Try A Little Tenderness” in 
Pretty in Pink, does not make the films richer, and after the pause in narrative, their 
stories resume as if nothing had ever happened (Wyatt 1994, p.44). Moments of 
“excessive” style can also be used to showcase a much beloved quality of an actor. 
Wyatt comments on the role of Eddie Murphy in the story of Beverly Hills Cop: 
Murphy’s performance in Beverly Hills Cop breaks the development of the story 
at several occasions due to Murphy’s extraordinary “transformations.” In order 
to gain access to information, Murphy playing Detective Axel Foley, assumes 
strikingly different identities: from an irate Rolling Stone reporter to a dedicated 
floral deliveryman to an effeminate gay lover. Each of these transformations is 
accomplished solely through Murphy’s acting: through his speech patterns, 
gestures, and manner of presentation, rather than through physical disguises. 
The abruptness with which Murphy assumes each new character, along with 
the apparently arbitrary choice of persona, serves the break the world of the 
film. Murphy’s performance, composed of these psychological transformations, 
explodes the banal detective story at these points, taking precedence over any 
narrative development. (1994, p.33) 
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This same method of “storytelling” was used in many Jim Carrey films in the 1990s, 
particularly Ace Ventura: Pet Detective, The Mask and The Cable Guy. In each of these 
films, the story is thin because the true purpose is to have Carrey-the-actor 
showcase his abilities in physical comedy and impersonations. 
 The excessiveness of high-concept imagery actually increases the need for 
the story of a high-concept film to be straightforward and easy to follow. If the 
imagery does not add any complexity to a film, the time left over for narrative 
development might not be enough to produce the experience of following the 
progression of a good story. As Mamet notes, great films of various genres are able 
to build anticipation and excitement step by step because dramatic experience is 
“essentially the enjoyment of the postponement of enjoyment” (Mamet 2007, p.130). 
But for this deferred form of enjoyment, the screenwriter needs a lot of pages and 
the director needs every scene. When films are, instead, built around scenes or 
images that do little to deepen meaning, what is generally left over for story are 
simply pretexts for action, or a “loose assemblage” of visual effects or scenes 
(Mamet 2007). 
  
Capitalizing the Habits and (Low) Artistic Expectations of Hollywood Cinema 
 
 As Wyatt observes, the elements of high-concept cinema come together such 
that they weaken our identification with character and narrative. Instead of building 
a complicated relationship between subject and object,  
the viewer [of a high-concept film] becomes sewn into the “surface” of the film, 
contemplating the style of the narrative and the production. The excess created 
through such channels as the production design, stars, music, and promotional 
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apparati, all of which are so important to high concept, enhances the 
appreciation of the films’ surface qualities. (1994, p.60) 
 
But how does high-concept filmmaking reduce risk? On the surface, the answer 
seems apparent: high-concept films are less risky because their stories are simpler 
and more straightforward, and the superficial style—be it through the marketing of 
a star, the music or even the look of the film—is a quick and easy “argument” about 
why you, the typical moviegoer, should see a film. While this may be partly true, it is 
merely the first step. In order to understand the apparent box-office appeal of 
simplicity, we need to consider and historicize the social relationship between 
filmmaking and film consumption.  
 High-concept filmmaking helps increase major filmed entertainment’s degree 
of confidence because it has become a socially accepted style of cinema. Not every 
Hollywood film is high concept, nor is every film of this type wildly popular. Rather, 
the general persistence of high-concept films shapes and reinforces social 
expectations about what cinema should and should not be. If the belief that films 
should be simple and straightforward is strongly held by managers, producers, 
directors, screenwriters, actors, artists and the consumers of their films, major 
filmed entertainment can, with a greater ability, quantify its expectations about the 
repeatability and regularity of high-concept cinema. Thus, the social institution of 
high-concept cinema relies on the social-historical foundation of aesthetic 
experience (Adorno 1997, p.269). Low, pessimistic expectations about the aesthetic 
potential of cinema can reinforce the institution of a narrow aesthetic horizon. 
Prevailing cinematic habits and expectations can also disadvantage filmmakers and 
audiences that would otherwise wish that films discovered the artistic depths of 
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cinema. With respect to the pursuit of alternative narrative styles, for example, 
Iranian filmmaker Abbas Kiarostami highlights Hollywood’s problematic effects on 
the way we watch films: “… we want to follow everything or we think the film has 
failed” (Baumbach 2014). 
 The wide social acceptance of high-concept cinema is assisted by other 
characteristics of the Hollywood film business. For instance, the Hollywood star 
system is commonly used to develop a film project that can be sold in one or two 
sentences. The use of well-known stars, whose fame has come from repeatedly 
playing certain character types, gives a film a “certain pre-sold identity” (Wyatt 
1994, p.24). By virtue of Tom Cruise or Meryl Streep being cast in a film, we already 
imagine what this film is about, or, at the very least, what it is likely not about. From 
the perspective of major filmed entertainment, our mental associations between 
movie stars and their typical movie roles can be sold back to us. Moreover, major 
filmed entertainment can sabotage the art of filmmaking to guarantee that the 
advertisements of films follow through on their promises. If an advertisement 
suggests that I keep holding on to my idea of what a typical Julia Roberts film is, it is 
also promising that this particular Julia Roberts film, the one being advertised, will 
deliver the goods; it will be what I already expect it to be. 
On this count, high-concept cinema is a variation of what Hollywood has been 
doing for many decades. In the past, the form and content of a typical Hollywood 
film also served to reinforce and solidify the social relations that Hollywood needed 
to extend itself as the most dominant cinematic tradition. For instance, in the 1930s, 
MGM attempted to develop an MGM style that the audience would identify as any 
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film with high production values and a lot of movie stars. Through repetition of this 
“style,” MGM created a feedback loop in which more and more “MGM-type” films 
were made because moviegoers had come to associate aesthetic quality with high 
production values and lots of movie stars (Christensen 2012). Other studios also 
learned how a business-led institution of aesthetic standards was simultaneously an 
ideological and financial strategy. Once, in the words of Maltby, the “fabled 
extravagances of film production” had become “central to the myth of Hollywood 
the Dream Factory,” the ideological predominance of the Hollywood style of cinema 
had “the practical effect of restricting the number of companies which could afford 
to mount A-feature productions” (1983, p.48). Only the major studios could afford to 
produce A-feature productions, and if moviegoers developed a habituated taste for 
nothing but A-feature productions, films with smaller budgets, or even an 
alternative cinematic style, were technically not in competition for the same streams 
of revenues.  
 What sort of empirical evidence can we offer in support of our arguments 
about risk and high-concept filmmaking? Wyatt has his own statistical evidence, and 
his conclusion that “high concept lowers the risk and uncertainty within the movie 
marketplace” reinforces the argument of this section (1994, p.172). Yet Wyatt 
acknowledges that his method carries a statistical bias for high-concept films. Wyatt 
looks at the revenue impacts of a film’s “elements,” as if every film in the dataset 
could be broken down as a production function of inputs. Such elements as “stars, 
bankable director, merchandising tie-ins, and genre,” however, already favour high-
concept cinema’s method of income generation: 
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The modular, packaged high concept films, with marketing hooks inherent in 
the projects, lend themselves to this analytical breakdown. Consequently, it is 
not surprising perhaps that the statistical model illustrates that high concept is 
actually more predictable than other forms of production. The model works 
most successfully with genre-bound, linear narrative and pre-packaged films—
all categories which overlap with high concept.” (Wyatt 1994, p.172) 
 
Instead of retaining the assumptions that underlie Wyatt’s quantitative analysis of 
high-concept “elements,” we can offer an alternative method that treats high 
concept as a world within a larger cinematic universe. As was established in figure 
4.3, U.S. theatrical attendance per capita has remained at roughly the same level for 
over 50 years. If we treat this average moviegoing habit as an outer limit of the 
social world of American cinema, we can then ask how much of the average movie 
consumption (~5 films per year) goes to high-concept films. We can also ask 
whether the general fixation on high-concept films has strengthened over the years. 
If U.S. theatrical attendance per capita of high-concept films has increased, we can 
conclude that these films have a greater degree of social longevity. Concomitantly, 
we can infer that capitalist confidence in high-concept filmmaking has increased—
though, by exactly how much, our method cannot determine. 
 Changes in the share of high concept cinema offer a rough approximation of 
changes in risk perception, to be sure. Yet U.S. theatrical attendance per capita has 
been more or less stable for some time, so an increase in attendance for high-
concept cinema means that this type of film is being substituted for other types of 
films. And if, over the long term, high-concept films are watched with greater 
frequency, that increase suggests that moviegoing habits are locked into a 
narrowing range of film types. Stronger dedication to high-concept filmmaking, even 
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if only in relative terms, speaks to the durability of Hollywood’s social-historical 
foundations, which could always change in light of new creation. 
 Figure 7.1 presents data on U.S. franchise films, a term denoting a film that 
has the copyright to exploit images, characters, environments and stories of 
intellectual property (e.g., James Bond, Ghostbusters, Indiana Jones, Jurassic Park, 
Marvel superheroes, Harry Potter). The intellectual property of a film franchise can 
originate from other media, such as literature, television shows and comic books. 
The production of sequels or “spin-offs” can also create or extend a film franchise. 
Not every high-concept film is a franchise, but all film franchises are high-concept. A 
typical franchise film is reducible to its marketable element, which is often one or 
many of its characters. This marketable element is the franchise film’s essence 
because the franchise is primarily designed to carry its theatrical success to or from 
other channels: television, novels, fast-food chains, toys and video games (Drake 
2008, p.77). Additionally, if a franchise pre-exists its cinematic manifestation, a film 
version of the franchise is its own shorthand advertisement, as the essential idea 
has been pre-sold to its audience through other media. 
 Figure 7.1 shows three series, which are each smoothed as a five-year trailing 
average. The series on the left y-axis measures the per capita attendance of 
franchise films. The other two series present the share of franchise films in major 
filmed entertainment’s total film releases and the share of franchise films in the total 
number of films released in the United States. With respect to major filmed 
entertainment’s releases, the share increase of franchise films after 2000 has 
pushed per capita attendance higher—i.e., the average American moviegoer is still  
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Figure 7.1 Franchise Films, 1980-2011: U.S. Attendance per capita  
and Share of Releases 
 
Note: All series are 5-year trailing averages. 
 
Attendance = total U.S. gross revenues/average US ticket price. 
 
Sources: www.boxofficemojo.com for yearly gross revenues of individual films: 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/franchises/ for franchise films and 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/genres/chart/?id=foreign.htm for foreign language; National 
Association of Theatre Owners for average US ticket price (http://natoonline.org/data/ticket-
price/). Global Insight for total United States population. 
 
 
 
not seeing more films in total, but more of her ~5 films per year goes to the 
franchise films that Hollywood distributes. Relative to the U.S. total number of films, 
franchise cinema continues to be small world in a much larger cinematic universe. 
Increased consumer dedication to this small world corroborates the film criticism of 
Jonathan Rosenbaum (Rosenbaum 1997b; Rosenbaum 2000). As Rosenbaum often 
argues, our collective comfort in the mainstream of Hollywood cinema perpetuates 
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our ignorance of the larger universe of cinema, which is much more expansive than 
we habitually imagine.  
  An audience usually knows what it wants to get out of franchise films, and 
Hollywood, for its part, is committed to delivering it. Only so much originality, or 
even abnormality, is tolerated in a franchise film because there is always a more 
pressing task: the film must touch upon many or all of the established themes and 
images of the franchise in question. Christopher Nolan, for example, injected his love 
of monochromatic visuals and film noir into Batman Begins, The Dark Knight and 
The Dark Knight Rises, which creates a stylistic continuity between these three 
franchise films and his non-franchise projects, such as The Following or Memento. 
However, the key elements of the Batman universe are nevertheless given primacy 
in Nolan’s Batman trilogy. A Batman film without the Batmobile, the Batcave and the 
Bat-Signal is taboo. It is also never a cliché to re-use the villains of previous Batman 
films: the Joker, Bane and Two-Face.  
  To get a better sense of how American cinematic habits are narrowing, we 
need to answer the following question: what is the average American not watching? 
Figure 7.2 compares franchise films to another series, U.S. theatrical attendance per 
capita for foreign-language films. Here the difference is stark. U.S. theatrical 
attendance per capita for franchise films is currently above 1, and there is still a lot 
of room for growth. By comparison, foreign-language films are not even in 
competition for American attendance; they are generally ignored and relegated to a 
minor league. U.S. attendance per capita for foreign-language films is so low that 
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only a small proportion of Americans bother to see even one foreign-language film 
per year. 
  
 
Figure 7.2 Franchise Films versus Foreign Language Films: 
U.S. Attendance per capita 
 
Note: Each series is a 5-year trailing average. 
 
Attendance = total U.S. gross revenues/average US ticket price. 
 
Sources: www.boxofficemojo.com for yearly gross revenues of individual films: 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/franchises/ for franchise films and 
http://www.boxofficemojo.com/genres/chart/?id=foreign.htm for foreign language; National 
Association of Theatre Owners for average US ticket price (http://natoonline.org/data/ticket-
price/). Global Insight for total United States population. 
 
 
 
Some readers might already know this last fact about the unpopularity of 
foreign-language films in America. However, when examined more closely, low 
American attendance for foreign-language films says something important on the 
degree of confidence of major filmed entertainment. First, there have been four mini 
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flashes of a relative increase in American attendance for foreign-language films: 
1998, 2000, 2004 and 2006. Interestingly, these moments do not signal a threat to 
major filmed entertainment. These short-term increases were the result of four 
films that were distributed by major filmed entertainment’s subsidiaries. The films, 
distributors and the corporate parents of the distributors are Life is Beautiful (1998, 
Miramax, at the time owned by Disney), Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000, Sony 
Pictures Classics, Sony), Hero (2004, Miramax) and Pan’s Labyrinth (2006, 
Picturehouse, Time Warner). All four films are part of Hollywood’s aggressive-but-
common strategy to invest and over-inflate the artistic merits of only a few foreign-
language films per year. Life is Beautiful, Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Pan’s 
Labyrinth won awards at the Golden Globes and the Oscars, and distributors like 
Miramax and Sony Pictures Classics have been known for stubbornly preferring 
foreign-language films that can be easily tailored for the tastes of North American 
audiences (McDonald 2009). 
 Second, the trend of the foreign-language series in Figure 7.2, however short, 
suggests that major filmed entertainment can be quite confident about what its 
potential consumers are unlikely to watch. Long-term disinterest in foreign-
language films, be they German, French or Hindi, is stable; foreign-language films do 
not threaten the amount of attention and hype that is given to Hollywood’s franchise 
films. Thus, the existence of foreign-language films is not a barrier to the continued, 
and possibly intensified, strategy of making more and more franchise films. This 
point is, oddly enough, an extension of what was just said about the few foreign-
language films that major filmed entertainment has taken an interest in. In the time 
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since Hero and Pan’s Labyrinth, major filmed entertainment has closed some of its 
independent, more artistically-minded cinema divisions (Ortner 2013) and the 
budget range of $20 million to $85 million has become, says Steven Soderbergh, a 
“dead zone.” It is possible for an art film to find financing below $20 million—
although even that might be too generous—but a budget above $85 million is not 
even a conceivable possibility. “Above the 85 range you’re into sort of the physically 
big movies that probably have movie stars in them or have some high concept 
behind them that they can sell” (Soderbergh 2010, p.62). 
 Figures 7.1 and 7.2 stand as historical evidence that the subject-object 
relationship between consumer and Hollywood film is ripe for reification. Here, 
Adorno’s argument about the repetitive cycle of a type of music listening can be 
applied to franchise cinema: 
Aesthetic norms that are said to correspond to the perceiving subject’s 
invariant forms of reaction are empirically invalid; thus the academic 
psychology is false that, in opposing new music, propounds that the ear is 
unable to perceive highly complex tonal phenomena that deviate too far from 
the natural overtone relations: There is no disputing that there are individuals 
who have this capacity and there is no reason why everyone should not be able 
to have it; the limitations are not transcendental but social, those of second 
nature. If an empirically oriented aesthetics uses quantitative averages as 
norms, it unconsciously sides with social conformity. What such an aesthetics 
classifies as pleasing or painful is never a sensual given of nature but something 
performed by society as a whole, by what it sanctions and censors, and this has 
always been challenged by artistic production. (Adorno 1997, p.267) 
  
Before High Concept 
 
Figures 7.1 and 7.2 corroborate the argument that high concept helps 
increase major filmed entertainment’s degree of confidence because it has become a 
socially acceptable style. However, it is still possible to continue pondering why 
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high-concept cinema, of all possible cinematic styles, is related to the risk-reduction 
strategies of major filmed entertainment. Why is this style of cinema an effective 
component in risk reduction?   
It would be an exaggeration to state that high concept was, logically, the only 
aesthetic style capable of helping major filmed entertainment reduce risk from 1980 
onwards. Yet we can pinpoint the importance of high-concept aesthetics another 
way. The institution of high-concept filmmaking is, as a particular risk-reduction 
strategy, the product of a two-stage process that began in the late 1960s. By briefly 
looking at Hollywood cinema during the American New Wave years, from roughly 
1968 to 1977, we can see that the Hollywood film business purposefully instituted 
high-concept filmmaking in order to negate ambiguity and indeterminacy as 
filmmaking techniques. In comparison to the style of cinema it superseded, high-
concept filmmaking was a much more suitable aesthetic style for saturation booking 
and contemporary marketing efforts. Overall, major filmed entertainment used 
high-concept filmmaking to go back to what Hollywood does best: sustain a social 
world of cinema through repetition and sameness. In comparison to American New 
Wave, high-concept films affirm, with much greater intensity, what Adorno and 
Horkheimer would describe as the schema of mass culture. 
  
The Aesthetic Dimension and the Auteurism of American New Wave 
 
 American New Wave is associated with the period of institutional rebirth, 
when out of the ashes of the crumbled studio system came the phoenix of “New 
Hollywood.” A partial list of New Hollywood filmmakers includes Hal Ashby, Robert 
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Altman, Peter Bogdonovich, John Cassavetes, Francis Ford Coppola, Sidney Lumet, 
Arthur Penn and Bob Rafelson. What these filmmakers have in common is a 
composite of two influences. American New Wave was predominantly European in 
form and American in content. With respect to form, the aesthetic of New 
Hollywood was imported from European cinema of the fifties and sixties—e.g., 
lengthy shots, location shooting, handheld cameras, the use of natural light and a 
grainy colour palette achieved through the exposure of film negatives. Its stories 
were also character driven and the plot, often non-linear, was typically used to 
explore a political issue conceptually.  
 European art cinema has had a small but stable place in American 
consumerism since the 1920s (Guzman 2005), but in the business environment of 
New Hollywood, European New Wave cinema actually had a direct influence on 
mainstream American film production. Essentially, many of the artistic techniques 
of European New Wave were consciously mixed with the content of American 
society. An American New Wave film does not always make explicit references to 
Vietnam, President Nixon, civil rights or the Women’s Liberation Movement and the 
sexual revolution, but the Hollywood film business hired many young and 
previously inexperienced directors because they had the eyes and ears for an 
America that was in the midst of social and political upheaval. In fact, to the extent 
that youth in America were developing a “new sensibility” in the 1960s and 1970s 
(Marcuse 1969), some American filmmakers had chances to practice a form of 
auteur filmmaking in the Hollywood system. As Cook notes, “the studios’ 
transitional managers briefly turned the reigns of creative power to a rising 
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generation of independents and first-time directors” because their “values seemed 
to resonate with the newly emerging ‘youth culture’ market” (Cook 2000, p.156).  
 However monumental the rise of American New Wave was, its aesthetic and 
commercial successes were eventually overshadowed by the rapidity of its death. 
Around 1980, it had become clear that major filmed entertainment’s embrace of 
New Wave cinema would only ever be an exception to Hollywood’s usual aesthetic 
style.1 What had changed? Why was this aesthetic movement, which appeared to be 
temporarily loved by investors and critics alike, suddenly buried as a brief 
experiment in the long history of Hollywood cinema?   
 The quantitative research of Chapters 4 and 6 already gives us part of the 
answer. As Figure 4.2 shows, the differential profits of major filmed entertainment 
were highest in the 1970s (at least for the roughly 50 years for which data are 
available). Yet the relatively high volatilities of earnings (Figure 6.2) and of 
attendance for the same period (Figure 6.5) are indicators that risk was a serious 
issue for major filmed entertainment. That these volatilities of profits and 
attendance were sharply reduced in the 1980s is no coincidence. In the twilight of 
American New Wave, the delicate balance between auteur filmmaking and studio 
management had, after almost a decade of functioning well, suddenly tipped over 
and smashed to pieces, having been replaced by the far less risky high-concept style. 
                                                        
1 Some of the works of David Bordwell and Kristin Thompson could be combined and stand as one 
long study of Hollywood’s general aesthetic style, with the auteur movement in the 1970s being the 
lone exception. For studies of Hollywood’s classical style, see Bordwell & Thompson (1993) and 
Bordwell et al. (1985). For a study of Hollywood’s neoclassical style, which was established in the 
1980s, see Bordwell (2006). 
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A brief summary of Marcuse’s theory of the aesthetic dimension will enable 
us to frame this process. His theory orients us to the form-content question in 
aesthetics, which in turn allows us to highlight the aspect of American New Wave 
that was such a problem from the late 1970s onwards. American New Wave was 
risky for business not simply because its artists addressed or were inspired by 
political issues of the 1960s, from America’s war in Vietnam to the social 
movements that were organizing themselves in cities like Washington, New York 
and Chicago. Rather, it was risky because young filmmakers were using the spirit of 
the times to reimagine the industrial practices of filmmaking and to take the form-
content relationship of aesthetics very seriously—and that shift in industry 
threatened to undermine the control of business. In fact, when major filmed 
entertainment was ready to steer the film industry towards high-concept 
filmmaking, the aesthetic spirit of New Wave cinema had become an obstacle that 
needed to be pushed to the outskirts of American filmmaking.  
As Marcuse argues, the form-content problem in art is the responsibility of 
the artist. It is the unity of the form and content that gives an artwork the “power to 
break the monopoly of established reality (i.e., of those who established it) to define 
what is real.” There is certainly a multitude of artistic styles to choose from, but 
great artworks of various styles demonstrate the same point: “… aesthetic form, 
autonomy and truth are related” (Marcuse 1978, p.9). For Marcuse, this common 
denominator lies beneath different styles of artistic representation because, in each 
case, the artist is deciding how to represent the essence of reality “through 
estrangement.” Thus, tackling the form-content problem is a crucial step in the 
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production of “critical mimesis,” which works with the content of established reality 
but has the power to make the invisible visible and the familiar unfamiliar. For 
example, “mimesis in literature occurs in the medium of language; it is tightened or 
loosened, forced to yield insights otherwise obscured. Prose is subjected to its own 
rhythm. What is normally not spoken is said; what is normally spoken too much 
remains unsaid if it conceals that which is essential” (Marcuse 1978, p.45). 
Therefore, form is what gives historical content “aesthetic meaning and function” 
and once formed, the content of an artwork is “re-presented” as something in need 
of conscious re-examination. 
This artistic ideal is fundamentally social: “in its very elements (word, color, 
tone) art depends on the transmitted cultural material; art shares it with the 
existing society” (Marcuse 1978, p.41). American New Wave tried to let the light of 
this social-artistic ideal shine with great intensity. It was trying to establish a form 
of filmmaking that, as art, was able to represent the estrangement of the ideal from 
the real. A New Hollywood film like The Friends of Eddie Coyle, for example, extols 
happiness and fulfillment as human needs, but this message only comes across in 
the negative, as a repressed ideal: the amelioration of life is not possible in the 
present, in social conditions where friends are not really friends at all (Kirshner 
2012). 
Looking at the form-content relationship reveals the qualitative change 
brought on by American New Wave. The content of a New Hollywood film, while 
often pushing the envelope with regards to how much sex and violence could be 
shown in a mainstream film, is only half the story. In fact, the freedom for an 
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American filmmaker to show more adult-oriented content on the silver screen was 
gained in the 1950s, when both the U.S. Supreme Court granted First Amendment 
rights to films distributed in the United States and the Hays Production Code 
effectively died.2 The other half of the story was the form of American New Wave. It 
was aesthetically powerful because it was trying to reveal the ambiguity and 
indeterminacy of the content: an American society that was in turmoil since its 
established values were losing legitimacy.  
At least for the filmmakers themselves, New Hollywood was an opportunity 
to make cinema political without shamelessly appropriating the news of the day or 
“hot-topic” subjects like gender, race, class and the rights of the individual. Rather, 
the point was to develop a style of cinema that could focus on, rather than gloss 
over, the moral ambiguity, complexity and difficulty of being a citizen in an unequal 
society that only paid lip service to the universal ideals of life, liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness.3 New Hollywood cinema was fundamentally about the political: it 
found ways to look at the different processes, decisions and rationalizations that go 
                                                        
2 The collapse of the Hays Code was the result of more and more films, like those of Otto Preminger 
and Alfred Hitchcock, being released without a PCA seal of approval. A Supreme Court decision was 
also handed down in Burstyn v. Wilson, which dealt with the attempt to ban The Miracle (the first part 
of Rossellini’s L’Amore) in New York for being “sacrilegious.” Explicit representations of sex and 
violence in Hollywood cinema continue to this day, while the form of New Hollywood films has 
vanished. Indeed, American New Wave cinema was never just about blood and nudity. Directors like 
Arthur Penn and Sam Peckinpah mixed their flair for violence and sexuality with the formal 
influences of European art cinema. For more details about the granting of First Amendment rights to 
motion pictures and the abandonment of the PCA seal of approval, see Kunz (2007, p.21). 
3 Of all these terms, “ambiguity” may be the key one. For instance, David Newman and Robert Benton, 
the writers of Bonnie and Clyde, declared that filmmakers in the late 1960s had good reasons to let 
ambiguous meaning roam free: “It is safe to assume… cinema lends itself to such a variety of 
interpretations because visual images tend to be more ambiguous than words in a book. The director 
can make his setup and call his shot, but you might get a fix on a table lamp in the corner of the frame 
and decide that’s the real meaning of the image…. This quest for ambiguity has, to a great extent, 
been encouraged by filmmakers in the last few years. Odd juxtapositions of subject matter or of 
images themselves have been so freely used that audiences have become educated to expect the 
shattering of ‘continuity’” (quoted in Christensen 2012, p.250). 
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into the institution of a social order. This artistic study of the political is what leads 
Kirshner to state that New Hollywood was truly an “adult” cinema. It was in this 
brief period that we found, in mainstream American filmmaking, “characters with 
morally complex choices, not necessarily between right and wrong, but made by 
imperfect people trying to find the best alternative from the menu of compromised 
choices that circumstances have made available to them” (Kirshner 2012, p.21).  
As a type of “adult” film, New Hollywood cinema showed, for example, more 
explicit sexuality than had hitherto been shown in mainstream American cinema. 
Yet, argues Kirshner, greater amounts of “frank sexuality (admittedly at times 
vulnerable to the charge of pandering and titillation) were embraced as an 
important vehicle for exploring characters’ challenges and complexity, and 
acknowledging that sex and gender are inescapable elements of adult relationships” 
(Kirshner 2012, p.21). Moreover, many American auteurs of the 1960s and 1970s 
were purposefully and consciously trying to counterbalance the affirmative 
character of cinema. Since the cinematic image has a technological capacity to, with 
good-looking people, the right lighting and excellent picture quality, make almost 
anything look beautiful, New Wave filmmakers avoided any style that would give the 
facts of a bad reality a smooth gloss and sparkle.  
Consequently, American filmmakers such as Scorsese, De Palma and Altman 
used cinematic form to deepen the moral and ideological incongruities of a complex 
narrative (Wyatt 1994, p.34). As Berliner notes about Nashville, Altman’s film is not 
complex just because it has a lot of main characters—24, to be exact. The style of 
Nashville gives the interwoven narratives a political quality. By making a multitude 
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of characters move in and out of the same scene, or by using parallel editing 
techniques to have different lifestyles and attitudes collide into one another, Altman 
reveals that many of the characters are inconsistent in their motivations and 
actions. In fact, Altman’s lengthy presentation of these inconsistencies does not let 
the moviegoer use cinema to escape from real social antagonisms that lie outside of 
the movie theatre (or, in the twenty-first century, the living room) (Berliner 2011). 
Speaking about the form-content relationship in protest films such as 
Medium Cool, Peter Lloyd states: “No engagement with the subject-matter can be 
possible if the ‘style’ is directed towards… superficial ends, without any sense of 
structure or the organic relation of every frame to the total conception of the movie 
itself” (quoted in Wyatt 1994, p.34). As was the case for Haskell Wexler, the director 
of Medium Cool, the artistic sincerity of American New Wave was often the result of 
“auteur filmmaking,” which is an idea that was first instituted by French New Wave.  
Originally articulated by Francois Truffaut in 1954, the fundamental idea of auteur 
filmmaking was that the director was the principal author of a film (Kirshner 2012, 
p.28). “Principal author,” not sole author—there are many branches of filmmaking 
(costume, lighting, design, makeup, sound, film scoring), and on professional films 
copyright law and trade union regulations require that the contributions of these 
branches are credited by name (MacCabe 2003, p.36). However, the philosophy of 
auteur cinema gives the film director principal authorship because directors have 
the exceptional task of having to express, on film, their attitudes about the visual 
amalgamation of all the content being used. Thus, as Andrew Sarris describes, the 
job of the director is to take in everything that goes into a cinematic image—
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“cutting, camera movement, pacing, the direction of players and their placement in 
the décor, the angle and distance of the camera, and even the content of the shot” 
(2003, p.27).  
Auteur cinema does not praise film direction as such, but directors who take 
responsibility for their creative role in a medium that is primarily visual.4 This 
aesthetic principle was antithetical to the corporate structure of film production in 
the first half of the twentieth century, when directors traditionally were attached to 
film projects late in the creative process. It was often the case that in the studio 
system the director joined a film project that had already been “imagined” by 
others—e.g., the project had already been written by a screenwriter who had been 
hired to shape the preliminary visions of a producer or a studio executive (Bordwell 
et al. 1985; Balio 1993). Consequently, the idea of creative control was being turned 
on its head when, for instance, Robert Newman and David Benton, the screenwriters 
of Bonnie and Clyde, publicly extolled the role of the director: “… if there is one thing 
we learned beyond any question in the movie business it is this: once there is a 
director, he is the boss” (quoted in Christensen 2012, p.257). 
  
The Party is Over 
 
 Capitalist interests were certainly never wholly absent from the production 
of American New Wave films—in fact, the logic of capitalist investment always, at 
some level, needed to instrumentalize what was being filmed for profit, the ultimate 
                                                        
4 Who exactly these directors are is a matter of debate, subject to time and place. But some names 
kept coming up when auteur cinema was first articulated: Chabrol, Ford, Godard, Hawks, Hitchcock, 
Mizoguchi, Ray, Renoir, Resnais, Rivette and Rossellini. 
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end of any capitalist endeavour. Yet by the end of the 1970s, the industrial practices 
of American New Wave had become a severe irritant to major filmed entertainment. 
The instrumentalization of American New Wave filmmakers had grown to be 
difficult, especially in comparison to less “resistant” filmmaking techniques.  
 In the golden years of American New Wave—from about 1968 to 1975—the 
balance between business and industry could be considered mutually beneficial.5 
Many filmmakers were able to, for example, acquire autonomous creative control—
from project approval to final cut—but only as long as they kept within the budgets 
that were decided upon by the respective studios. Woody Allen, an auteur in his own 
right, but not necessarily associated with New Hollywood cinema, was able to 
negotiate this freedom to do whatever he wanted with United Artists as long as he 
stayed on budget (Bach 1985, p.51). Similarly, the six-picture deal between 
Columbia and BBS productions, the production house that made Easy Rider, 
stipulated that Columbia would only keep its hands off development and production 
if all budgets stayed under $1 million (Cook 2000, p.109). The needs of business 
were also expressed negatively, when studios sometimes made it clear they were 
not necessarily open to any form of American New Wave. For instance, the $600,000 
deal between Francis Ford Coppola’s film development project, American Zoetrope, 
and Warner Bros. was abruptly cancelled after the latter was thoroughly displeased 
                                                        
5 The golden years of New Hollywood exemplify Schumpeter’s theory of creative destruction. 
Schumpeter’s theory, however, depends on the repetition of creative destruction, which has 
disappeared since Hollywood became comfortable with saturation booking and blockbuster cinema. 
See Chapter 3 and our brief commentary on Schumpeter and the creative instability hypothesis (Earl 
& Potts 2013). 
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with the rough cut of the first Zoetrope project, George Lucas’s THX-1138 (Cook 
2000, p.135).  
 Even this relative creative autonomy, however, became too costly by the end 
of the 1970s. At the time of American New Wave’s twilight, blockbuster cinema was 
proving to be the next major strategy of Hollywood. Auteur-inspired films such as 
Barry Lyndon, New York, New York, Sorcerer, Apocalypse Now and One From the 
Heart had budgets the size of some contemporaneous blockbusters, but the style 
and substance of these particular films were far more esoteric.  These films fell well 
below their financial expectations, and the blame for budget overruns fell on the 
philosophy of auteurism. Kubrick, for instance, was once praised by Warner Bros. 
management for keeping the production of his films on budget and schedule, but the 
huge cost of Barry Lyndon was the effect of shooting the film on location in Ireland 
and Kubrick’s obsession with achieving an extremely detailed visual representation 
of English aristocratic life in the eighteenth century. Similarly for Terrence Malick, 
the production of Days of Heaven ran well over schedule because many of its 
beautiful long shots could only be achieved in the light of each day’s “magic hour,” 
the brief period when, during a sunrise or sunset, the top of the sun is just above the 
horizon (Cook 2000).      
 Perhaps the greatest impetus for instituting stricter controls over the pace 
and direction of Hollywood filmmaking was the production and distribution of 
Heaven’s Gate, one of Hollywood’s infamous financial disasters. Inspired by the 
Johnson County War of 1892, Michael Cimino’s film was an ambitious portrayal of 
the conflict between the big and small players of the American frontier. With much 
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of the film shot on location in Montana, Cimino was obsessive about every detail 
that went into the story of cattle barons, the Wyoming Stock Growers Association, 
conspiring to kill settlers who, because of poverty, rustled cattle. Cimino’s repeated 
demands to reconstruct sets, shoot multiple takes for virtually every shot and delay 
the daily shooting schedule in wait for potentially more beautiful shots ballooned 
the production budget to $30 million, up from the planned $11 million. At the end of 
shooting, there were over 1 million feet of footage, which is over 200 hours of 
running time.  
 Having lost Woody Allen to the newly formed Orion Pictures, United Artists 
hired Cimino on the hopes that Heaven’s Gate would match the success of The Deer 
Hunter, a winner of five Academy Awards and Cimino’s first film. By the time 
Heaven’s Gate was actually released in 1980—Cimino cut and re-cut the film himself 
in post-production—United Artists had the task of advertising and distributing a 
film that was 3 hours and 39 minutes long and which ultimately cost $44 million to 
produce and distribute. The domestic sales for its theatrical release were roughly 
$3.5 million.6 On top of being unsuccessful financially, Heaven’s Gate won little to no 
critical acclaim during its initial theatrical run. All it ever became in the initial years 
of its release was the ultimate reason for Transamerica to sell United Artists to MGM 
in 1981.7 In addition, Cimino himself became the public face of massive egotism and 
uncontrollable creativity in a Hollywood system that could no longer tame its own 
                                                        
6 For more on the Heaven’s Gate fiasco, see (Bach 1985; Cook 2000). 
7 “Gosh,” said John Beckett, the CEO of Transamerica, “the reason we bought the darn company in the 
first place was we hoped it would have some effect on the Transamerica stock, and it never has [sic]. I 
don't know why. Paramount gooses Gulf and Western, and Universal pushes up MCA…. That’s a 
shame because, the stock ought to reflect your success” (Bach 1985, p.25). 
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directors—Francis Ford Coppola being one of the other well-publicized examples 
(Corrigan 2003, pp.102–108). 
 The sector-wide impact of Heaven’s Gate is addressed in Steven Bach’s 
memoir. As one of the United Artists vice-presidents involved with the financing and 
theatrical distribution of Heaven’s Gate, Bach attempts to draw conclusions that are 
relevant to the business of Hollywood as a whole: 
Movies matter. Because they do, and because they are created and 
manufactured in both artistic and industrial contexts, their costs matter, too. 
Signs that costs are once again escalating wildly and could one day make movies 
simply a prohibitively expensive “luxury” should be deeply sobering to those 
who care about them and most sobering of all to those who make them, the 
auteurs and artists whose assiduous pursuit of final cut or this or that other 
contractual advantage is a meaningless, even destructive luxury unless 
accompanied by the salutary force of discipline which no union, management, 
or conglomerate can impose. Like art, it comes from within. (Bach 1985, p.416) 
 
Having worked with Cimino directly, Bach’s memoir remains partly sympathetic to 
the aesthetic goals of Heaven’s Gate. He is also clear that before production began, 
Bach and the rest of United Artists management wanted Cimino to ambitiously make 
an artistic masterpiece like his other film, The Deer Hunter. Yet Bach’s conclusion on 
the Heaven’s Gate fiasco also speaks to the changing attitude of management and 
investors, who were suddenly in no mood to deal with the “next Cimino,” whoever 
that may be.  
 High concept contributed to the death of American New Wave because it, 
through its general application, created a dialectical opposite for business concerns 
to identify why films like Heaven’s Gate were such bad investments. These films 
were so-called “low concept.” Take, for instance, the words of Dawn Steel, former 
president of Columbia Pictures: 
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[The movie business in 1978] was all about capturing the spirit of the times 
with high-concept pictures geared to the youth audience—movies whose 
themes could be explained in a sentence or two. These were movies like 
Saturday Night Fever that were, as they were called at the time, critic-proof, so 
that they could bypass all the old ways of thinking. Following this premise, 
those films which are high concept could be matched by marketing campaigns 
that accurately represent their content, while marketing for low concept films 
would be more problematic, since the marketing, which inevitably operates 
through a reduction of the film’s narrative, misrepresents the film as a whole. 
(Quoted in Wyatt 1994, p.9) 
 
As Steel and other executives began to yearn for films that could be marketed in a 
straightforward manner, the ambiguity and complexity of many New Hollywood 
films began to be judged according to their perceived inability to fit the mould of 
high-concept cinema. Steel is right to imply that some films, by virtue of their style 
and content, cannot be reduced to one or two sentences; but this was now, in 1978, a 
problem in serious need of a “solution.”  
 The rise and fall of Robert Altman’s career in Hollywood reflects the changing 
attitude toward American New Wave. In the first half of the 1970s his films were 
acclaimed for being imaginative, self-reflexive approaches to film genre and other 
staples of Hollywood storytelling. McCabe and Mrs. Miller is an anti-Western 
Western. Played by Warren Beatty, John McCabe is stubborn, but his stubbornness 
in the face of an encroaching mining company, a much larger foe, is not presented as 
a courageous virtue. Rather, McCabe is a bumbling character, unsure as to why, in 
the first generation of American trusts and cartels, he holds so strongly to the myth 
of the small entrepreneur (Shapiro 2008, p.58). Altman himself said that that the 
point of McCabe and Mrs. Miller was to turn “a number of Western conventions on 
their sides,” such as “male dominance and the heroic standoff; gunplay is a solution 
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only after reputation, wit, and nonviolent coercion fail; and law and order do not 
always prevail” (quoted in Shapiro 2008, p.55).  
 Altman’s The Long Goodbye, a film adaptation of a Philip Marlowe detective 
novel, is a neo-noir detective story fit for the American social consciousness of the 
1970s. As Kirshner argues, Altman fought for and kept the revisionist ending of The 
Long Goodbye, where, unlike in Raymond Chandler’s novel, Marlowe (played by 
Elliot Gould) kills his friend, Lennox. Altman’s intention was to indict the “times he 
was living in. In the 1970s, not only was the world corrupt, but also there was no 
sanctuary to be found through the shared understanding of [a moral] code” 
(Kirshner 2012, p.173).  
 The dissonance between the aesthetic and commercial value of Altman’s 
Nashville symbolizes the changing perceptions of “low-concept” films best. For its 
cultural and political value to the community at large, Nashville is excellent because 
it is so ambitious. With its ensemble cast of 24 characters, the film follows multiple 
storylines, yet impressively reserves over one hour for musical performances. As 
Molly Haskell argues, Nashville has, with respect to cinematic ambition,  
no successors except Altman’s own films—it was simply too complicated, too 
ambitious, too original in its improvisatory style, its huge cast, in other words, 
too inimitable. Think of it: twenty-four main characters—singers, musicians, 
wannabes, hangers-on—orbiting around the Grand Ole Opry and its satellite 
clubs, wandering into one another’s lives and limelight; twenty-four actors, free 
to work up their own material but staying in character through long crowd 
scenes, never knowing whether the camera was on them or not, never knowing 
whether what they sang or said would end up in the final cut. (Haskell 2013) 
 
However, under the gaze of a film business that was, in 1975, beginning to prefer 
simpler, more straightforward films, Nashville malfunctioned financially. It became 
the typical “low-concept” film. Marketing-wise, the film had too many characters 
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and no single narrative to advertise. The original poster featured photos of the 
entire main cast of 24 characters. The advertising copy ignored the narrative and 
the complex social and political themes, and instead suggested that the consumer 
would feel an array of emotions because the film was “wild, wonderful, sinful, 
laughing [sic], explosive.” In contrast, this type of marketing problem did not affect 
Jaws, which was released in the same year as Nashville. The style, imagery and story 
of Jaws could be reduced “to a single marketing image without severe distortion, or 
oversimplification.” The iconic poster of Jaws, one of the first high-concept films in 
Hollywood, is not just clever marketing. The single image of an enormous shark 
approaching a woman swimming in the ocean is an adequate representation of what 
Jaws is all about (Wyatt 1994, p.117).  
 
 
 
The Hegemony of High Concept 
 
For the period when major filmed entertainment was willing to give anti-
Establishment youth of America what they wanted, the artistic principles of auteur 
filmmaking were less of a business nuisance. For instance, Jack Warner and the rest 
of the Warner Bros. management originally hated almost everything about Bonnie 
and Clyde, but the corporate mood in Hollywood momentarily changed when the 
film became the first of many commercial successes for American New Wave 
(Christensen 2012). And like the American New Wave films that followed on its 
heels, the writers and directors of Bonnie and Clyde were useful to business 
enterprise because they had access to social pipelines that were virtually invisible to 
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out-of-touch studio heads: European New Wave cinema, the American New Left, the 
Hippie movement, civil rights, women’s liberation and a generational desire among 
young Americans to opt-out of the social structures they were supposed to inherit 
from their parents and grandparents.  
Because American New Wave’s main source of inspiration was the cultural 
and political transformations of the late 1960s and early 1970s, it is certainly 
possible that this cinematic movement would have faded anyways, as the norms and 
values of America became more conservative by the beginning of the 1980s. And as 
Todd Berliner notes, it is common for academic literature to focus on the content of 
American New Wave, which is then connected to the “ideological conflicts and social 
upheavals of the era” (2011, p.16). But while certainly important, this focus on the 
ideological content of American New Wave is still too narrow. By neglecting the 
form of American New Wave filmmaking, especially the form-content relationship, a 
one-sided view misses the part of the story that explains how Hollywood’s shift 
from counterculture to high concept was also an effect of strategic sabotage.  
Beneath the visible shift from a critical American New Wave to an affirmative high-
concept cinema was a structural, more subterranean shift in the ways in which 
major filmed entertainment sabotaged filmmaking. This shift took place in the 
institutional “asthenosphere” of film production, which is beneath the “lithosphere” 
of Hollywood aesthetics.  
 By looking at some of the institutional conditions surrounding the rise of 
high concept, we can make some connections between Hollywood’s style of cinema 
and the pecuniary interests of major filmed entertainment. In fact, the “what might 
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have been?” question—namely, “what if the political and aesthetic principles of New 
Wave filmmaking had remained mainstream for many more decades?”—should 
flare in our minds because the social and political issues of modern civilization are 
reified just a bit more when the critical potential of cinema, and other mediums of 
mass culture, is being deflated by the pressures of business.8  
 If major filmed entertainment had no institutional means to sabotage the art 
of filmmaking, the synchronization of creative output in film production with 
Hollywood’s distribution and exhibition strategies would be beyond the control of 
capitalists. But with the institutional means to sabotage the art of filmmaking, as we 
will elaborate further, major filmed entertainment has been able to incorporate 
high-concept cinema in its greater project of reducing risk through blockbuster 
cinema and saturation booking. The power of the Hollywood film business over the 
social creativity of filmmaking mitigates the threat that, over time, the social 
relations of high-concept cinema will be undermined by a cultural-political project 
of autonomy.  
 The telos of a typical high-concept film is to produce the elements mentioned 
above—character types, simple narrative and superficial imagery—and institutional 
power is the efficient cause of making high concept become a cinematic movement. 
To appropriate Marcuse’s insights into the dialectical quality of persistence in 
historical time, the identity of high-concept cinema is “only the continuous negation” 
                                                        
8 For example, income inequality and crime and punishment in the United States more or less rose in 
tandem from 1980 to 2000 (Bichler & Nitzan 2014). And aside from RoboCop (1987), there are no 
mainstream Hollywood films that, without resorting to allegory, present the systemic causes and 
effects of crime in the contemporary era. Beyond the mainstream, I can think of only two American 
films where it is argued that crime in United States is structural: Repo Man and Homicide. 
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of any cinematic style that opposes its essence. In other words, American New Wave 
is in the oppositional camp; it is “other than” high concept.  
 Two institutional characteristics of Hollywood have, on the one hand, 
enabled high concept to persist for so many years after the fall of American New 
Wave, and, on the other, foreclosed the possibility that another radical auteurism 
will sprout up in an era in which Hollywood has lost its tolerance for an autonomous 
film industry. The first characteristic is the intensification of the continuity style, 
which, for the Hollywood film business, is closely entangled with the second 
characteristic, the rights of ownership in American copyright law. 
  
Intensified Continuity 
 
 What David Bordwell (2006) calls “intensified continuity” is the 
contemporary version of what classical Hollywood cinema often used to make the 
temporal and spatial construction of each film coherent. Classical continuity 
techniques involved “opening a scene with master shots, handling it through 
matched shot/reverse-shot coverage, going in [with close-ups] to underscore a 
point” (2006, p.161). Intensified continuity adopts these techniques and the 
“classical precepts of Hollywood spatial construction: break the dramatic 
interaction into segments according to the dramatic curve, keep eyelines and 
posture coherent so that we always understand who is looking at whom” (2006, 
p.161).  But as the name suggests, intensified continuity also heightens the classical 
Hollywood style by using “rapid editing, bipolar extremes of lens lengths, reliance 
on close shots, and wide-ranging camera movements” (2006, p.121). 
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 Average shot length (ASL) is a partial indication of the continuity style 
(Bordwell 2006, pp.121–124). Figure 7.3 demonstrates that the era of high concept 
(1980-present) has also been one of intensified continuity. The figure uses the ASL 
data provided by Barry Salt, whose Cinemetrics software allows interested 
researchers to create their own ASL database. Salt’s data are certainly not 
exhaustive, but they offer an excellent start.9 The series in the figure is the mean ASL 
for every five-year block of American films, starting in 1915. The mean ASL for all 
American films in the data set (7.68 seconds) shows us that the period of 1965 to 
2009 is entirely below the historical average.  
 Aesthetically, intensified continuity is a temporal and spatial cinematic style 
that does not interfere with the types of characters, narrative style and imagery of 
high-concept cinema. “When every shot is short,” writes Bordwell (2006, p.124), 
“when establishing shots are brief or postponed or nonexistent, the eyelines and 
angles in a dialogue need to be even more unambiguous, and the axis of action is 
likely to be respected quite strictly.” Is it a coincidence that “in the 1980s the tempo 
[of Hollywood cinema] continued to pick up” and “double-digit ASLs, still found 
during the 1970s, virtually vanished from mass-entertainment cinema” (2006, 
p.122)?  
 The intensity of this continuity style is also important to the business-
industry relationship in contemporary Hollywood cinema. The large number of 
                                                        
9 Because Salt has made his Cinemetrics software publicly available, the website 
http://www.cinemetrics.lv/ has data that have been added by others. For the time being, I am only 
using Salt’s own data (http://www.cinemetrics.lv/satltdb.php#asl) because there is yet to develop a 
standard methodology that allows the data of different people to merge into one large Cinemetrics 
database. Consequently, it is likely that users might rely disproportionately on the data of one 
person. However, Salt not only offers the largest data set made by one person, he has also published 
on his methodology and how it came about. 
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Figure 7.3 Average Shot Length in American Cinema, 1915-2009 
 
Note: All of the available data was sorted into bins of five years (e.g., 1915-1919, 1920-1924,etc.) 
 
Source: Barry Salt’s Cinemetrics data (http://www.cinemetrics.lv/satltdb.php#asl). 
 
 
 
quick shots contained in an average Hollywood film since the 1980s relies heavily, 
Bordwell argues, on a set pattern of shooting and editing techniques, all of which are 
designed to achieve a tighter degree of coherence and continuity. As an extreme 
form of cutting between multiple quick shots, intensified continuity exploits, for the 
vested interests of Hollywood, what Bazin thought was deficient about montage 
techniques:  
Through the contents of the image and the resources of montage, the cinema 
has at its disposal a whole arsenal of means whereby to impose its 
interpretation of an event on the spectator. (Bazin 2005a, p.26)  
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In analyzing reality, montage presupposes of its very nature the unity of 
meaning of the dramatic event…. In short, montage by its very nature rules out 
ambiguity of expression. (Bazin 2005a, p.36)  
 
When films are not comprised of constant cutting between quick shots, cinema is 
capable of producing ambiguity and non-identity in the subject-object relationship 
of moviegoer and film. For Bazin, the works of Orson Welles and Italian neorealism 
are examples of how the absence of montage can “give back to the cinema a sense of 
the ambiguity of the reality” (2005a, p.37). Deep focus and single shots of greater 
duration also imply “a more active mental attitude on the part of the spectator” 
(Bazin 2005a, p.35). Interestingly, Bazin’s perspective is similar to Adorno’s. The 
“static character” of Antonioni’s La Notte is, according to Adorno, a good example of 
how lengthy takes can resuscitate a “subjective mode of experience” that is not 
simply a “technique of consumer exploitation.” Much like the experience of the 
person who, “after a year in the city, spends a few weeks in the mountains 
abstaining from all work,” the slowness of La Notte gives the subject an opportunity 
to explore unfamiliar and discontinuous images (Adorno 2004e, p.180). 
 Apart from its aesthetic functions, intensified continuity is a means for high 
concept to become the intended product of strategic sabotage. Achieved through 
quick shots and a lot of editing in post-production, intensified continuity 
marginalizes other filmmaking techniques in the Hollywood system to which Bazin 
and Adorno might have been sympathetic: “fixed-camera long takes, sustained two-
shots, frequent long shots and mid-range framings” (Bordwell 2006, p.138). 
Furthermore, as these alternative methods have shrunk before the established 
standard of intensified continuity, the predominance of the latter has transformed 
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the actual structure of film production in Hollywood. It has given capitalist power a 
form of insurance over principal photography, the stage of shooting when directors 
and other creative personnel can significantly shape the form and content of a film 
project.  
 As the principal photography of Heaven’s Gate demonstrated, the day-to-day 
process of film production can become a source of financial disaster. Costs can 
balloon when directors are not satisfied with the takes they already have, or when a 
shooting schedule is delayed or cancelled in hopes of achieving just the “right” look 
for a shot. Moreover, location shooting has been a common practice since the end of 
the classical studio system (Hozic 2001), which means that upper management 
might not always be on location to closely supervise filmmakers. Regardless of 
whether or not fast cutting between a lot of close shots has an aesthetic function in 
specific instances, the repeated use of intensified continuity is good for business 
because coherence is mainly achieved in postproduction, where producers and 
distributors have, as a result of contract agreements and the structure of the 
contemporary Hollywood system, the upper hand.10 Their right over final cut gives 
them the ability to use postproduction editing to alter, cut or altogether second-
guess the footage that was shot in principal photography, even if it was shot far 
away on location. Therefore, the threat of aesthetic overproduction from auteurism 
is greatly reduced and the potential of the aesthetic dimension are taken out of the 
                                                        
10 As Powdermaker revealed in her anthropological study of Hollywood in 1950, the current power of 
producers and management in postproduction has an ancestor in the classical studio system (1950, 
pp.100–130). 
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hands of filmmakers and transferred to people who may care much more about 
reducing financial risk. 
 Once again, the work of David Bordwell can help us perceive strategic 
sabotage in the filmmaking techniques of intensified continuity. As a result of what 
can happen to a film in postproduction, contemporary Hollywood now demands 
complete coverage from film production. Complete coverage means “shooting every 
scene from half a dozen angles to defer choices until the months of editing” 
(Bordwell 2006, p.118). It also means that the filmmaker is not in direct control of 
the form that is given to the content. There were certainly limitations to what a 
filmmaker could or could not do with cinematic form in previous decades, but 
intensified continuity is a much more formless process from the perspective of the 
director:  
If you were a director [during the studio era], your choices were constrained by 
tacit but strongly felt boundaries, matters of taste and judgement as much as 
anything else. You could move the camera, but you couldn’t cut in the middle of 
a movement. You could shoot extreme close-ups, but rarely. Every piece of 
action demanded one right spot for the camera, which it was your task to find. 
You didn’t (for reasons of economy as much as professional pride) set up four 
cameras to grab action haphazardly. From this perspective, the casual setups 
and abrupt cuts that emerged in the 1960s could only look amateurish. 
(Bordwell 2006, p.118) 
 
In the opinion of Sven Nykvist, the Swedish cinematographer who is noted for 
working on many Ingmar Bergman films, Hollywood’s “requirement for so many 
cover shots… comes from the fact that the producers really have the final cut and 
they want to have all the material they can get in order to speed up the pace of the 
film or make other changes that may be necessary” (Nykvist 1981). And as Steven 
Soderbergh, Billy Bob Thornton, Jodie Foster and likely countless other filmmakers 
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have learned while working in contemporary Hollywood, single long takes are 
antithetical to a business that demands that contemporary filmmakers will cover all 
the angles during principal photography (Bordwell 2006). It is difficult to cut a 
carefully constructed lengthy shot into smaller pieces, and anything shot in one take 
leaves postproduction with less material to work with. 
 If the reader is holding on to the idea that the shift of creative control from 
production to postproduction is not much of a problem because directors often 
participate in the editing of a film, this idea can be put to rest. In fact, the symbiotic 
relationship between complete coverage and intensified continuity is only 
exacerbating the mechanization of cinema. Here is it useful to quote Bordwell at 
length: 
With demands for complete coverage and a belief that the movie could be made 
in the cutting room, directors were overshooting wildly. A 100-minute movie 
runs nine thousand feet, but to arrive at that the editor might hack through as 
much as six hundred thousand feet of material. Directors and producers began 
to subdivide editing labor. Rather than handle all the footage, the principal 
editor might supervise a team of several cutters, often making each responsible 
for one reel of the final cut. (This was called, with typical Hollywood delicacy, 
“gang banging” the film.) The introduction of computerized editing systems 
allowed producers to demand even faster output. Now databases could track all 
the takes, the physical act of splicing was not needed until the very last moment. 
Producers began to expect to see a rough cut in as little as a week. Editors 
complained that they were overworked and didn’t have enough time to fine-
tune the film. Under these conditions, they evidently felt obliged to fall back on 
the default settings of the dominant style. “I’m concerned,” remarked one 
director at the beginning of the trend, that “management will assume electronic 
equipment means editors should work faster. And faster means formula. Go to 
the master, two shot, close-up, close-up and get out.” Likewise, assigning each 
editor a reel of a big project favoured a neutral, standardized way of handling 
footage so that the completed film looked uniform throughout. (Bordwell 2006, 
p.156) 
 
This quotation enables us to add another level of interpretation to Figure 7.3. The 
intensification of ASL likely tightens the relationship between coverage and 
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formulaic editing. The pressure for film production to contribute to the goal of 
intensified continuity is that much greater when the average shot is now less than 
five seconds.  
   
The Rights of Ownership 
 
 In its attempt to reduce risk, the Hollywood film business discovered a 
method of transforming the social-aesthetic principle of continuity into a business 
tool of strategic sabotage. The institution of intensified continuity is complementary 
to the means and ends of high-concept cinema, which is in turn part of the 
saturation-booking and blockbuster strategy. With this backdrop in mind, the 
question naturally arises: can the indeterminacy and ambiguity of American New 
Wave resurface in another form of Hollywood cinema? What are the chances that 
major filmed entertainment will allow aesthetic experimentation and alternative 
methods of cinematic expression in the foreseeable future? 
 The scope of these two questions is wider than our present discussion of 
high-concept cinema. Nevertheless, we can use them to add one more level to our 
analysis of high concept. Major filmed entertainment’s pushing of the art of 
filmmaking towards high-concept cinema has been made possible by Hollywood 
owning the legal business right to sabotage the art of cinema. Indeed, Hollywood 
needed an institutional mechanism to steer the American film industry away from 
American New Wave and towards high concept, blockbuster cinema. Hollywood also 
needed institutional mechanisms to make and keep blockbuster cinema 
predominate for over 30 years. This institutional ability to limit the creative 
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faculties of industry and steer it toward profitable ends is the foundation of business 
enterprise. And in order to invest, capitalists need to be confident that this 
institutional ability will continue in the future. 
 A key institutional mechanism for major filmed entertainment to control 
Hollywood cinema is American copyright law (Decherney 2012; Kamina 2002; 
Salokannel 2003). In American law, as in other Anglo-American legal systems, the 
rights associated with the ownership of film copyright are always established 
through contract negotiation and guild rules. Moreover, American filmmakers are 
not perceived to naturally possess “moral rights,” which give original creators 
(filmmakers) an inalienable claim over the manner in which their films are 
exhibited to the public (Salokannel 2003). By contrast, European copyright law 
recognizes that “those who provide the original creative effort in the generation of 
the work should, prima facie, be considered the authors of the work.” This type of 
assumption about the authorship of original creator(s) grants the following moral 
rights: 
1. “the right of paternity, i.e. the right to be identified as the author of the 
work”;  
2. “the right of integrity, i.e. the right to object to derogatory treatments of 
the work”;  
3. “the right of divulgation or of dissemination, i.e. the right to decide when 
and how a work should be made public (including the right not to make it 
public)”;   
4. “the right to revoke a grant of right or to withdraw a work from 
commerce, on the condition that the author indemnifies the transferee for 
any loss (sometimes called the ‘right of reconsideration’).” (Kamina 2002, 
p.285)  
 
 Moral rights have sometimes been implicitly recognized in American law 
(Decherney 2012). But without the backing of Supreme Court decisions or strong 
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legislation from Congress, a filmmaker in the United States has generally been left to 
contractually negotiate the rights to control the aesthetic dimension of filmmaking 
from production to distribution and exhibition. In Europe, by contrast, there are 
examples of moral rights and the aesthetic principles behind them trumping the 
demands of a film’s distributor. As Salokannel notes, an Italian appellate court “held 
that breaking [the television presentation of Serafino] up with commercials 
infringed the moral rights of its director [Pietro Germi]” (Salokannel 2003). Even 
more remarkably, the estates of John Huston and Ben Maddow were able to 
convince a French court to stop Turner Entertainment from broadcasting on French 
television a colourized version of The Asphalt Jungle, Huston’s black-and-white 
American film (Decherney 2012, p.244). 
 These examples are certainly small drops in the massive pool of films ever to 
have been distributed in Europe. And the point is not to exaggerate the effectiveness 
of moral rights, especially with respect to the insertion of commercials into the 
television broadcasts of films. Rather, the point is to demonstrate that there are 
important differences between Europe and the United States with regard to 
copyright law. In Europe, the ideals of auteurism have a legal counterpart in the 
Berne Convention, which states that  
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the 
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and 
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other 
derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his 
honour or reputation. (Kamina 2002, p.286) 
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In the American system, in contrast, the principles of auteurism can only win the 
day by battling through a system of contract negotiation, which involves filmmakers, 
writing and directing guilds, agents, producers and studios. 
 Ever since the inclusion of cinematic art in American copyright law, which 
recognizes film as its own artistic medium rather than an appendage of either 
photography or theatre, the rights of cinematic expression have almost always gone 
to the film producer, the distributor or both. In other words, they went not to the 
film creators, but to its owners. And while the United States did implement the 
Berne Convention in 1988, Congress also made it explicit that it would take a 
“minimalist” approach to the issue of moral rights. Thus, unless a filmmaker lives on 
the margins of independent film for the express reason of trading financing 
opportunities for more creative control (Sayles 1987), it is rare for any of the key 
creators (director or screenwriter) to retain authorial rights in mainstream 
American cinema. Consequently, there is no authorial right based in natural law that 
stands in the way of American film distribution and its strategies of doing business. 
In other words, major filmed entertainment has the power to use its dominance 
over distribution to significantly leverage its rights of ownership against the 
industrial art of filmmaking, and the creators and artists have little legal recourse to 
object to what the former does with its property. 
 A 1990 United States Congressional Hearing before the Subcommittee on 
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice illustrates how 
frustrated filmmakers have become with this state of affairs. According to Joe Dante, 
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film director and the Directors Guild of America representative before the 
subcommittee,  
State statutes systematically exclude motion pictures from protective status, the 
Lanham Act leads on to consumer’s rights through labeling, and contracts in the 
motion picture business more and more routinely include boilerplate denying 
moral rights to creative participants for all time. Moral rights provide the legal 
tools for creators to protect their work from alterations that undermine their 
honor or reputation. There are no moral rights for filmmakers in the United 
States, and no arcane legal theories can alter that simple fact. (Dante 1990, 
p.184) 
 
Phil Alden Robinson, screenwriter, director and the representative for the Writers 
Guild of America, shared the same feelings before the subcommittee. At one point in 
the hearing, Robinson argued that moral rights can only exist if the objections of 
principal artists (directors and screenwriters) are actually effective: 
Mr. ROBINSON. Well, in fact, what we are asking for, we are saying, “You can do 
whatever you want to but we retain the right to object to it, if you change it in a 
way that”—. 
 
Mr. BERMAN [Congressman for California’s 26th district]. Here is my problem, 
this word objection. 
 
Mr. ROBINSON. Yes, sir. 
 
Mr. BERMAN. Consultation, I understand. And I understand your version of 
consultation which is, “Come on in; tell us what you think. If we like what you 
say, we may do it, but we are going to decide and all the cards are in our hand.” 
That is what consultation is. It is better to have it than not…. But now 
registering your right to object, what does that mean? Is that, you can block [a 
film] from being shown in an [edited] form? 
 
Mr. ROBINSON. To me the right to object is the right to objectively object. It is 
not to have freedom of speech, to say, “Wait I object.” And they say, “Thank you, 
goodbye.” … And my limited understanding of the Berne Convention is that 
moral rights includes the right to object. It seems to me that we need some way 
to redress our grievances. Right now, we do not have one other than the 
individual clout of the director or the writer. When they cut up my film or when 
they change it in a way that I feel damages me, where can I go? Who do I talk to 
under the present system? (Robinson 1990, p.209) 
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 Major filmed entertainment has an institutional mechanism to enforce its 
will. Artists can be kept at arm’s length once a film is finished and ready to be 
distributed through the different windows of exhibition (theatres, pay-per-view 
cable, DVDs and Blu-Ray, the Internet and television). This seemingly innocuous fact 
is actually, according to Robinson’s testimony, a licence to strategic sabotage. Film 
production can create a product, a film, but the technological capacity to alter, edit, 
rearrange or add to any film that is ostensibly completed, at least in the eyes of the 
director, screenwriter, actors and other members of the film crew, can be abused by 
business interests when there is a proprietary distinction between authorship and 
ownership: 
…maybe all over America, all over the world, people will sit in dark rooms and 
watch something that once existed only in your imagination. And they will be 
moved or entertained or enlightened or somehow touched by it. And this movie 
that you imagined that is the product of so many people working so hard for so 
long, this movie that against all odds, somehow turned out pretty good, this 
movie that bears your name, will outlive you…. Mr. Chairman, to accomplish 
that is an extraordinarily moving thing. To have even a chance of accomplishing 
that is the prime reason we create. But to go through all that and then to have 
somebody who did not put any of his sweat and tears and passion, much less a 
big chunk of his life into it, turn around and say, “Hey, pal, I own this and I think 
it would be better if we painted it green or cut off the ending or put in some 
rock music, or slapped in some nudity or lopped off the beginning,” for someone 
to do that is the ultimate degradation, discouragement, insult, crime. It is a 
moral crime, not just against the creators, but against the people for whom that 
work was intended because they will not get to see it the way it was meant to be 
seen. So, instead of being moved by an artist who put part of his life into this, 
they will be ripped off by a merchant who gave it maybe 5 minutes of thought. 
(Robinson 1990, p.197)  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The arguments in this chapter followed in the footsteps of Chapter 6. The 
series of figures in Chapter 6 collectively suggest that major filmed entertainment 
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has been able to increase its degree of confidence about its blockbuster and 
saturation booking strategies. Furthermore, the 1980s appear to have been a key 
turning point in Hollywood’s risk perceptions—this was the decade in which the 
systematic reduction of risk in the contemporary period gained momentum. 
 Building on these results, this chapter analyzes some of the underlying 
transformations that enabled and boosted major filmed entertainment’s risk 
reduction strategies. If the 1980s was the decade when blockbuster cinema and 
saturation booking increased in effectiveness, the 1970s was the decade when the 
institution of high concept cinema helped redefine Hollywood’s business-industry 
relationship according to these strategies. High concept cinema narrows the horizon 
of aesthetic potential; filmmakers might still have a personal desire for ambiguity 
and discontinuity, as these qualities can become ingredients for political cinema, but 
the Hollywood system generally wants ideas, stories and characters that can be 
marketed in a simple and straightforward manner. Intensified continuity and the 
U.S. legal framework of film copyright also protect business interests from a film 
industry that can become “uncontrollably” obsessed with the truths of the aesthetic 
dimension, whereby filmmakers inflate costs with artistic improvisations or deliver 
films whose cinematic meanings are too obscure for wide theatrical releases. 
Overall, the historical evolution of Hollywood’s aesthetics are related to changes in 
the business-industry relationship in Hollywood, which is an effect of major filmed 
entertainment seeking to accumulate differentially by reducing its risk and 
differential risk.  
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Conclusion 
 
 This dissertation has operated at two levels of analysis. At the level of theory, 
the presentation of the capital-as-power framework followed from a critique of 
Marxist political economy. While Marxist theory has advanced a great number of 
arguments about mass culture and its function in capitalism, the capital-as-power 
approach enables us to break new ground on this subject. It helps us demonstrate 
why the politics-economics separation in Marxism makes it difficult if not 
impossible to jointly theorize mass culture and accumulation in advanced 
capitalism. The capital-as-power approach also helps us theorize how major filmed 
entertainment capitalizes an order of cinema that is predominantly formed, shaped 
and transformed through capitalist power. Hollywood is an expression of capitalist 
power because its dominant firms, in their pursuit of differential accumulation, are 
compelled to delimit the possibilities of cinema through strategic sabotage. Strategic 
sabotage is used to predetermine, as much as possible, the place of new social 
creation in an instituted field of social significations.  
 At the empirical level, the dissertation has applied the capital-as-power 
approach to the historical trends and details of the Hollywood film business and the 
aesthetics of its cinema, with a particular focus on the theory and practice of risk 
reduction. The research on risk has been tied to two related questions. How is 
Hollywood cinema sabotaged? And how is sabotage in Hollywood cinema 
capitalized? The research on risk has sought to explain why aesthetic 
overproduction matters to the business of film and how the reduction of risk, both 
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absolute and differential, bore on the differential accumulation of major filmed 
entertainment. 
 While risk is only one of many aspects of the political economy of Hollywood, 
this type of research demonstrates the usefulness of transcending the politics-
economics duality that is commonly assumed by political economic theories. The 
creative labour of the Hollywood film industry is still a part of our story about risk 
reduction, but this story also includes the institutional creation of ideology through 
the repression of meaning and the control of social behaviour. This institutional 
activity is political because it is about the power of major filmed entertainment to do 
the following: to effectively block unwanted creativity from finding the mainstream; 
to create a habituated social system of creation and consumption through the 
establishment of its own aesthetic principles; and, to narrow our collective 
expectations about the aesthetic potentials of cinema. These aspects of institutional 
power are mostly understood qualitatively, as they are rooted in the social relations 
of Hollywood cinema. Yet by challenging the politics-economics separation in Part I, 
we opened the door to research how, in our case, the logic of capitalization includes 
the control of ideology, meaning and other social characteristics of cinema. From 
this perspective, these qualitative aspects have a direct bearing on Hollywood’s 
accumulation strategies.  
 More specifically, Part II argues that the Hollywood film business’s ability to 
strategically sabotage the aesthetic, political and social qualities of cinema have a 
bearing on major filmed entertainment’s degree of confidence. Expected future 
earnings can be predicted with a greater degree of confidence when the qualities of 
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cinema begin to function according to a level of predictability. Thus, the 
capitalization of cinema assumes that culture and art should behave like other 
determinate systems; elements “must be connected together by relations of causal 
determination, linear or cyclical (reciprocal), categorical or probabilist—relations 
which themselves are amenable to univocal definition…” (Castoriadis 1998, p.177). 
To passionate filmmakers and avid consumers of films alike, the capitalization of 
cinema does not capture the experience of creating and engaging with good films, 
especially novel ones. Yet this logic shapes the worldview of those who seek to 
profit from mass culture. Capitalization pushes capitalists to define where human 
creativity becomes aesthetic overproduction, which itself relates to the order of 
cinema. Furthermore, the chance to reduce risk compels capitalists to sabotage the 
industrial art of filmmaking, whose improvisations, experimentations and desires 
for new aesthetic forms can translate into greater business uncertainty and, 
therefore, lower capitalization.      
  
The Direction of Future Research 
 
 The empirical and theoretical levels of this dissertation can each be 
developed further, in future research on the political economy of Hollywood. 
Empirically, an obvious step is to take a closer look at conglomeration. Research on 
the big media conglomerates could ask, for example, why these diversified 
corporations own both “software” (film, TV, music) and “hardware” (satellite 
systems, cable networks and other infrastructure). This question is important to 
understanding how the complexity of media intellectual property is constituted by 
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its networks of distribution. For instance, the transaction costs, sales and profits of 
Time Warner stay “in house” when its intellectual property is produced at Warner 
Bros. studio facilities and then traverses cable subscription (e.g., HBO, TNT, CNN, 
Cartoon Network), newsprint (e.g., Entertainment Weekly, Time Magazine, People) 
and the Internet (e.g., HBO Go, CNN.com). Overall, research on the corporate 
parentage of Hollywood can help us develop a better proxy for the capitalization of 
Hollywood cinema.  
 Another research question concerns the apparent inverse relationship 
between the volatility and level of major filmed entertainment’s earnings. As major 
filmed entertainment’s differential risk declined, its differential earnings have 
stagnated. Can the risk of mainstream Hollywood be reduced further, or has it 
reached its limits? As of this writing, Hollywood remains committed to the 
distribution of blockbuster, high-concept cinema, but can this commitment cause 
further increases in theatrical attendance per capita, profits per firm and differential 
profits per firm? If Hollywood’s contemporary strategies are effective at reducing 
risk but ineffective at increasing earnings, its largest firms might need to reconsider 
how it will sabotage industry in the future. One way or the other, though, a new 
business-industry relationship that accommodates autonomous creativity might not 
be welcomed by Hollywood’s vested interests. American New Wave gave major 
filmed entertainment its longest differential increase in profits, but its wave of 
creativity also engendered Hollywood’s most unstable relationship between 
business, industry and consumerism. 
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 Theoretically, the next step would be to consider why democratic self-
determination and non-determinable creation are important political values to the 
art of cinema. Indeed, this dissertation spoke of this aspect in the inverse, when we 
showed that Hollywood, in its quest to accumulate differentially, must sabotage 
democratic self-determination and the non-determinable qualities of human 
creativity. If the power of businesses over artistic creativity is meant to repress the 
possibility that filmmaking will become too open, we need to outline the anti-thesis 
of this repression—namely, a political theory of democratic cinema. Questions could 
include the following. How would we institute a form of cinema that affirms the 
openness of radical democracy? Within the present historical context, what mode or 
form of cinema is potentially capable of affirming the democratic principles that 
structure Castoriadis’s model of autonomy? How would this form of cinema be 
related to the technological and anthropological potential of cinematic art?11 What 
spaces are available to a radically democratic cinema under capitalism?  
 These questions are relevant to the art of cinema because decisions about the 
form and content of films are currently shaped by the structures of ownership and 
institutional power in capitalism. We can certainly choose to ignore the capitalist 
character of Hollywood cinema, but doing so severely limits our ability to 
understand how filmmakers, actors, writers, designers and other related artists will 
or will not conflict with business interests. As Lowenthal suspected, when “we talk 
about art” we tend to “reflect upon a specific product, its inner structure, its norms, 
and the relationship of such structure and norms to those of other individual 
                                                        
11 Christopher Holman and I have begun researching these questions. See Holman & McMahon 
(2015). 
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products…” (Lowenthal 1961, p.xix). What is missing from this perspective, 
however, are all of the decisions and institutional dimensions that could very well 
impact the creation of art, including its claims to truth:  
… who makes decisions about the kinds of entertainment and art offered in a 
given society? To indicate the scope of the problem briefly, one need only ask: 
who decides about the form and content of productions which may become, or 
are intended from the beginning to be, products of popular culture? If one can 
determine the conditions under which the decisions are made, one has moved 
at least a step toward answering the question of whether the gap between art 
and popular culture is unbridgeable. Decisions which are taken by joint 
conferences of financial groups, advertising agency and media corporation 
executives, engineers, directors and script writers have become so far removed 
from the realm of responsibility of the individual artist that no ready answers 
suggest themselves. (Lowenthal 1961, p.xx) 
 
Analysing the political economic dimensions of Hollywood force us to situate the 
cultural and political value of filmmaking against the goals of the film business. 
Moreover, the political economic dimensions of Hollywood give us the means to 
judge whether the business control of industry is legitimate. While the creation and 
distribution of culture, particularly in a highly complex technological setting, will 
never be entirely separate from acts of administration, the degree of power that the 
Hollywood film business imposes over the social creativity of filmmaking is not an 
inevitable fact. There are degrees of institutional control, just as the scope and effect 
of political power change with the type of political organization that is predominant 
in society. As the work of Castoriadis (1993) emphasizes, decisions on the 
limitations imposed on society and its institutions need not be heteronomous; they 
can also be made autonomously, through democratic activity.  
 The logic of repressing social creativity for the purpose of accumulating 
differentially is very different from the logic of artists constraining their work 
according to ideas about the form and content of art. These logics are certainly 
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mixed in capitalist society, but it is the difference between them that makes the 
question “What makes Hollywood run?” so interesting. According to Castoriadis, the 
historical potential of cinematic art is one the “great creations of the first quarter of 
the twentieth century” (Castoriadis 1993, p.306). And as Al Manheim comes to 
appreciate in What Makes Sammy Run?, the behaviour of major filmed 
entertainment can undermine but not exhaust this potential. 
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